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ABSTRACT
Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures
by
Maurice Arthur John Tugwell
The thesis examines propaganda as a weapon in violent revolutionary
situations. The first chapter discusses the meaning and nature of
propaganda, and goes on to relate the six case studies that are to
follow to the historical development of conflict propaganda. The
survey notes how, as a result of dishonest usage in war and because
of its totalitarian overtones, propaganda became discredited in
liberal democracies, so much so that governments were reluctant even
to think about it.
The six case studies deal with the propaganda aspects of the
campaigns of the Assassins in medieval Persia, the Easter Rising in
Dublin 1916, Zionist ambitions in Palestine after the second World
War, the Algerian struggle for national independence 1954- 62, the
Provisional IRA's campaign during 1971 and early 1972, and the Dhofar
rebellion that ended in 1976. The discussion that concludes each
chapter summaries the role and importance of propaganda as a component
of the revolutionary strategy, assesses its methods and themes, and
considers the government response in this area.
The final chapter offers deductions on the nature of
revolutionary propaganda and on possible counter-measures. Analysis
of the case studies points to a more or less regular pattern of
revolutionary propaganda from which emerge twenty themes and
associated messages. Revolutionary propaganda themes are grouped
into four categories - mobilisation, conflict, survival and victory.
Certain distinguishing technical characteristics are identified and
the role of the news media in present-day revolutionary situations
is discussed.
Case analysis of government responses shows that propaganda can
only be countered in kind, and that failure to counter this weapon
has on several occasions undermined political and security force
counter-insurgency efforts. It is dangerous for governments to
ignore propaganda, and ignorance bars the way to any effective cure.
In the modern liberal democracy the best course may be to educate
politicians, officials, police and military in this subject, and to
spread understanding to the media and general public. Dislike of
propaganda per se is justified. The liberal regime should reject
falsehood,'dirty tricks' and psychological manipulation and base
its defence, its 'counter-propaganda', on truth and understanding.
This would not remove the need for a lively government effort to
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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES
Aim and Method
This thesis addresses the subject of revolutionary propaganda and
possible counter-measures. it is a war study aimed at improving
understanding of propaganda as a weapon system in revolutionary
situations. The conclusions on counter-measures relate to a liberal
democracy confronted by a revolutionary threat.
The introductory chapter examines the nature of propaganda and
sets the scene for the case studies that follow. In each of the six
studies the evidence is sifted in an endeavour to discover the
effectiveness of propaganda as a weapon for and against rebellion. It
is not the writer's purpose to advance knowledge of propaganda within
the disciplines of psychology, the social sciences or mass
communication theory, important areas wherein much valuable academic
work on the subject has already been done. Some of this work will,
however, be mentioned in this ch3pter because it is relevant to our
understanding of propaganda as a revolutionary asset.
It should be said at once that propaganda is an illusive creature,
easy to talk about in vague terms but difficult to catch and hold up
to the light of academic enquiry. It is rather tempting to remain in
the area of generalisation, with its unfettered claims, but the
writer is aware that unless claims are backed up by empirical evidence
little will be accomplished beyond the airing of personal opinion,
with the likelihood of increased scepticism on the part of the reader.
This is one of the reasons why the case study method haa been adopted
for this research. The conclusions from each chapter will so far
as possible be drawn from the historical evidence, and although the
writer's interpretations are bound to affect jud.gement, the reader
can also judge whether or not the facts support the deductions.
Because the case studies are directed towards a better
understanding of the role and importance of propaganda in
revolutionary conflict, there is a need, in the writer's belief, to
see the subject in relation to the campaigns as a whole rather than
in isolation. Unless this opinion is shared, the reader may object
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that too much attention is paid in the studies to political and
military functions. It is argued in defence of the arrangement
adopted that to write a military study neglecting political factors
would beconsidered dangerous, and vice versa. Likewise, there seems
to be no way of judging the effectiveness and overall contribution
of propaganda to a campaign unless the study includes at least a
cursory examination of both political and military matters.
The campaigns chosen were selected from a longer list after
preliminary reading had suggested that these six would yield
interesting and relevant evidence. Although the aim of the thesis is
to draw conclusions useful to a liberal democracy, no attempt has
been made to restrict the studies to revolts inside such societies.
This is because revolutionary philosophy draws little distinction
between regimes that are totalitarian, authoritarian or liberal,
although strategy and tactics for their overthrow may differ.
Philosophically the rebel is convinced that any regime he plans to
destroy is oppressive, illiberal and unjust. It is part of his task
to make his followers share these beliefs. We cannot, therefore,
ignore the methods used to challenge what, in some cases, were
undemocratic and unjust administrations on the grounds that no
parallel is likely to exist in our enlightened society, because the
parallel may be created.
In the final chapter the evidence collected from the case studies
is brought together for analysis, to identify any common
characteristics and to attempt an assessment of the role and
importance of revolutionary propaganda. In a search for possible
counter-measures it will be necessary to study lessons from the
government responses in the case studies and then to relate these
to the conclusions reached on the nature of revolutionary
propaganda per se.
The Meaning of Propaganda
Revulsion against public deception during World War I led
Viscount Bryce later to define propaganda as 'that dissemination by
the printed word of untruths and fallacies and incitements to
violence'. 1 It was true that propaganda could and sometimes did fit
1. James Bryce Modern Democracies (London, 1921), Vol II, p 505.
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this description, but the definition was nevertheless prejudiced and
therefore misleading. Two years later, in 1923, Mr R J R G Wreford
provided an unbiased definition: 'the dissemination of interested
information and opinion'. 2 This was seen as being closer to the
mark, but critics felt it to be incomplete, being limited to the
spread of ideas by- the use of language whether spoken or written, and
excluding such wider activities as the wearing of emblems, the
flying of a flag or the playing of a tune.
An alternative was offered some years later by Dr Harold D Lasawell
who suggested 'the management of collective attitudes by the
manipulation of the significant symbols'. 3 Re defined 'symbols' as
'words, or word substitutes like pictures and geatures, thus
incorporating activities omitted by Wreford. Thirty-five years later
Dr Terence H Qualter sought to improve Lasswell's version. He defined
propaganda as 'the deliberate attempt by some individual or group to
form, control, or alter the attitudes of other groups by the use of
the instruments of communication, with the intention that in any
given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be that
desired by the propagandiat'. 	 Qualter explained that by 'the
instruments of communication' he meant much the same as Lasswell
when he talked of 'symbols'. His definition, therefore, differs
from Lasawell' a in one important respect only, his final clause
attributing to propaganda the disposition invariably to treat its
subjects as means rather than ends, to require a 'pay off'. Qualter
insisted that the goal of the propagandist was not just a change in
attitudes, but a change in attitudes that resulted in action.
Reference to encyclopaedias shows that one, Chambers's, supports
Qualter wholeheartedly with its 'the advancement of a belief or the
creation of a state of mind to the exclusion of rival beliefs or
states of mind. To this end it will principally rely upon the appeal
to the instincts or the emotions (unlike education which appeals to
2. R J B G Wreford 'Propaganda, evil and Good', paper in The
Nineteenth Century and After, Vol XCIII, 1923, pp
3. Harold D Lasswell (i) 'The Theory of Political Propaganda',
paper in American Political Science Review XXI, 1927, p 627.
s. Terrçnce Qualter Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (New York,
i962 p 27.
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reason). Its object will always be the immediate or eventual
production of some action on the part of its subjects'. 5 Another,
Britannica, supports him by implication: 'the more or less systematic
effort to manipulate other people's beliefs, attitudes or actions by
means of symbols (words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing,
hairstyles, designs on coins and stamps). Emphasis on deliberateness
and manipulativeness distinguishes from casual conversation and easy
exchange of ideas. The propagandist has a specified goal. or
goals' 6 This insistence upon a motive is confirmed by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, whose definition seems to incorporate
the best from Qualter's and Chambers's as well as being shorter:
Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals
disseminated to influence th. opinion, emotions, attitudes or
behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the
sponsor either directly or indirectly.7
We should not however ignore the partial definition offered by
Professor Jacques Ellul:
Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organised group
that wants to bring about the active or passive participation
in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically
unified through peyhologica]. manipulations and incorporated
in an organisation.0
This introduces the original concept that orgaziisation is essential
to propaganda. Lilu]. was writing about propaganda in the modern
technological society and his definition may or may not hold good for
propaganda generally. As a starting point for this thesis we should
perhaps adopt the NATO definition, keeping flu].' a organisation
caveat in view to be tested against the conclusions from case studies
Before we leave this word its origin should be noted. In 1662
Pope Gregory XV established the Congregatio de Propaganda Tide, a
5. K G Nicholas 'Propaganda' in Chambers's Encyclopaedia New Revised
Edition, Vol XI.
6. Bruce Lannes Smith in Encyclopaedia Britannica 15th Edition,
Vol XV.
7. NATO (Unclassified) Glossary of Military Terms, p 2-205.
8. Jacques flu]. Ci) Propaganda; The Formation of Men's Attitudes
(New York, 1965), p 61.
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committee of cardinals to whom was entrusted the supervision of
foreign missions. Aimed especially at the 'heathen masses of the
Americas and the protestant populations of Europe', the Propaganda
provided centralised policy, direction and supervision over content
and format of liturgical books and techniques of missionary
ac'tivity. 9 Not surprisingly, all this has lent a deprecatory
significance to the word in northern Protestant lands, not shared in
southern Catholic countries. Latin language peoples often use the
term propagande commercial for 'commercial advertising' without
imputing sinister method or motive.
The Nature of Propaganda
Four centuries before Christ, the Indian minister Kautilya wrote
about propaganda in his 'Essentials of Indian Statecraft', Arthasatra.
On the home front, he advised, propaganda should be carried to the
people wherever they were gathered together, in tourist centres,
villages and associations. Citizens who demurred should first be
propitiated by presents and conciliation. If these failed to win
their support, tougher measures would have to be used, such as
harassment, exposure to the wrath of the people, taking families
hostage, and sentence to exile or forced labour. Special care should
be taken to prevent hostile propaganda subverting unreliable elements
of the population - the incensed, the ambitious and the disaffected.
'Thus, in his own state, the ruler should preserve parties and
factions among the people, friendly or opposed, powerful or piftile,
against the intrigues and machinations of the foreigners.' 10
When dealing with parties within the enemy state, Kautilya
advised careful analysis of interest groups to identify possible
causes of friction between these groups and the enemy ruler.
Propaganda would then be devised to undermine loyalty and promote
rebellion. 'Similarly, friends of a foreign king can only be won over
by rewards and propaganda, while impending enemies can be seduced by
breaking alliances, open threats and by showing the defects of the
ruler.'	 These early prescriptions showed that in a conflict
9. See Smith, op cit.
10. T N Ramaawamy Essent
	 of Indian Statecraft:	 'S
	Arthasatra for Conte	 rv Readers (London 19
	
pp
11. Ramaswamy, pp 60-Gi.
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situation propaganda could be aimed at friends, neutrals and
enemies, civilians as much as military, and they also demonstrated
close links between politics (conciliation, breaking alliances), force,
and propaganda.
The Greek philosopher Plato described his idea]. city state in his
dialogue The Republic. In this society friends would have all things
in common, including women and children, the weak and sickly would be
allowed to die, and all would submit to the rule of an elite group of
philosophers known as the Guardians. Acceptance of Guardian rule
would be brought about by propaganda. Mothers and nurses were to tell
their children only authorised stories, while for adults music was to
be strictly censored and drama banned. 12 Lying, Plato said
explicitly, was to be a prerogative of government, and central in the
scheme of things was 'one royal lie'. Plato explained how this royal
or 'noble' lie would promote belief in the preordained superior status
of the Guardians and thus ensure unquestioning obedience of their
political will by the masses.13
The military strategist Sun Tsu wrote in fourth century B C China
that enemies could be weakened by encouraging the dissipation of
wealth, sending women or boys to befuddle leaders, manipulating
character defects, creating anxiety over constant casualties and
slandering those with too much honour. 'Generally in war the beet
policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior ... To
subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.hhhl
In the twentieth century, theories on propaganda have multiplied
and the subject has attracted the attention of scholars and
journalists as well as those interested in its application. Books,
theses, newspaper articles and pamphlets have warned of propaganda's
potential for evil, boasted of its achievements or described its
methods. The Marxist author Georgy P].ekhanov originated the idea that
the masses needed a cruder stimulus than the propaganda aimed at the
educated minority, and adapted the word 'agitation' to this purpose.
12. Bertrand Russell U) A History of Western Philosophy
(London, 19k6) pp 130-131.
13. Russell Ci), p 133.
ik. Sun Tsu, translated Samuel B Griffitbe The Art of War (Oxford,
1963 p 77.
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Lenin elaborated upon this theory in his 1902 pamphlet What is to
be Done?15 in which he defined propaganda as the reasoned use of
historical and scientific arguments to indoctrinate the educated
and enlightened, and agitation as the use of slogans, parables and
half-truths to exploit the grievances of the uneducated and
unreasonable. In Marxist terminology the two methods are pinned
16
together to form the label 'agitprop'. 	 In reality the two forms
overlap and both are propaganda, as is Lenin's use of the words
'historical and scientific arguments' when he means political
indoctrination.
Much of the pioneering academic work in this field was American,
and between the two world wars Harold Lasswell, W Doob, Walter Lippmann,
Edward Munson and Dorothy Blumenstock 1T were influential. In Germany
during the same period Eugen Hadainorsky wrote while Dr Joseph Goebbels
practised.lS 'Nothing is easier', Goebbels boasted, 'than leading the
people on a leash. I just hold up a dazzling campaign poster and they
jump through it.' 19
Totalitarian regimes, immune from the wish or the need. to permit
more than one viewpoint, feel no more moral or social inhibition
against propaganda itself than did the Church of Rome in the
seventeenth century. Mr Michael Binyon in the London Times quotes
Mr Viktor Afanasyev, Editor-in-Chief of Pravda as saying, 'Our aim is
propaganda, the propaganda of our party and state. We do not hide
this. We are clearly a party newspaper.' Binyon goes on to remark
that 'propaganda in Soviet society, of course, has positive
connotations'. 2° There are good reasons why the liberal democracies
15. See H M Christinan (ed) Essential Works of Lenin (New York, 1966),
pp 53-175.
16. See Christman, op cit.
17. See Harold D Lassweil (ii) and Dorothy Blumenstock World
Revolutionary Propaganda (New York, 1939); Leonard W Doob
Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique (New York, 1935);
Edward L Munson The Management of Men: Handbook of Systematic
Deve1omentofMorale and Control of Human Behaviour (New York,
18. See Eugen Hamcysky Propaganda and National Power (Oldenburg,
1933) republished in English (New York, 1972)..
19. Quoted Anthony Rhodes Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion in World
War II (London, 1976), p 9.
20: Michael Binyon Times (London, 22 February 1978).
1].
cannot view the subject in this light, some of which wili be
discussed in a later chapter. All that we need to note now is that
besides enjoying advantages in the field of propaganda bestowed by
discipline, unity and organisation, totalitarian states also possess
(in their minds at any rate) a subtle but important sense of moral
superiority over its use. Propaganda is 'their weapon'.. This
contrasts sharply with the situation in the democracies. Catholicism
apart, the events of World War I sharpened the tendency for ordinary
people to associate propaganda with 'untruths and fallacies and
incitements to violence'. In his book Falsehood in Wartime
Sir Arthur Ponsonby quoted John Bright's line: 'When war is declared,
Truth is the first casualty', 21 and backed the statement with ample
evidence. Hitler's reported remark that the bigger the ii., the
better it. chance of being believed, did nothing to restore
propaganda's reputation. Dame Freys Stark, who spent the years
1939-k5 working in this field, remarked:
The main obstacle was the unfortunate word propaganda itself.
When first adopted by- the Church of Rome it was simply used in
the gospel sense of the spreading of a faith, until a
reputation for subtlety whether or not deserved gave it a new
and sinister twist of deceit. Two opposite ideas, the truth
and the hiding of truth, thus became sheathed in one term, and
have shuffled promiscuously inside it ever sinc..22
There now exists in the democracies, particularly Britain and
America, an antipathy to the very idea of propaganda. At it. extreme,
thi. hostility would consign the subject to the same compartment as
poison gas and germ warfare. In generally accepted form it would
allow propaganda to be used in war only, as a necessary although evil
weapon in the nation's defence. In either form, the attitude has
closed minds and stifled knowledge. To what extent this feeling has
been subtlely intensified by totalitarian propaganda, it 1.
impossible to say. The implication of such attitudes to the
countering of revolutionary propaganda is obvious.
21. Arthur Ponsonby Falsehood in Wartime (New York, 1929), p 11.
22. Frey-a Stark (i) Dust in the Lion's Paw (London, i96i), p 6k.
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Most of today's propaganda theorists and practitioners would
deny or at least qualify Hitler's suggestion that big lies win big
propaganda successes. Even Goebbela contradicted his F1hrer by his
insistence that facts for dissemination had to be accurate. The
reasons for the shift of emphasis away from lies towards truth were
practical, not moral, although moral factors were indirectly
involved. When both sides are using propaganda the good operator
will note what his opponent says and expose any untruths. Goebbels
in 19k0 destroyed the effectiveness of some British propaganda by a
variation of this method. Although the English propagandists were not
lying at the time, Goebbels was able to recall Britain's 1916
propaganda lies, which had later been admitted 23, and by association
cast doubt on the i9+O statements. Expanded sources of news, greater
public scepticism and an enhanced appreciation by propagandists of
the importance of credibility have all contributed to the shift.
Professor E].lul comments that the truth which pays off is in the realm
of facts. The necessary falsehoods, which also pay off, are today
disguised within intentions and interpretations2. One limitation
on the use of truth is the fact that truth can sometimes be
incredible. Propagandists therefore talk of using 'selected credible
truth'.
The moral factor indirectly involved in the shift away from
untruthful propaganda arises out of the present day desire of
national governments, whether democratic or totalitarian, to appear
respectable and virtuous. Bertrand Russell referred to this desire,
in words that suggest that the apparent moral quality is often no
more than another propaganda theme in support of political and military
power:
If the side that you think right prevails, that is because it
has superior power. It is true that power, often, depends upon
opinion, and opinion upon propaganda; it is true also, that it is
an advantage in propaganda to seem more virtuous than your
adversary, and that one way of seeming virtuous is to be
virtuous ... But there are important limitations. In the first
place, those who have seized power can, by controlling
propaganda, cause their party to appear virtuous. 25
23. See, for example, Ponsonby op cit.
24. Ellul (1), p 53.
25. Russell (i), p 531.
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Ellul argue. that Lenin and Hitler understood that the modern
world was essentially a world of 'means', and that ends and aims had
been transformed by the profusion of means. In Lenin's political
strategy the means were permitted to assume first place and this led
him, on the one hand, to modify Marx's doctrine, and on the other,
to give the doctrine itself an importance secondary to action.
Tactics and the development of means, then, became the principal
objects even of political science.26 With Hitler, doctrine was not
merely demoted, it disappeared altogether. Neither his vague
millennium nor his anti-Semitism could be considered a doctrine.
Instead Hitler used pure action. 27 Thus instead of propaganda
serving ideology, we see in these examples the reverse. Ideology,
Ellu]. believes, has a small role in the modern world. Propaganda's
task is less and less to propagate ideologies; it now obeys its own
laws and becomes autonomous.28 If we feel inspired or threatened
by an ideology, we may possibly be reacting more to propaganda than
to any real body of ideas or beliefs. To say that such-and-such a
nation or movement is invincible because of the strength of its
ideology may really be an acknowledgement of the invincible power of
propaganda.
Kautilya showed how propaganda can be aimed at several
audiences. Colonel T E Lawrence expanded on this aspect in his
classic account of guerrilla warfare behind Turkish lines. On
propaganda he wrote:
Some of it concerned the crowd, an adjustment of its spirit to
the point where it became useful to exploit in action, and the
pre-direction of this changing spirit to a certain end. Some of
it concerned the individual, and then it became a rare art of
human kindness, transcending, by purposed emotion, the gradual
logical sequence of the mind. It was more subtle than tactics,
and better worth doing, because it dealt with uncontrollables,
26. Ellul (i), p 195.
27. 'Every idea that i. meant to move the world has not only the
right but also the obligation of securing control of those
means which will enable the idea to be carried into effect.'
Adolf Hitler Mein Kampf (London, 1939), p 288.
28. Ellul (i) p 196.
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with subjects incapable of direct command. It considered the
capacity for mood of our men, their complexities and
mutability, and the cultivation of whatever in them promised
to profit our intention. We had to arrange their minds in
order of battle just as carefully and as formally as other
officers would arrange their bodies. And not only our own
men's minds, though naturally they came first. We must also
arrange the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them;
then those other minds of the nation supporting us behind the
firing line, since more than half the battle passed there in
the back; then the minds of the enemy nation waiting the
verdict; and of the neutrals looking on; circle beyond
circle.29
Implicit in these words is an acknowledgement of the superior power
of propaganda over one's own side, as opposed to 'the minds of the
enemy'. This fact is frequently overlooked by writers on the subject,
who see in the psychological attack on enemy morale the most
exciting, and therefore in their eyes the most important, form of
propaganda. Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien described how the Irish
Government once issued 'a repulsive and expensive pamphlet' called
Ireland's Right to Unity and distributed this internationally for
propaganda purposes. It was, he said, 'written by an old Sinn Feiner
for other old Sinn Feiners; it made them feel good and they did not
trouble to imagine what effect it might have on its hypothetical
foreign readers. 30
 Cruise O'Brien brought this set of phenomena to
the attention of Professor C Northcote Parkinson, who then framed the
following law:
Propaganda begins, and ends, at home.31
At first eight this Parkinson Law is hard to accept, but with expert
help we begin to understand its significance. Ellul identifies six
main limits on propaganda's effectiveness which may be summarised as
follows:
1. Initially propaganda cannot operate except within the
framework of pre-.existing attitudes, which it can modify only
very slowly.
29. T E Lawrence Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London, 1935), p 195.
30. Conor Cruise O'Brien (i) 'Epilogue: The Embers of Easter' in
Edward and Pyle 1916 The Easter Rising (London, 1968), p 23l.
31. Ibid.
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2. Propaganda cannot reverse fundamental trends and
sociological factors of the society in which it acts. Unlike 1,
which is a relative impediment, this rule is absolute.
3. Propaganda must be consistent with the facts. A basic fact
is alwaye necessary. Propaganda can never be the advancement
of ideas, but must pronounce ,judgement on certain facts
(whether these judgements are accurate or not).
Li. Time abridges propaganda's capability in two ways. To have
any effect, psychological action needs to be lasting and
continuous. Time also imposes a limitation because of the weak
durability of its effects.
5. Despite all technique, the propagandist's art remains
uncertain in one important respect: he is unable to foresee the
response that the individual subjected to his propaganda will
make.
6. Finally, and directly relating to Parkinson, propaganda
addressed to the outside, to a foreign country or enemy, is
inevitably largely ineffective. At its most effective and most
dangerous when working within a group, society or nation,
propaganda loses much of its power when this arrangement is
impossible, as is the case in overseas operations. The
propagandist is likely to be ignorant of the attitudes,
interests and presuppositions of the target audience: he may
have difficulty establishing continuity or being in real
'communication'. There wifl be problems too of achieving
immediacy, of using mass media, of making 'pre-propaganda'.32
Psychological action can be fully effective only in the bands
of nationals addressing themselves to their fellow citizens.
This is the secret force of communist propaganda, which uses
national parties or front organisations.33
It is obvious that this conclusion is of immense importance to this
study of revolutionary propaganda.
The ways and means of spreading propaganda are many, and vary
from setting to setting and from age to age. Visual media include the
32 See p i8.
33. Ellul (i) pp 29k-302.
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written word, pictures, cartoons and symbols, spread in the form of
leaflets, handbills, posters, pamphlets, newspapers and books,
Audio media are, first and foremost, the spoken word, whether
directed face to face, by radio or loudspeaker or tape, or as a
rumour, but also include music and such symbolic effects as the morse
code 'V' sign so successful in World War II. Audio/visual means
include film, television, drama, and 'propaganda of the deed',
although the latter depends for its main impact on being relayed
second-hand by the other propaganda media. A reading of this list
will indicate how closely propaganda media and news media correspond1
and this points to the crucial importance of the media's response to
a revolutionary situation.
One authority, Mr Oliver Thomson, has identified three main
propaganda message styles; the purely rational, the quasi-rational/
half emotional, and entirely emotional. The first is easily
countered by an opponent's rational arguments and is therefore
seldom used. The second and third are often effective, making use
respectively of propaganda techniques in conjunction with apparent
rationality, and the constant repetition of emotive slogans
accompanied by emotional stimuli. Thomson also writes of message
structure, being either linea (or logical), as in the Communist
Manifesto, or in the form of a parable, as in the case of an epic,
novel, theatre, or TV dramatised documentary, or possessing ritual
quality, involving build-up, climax and solution.35
Mention has earlier been made of the work of Professor Jacques
Ellul. Hi book Propaganda, The Formation of Men's Attitudes, first
published in French in 196236 aM in English in i965, is of first
importance to anyone wishing to understand the subject. Ellu]. regards
propaganda as a sociological phenomenon essential to the technological
society, which in turn makes propaganda possible in its modern form
and order of magnitude. It is with us forever, aimed at the
individual in the mass, all-pervading. Only in passing is
propaganda concerned to change opinions. Much more importantly it
aims to intensify existing trends, to 8harpen and focus them and to
lead men to action.
3. see p 22.
35. Oliver Thomson Mass Persuasion in History, A Historical AnalTsis
of the Development of Propaganda Techniques (Edinburgh, 1977)
pp 15-17.
36. Propagandes (Paris, 962).
37. Ellul U) op cit.
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EUu1 identifies several forms of propaganda active today. His
terms and meanings will be used in this thesis. First, there is
Pre-Propaganda, the conditioning of minds with vast amounts of
incoherent information, posing as 'facts' and as 'information', that
create pseudo needs that other forms of propaganda can later
satisfy. These other forme include Political Propaganda, through
which a government, a party, an administration or a pressure group
seeks to change public behaviour, and Sociological Propaganda, which
combines extremely diverse forms within itself but is generally the
way that any society seeks to integrate the maximum number of
individuals into itself, to unify its members' behaviour according
to a pattern, to spread its life-style and thus impose itself on other
groups. Basically, sociological propaganda is the penetration of an
ideology by means of its sociological context. It produces a
progressive adaptation to a certain order of things, a certain concept
of human relations, which gently and unconsciously moulde individuals
and makes them conform to society. Ellul sees it as a spontaneous
phenomenon rather than the result of deliberate manipulation.
Integration Propaganda, on the other hand, is described as the
creation of developed nations in the twentieth century. It is the
propaganda of conformity, an instrument of government, aiming to make
the individual participate in his society in every way. Ellu]. believes
that integration propaganda is the most important form in our time,
seeking not a temporary excitement but a total moulding of the person
in depth. Finally he refers to Agitation Propaganda, giving the
adjective a meaning different from that intended by Lenin when he
drew his distinction between propaganda and agitation.38
Ellu]. sees agitation propaganda as most often subversive, with
the stamp of opposition. It is led by a party seeking to destroy
the government or the established order. It seeks rebellion or war.
But although it is most often in opposition, the propaganda of
agitation can also be made by a government when, for instance, it
wants to galvanise energies and mobilise the entire nation for war
or for some revolutionary course of action.
In Ellul's view no propaganda is possible unless psychological
influence rests on reality, and the recruiting of individuals into
cadres or movements goes hand in hand with psychological
manipulation. This is where he introduces his concept of organisation
38. Ellu]. Ci), pp 62-79.
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being essential to propaganda. The sense of belonging to a group,
of being led into action and 'committed' leads to the
of the individual. Ellul regards the manipulation of symbols to
be necessary for three reasons; to persuade the individual to enter
the framework of the organisation, to furnish him with reasons,
justifications, motivations for actions, and to obtain his total
allegiance. 'More and more we are learning that genuine compliance
is essential if action is to be effective.'39
Discussing how liberal societies can protect themselves against
the dangers posed by propaganda, Ellul is profoundly disturbing.
Democracy's need of propaganda is unquestionable; at the same time
'it is evident that a conflict exists between the principles of
democracy - particularly its concept of the individual - and the
processes of propaganda'.	 Some of democracy's fundamental
aspects tend to paralyse the conduct of effective propaganda. If
these obstacles are overcome, it means that democracy has lost its
true character. He concludes that the only safe course is to show
people the extreme effectiveness of the weapon used against them, so
that they may be aroused to self defence rather than soothed by
illusions.
Turning from theory to practice, it may be useful to list some
of the commonly recognised techniques of propaganda, many of which
are also used in commercial advertising.
Symbolism uses any device, visual or aural, which by established
association arouses predictable emotions. An audience can be warmed
towards a propagandist by an Appeal to cherished traditions and values.
It is sometimes better to make a point by Insinuation rather than by
blatant statement. Ridicule can be effective, although it can also
be dangerous: much depends on the subtlety of its use. Simplification
is really a euphemism for selecting facts favourable to the
propagandist's message rather than using the entire truth. This i8
otherwise known as Card Stacking. In theMirror technique the
propagandist deliberately presents facts unfavourable to his cause to
gain the confidence of his audience. With enhanced credibility he is
39. Ellul (i) p 23.
1+0. Ellu). (i), p 233.
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then able to obtain acceptance of his intended message. Difficult
facts can be Rationalised by spurious logic. Enemies can be hurt by
Name-calling (leading by repetition to a new Symbol), by Character
Assassination, or by Guilt Association. Slogans unite those who chant
them and shut out reason. Vagueness is often a characteristic of
slogan-making, but can be applied more widely. A vague statement that
possesses Appeal can be afl. things to all audiences.
Transfer of Testimonial involves associating new ideas with a
person, image or symbol revered by the audience. Nostalgia, the
dreams of happier bygone days, and reference to such universally
appreciated concepts as family and children, can be used to good
propaganda effect. A closely-linked technique is sometimes known as
Glittering Generalities, and involves linking one's cause to concepts
that a section of the public holds to be above criticism. 'Social
juatice, 'one man, one vote', 'civil rights' are examples. By
projecting a leader as an ordinary, down to earth person, his
popularity may improve: this is the Plain Folks ploy. Once a campaign
is under way its progress can be stimulated by the Bandwagon method,
which persuades people to pledge their allegiance while there is still
time, to join the winning side. Finally there is Purity of Motive,
the technique that suggests that the propagandist is acting only in the
best interest of his audience, which is not to be confused with the
theme of purity relating to the cause itself. A Target Audience is an
individual or group, whether enemy, neutral or friend, to be
influenced. The audience's Receptivity is its vulnerability to
particular means of persuasion, and its Susceptibility relates to its
vulnerability to a particular idea. A Theme is a basic idea, such as
hatred, and a Message is the means of bringing the theme home to
target audiences. A message such as 'The police torture and kill on
behalf of the oppressive regime' might focus hatred against the
government and its security forces.
Whenever a message is delivered verbally, the choice of words is
important. Certain words and phrases have well established
connotations through which the narrator can subtly interpret the facts
he is communicating. 'The enemy resisted fanatically', but 'our troops
held their positions bravely'. Propagandists can also change the
meanings of words, either by capturing a term like 'democracy' and
applying its glitter to some totally undemocratic political system,
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or by substitution, such as calling police 'pigs', or by
condemnatory usage, whereby a once-proud word like 'property' is
made synonymous with theft. The Black Power leader
Mr Stokely Carmichael was keenly aware of the power of words, and he
quoted Lewis Carroll to make his point:
"When I use a word, t' Humpty-Duxnpty said in a rather scornful
tone, it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more
nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can
make words mean so many different things." "The question
is," said Humpty-Dumpty, "who is to be the master - that's
all." 141
Propaganda strategy is guided by the political and military aims
of the leadership. The target audiences are selected, the results
hoped for (the objectives) are listed and from this assessment the
propagandist selects themes and related messages designed to lead
his audiences towards the desired states of mind. He may have four or
five constant themes which relate to enduring aspects of the overall
struggle. In addition, for each phase of the campaign he will use
themes relating to the various dominant issues of the time. Constant
and tactical themes may be varied in style and emphasis for different
target audiences - enemies 1 friends and neutrals - but it is
dangerous to be inconsistent or contradictory. A story or angle that
makes a point essential for the propagation of a theme or message
is sometimes called a 'line'.
There is a distinction between the stories and lines that carry
the message and. the techniques that help put the message across.
They may be likened, respectively, to the script of a film and the
skills of film editing. Nevertheless,the two seem sometimes to be
nearly the same. One of the commonest themes in conflict situations,
and one that dominates communist propaganda, is that of the
'inevitability of victory', or 'invincibility of the cause'. This
may seem identical to the technique of the 'bandwagon'. This apparent
identity is misleading. The theme will be constant throughout a
campaign. It will endure among the party faithful even when events
appear to render it hopeless. It is only when the tide of events is
running hard in the campaign' a favour, and when the theme has strong
credibility, that the technique of the bandwagon can be used to sell
the theme to mass audiences.
Revolutionary propaganda has established some terms and
techniques of ita own. The nineteenth century anarchist Bakunin
14i. See Donald Rackin (Ed) Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, A Critical
Handbook (Belmont, Calif 1 1 969), p 328.
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coined the phrase Propaganda of the Deed to describe an act, usually
of terrorist violence, committed more for ite indirect effect upon
public opinion than for any direct benefit arising from the act
itself. Mr Paul Wilkinson has suggested that 'the terrorist by his
act of violence is telling the world: "We are here. Look what we can
do. Heed us or there is worse to come.42 We may comment that this
message is the one intended for 'enemies' and that the same act is
telling 'neutrals' and 'friends' other things. To 'neutrals' it may
aay 'We are here. See how the weak oppose the oppressors.
Obviously our cause has justice on its aide. Support us'. And to
'friends' it may impart this message: 'We are here. Look how the
mighty forces of oppression fade before our blows. There is no cause
to fear them. Victory wil].be ours. Join.'
Another term in common use is Armed Propaganda. The Brazilian
guerrilla Canoe Marighe]la defined this in terms similar to
113
Propaganda of the Deed. 	 His is not the generally accepted view,
which sees Armed Propaganda as the indoctrination of the nsses by
armed bands of guerrillas who are able to use a mixture of
persuasion and, coercion to influence their literally captive
audiences. The New Left ideologue Regis Debray devotes a whole
chapter to this subject in his Revolution in the Revolution?: 'Cells,
public or underground, will be organized in the villages; union
struggles will be supported or initiated; and the program of the
Revolution will be reiterated again and again.'	 Dezinformatsiya,
'disinformation', is a Soviet technique in which incidents calculated
to affect public opinion in a certain way are covertly engineered by
propagandists, appearing to their audiences to have arisen 'naturally'
out of the march of events. Sometimes the group whose reputation is
to be injured by the incident is induced to play a prominent part in
the action.
Finally, practitioners recognise three shades of propaganda:
White propaganda, disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by
an accredited agency: Grey propaganda, which does not specifically
112. Pan]. Wilkinson Terrorism and the Liberal State (London, 1977) p 111.
11.3. Carlos Marighella Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (no date)
pp 33-3k.
kk. Regis Debray Revolution in the Revolution? (New York, 1967), p 11.7.
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identify any source: and Black propaganda, which purports to emanate
from a source other than the true one. Black operations sometimes
involve the setting up of bogus sources that appear to their
audiences to be domestic when in fact they are foreign. During the
second World War Britain made radio broadcasts to the German army
that were dressed up to sound like the work of disaffected elements
within the Wehrmacht. Such operations depend for their success upon
credibility, which in turn relies on truthful, up-to-date reporting
of events that the audience can verify. The need for a close working
relationship between the intelligence staffs and the propaganda
organiaation for this and other operations is obvious. The
association in many people's mind8 of lies with black propaganda is
mistaken. This impression, strengthened no doubt by the term 'black
propaganda' itself, has been worked on by revolutionary groups who
sometimes use the words in a deprecatory sense in order to discredit
any government statement.
Associated Concepts and Terms
The term Psychological Operation (or warfare, action, etc) is
closely related to the subject of this study. In seeking a
definition, the difficulty lies not so much in deciding what is
psychological warfare, as in determining what is not. It could be
argued that the purpose of war is to influence the enemy leader (to
surrender rather than to fight, to withdraw rather than to hold
ground, to accept your conditions rather than any longer to suffer the
consequences of refusal), and as a consequence all conflict is
psychological. Such a view would see military violence, along with
political and economic activity, merely as a means of changing the
mind of one's opponent. This is one way of looking at the struggle
for power; indeed, the historical, survey later in the chapter tends
to see events from such an angle. Taken, however, to its logical
conclusion this approach must inevitably promote the subject under
discussion from its status as a component of conflict to pre-eminence,
rather in the way that Karl Marx's interpretation of history hoists
economics into pride of place. If we accept the pre-eminence of
psychological action in all matters affecting conflict, our subject
expands across the entire spectrum of human activity and we are
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discussing the role or kings. It will perhaps be better to confine
psychological operations to the status most people might assign to
them, an important but subordinate situation in the King's household.
Consequently too much ought not to be read into the second sentence
of this NATO definition:
Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed
towards enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to
create attitudes and behaviour favourable to the achievement
of political and military objectives. These operations inclu
psychological action, psychological warfare, and psychologic&
consolidation and encompass those political, military, econoaL
ideological and information activities designed for achieving
a desired psychological effect.
Our adopted definition of propaganda is wide enough to cover all
activities that seek to influence the group, that is, people in the
mass. 'Propaganda of the deed' shows that the words 'special
appeals' include an assassination or the blowing up of a pub. It is
clear, too, that all propaganda is a psychological operation. In
matters affecting mass opinion the two terms are synonymous. However
psychological warfare has other manifestations also. These are
outside the meaning of propaganda, and outside, too, the scope of this
thesis. If gunmen holding hostages are talked into surrender by the
skill and patience of the police, when terrorists lose faith in their
weapons after one blowa up in use as a result of covert action by the
security forces, if nomadic tribesmen side with guerrillas because
these warriors have made more land safe for the grazing of flocks,
when an army adopts a machine-gun with a higher rate of fire than
is technically necessary because the noise it makes is so
frightening to the enemy, these are all psychological operations.
This form of warfare also has an important role in the art of
deception, whereby the enemy is misled as to the real strength,
disposition and intention of one's forces. In passing it may be noted
that in World War I America and Britain engaged quite openly in
'propaganda', while in the second great war the Americans used the term
'psychological operations' and the British hid their activities in
this field behind the cover name 'political warfare'. The US have
stuck to their World War II terminology and have not been afraid to
k5. NATO (unclassified) Glossary of Military Terms, p 2-206.
2k
publish official accounts of their own and other countries'
endeavours.L16 In Britain pressure groups seem to have tried to
bring the same discredit upon the concept of psychological
operations as earlier events and pressures have done for the word
'propaganda' 
L47 
A possible intention is to deprive the
government of this weapon by the technique of 'guilt assocjatjon'.
No thesis on propaganda can avoid reference to Public Opinion.
This is a phenomenon that some people dismiss as unreal, or see as
something so vague that measurement is impossible, or liken to the
Delphic oracle, a device through which ambitious or powerful men lay
claim to special wisdom or guidance. These positions can all be
defended, but at the end of the day public opinion wiU still be with
us, and cannot in a study of propaganda be ignored. Some definitions
should therefore be examined. Chambers's offer: 'an aggregate of
the individual views, attitudes and beliefs about a particular topic,
expressed by a significant proportion of a community'
Now this is vague, considering how difficult it is to aggregate
people's opinions, how unclear individuals often are about their own
views, attitudes and beliefs on any particular topic, and how imprecise
are the words 'significant proportions. The expression does not
readily lend itself to exact definition in lay terms, and the rather
unsatisfactory nature of this and other attempts should serve to
warn us against treating public opinion in the general sense as
anything more than a hazy notion. Those who talk confidently about
public opinion on some topic as being this or that are usually
expressing a very private opinion on how other peop1es views,
attitudes and beliefs are, or ought to be, conditioned.
There is, however, another definition of public opinion that
deserves study. This is the view held by some researchers in the field
'+6.See William E Daugherty and Morris Janowitz A Psychological
Warfare Casebook (Washington, 1958).
'+7.See, for instance, 'One Eyed Psych-Ops' in Time Out (London,
13-19 Oct 1972) and 'Civil Servants selected for Psychological
Warfare Studies' in Irish Times (Dublin, 27 Oct 1976).
'+8.Chambers's Encyclopaedia Vol XI.
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of Mass Communications, expres8ed in this case by
Dr Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. In her view 'public opinion is
controversial opinion which can (and on some matters must) be uttered
publica].].y without risking isoiation'. 1	Noelle-Neumann's
definition advances from the assumption that most members of a
society try to avoid isolation and are therefore ready to adjust or
to conform, however great the effort. Isolation, she suggest8, may
also be equated with rejection, disdain end contempt, in contrast
with the desired effects of popularity, affection, respect and esteem.
The problem of measurement and the dangers of unfounded claims as to
which way public opinion has turned remain, but this definition
certainly provides a better starting point.
To the disciples of Mass Communications Theory, 'Climate of
Opinion' is a closely-linked concept used to describe the totality of
opinions, cognitive-affective attitudes, values and behaviour which,
for a certain period and at a certain place, either must be displayed
publically by members of a society in order not to become isolated, or
.!Z be displayed publically without risk of isolation from the other
members of the society. Researchers also talk about dominant opinions,
attitudes, tastes and customs or expected, fixed and approved patterns
of behaviour which together form the climate of opinion. The term is
seen as appropriate because, from the viewpoint of the individual
member of society, climate is something external which nevertheless and
most strongly influences his inner being by its condition and
variability.
Relating public opinion to propaganda, Ellul points out that in
large societies individuals do not share the direct experience of
problems on which they must make decisions. Public opinion in such
societies has three characteristics. It depends upon institutionalised
channels of information bringing to the people concerned the facts on
which they will take a position. Opinion will depend to a large
extent on such intermediate channels. Secondly, public opinion cannot
express itself directly, but only through such channels as elections,
L19 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumana 'Mass Media and the Climateof Opinion',
paper at 10th General Assembly, International Association for Mass
Communication Research, University of Leicester, 1 Sep 1976
(p 2 of transcript).
50. Noelle-Neumann, p 2.
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political parties, newspapers, opinion polls and referenda. Lastly,
this collective opinion ought not to exist at all, because of the
different standards, languages, cultures and social positions of the
people who make up the society. Yet, Ellul explains, such a society
does produce a collective 'public opinion' and this is possible
because very often individuals are not really apprised of the facts,
but only of abstract symbols that give the facts a shape in which
they can serve as a base for public opinion. 'Public opinion forms
itself around attitudes and theoretical problems not clearly related
to the actual situation. And the symbols most effective in the
formation of public opinion are those remote from reality. Therefore,
public opinion always rests on problems that do not correspond to
reality.' 51
Before moving on to the setting of the case studies in the
history of conflict propaganda, certain additional words and terms
that will be used in this thesis ought perhaps to be defined, since
their usage is not always standard. Ellul draws a distinction
between a Revolt, which he sees as a refusal to obey authority often
leading to spontaneous violence, and a Revolution, which he defines
as a planned attempt to overthrow the existing regime. 52
 However,
in apparent contradiction Mr Meriachem Begin refers to his well-led,
skilfully planned, 1+-year struggle against the British in Palestine
as a revolt. While the many shades of meaning and definitions
imposed by Service glossaries are respected, in this thesis the two
words, together with Rebellion, Insurrection, Insurgency and Rising
are used by the writer in their more general meaning of internal
violence challenging government authority. The term Counter-Insurgency
here means government action to quell the rebellion and protect the
political status quo. Counter-Revolution, in the meaning accepted in
this work, involves government action not just to quell the revolt
but to superimpose fresh ideological and political ideas. By
Security Forces is meant the police and those armed forces of a
country that are committed to countering insurgency. Leverage is a
51. Ellul (i), pp 100-101.
52. Jacques Ellul (ii) Autopsy of Revolution (New York, 1971),
pp 38-56.
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term denoting indirect pressures exerted either through diplomatic
channels, through public opinion at home or abroad, or by economic
means, that force one party to a dispute to alter policy, not because
that party wants to, but because the consequences of adhering to the
original policy appear worse than the consequences of a change.
Leverage is a form of coercion rather than persuasion. We will refer
to Legitimacy and Credibility, stretching the meanings of these words
in their propaganda usage beyond their normal day-to-day application.
Legitimacy here relates to the focus of group allegiance, which may
or may not correspond to legitimacy in legal terms. It reflects the
group's verdict on an assumed right to govern. Credibility is a
reputation for truth, for rationality, and for an ability to see
strategy through to its conclusion, as well as reliability in
reporting facts.
The Case studies in relation to the History of
Conflict Propaganda
Authorities on the subject of propaganda agree that persuasive
techniques have been a part of warfare from earliest recorded
history. Our first case study is set in Persia at about the time
when the Normans were consolidating their lold over England, and it
may come as no surprise to find propaganda playing an important role
in the struggle for power between rival sects of Islam. In a thesis
that aims to throw light onto a contemporary problem the relevance
of delving so far back into history may not be immediately obvious.
It is justified in the writer's opinion if the study reveals
continuity in revolutionary propaganda style, organisation, themes and.
usage between the medieval Assassins and their modern counterparts.
The search for evidence of such continuity has been assisted by a
document in the Library of the School of Oriental and Asiatic Studies
which is, in effect, an eleventh century directive on subversive
Fatimid propaganda.
Between the defeat of the Assassins in the mid-thirteenth
century and the Rising in Dublin, 1916 which comprises our second
study, the means available for the spreading of propaganda increased
enormously. It was in revolutions particularly that the new
propaganda means sometimes proved decisive. Written appeals followed
in the wake of literacy and the printing presses. Had it not been for
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the invention of printing sixty years before Luther's
revolutionary religious teaching, it is possible that his ideas might
have perished. By writing hi Appeal to the Christian Nobility of
the German Nation in the vernacular German instead of the academic
Latin, he captured a wide readership for his teaching all over
northern Europe. The threat posed by the printed word to established
order was soon appreciated. In 1559 Pope Paul IV instigated an index
of prohibited books and four years later Charles IX of France decreed
that nothing was to be printed without his consent. During the Thirty
Years War a flood of propaganda tracts, many illustrated with wood
cuts, emanated from both sides. Speeches, sermons and face-to-face
persuasion also swayed opinions. Similar activities stirred emotions
before, during and after the Civil War in England. Within months of
Oliver Cromwell's death pamphlets reviling his memory were being
circulated, as history was revised to suit political needs. History
as propaganda is a phenomenon almost as common as propaganda in
history.
Revolutionary propaganda encouraged and accompanied the secession
of the American Colonies. When in 1770 Samuel Adams coined the
phrase 'Boston Massacre' he did so to exasperate local opinion. Five
civilians had indeed died after British troops fired into a mob, but
the soldiers concerned went before a local court where murder charges
were rightly dismissed. The emotive tag and the resentment it was
intended to inspire were kept before the public by hand bills produced
from a wood cut of the event by Paul Revere, which depicted the
British as callous oppressors. All this W&S pre-propaganda, which
helped to condition colonial minds to the justness of their cause should
the need for violence arise in the future. When in 1775 that need did
arise the principles of the revolution were debated, and set out one
year later in the Declaration of Independence, a propaganda document
of inspiration, remarkable for its powerful eloquence and powerful for
its moderation and simplicity. 53
 The rebels carried their religion
into their design for a just future, but the design itself was
nevertheless secular, a free and independent nation. Without
challenging spiritual values, the Declaration was to become in its own
right an ideological statement of lasting consequence, perhaps the
first lay document to match in importance the great religious
teachings.
53. Inspired by Thomas Paine's pamphlet 'Common Sense'. See
Gorham Munson 12 tive Bttls of the Nind (New York, i92)
pp 75-80.
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It is noteworthy that the Declaration, like all the examples of
propaganda offered so far in this sketch, was aimed first and foremost
at the domestic or internal audience. The authors of the document
also needed international goodwill and assistance in their struggle
against England. With this in mind the Declaration addressed itself
to the external audience:
a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they
(the rebels) should declare the causes which impel them to the
separation (from Britain). 5k
During the War of Independence the Americana demonstrated an aptitude
for addressing the enemy, as well as friends and neutrals. They
circulated leaflets amongst British troops which set out to intensify
these soldiers' existing reluctance to fight against their own kith
and kin and which pointed to the Britons' miserable existence and the
rebels' relative freedom. Other literature, playing upon a wave of
anti-Catholic sentiment at that time sweeping England, insisted that the
real purpose of British military action in America was to 'compel your
Fellow Subjects there to submit to Popery and slavery
George III's decision to hire mercenaries from the Landgrave of
Kease Cased and the Duke of Brunswick to serve in America led
Congress to resolve:
That a committee of three be appointed, to devise a plan for
encouraging the Hessians, and other foreigners ... to quit that
iniquitous service: the members chosen, Mr Wilson, Mr Jefferson,
and Mr Stockton. 56
The committee drafted hand bills, which Congress approved, offering
the Hessian troops citizenship, freedom of religion and 50 acres
of land each if they would desert the British service. A later
edition tempted officers with between 200 and 1000 acres, according to
rank. Initially these had little or no effect. Attempts to disseminate
5k. Quoted Encyclopedia Americana, International Edition, (New
York, 1975), Vol 8, p 591.
55. A C Ashworth 'The Enduring Weapon', in The British Army
Review (London, 1958), p 66.
56. W C Ford, et al (Ed) Journals of the Continental Congress
(Washington, 190k-37) Vol k, p 369.
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the literature were not particularly successful and the Germans,
indoctrinated by the British into believing the worst of the enemy
and initially successful in battle, were in no mood to heed such
appeals.
This changed as the conflict wore on, as Victory over the
rebels seemed elusive, and as casualties and bitter experience damped
German morale. The appeal to desert was no longer just an idea.
The fact of military failure made it seem like a reasoned reaction to
that fact. The Americana were clever enough to treat captured
Germans well and, in subsequent prisoner exchanges, have them returned
to their units in a mood to persuade their comrades to surrender.
Of the 30,000 Germans deployed to the fight, some five or six thousand
did in fact desert.57
The propaganda campaign was not confined to North America. In an
ingenious effort to turn off the supply of mercenaries at source the
Americans faked a letter supposedly from Count von Schaumburg in
Europe to the Hessian commander in America, lamenting that the Hessian
losses at Trenton had not been even greater than was the case, with
consequent benefit in the form of 'blood money' from the British. The
purpose of this fake, which was circulated in France, was to impress
influential Europeans with the infamy of a pact binding George III to
reward the German princes by payments 'per corpse'. In fact no such
agreement had ever been made but the letter, and its false
implication, were widely believed.8
Secular political ideology again replaced religion as
justification for revolt later in the same century when France
embarked upon revolution. Here the new political theories advanced
not in harmony with religious belief but in contradiction or
rejection. Robespierre even devised a new state religion, the worship
of the Supreme Being. As the so-called popular will became
al].-powerfu]. the ability to manipulate the hitherto apolitical and
still largely uneducated masses was recognised as the key to power.
57. A B Faust The German Element in the United States (Boston,
1909), Vol I, pp 35k-355.
58. See C Berger Broadsides and Bayonets: The Propaganda War of
The American Revolution (Pennsylvania, 1961).
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Two weapons were found particularly effective - terror and
propaganda. The French revolution heralded in the era of the
revolutionary myth. Jacques Ellul described it thus:
Until 1789, revolutions were attempted and occasionally achieved,
but never romanticized. Then the era of the revolutionary
epic began. Revolution, in the person of the revolutionaries,
started to look at and admire itself, to grimace and disport
in the mirror. The myth of the revolution was about to descend
on the modern world. 59
Possibly the best known example of music as a propaganda medium
arose out of this revolution. In July 1792 the men who came from
Marseille to Paris marched to the stirring H ymne des Marseillois.
Soon it was the Trench National Anthem, and indeed the song of
republican and revolutionary movements worldwide. Architecture, too,
had its part to play. H Eugenic de Keyser had this to say of the
style of the First Empire:
To retain power over men who believed themselves to be free the
ruler had to display such strength that resistance would be
futile, such splendour as to make rebellion a form of
blasphemy ... Having stifled opposition by gagging the press,
his (Napoleon's) regime only had to inspire enthusiasm axd
fear. Building a triumphal arch became an act of State.
Napoleon certainly possessed a keen appreciation of the importance of
propaganda. 'To attach no importance to public opinion', he wrote,
'is a proof you do not merit its suffrage'. Also, 'the truth is not
half so important as what people think to be true'. And he was
aware that, for a military commander, propaganda could not on its
own achieve miracles; it had to run parallel with military and
political action, with facts. In his own words, 'the greatest orator
in the world is success'. 61
i8k8 saw the proclamation of the French Second Republic as a new
generation of revolutionaries drove out Louis-Phillippe. At the time
these dramatic events must have overshadowed the publication of a
political statement by two almost unknown philosophers named Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels. Yet their work, the Communist Manifesto,
became a dominant influence in world affairs, effective long after the
59. Ellu]. (ii), p 86.
60. Eugenic de Keyser The Romantic West, (Geneva, 1965), p k7.
61. See Robert B Holtman Napoleonic Propaganda (Louisiana, 1950).
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Ketten
looting mobs of Paris had passed into history. The inconsistent but
powerful political philosophy of the Manifesto was expressed in
wonderfully effective propaganda terms, ending with these famous
words:
.,,I nanI 4 a..an a1 a 4 t,..a
Rather less appealing but equally to the point were these additional
words from Marx, published one year later:
We are ruthless, and ask no quarter from you.
	 63When our time comes, we shall not disguise our terrorism.
During the nineteenth century industrialisation changed the face
of Europe and North America. Populations grew and cities attracted
labour from the land. Educational opportunities and scope for social
advancement did not always keep pace with the extension of the
franchise, creating a gap between democratic theory and practice that
was quickly filled by the ready-made judgements of political leaders
or commentators. The process of dissemiiating such views was
facilitated by the concurrent revolution in communications. Railways,
telephones and telegraphs, and cheap and efficient postal services
encouraged mobility of people and ideas. Newly literate masses
created a demand for mass circulation daily newspapers, a demand that
entreeieur skills and new technology combined to satisfy. Thus was
born the means by which the few could reach the minds of millions and
the scope for propaganda activity increased dramatically.
The important role of the war correspondent in affecting public
attitudes towards a war was demonstrated in 185k-56 by the London
•	 •.	 61+Times reporters William Howard Russell and Thomas Chenery.
	 Their
62. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Manifesto of the Communist Party,
(Moscow, 1952). Translation reads;
The workers have nothing to lose in this (revolution) but
their chains. They have a world to gain.
Workers of the world, unites
63. Neue Rheinische Zeitung May 181+9, quoted George Watson 'Race and
the Socialists' in Encounter (London, Nov 1976) Vol XLVII, No 5,
p 19.
61+. See P Knightley The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as
Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker from the Crimea to Vietnam
(London, 1975).
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descriptions of the consequences of maladministration upon the
soldiers fighting in the Crimea, and specially upon the wounded,
shocked the hitherto complaisant and ignorant British public and
helped create a climate of opinion in which demands for reform became
irresistible. This was not war propaganda, far from it. The
incident showed, however, that criticism from, as it were, one's own
side, could influence public opinion and lead to changes in policy.
Given goodwill and intelligence, thia could only be to the good,
however great the embarrassment to officialdom. But what if the
criticism was ill-founded, unbalanced or inspired by hostile motive?
The full potential was to lie dormant for more than a century.
The nineteenth century anarchist movement entered its period of
terrorism, which it referred to as 'propaganda of the deed', after
its failure to attract massive working class support. The turn to
violence in the i880s and i890a has been interpreted as a reflection
of despair and frustration rather than of confidence in the movement.
'To shock, to infuriate, to register one's protest became the only
thing that any decent or sensitive man could do.' 6 The anarchist
prophet, Michael Bakunin, anticipated that the violent acts of the
revolutionary core would stimulate a general rising that would sweep
away all public institutions. Such futile hopes were dismissed by
Friedrich Engels with contempt:
They demand that the first act of the social revolution shall be
the abolition of authority. Have these gentlemen ever seen a
revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian
thing there is: it is the act whereby one part of the
population imposes its will on the other part by means of rifles,
bayonets and cannon - authoritative means if such there be at
all; and it the victorious party does not wish to have fought in
vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its
arms inspire in the reactionaries. 66
The Great War of 1911#-18 was the first in which the new means of
communication enabled propaganda to be conducted on the grand scale.
The Germans set up special sections in each of their principal
government departments, charged with propaganda at home and overseas:
65. Gerald Brenan The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, 1962), p 162.
66. Quoted James Joll The Anarchists (London, 196k), p 110.
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the French made similar arrangements. 6
	Britain began the war with
a War Propaganda Bureau which in 1917 expanded into a Department and
finally became a Ministry. Mr Charles Roetter has pointed to a
special advantage enjoyed by Britain in this field. He argues that
from the prolonged and, for many ,agonising moral reappraisal from
pacifist or neutral leanings to full support for joining the war in
191k emerged intellectual and moral justification for Britain's cause
that provided a base for future propaganda policy.68
Initially both sides concentrated their efforts upon their own
populations and towards neutrals. The war was the first modern
conflict between nations and not merely between armies. Huge armed
forces were needed, so mothers, wives and sweethearts had to encourage
their menfolk to enlist; unprecedented quantities of ammunition and
equipment were consumed, so high taxes and great exertions had to be
accepted; terrible casualties were inflicted so, as Bertrand Russell
put it, a nation which was to succeed had to be able to convince its
69people that the cause of victory was worthy of martyrdom. 	 While
their armies sought in vain to achieve decisive results on the
battlefields, belligerents turned part of their military efforts
against one another's home fronts. The British surface fleet and
German submarines blockaded their opponents, threatening starvation as
well as scarcity of war materials. Zeppeline and later bombers
attacked London, bringing civiliansunder fire. Populations were not
subject to military cohesion and discipline, yet cohesion and
discipline were vital to national survival. Propaganda was developed
to conjure up these qualities within the civilian ranks of the warring
nations. 7° This propaganda was almost entirely emotional in its
message style. Fear and hatred of the enemy were conatant themes,
backed up by atrocity storiese Writing after the conflict,
Harold Lasswell observed:
67. See Charles Roetter Psychological Warfare (London, 197k).
68. Roetter, pp 30-31.
69. Bertrand Russell (ii) Power - A New Social Analysis (London,
1938), p 135.
70. See Cate Haste Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the
First World War (London, 1977).
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All the specific means of conquering the Evil One are, and
should be, glorified. The cult of battle requires that every
form of common exertion should have the blessing of the holy
sentiments. 71
Wars are rarely fought without cruelty and there was sufficient
evidence of German excesses in 191k and 1915 to supply propaganda for
the British cause, using 'selected, credible truth'. A British
Government committee investigated alleged outrages and concluded
that 'murder, lust and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on
a sca].e unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the
last three centuries'. 72
 The Committee's Chairman was
Viscount Bryce, who was later to write so dismiseively of propaganda.
Tact, however, seemed insufficient to satisfy the ambitions of the
British propagandists. Carried along on a tide of popular hysteria
they had helped create, they turned from truth to falsehood, winning
short-term victories at the cost of moral corruption and. long-term
disgrace. The story of the German 'corpse factory', in which dead
bodies were supposedly boiled down into fat and soap, illustrated the
depths of this deception. 73
 Reports from the front were distorted
by jingoistic optimism, and rigid censorship contributed its share
in the suppression of truth. It was towards the end of the second
year of this war that militant Republicans in Dublin rose in rebellion
against the United Kingdom Government.
This Rising, the second case study, led by men who had probably
never studied the works of Michael Bakunin, provides a remarkable
example of the power of facts to give reality to ideas. The
'propaganda of the deed' of Easter Week remains a classic illustration,
and deals mainly with the mobilisation phase of a revolution that was
71. Harold D Lasswell (iii) Propaganda Technique in the World War
(London, 1927), pp 96-97.
72. HM Government Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages
(London, 1915), p L13,
73. Ponsonby, Chapter XVII. See also James Morgan Read Atrocity
Propaganda 1 91k_19 19 (New York, 1972).
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not to become effective until 1919. The Easter Rising changed the
course of Irish history. For those who see that event as the
beginning of the end of British imperialism, it was an historic
landmark for Britain too. Nevertheless, at the time this Irish
upheaval was soon forgotten by England and her Allies, as the far
greater conflict absorbed all interest.
Four propaganda successes can be taken as examples of work in
this field during World War I. The first was aimed at a neutral, and
involved the slow but sure seduction of American public opinion by
the British, towards their taking sides with the Alliea.	 The
Germans provided the second, involving a combined propaganda and
political offensive to take Russia out of the war. Russian prisoners
who were due to be exchanged were first inspired with revolutionary
fervour against the Tzarist regime. Later, Lenin was returned to
Russia from exile in a sealed train, so that he might use his
influence to stop the Russians fighting. 75 The Germans thus made
effective defeatist peace propaganda inside an enemy country, by
using enemy nationals to do the job for them on home soil. A third
example was the Allied campaign to subvert the loyalty of non-German
and non-Magyar subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This worked
so well that the forces which had defeated the Italians at Caporetto
and advanced to the banks of the Piave, were never capable of resuming
their attack, two-thirds of the Austro-Hungarian forces being by that
time 'unreljable'. 6 Here, the seeds of disaffection were there all
the time, waiting to be watered. Fourthly, there was the propaganda
offensive of 1918, in which the Americans played an important role,
designed to accelerate the collapse of Germany herself.
In February 1918 M Henri Moysset was the French delegate at a
conference held in London to co-ordinate Allied propaganda efforts.
Addressing the British, US and Italian representatives, Moysset called
for a systematic Allied propaganda offensive, 'a war of ideas against
Germany as a corollary of military resistance to her attack'. 77 He
7k. See H C Peterson Propaganda for War - the Campaign against American
Neutrality 191k-1917 (Oklahoma, 1939) and James Duane Squires
British Propaganda at Home and in the United States from 191k to
191 7 (Harvard, '935).
75. Roetter, pp 7k-75.
76. Roetter, pp 76-79.
77. H W Steed Through Thirty Tears (London, 192k), Vol II, Chapter XV.
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recommended that disruptive, revolutionary and defeatist appeals
should be directed against Germany's weaker allies, followed by
direct attacks on German morale. Re went on to say that it was not
enough to stress such negative themes as German war guilt: what was
wanted was a 'positive formulation of public right and the Law of
Nations superior to the German conception of uitur'. 8
 This
approach saw political policy being fashioned in consultation with
propagandists who would advise not only on the likely effects of
policy upon public opinion at home and abroad, but also on the
possible effects of public opinion upon future policy. It also
perceived the need for an acceptable Allied ideology - a consensus
of war aims - that could justify the war effort and counter hostile
idealistic appeals. This idea later took form in President Wilson's
'Fourteen Point' formulation, being supported by the President's
close adviser and propaganda chief, George Creel.
After the war there was a tendency in Germany to use Allied
propaganda as a scapegoat for the nation's military defeat. In fact
this psychological campaign had become effective only after Ludenorff's
spring offensive bad opened the eyes of German troops to the superior
rations and equipment available to the Allies, thus destroying their
faith in what their leaders had told them, "9
 and after the military
counter-offensive had destroyed German hope of victory. 0 Allied
propaganda aimed at the enemy no longer needed to spread new ideas:
it had only to intensify existing trends towards defeatism.
Nevertheless Ludendorff'a war memoiree would have us believe that
propaganda was effective in spite of German military strength8l and
most of what Hitler had to say on this subject in Mein Kampf was in
praise of English and condemnation of German propaganda efficiency in
that war.62 These and other writings tended to boost the esteem of
78. Ibid.
79. Barry Pitt 1918, The Last Act (London, 1962), pp 150-151.
80. See George 0 Bruntz Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the
German Empire in 1918 (Stanford, 1938).
81. See Ludendorff My War Memories i9i-19i8 (2 Vols) (London, written
1919, no date).
82. Hitler, pp 160-163.
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British, French and American propagandists and to confer an inflated
reputation for success upon propaganda as a weapon against enemies.
In the democracies there was a post-war reaction against the idea of
propaganda once the extent of deception became widely known.
Propaganda became a dirty word.
Between the wars motion pictures and radio joined the ranks of
communications media that could be used to deal out propaganda. The
film, combining the effects of moving images and sound, produces in
skilful hands the appearance of absolute reality. The radio can carry
the spoken word into living rooms and it can cross oceans and national
borders with an easy stride. Moreover it is possible to mislead an
audience as to the source of a radio broadcast.
These new weapons of mass persuasion were seized upon by the
revolutionary, totalitarian political leaders who were to dominate
the inter-war years: in poet-revolutionary Russia, Lenin (and later,
Stalin); in Italy, Mussolini; in Germany, Hitler. As each in turn
seized or consolidated power, he sought to control the thoughts of
his subjects by, on the one hand, continuous or 'saturation'
propaganda and, on the other, complete insulation from any unwelcome
fact or opinion. In all cases propaganda was backed up by state
terror, designed to deter or crush dissent. Organisation played an
important part in this process, involving people in groups and leading
them into acts which committed them to the party and its propaganda.
The totalitarian's ability to insulate his domestic audience from
outside opinion and to present unchallenged versions of history,
current events and future aspirations has given apparent strength to
his propaganda. However, although a public exposed to such
saturation techniques will lose all resistance, it will also require
ever greater stimulus for ever weaker response. Furthermore, people
may develop the ability to believe with one part of their minds while
rejecting with another, and in time to form a subconscious scepticism
of all public announcements. Total state censorship also runs counter
to the spirit of free enquiry essential to science and technology.
Conflicts of interest between the political need to protect the 'noble
lie', and the practical needs of progress can arise. Nevertheless,
as events in World War II were to show, the integration propaganda of
such states can be remarkably strong. To external audiences, too,
propaganda exciting respect for the ideology and achievements of the
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ruling party can make progress, particularly when it is unchallenged.
In his account of Britain's propaganda against Germany in World War 11
Dr Charles Cruickahank has noted how, prior to the outbreak of war,
'the Nazis might pour out oceans of anti-British propaganda without a
murmur of protest from Westminster, but the merest threat of a
droplet in reply had to be defended (by our ambassador) to the
FUbrer'. 8
	The discrediting of propaganda after 1918 had led to
a situation where neither politicians nor officials knew or wished to
know anything about it.
The mandarins of Whitehall believed that propaganda to enemy
countries was an idea that should be swept under the carpet until
war had started •.. the three most influential civil servants
of th day, for reasons which in retrospect seem to be entirely
unconvincing, refused to give Tallent8 (the man selected for the
task) his head. Propaganda was a dirty word and the ess it was
thought about before hostilities started the better. O
In the Soviet Union integration propaganda was evidently slow to
gain widespread acceptance, hence Lenin's resort to the starvation of
the peasants and Stalin's reign of terror in the 1930s. To the
external audience, informed by local communist party spokesmen, the
'glittering generalities' of ussian appeals - peace, progress and
equality - sometimes seemed irresistible. In America,
the Stalinised Communiet Party appealed to some strange corner
of the intellectual's brain - a roped off region in which he
sought relief from the critical thinking and questioning which
are the intellectual's raison d'etre, in which he sought the
comfort of declared truth and security of submission. Under
Marx's wing and Stalin's watchful eye, the intellectual could,
in the name of the coming millennium, lay down his burden of
doubt 85
World War II seemed to provide strong evidence in support of
Parkinson's contention that propaganda begins and ends at home.
Backed by organisation and discipline, integration propaganda kept Nazi
83. Charles Cruickshank The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare 1938_5
(London, 1977), p 10.
8k. Cruickahank, pp 178-179.
85. Norman F Cantor Age of Protest (London, 1970), p 153.
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Germany and Imperial Japan fighting long after all rational hopes of
victory must have faded. Weakness in this area may have been a prime
cause of France's defeat in 19110, and it certainly threatened Soviet
Russia with disaster one year later. Stalin appreciated just in time
the need to mobilise his people to the defence of their country.
In place of turgid sermons on Marxist-Leninism Soviet propagandists
provided stirring tales of the great Russian soldier-heroes, Nevsky,
Suvorov, Donskoi, Kutozov and Pozharky, and the struggle became the
'Great Patriotic War'. Religion was freed from persecution in
86
exchange for Orthodox Church support for the war effort.	 This
new propaganda, backed by Beria's terror, stemmed the flow of
desertions and, once mobilised, the Russian people fought valiantly.
For Britain, the tone of internal propaganda was set in May 19140 by
the new Prime Minister with his 'blood, toil, tears and sweat'.8
Britain was successful in keeping alive the spirit of resistance in
German-occupied territories, using the 'underground' organisations
in those countries to amplify messages. Towards neutrals, British
appeals were also remarkably effective, gaining from a policy of
truthfulness.
In contrast, propaganda aimed by all belligerents at 'enemies'
was weak. Germany and Japan tried familiar ploys to undermine
Allied servicemen's morale. British tocnmies' wives were in bed with
American coloured GIs; Americans were being sacrificed on Europe's
behalf; the anti-malarial drug atabrine robbed soldiers of their
sexual potency. But neither William Joyce (Lord Haw-Haw) nor
Mrs D'Aquino (Tokyo Rose) achieved deep or lasting results. The same
may be said of Mr Sef ton Delmer's 'Black' broadcasts to German
troops88 and Captain Zacharies's appeals to the Japanese 'Peace
Faction'. Hitler missed the opportunity offered in 1914.1 to exploit
dissension inside Russia. Once Soviet internal prop aganda had taken
86. Daugherty and Janowitz, pp263-273
87. Quoted Charles Eade (Ed) The War Speeches of Winston Churchill
(London, 1951), Vol I, p i8i. (Speech to the House, 13 May i91#o)
88. For a critical view of these activities, see Cruickshank, op cit.
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hold, it was too late, and Nazi appeals could not penetrate communist
organi as tion.
Allied chances of winning psychological victories over Germany
and Japan were additionally handicapped by the policy of the
principal political leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, which
demanded	 surrender'. Experience in World War I had
shown that, in spite of its inherent difficulties, propaganda
against enemies could become effective once defeat stared them in the
face, once there were overwhelming facts to support it. However
• unconditional surrender' and the 'I4orgenthau Plan' for the
destruction of German industry succeeded, in the words of a senior
American psychological planner, in putting 'the iron of desperate
resistance into the Germane, Japanese and Italians' ,89 In the
first great war President Wilson had accepted advice from his Head of
Propaganda, George Creel. In the second conflict neither Roosevelt nor
Churchill heeded their propaganda experts. A senior British operator
wrote of the Prime Minister: 'Unfortunately for us, this great man,
himself our greatest propagandist, attached at best a secondary
importance to a].]. forms of propaganda'
Although British propaganda in World War II went a long way
towards obliterating memories of it previous over-indulgence in
falsehood, with the end of hostilities the subject was once again
swept under the carpet. Perhaps because Allied work in this field
was sufficiently skilful to avoid propagandist appearances, while the
German, Italian and Japanese efforts were blatant, the word assumed
an even more unpleasant, totalitarian association in people's minds.
Moreover in most liberal democracies the organisations and staffs
that ran propaganda operations in the war disappeared completely as
these nations demobilised. Tiny cells concerned with various
'information' functions remained, scattered in several ministries,
generally lacking political sponsors and official support. For the
most part the experts returned to civilian life, leaving politicians,
civil servants and servicemen as ignorant on the subject as if the
war had never been. Propaganda was once again a dirty word.
89. Robert Sherwood Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History
(New York, 19k8), p 695.
90. Robert H Bruce Lockhart Comes the Reckoning (London, 19k7),
p 127.
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The third case study begins in the last years of World War II
and ends with the establishment of the State of Israel in May 19k8.
It deals with the propaganda of Zionism, which in certain respects
seems to have taken charge of the events it was supposed to support.
The study also serves to demonstrate how completely Britain lost her
capacity in this field, once the war-time apparatus disappeared, and
when the issue involved was no longer seen as vital to the national
interest. Britain's withdrawal from India and Palestine marked the
beginning of a process lasting a quarter of a century during which all
the great European colonial empires came to an end. The remarkable
myth of the empire 'on which the sun never sets' faded once the home
country no longer believed in it and when nationalism provided a
stronger myth. Withdrawal was sometimes accomplished with comrnonsense
and dignity, and sometimes in confusion and bloodshed. Palestine was
in the second category-, as was France's removal from Algeria some
years later. Algeria forms our fourth study, illustrating the power
of propaganda as a weapon in the hands of the military as well as the
revolutionaries.
Throughout the post-war period Soviet propaganda has continued
on its uncertain course, achieving since Stalin's death a higher degree
of success inside Russia, rather doubtful success in the captive
nations of Eastern Europe, and a mixture of brilliance and disaster in
its dealing with various external audiences. More impressive has
been the propaganda of revolutionary China. During the civil war the
peasants were organised by the communists into 'Peasant Unions' and
directed by an 'alternative government' at Rll levels. Mao Tse-tung
developed the 'horizontal' process of mass education, which employs
organisation to spread the message outwards, face-to-face, like
ripples on a pond. The Army was seen by Mao as 'an armed
organisation fulfilling the political tasks of the revolution
The Red Army does not make war for war's sake: this is a war of
propaganda in the midst of the masses'. 91 Another great source of
propaganda in the post-war era has been nationalism, accompanying
the de-colonisation process. Both America and Russia supported this
movement for their own reasons but, through what may be seen as a
91. Quoted Ellul (i), p 306.
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demonstration of the superior power of communist psychological
manipulation, the end product has been the attachment of the
'imperialist' label to America, even though it was Russia that expanded
and consolidated what to all intents and purposes is her own new empire
over the same period.
The campaign to condemn America for imperialist policies was of
course assisted enormously by that country's involvement in Indo-China.
By the 1960s, when this commitment began, television had overtaken
radio and newspapers as the principal means of influencing public
opinion in those developed nations where sets were owned by most
families. As American troops were sent into battle their actions and
sometimes their deaths were seen shortly afterwards by millions of
viewers at home. The US failure in Vietnam has sometimes been
attributed to the domestic news media, which, it is argued, destroyed
public confidence both in the style of the campaign and in its hopes
of success. A rider is often added or implied to the effect that this
was a deliberate act of subversion carried out by politically motivated
journalists and editors. Research has been carried out by
Mr Peter Braestrup on one key period, the Pet offensive of 1968 and its
aftermath. Braestrup concludes:
In overall terms, the performance of the major American television
and print news organisations during February and March 1968
constitutes an extreme case. Rarely has contemporary
crisis-journalism turned out, in retrospect, to have veered so
widely from reality. Essentially, the dominant themes of the
words and film from Vietnam (rebroadcast in commentary,
editorials, and much political rhetoric at home) added up to a
portrait of defeat for the allies. Historians, on the contrary,
have concluded that the Tet offensive resulted in a severe
military-political setback for Hanoi in the south. To have
portrayed such a setback for one side as a defeat for the other -
in a major crisis abroad - cannot be counted as a triumph for
American journalism. 92
Analysing the reasons for the media's failure Braestrup points to four
important factors. The first was the Johnson Administration's 1967
attempt to convince the media, and hence American and world opinion,
of 'progress' in Vietnam. News reporters who did not share this
perception became suspicious and resentful at what they saw as
92. Peter Braestrup Big Story: How the American Press and Television
ported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and
Washington (2 vols) (Boulder, USA, 1977) Vol I, p 705.
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manipulation and half-truths. Official 'credibility' was low.
Second yes the contrast between the nature of the conflict before Tet
and the event8 accompanying that offensive. Whereas previously
Saigon and other main cities had been secure havens, with the fighting
confined to remote rural areas, suddenly violence was present, so it
seemed, everywhere. This was completely unexpected, particularly in
view of recent official pronouncements, and put many newsmen into a
state of shock. 'The sudden penetration of downtown Saigon by
Vietcong Sapper teams impacted personally on correspondents' lives.
The geographical dispersion of the concurrent communist attacks
elsewhere in the country led to uncertainty among newsmen about the
enemy's intent, strength, and degree of success in the countryside.'93
The third factor affecting the media response arose out of the
combined effects of the two already mentioned. 'As several Washington
reporters later noted, the primary reaction of many newsmen in the
capital after Tet was to indulge in retribution for prior manipulation
by the Administration ... to a rare degree the initial coverage
reflected subjective reactions by newsmen - not only to the sights
and circumstances of Tet itself, but also the Administration's past
conduct.'	 Fourthly, once the story of military disaster started
to appear, the herd instinct among journalists asserted itself. This
was the 'Big Story': not to report it in these terms would be to
court editorial. disfavour. The conventions and habits of the
profession encouraged simplification, the reduction of complicated and
multi-sided issues to 'stories', and the competition between rival
television companies, newspapers and magazines tended towards
exaggeration. Many reporters 'were adventurers and, to some extent,
voyeurs' 95
 who concentrated on the dramatic and neglected the wider
picture. 'The media in Vietnam committed major sins of omission as
time went
	
The dangers inherent in critical (and in this case
ill-informed) war reporting, that had hovered over the horizon since
the Crimea, had finally turned a military success into a disaster.
Braestrup is satisfied that 'ideology, per se, played a
relatively minor role in the media treatment of the Tet crisis.' 97 In
93. Braestrup, p 706.
94. Braestrup, p 708.
95. Braestrup, p 712.
96. Braestrup, p 712.
97. Braestrup, p 707.
other words few, if any, of the journalists who reported misleadingly
and the managers and, editors who, like those of Newsweek, called for a
negotiated peace, were working for the other aide. What has not yet
been researched, and may be impossible to prove to anyone's satisfaction,
is the extent to which many of those media people were already under the
influence of communist propaganda before Tet, and were unconsciously
conditioned towards an acceptance of the main propaganda themes of
the inevitability and justice of North Vietnamese victory, the
immorality of America's role and methods, and the benefits that would
flow for all mankind the moment the United States withdrew. Perhaps
it might be argued that North Vietnamese propaganda had sufficient
truth on its side to justify widespread acceptance by a nation
traditionally dedicated to the defence of the truth.
Whatever interpretations are drawn from the Vietnamese tragedy,
the impression that gained wide acceptance in the politico-military
circles of the Western World during and after the struggle was that the
power of the media could seriously diminish the ability of liberal
democracies to defend themselves. It was argued that while the
totalitarian could wage war or revolution in the safe knowledge that
nothing disagreeable would be seen or heard by his domestic audience,
the free society's will to resist could be broken by instant and
continual exposure to the horrors inseparable from conflict. How much
of this attitude was due to over-reaction in the face of what proved to
be an impossible military dilemma, and how much of it reflected the
truth, it is difficult at this stage to say.
It was while these ideas were gathering full strength that civil
strife broke out in Northern Ireland, leading in 1971 to a Republican
insurgency aimed at breaking the tie with Britain. A nine-month period
of this conflict ending in March 1972 forms the subject of the fifth
study. Here the revolutionary propaganda formed the main component
of the attack, with violence thrown in mainly as a means of psychological
manipulation. Facts were provided daily as the basis of persUaBiOn, and
the role of the media in the interpretation of these events was vital
to both sides. It was a battle for public opinion fought under the
shadow of Vietnam.
The same can be said of the last case study, only here the
remoteness of the setting and the relative backwardness of many of
those involved restricted the influence of events on the external
1+6
audiences. The conflict was in the Omani province of Dhofar,
beginning in the mid-1960s and ending in 1976. The effectiveness of
the psychological component of this little-known campaign may cause
the reader to reflect upon the preparedness of liberal democracies
to respond in this area if confronted by revolutionary challenges.
This is one of the questions dealt with in the final chapter which




A TRADITION IN THE WORLD
THE REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA OF THE ASSASSINS
Introduction
The Alborz mountains that stand between Persia's central plateau
and the Caspian Sea are dissected by ravines and valleys, many of them
isolated from the outside world. Towards the western end of the
range some vales are dominated by ruined castles. These are the
Valleys of the Assassins 1 , once the hub of a revolutionary movement
feared throughout the Islamic World.
The visitor to Iran in the years prior to the recent upheavals
would have found no mention of these relics in tourist literature,
and if he made his way to the Valleys no guide would have conducted
him around the crumbling fortresses 2 . The Assassins had no place
in the pageant of Persian history presented to visitors by the
Imperial regime. From Cyrus's tomb to the spectacular Pahlavi Stadium,
and from the poet Ferdowsi's Shah Nama (The Epic of the Kings) 3 to
the last Shah's Mission for my Country , the presentation emphasised
monarchy. Threats to the Shah's authority captured the world's
headlines only when they became irresistible: previously the subject
of terrorism was given the minimum publicity, whether this appeared
in the tangible form of the Mojahhedin-e-Khalq (People's Fighters)
and Cherikaye Feyayeen-e-Khalq (People's Fedayeen Guerrillas), or
in the shadowy form of medieval terrorists.
This chapter examines the revolutionaries generally known as the
Assassins, with particular reference to their use of propaganda.
Historical Setting
The unity of the Muslim world foundered shortly after the Prophet's
death on the question of succession. The fourth Mohammedan caliph, Ali,
1. See Freya Stark(ii) The Valleys of the Assassins (London, 1936).
2. The writer visited the valleys and castles twice in l97.
3. Ferdowsi The Epic of the Kings, translated Reuben Levy (London, 1967).
14• His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Pahlavi Mission for my Country
(London, 1961).
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married and had children by the Prophet's daughter, Fatima, before
being murdered in 661 AD (5k All). His elder son, Huaayn, was in turn
killed by troops of the rival house, the Uinayyad. Au's other son,
Hasan, reserved his claims to the caliphate rather than plunge Islam
into civil war.
The great majority of Muslims accepted the subsequent change in the
caliphate, which office they regarded as elective rather than divine:
these are the Surmites. But some held that only true descendants of
the Prophet could inherit the temporal and spiritual powers of Mohammed
and hence Au's offspring alone could be lawful caliphs: these are the
Shi'a. However the Shi'a were themselves divided over which descendant
was the rightful heir. Some believed that A].i had twelve descendants,
known as the Twelve Imams, of whom the twelfth, Muhammed, who
disappeared about the year 873, is still living and will one day
reappear to establish the Shi'ite faith throughout the world. Such are
termed 'Twelve Shi'a', and their beliefs have formed the official
religion of Persia since the sixteenth century. A rival group, the
Ismailis, believed that Ismail, the son of the Imam Ja'far, was
wrongfully deprived of his inheritance. For them Isinail was the
seventh Iiim rather than his younger brother accepted by the Twelvers.5
The fifth descendants of Ismail bad succeeded by 909 in forming
in Tunisia an independent Ismaili state, known as the Fatimid Caliphate.
In its first half-century this caliphate's power was consolidated in
the west only, in North Africa and Sicily. Its ambitions and influence
were, however, directed eastwards towards the heartlands of Islam,
since only by ousting the Sunni Abbasid Caliphs from their seat of
power in Bagdad could the Isinailis establish sovereignty over all
Islam. By 966 Egypt had been conquered and Fatimid troops were
advancing across the Sinai into Palestine and Syria. The Caliph
moved from Tunisia and built a new city, Cairo, as the capital of
his npire. There was erected a new mosque and university, called
al-Azhar, as the citadel of the faith and ideological power-house
for its missionaries, whose task it was to subvert the Sunni
strongholds to the east. The Muslim state derives its sovereignty
from God. No distinction is drawn between things secular and religious
5. See Peter Willey, The Castles of the Assassins, (London, 1963)
Appendix A.
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in law, in jurisdiction, or in authority. Consequently the Caliph
was all-powerful under God, and his missionaries reflected this
power in their appointed districts.
Hasan-i Sabbah
On 30 August 1078 a young middle-class Persian, a convert to
Ismailism, arrived in Cairo to begin his training as a missionary:
his name was Hasan-i Sabbah. The Fatimid Caliphate was at the peak
of its glory and it is unlikely that anyone in Cairo doubted for one
moment the permanence of the Empire and its ideology. During his
three years in Egypt Hasan would have been instructed in all the arts
of propaganda and leadership. He was an ardent revolutionary, a
passionate seeker after knowledge, an extreme ascetic, a powerful
orator, and a ruthless exponent of the art of seizing and
consolidating power. Before departing from Egypt he came into
conflict with the Commander of the Fatimid army, a military dictator
called Badr al-Jamali. Badr's partial usurpation of power from the
Caliph must have outraged the young zealot, to whom any challenge to
God's authority must have seemed sacrilegious. Hasan was deported,
and after surviving shipwreck he reached Isfahan on 10 June 1081, a
fully qualified and licensed missionary or da'i in the service of the
da'wa the Ismaili 'organisation' or 'party'.6
Some forty years earlier Persia bad been overrun by the Se].juk
Turks whose new military empire stretched from Central Asia to the
Mediterranean and. included virtually all the Sunni Caliphate. Instead
of weakening Sunni Islam, the Seijuk invasion gave it new strength.
The conquerers were recent converts, earnest, loyal and orthodox and
took seriously their duty to protect and strengthen the Caliph
against all threats, particularly Ismailism. At the same time the
Lunni theologians countered the intellectual and emotional challenge
of the Ismaili preaching with a revival of faith amongst their
followers. Hasan was thus operating in his own country against the
official religion and against the Seljuk rulers and security forces
who were pledged to uphold orthodoxy. For the first nine years of his
6. This Chapter draws massively on Bernard Lewis, The Aseasins,
A Radical Sect In Islam, (London, 1967).
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mission he travelled extensively throughout Persia before turning
his attention to the northern Caspian provinces of Gilan and
)lazandaran and especially to the mountainous region known as Daylam,
north of Qazvin. The Day].ami hill tribesmen were fiercely independent,
holding to the Zhi'ite rather than the Sunni faith, and had already
been infiltrated by Imaili propaganda. Hasan saw these folk as
politically pure water in which his revolutionary fish might safely
swim, and laid his plans accordingly.
High in the Alborz mountains, on a rock which dominated the
enclosed valley out of which it rose, stood the castle of Alanrnt. Of
ancient origin, Alamut bad been refurbished by an Alid ruler two
hundred years before Hasan set eyes on it. The present occupant was
one Mihdi, who held it for the Se].Juk Sultan. By a mixture of
cunning and bribery Hasan and his followers gained possession. It is
said that he never again left the castle and only twice in the
thirty-five years of life remaining to him did he come out of his
house. 'He was occupied with reading books, committing the words of
the da'wa to writing, and administering the affairs of his realm, and
he lived an ascetic, abstemious, and pious life.'
Even before his base in the Alborz was completely secure, Easan
sent da'is to set up comparable centres of Ismaii power in other
parts of Persia. All made use of disaffected minority groups who were
suffering at the hands of the Seijuk administration, and they mostly
took advantage of mountainous terrain where a small but determined
guerrilla force might hold out against regular troops operating in
distant and unfamiliar terrain. One larnaili base was set up in
Khorasan8 near the Afghan border, another in the south-west in the
Zagros mountains near Arrajan, and a fourth in the fortress of
Shadhdiz on a hill outside Isf'ih n. Meanwhile in Daylam, Hasan's men
occupied Lemsisar and Girdkuh castles, extending the main base area
westward to command the important route linking Qaevin with the
7. Bashid al-Din, Jami al-tavarikh; gusmat-i Ismailiyiyan, edited
Muhammad Taqi Danishpazhuh and Muhammad Mudarris, (Tehran 1338 AK)
p 131. Quoted Lewis, p '4k.
8. Lewis refers to 'Quhistan'. In this account the modern name,
'Khorasan', is used for this part of Iran.
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Caspian coast. The infrastructure of revolt was complete. Then,
just as Hasan was ready to launch his campaign, events in Cairo
provided the necessary ideological spark. In the relatively short
time between Hasan's indoctrination in Cairo and the completion of
his ground work for rebellion in Persia, the Fatimid Empire had
fallen into swift decline. A revolutionary ideology inspired by the
principle of unity and authority, lamailism suffered schism and
defections and fell under military dictatorship contrary to the
spiritual aspiration of its emergence. When in 109k AD the
Caliph al-Muatansir died, the movement was torn apart by the
persistent issue of succession. The dictator Badr al-Jainali, intent
upon consolidating his own power, appointed al-Mustanair's younger
son as the new Caliph. Nizar, the rightful successor, fled to
Alexandria, raised a revolt, but was ].ter captured and murdered.
The Nizari Ismailis
Even within the Fatimid Empire there was opposition to the new
Caliph. Amongst the revolutionaries operating in Sunni territories
to the east, there was total rejection. Ha8an-i Sabban was by this
time the senior da'i in Persia directly responsible to the Chief Da'i
in Cairo. Now he broke away completely, declaring his sect
Nizari Ismailis, with himself as leader. His challenge to Suzmi
orthodoxy and the Seljuk military administration was henceforth
personal and direct, and his followers everywhere rallied behind him.
After the split the Fatimid propaganda was termed the 'Old Preaching',
while the Nizaris proclaimed the 'New Preaching'.
Hasan's position in the Da'wa, the organisation or party of the
New Preaching, was that of Hujja or 'Proof' - the source of the
knowledge of the hidden Imam of the time. He delegated
responsibilities to three subordinate commanders of whom the senior
seems to have been the chief da'i, in charge of religious propaganda,
the second was the vizier or prime minister, and the third was defence
chief, responsible for the security of the base areas. Under Hasan's
leadership these men presumably co-ordinated Nizari strategy. Our
knowledge of the acts of the Assassins is relatively thorough, brought
to us in concise form by the scholarship of Professor Bernard Lewis.9
9. Lewis, op cit.
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From various accounts we can trace in fair detail the tactics
employed. But as to the underlying strategy, we have no historical
evidence and must draw our own conclusions.
The Acts of the Asassinz
The military events fell into two main categories, the
consolidation and defence of the base areas and the killing of
effective opponents of Nizari Ismailism. Of these, the second was
paramount and provided the main instrument for removing opposition to
ideological indoctrination. The first victim was no less a person
than the Seljuk vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, a determined opponent of
Ismailism who in 1092, two years before the 'New Preaching',
instigated the first military expedition against the bases in Daylam
and Thorasan. Easan selected Bu Tahir Arrani from volunteers for
the task of liquidating this over-zealous official. Arrani was
carefully briefed, provided with 'cover' that enabled him to pass
himself off as a Sufi acceptable in the Vizier's entourage, given a
consecrated dagger, and assured of the righteousness of his task and
the certainty of eternal bliss should its accomplishment involve his
own death. Over all these ingredients was poured a kind of adhesive
that bound together the agent, the plan, and its execution - secrecy.
This element was part and parcel of Wizen. Ismailism, which was a
secret backdrop for terrorism. The mission succeeded. Arrani drew
his dagger while the Vizier was being borne in his litter to the
tent of his women. Easan remarked: 'The killing of this devil is
the beginning of bliss.1°
The men who undertook such missions comprised the elite of the
Ismaili military wing and were known as fida'is. They were the 'hit
men' or 'killer squads' of the Da'wa, highly motivated, well trained,
dependable. Sometimes they operated singly, more often in pairs or
larger groups. Daggers were invariably used. Not infrequently,
against important, high risk targets, several such groups would be
10. Rashid al-Din, p 110, quoted Lewis, p 117. (Easan's remark is
remarkably similar to the exultant reactions attributed to the
Italian Red Brigade terrorist leader, Renato Curcio, after
Aldo Moro bad been found murdered.)
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sent out simultaneously to accomplish one mission. Speed, it
would seem, was not of the essence. If it took months or years
for the fida'i to get into position for a kill, that did not
matter. The vital element was reliability: once the decision to
kill a particular individual had been made, the Movement's
credibility depended upon there being no escape for the victim.
An ode in praise of three fida'is, written at the time, probably in
Alamut castle, express.it thus:
Who was he in the world who dared to show impudence towards
this Authority and who has not lost his life?
These cursed enemies of God do not realise that their life
and authority is approaching its limits, that
Every one who thinks of opposing the Lord of the Universe, is
punished by the fate by violent death.
The chosen prophets preached and warned people about this
from the beginning, that such is the promised punishment. 11
Before Hasan's own death in 112l .
 nearly 50 victims died, more than
half in the first ten years of his campaign. The dead included the
Mufti of Isfahan, the Prefect of Bayhaq, the Qadis of Iafahan and
Nishapur, and the Vizier-cum-military chief in Cairo, all too eager
or outspoken in their opposition to the New Preaching. Hasan's
successors continued the same policy. Buzurgumid, the second
Hujja, sent two killers after another vizier, Mu'in al-Din Kashi,
who had urged Sultan Sanjar to attack the Assassins' bases.
Disguised as grooms, the agents used their daggers when summoned to
advise the vizier on the choice of horses. In 1139 a large group of
Nizari Ismailis entered the camp of Sultan Mas'ud where the Caliph
of Baghdad, titular head of Sunni Islam, was being held in protective
custody. They murdered him without a second's thought, since such
chances were rare. The Caliph seems to have been an opportunity
target, in contrast to the carefully selected victims pursued
remorselessly by dedicated killer squads. In Alamut the news of the
murder was received with rejoicing and the Hujja announced seven days
and nights official celebration - the traditional gesture of
11. 'Ode by Hasan in Praise of Three Fidawis', translated
W Ivanow, (i), Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal
Asiatic Society, Vol 1+, 1938 pp 63-72, lines 23-26.
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appreciation after a better than average kill. Buzurgumid's other
victims included the prefects of Isfahan and Tabriz, a governor of
Maragha, and a mufti of Qasvin. Those selected came mainly from two
categories; Seijuk princes, officers and ministers, and Sunn.i qadis
and other religious functionaries. Shi'ites were rarely attacked, nor
were rank and file Sunnis. It was from these classes that the Da'is
sought their converts.
Buzurgumid was succeeded by his son, MuhRmmad, whose score was a
meagre fourteen assassinations. This declining application of Hasan'
methods continued throughout the reigns of Muhammad's son, another
Kasan, MllhRmmad II, Jalal al-Din Hasan, Ala al-Din and the last ruler
of Alamut, Rukn al-Din Khurshah, whose death in 1258 marked the end
of the Assassins' mission in Persia. The Movement was not ,however,
confined to that country. As early as 1102 Kasan-i Sabbah had
despatched missionaries to Syria. Early attempts to operate as urban
terrorists based in Aleppo and Damascus failed. Only when they were
able to fortify mountain strongholds in the Daylam fashion could the
Syrian comrades (rafiq) really feel secure. Many of the Movement's
most spectacular kills were made by these Imigr Persians and their
local recruits: the ruler of Horns, while at prayer in the cathedral
mosque; the Seljuk emir of Mosul; the commander of Fatimid armies in
Egypt; the Fatimid Caliph himself; the first Crusader victim,
Count Raymond II of Tripoli; Conrad of Montferrat and the vizier of
Aleppo, to mention only the more distinguished. Two attempts, both
unsuccessful, were made on the life of Saladin. The Syrian-based
Assassine were effectively extinguished in 1273.
Defending the Bases
The establishment and defence of base or 'liberated' areas was a
more conventional type of enterprise than the assassination campaign.
The Alamut strongholds were attacked repeatedly throughout the i68 years
that the Ismailis held them. Some offensives petered out for want of
zeal on the part of the Seijuk attackers. Others were discontinued at
the death of a sultan, when all existing policy fell apart until the
ensuing power-struggle eventually threw up a new ruler. More than one
besieging commander was bribed off. When in 1117 the Sultan's direct
assaults failed, he turned to a policy of food denial. 'For eight
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consecutive years', recorded the Persian historian Juvayni, 'the
troops came to Rudbar and destroyed the crops 	 ,12	 was
evidently the correct tactic, for 'in their (the Assassins')
castles there was a great famine and the people lived on grass'.13
But once again the Nizaria were saved by the death in Isfahan of the
Sultan, whereupon the troops dispersed, leaving all their stores,
arms and implements to their foes.
In Khorasan the Seijuk forces fared a little better,
succeeding on some occasions in clearing the Ismailia from parts of
their base area. But no thorough-going clearing-up operation was
ever mounted, with the result that the Assassins were always able to
infiltrate back and re-establish their ascendancy. Elsewhere in
Persia the Seijuk security forces were able to crush the Assassins.
Bases in the Zagroe and near Isfahan both fell in 1107, the latter
holding out longer than might otherwise have been the case by the
imaginative use of psychological warfare.
Sultan Muh,mmad Tapar laid siege to Shandiz castle outside
Isfahan on 2 April, but this event had already been delayed five
weeks by false reports of external threats - a deception plan put
about by Nizari agents in the Sultan's camp. When the siege began to
hurt, the Assassin leader Thn Attash managed to promote a religious
controversy. He had it put to the Sultan that their differences were
unimportant and did not justify war between Moslems, even though they
differed over the Imemate. This argument impressed many of the
Sultan's advisors and introduced a measure of ambivilance into Seijuk
thought and action. When this argument was eventually rejected, the
Nizaria played on humanitarian sentiments. They would agree to quit
Shandiz if the Sultan provided for their safety from mob vengeance by
giving them another fortress in the vicinity. Negotiations finally
broke down when the Nizaris failed to resist the temptation to 'rub
out' the emir most eloquently denouncing their proposal. When
Shandiz had finally been conquered, Ibn Attash was paraded through the
12. Ata Malik Juvayni, Ta'rikh-i Jahan-gusha, edited
Ilirza Muhammad Qazvini, translated into English by J A Boyle as
The History- of the World-Conqueror (2 Vols) (Manchester, 1958)
Vol II, p 68i.
13. Ju.vayni, Vol II, p 681.
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streets of Isfahan before he was flayed alive 1
 his skin stuffed with
straw, and his head sent to Baghdad. It was the end of Nizari military
power in that region, and in consequence the security of the castles
in Daylam was more than ever vital to the New Preaching.
Appreciating the increased strategic importance of his main base
area, Buzurgumid in 1127 had an additional castle built, midway
between Alainut and Lamasar, called Maymundiz. This is the only
important defence work constructed from scratch by the Nizaris, all
their other castles being seized from previous occupants. It shows
the same originality in design as the style of their campaign. Instead
of building upwards on the summit of a hill, the Assassins chose a near
vertical mountainside, and built horizontally into it, anticipating by
some 800 years the great defensive works 'Maginot' and 'Siegfried'.
With its entrances half-way between the foot and peak of the tall
escarpment, and with ladders easily withdrawn by the occupants,
ik!4aymundiz presented a baffling problem to any attacker.
Defeat
The strongholds of Daylam proved invulnerable to all assaults by
the Seijuks. But early in the thirteenth century a new power arose
from the north-east beside which the Seijuks seemed puny - the Mongols.
In 1219 Genghiz Khan led his army across the River Jaxartes. By 1221
he had captured the Muslim cities of Sainarkand and Bukhara, crossed the
river Oxus, taken Balkh, Mary and Nishapur and much of eastern Persia.
Genghiz died in 1227 but three years later his successor continued the
march of conquest and by 12k0 the Mongols had overrun western Persia
and were invading Georgia, Armenia and Meeopotamia. The Assassin
strongholds were surrounded by the Golden Horde.15 The last Hujja,
Rukn al-Din Khurshah, knew power when he saw it, and he saw it
clearly in these heathen Mongol invaders. He decided that, rather than
ik. For a description of Maymundiz see Wiley, Op cit.
15. A C Ashworth and others have concluded that Genghis Khan's armies
were never numerically overwhelming but encouraged rumours as to
their invincible strength for psychological reasons. Another
interpretation might attribute the 'horde' legend to vanquished
commanders seeking exoneration. See Ashworth, op cit.
resist, he would attempt a deal with Rulegu, Genghiz's grandson,
who in 1256 was ordered to crush Nizari defiance.
Rukn al-Din opened his diplomacy with a message to the Mongol
commander in Hamadan, offering to 'tread the path of submission and
scrape the dust of disaffection from the countenance of loyaltyl.16
In fact his intentions were less straightforward. Rulegu expressed
willingness to accept submission, provided the Assassins destroyed
their castles and Rukn al-Din came to him in person. The Hujja
evidently thought he could spin out negotiations and retain his base
area more or less intact, bending before the wind without being
uprooted. However for Hulegu, submission had to be total and
unconditional. While Rukn al-Din dithered in Mayinundiz, Hulegu' a
army entered the Valley and took up positions around the three
castles.
flukn al-Din's conditional offer of surrender was fatal to
prospects of determined defence, and his unwillingness to fulfil the
conditions stipulated by Hulegu was equally fatal to hopes for a
congenial surrender. He did eventually give himself up to the
besiegers and was initially well received by Hulegu. But when the
Hujja had used his influence to induce most of the fortresses in Daylam
and Khorasan to surrender and when it was clear that his authority
could not end resistance by the garrisons of Lamaear and Girdkuh, his
usefulness to the Mongols was at an end. The Persian historian
Juvayni described the final act: 'He and his followers were kicked
to a pulp and then put to the sword: and of him and his stock no
trace was left, and he and his kindred became but a tale on men's
lips and a tradition in the world.' 17
Once the citadel had fallen the movement lost its purpose,
fragmented, and became a minor sect in Islam. The main surviving
heirs of the Assassins are the Khoja community of India, with the
Aga Khan as spiritual head.
16. Juvayni, Vol II, p 712-3.
17. Juvayni, Vol II, pp 7214_5.
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Reflections on the Assassins' Possible Strategy
The tactics adopted by the Assassins might be seen as the first
phase of classic guerrilla warfare strategy as demonstrated in this
century by Mao Tee-twig. In this model the base areas would have
spawned guerrilla armies to operate throughout the country. Areas
cleared of Seljuk influence would have been ruled by an 'alternative
government' claiming the allegiance of the whole nation. Finally,
when the security forces were sufficiently weakened, an expanded
guerrilla force would have challenged the Seijuk army in open battle.
If Hasan-i Sabbah and his successors did have this strategy in mind,
they never progressed beyond Stage I - the establishment of base areas
and small scale guerrilla attacks. However in view of the confident
and protracted character of Assassin operations it seems unlikely that
they were forever stuck in a preliminary phase. Another possible
strategy would have used terror as the decisive weapon. Attrition by
assassination, particularly amongst the Seljuk leadership, wear and
tear on nerves from living in perpetual fear and uncertainty,
inability to control a deteriorating situation, the 'climate of
collapse' - all this might have led to surrender. Although this type
of terrorist activity may have been important to the overall plan, it
seems improbable that the murders themselves constituted the prime
threat to Seljuk rule. Even pusillanimous regimes tend to resist
such pressures, growing tougher in the process, and however wearing
the threat of assassination may have been it is unlikely that this
alone would have posed a credible threat to established authority.
If neither clash of arms nor reign of terror was to bring about
the triumph of the New Preaching, what was? The answer is surely to be
found in the question itself, in the words 'New Preaching'. Nizari
Ismailjsin was first and foremost a messianic creed, the fulfilment of
God's purpose on earth. At the same time it provided a means of
undermining a hated domination, and a release of pent-up forces of
passion, devotion and social aspiration. Perhaps the ideological
conversion of the people was the cornerstone of Nizari strategy, and
the evidence available of propaganda methods, set out below, tends to
support this view. Subversion would reach through all classes of the
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population, into the administration, the army and the Seijuk
leadership itself. One day the Sultan would awake to find he was
ruling a Nizari Ismaili Kingdom, at which moment his power would
evaporate. Violence may have acted in support of this mission, without
being seen as the decisive instrument. This interpretation helps us
to make sense of the acts of the Assassins, and it may also guide us
towards an understanding of why their cause never achieved more than
partial success.
Propaganda among the Persian masses must have required a great
number of da'is. We read very little about the work of these
subversive missionaries, infiltrating the villages and cities,
bazaars, and homes of Persian Sunnites. They must have proclaimed the
New Preaching mainly by face-to-face propaganda, since overt addresses
to crowds and assemblies would have provoked immediate action by the
religious and military authorities. Small secret gatherings of converts
in 'safe houses' no doubt took place, against the constant risk of
infiltration by government agents, or discovery by treachery or poor
security. The remorseless nature of this subversion, and its
success, would have been a source of severe anxiety and hatred to the
orthodox, partly because it posed a threat that military power could
not counter, and partly because of that special fanaticism with which
any religion opposes heresy, a far more fearful and vindictive hate
than anything expended upon the heathen.
We get some idea of the numbers of Nizari converts from reports
of spasmodic pogroms organised by the Seljuks, usually in revenge for
some assassination. Abbas, the governor of Ravy, ordered such a
massacre and is said to have built a tower of Ismaili skulls. So did
the ruler of Mazandaran. When the loyal population of Isfahan
demanded effective security force action against the Assassin bases,
action that was easier proposed than accomplished, the Sultan appeased
them by permitting or encouraging a massacre of converts in the city.
Officers, equally frustrated by lack of a decisive counter-insurgency
policy, led their troops in support of the citizens in the hunt for
suspects. Since Nizari security was good and the identities of
converts uncertain, legal and humanitarian considerations were
overlooked in the thirst for vengeance. Suspects were rounded up,
taken to the great square, and put to death. Clearly, if converts or
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suspected converts were there to be killed in large numbers, the
impact of the Nizari propaganda must have been considerable. It is
hardly surprising that the Sunni historians of the time left no
records of conversions. No ideology likes to admit to the possibility
of a stronger ideal.
The training of da'is in sufficient numbers and over the
time-scale of a prolonged campaign made a necessity of securebase
areas, particularly the main ideological centre at Alamut. Killer
squads could, with difficulty, have operated from urban hideouts whereas
a seminary for large scale missionary teaching could not. If the bases
were never intended to be used as springboards for a large scale
guerrilla campaign, their remoteness would have posed no problems to
their ideological incumbents, though making difficulties for armies
sent to conquer them.
The supporting role allotted to the fida' is can be likened to that
of naval escorts charged with ensuring the safe passage of a great
ship: they were to remove all dangers from its course. Whereas the
navy would be concerned with mines, submarines and surface attack, the
fida'ia dealt with princes 1
 military commanders, teachers and
religious leaders who interfered with the work of the da'is or closed
the minds of the people to indoctrination. The roots of regicide and
tyrannicide lie buried in ancient history and the practice of killing
the unrighteous was established in Islamic tradition long before
Easan-i Sabbah's day. As early as 661 AD (5k AH) the Kharijite murder
of the Caliph Au was glorified thus:
O blow delivered by a God-fearing man who desired with it nothing
but the satisfaction of the master of the ThroneL
On the day I &i1l invoke his name and I am certain that of all
creation he will weigh most heavily in the scales of the
Lord. 18
Easan's strategy involved harnessing what had hitherto been a rare and
special religious obligation to kill to a sustained form of warfare.
The killing by an Assassin of a victim selected by the Organisation was
always an act of piety. By long and thorough indoctrination, the
fida'is believed utterly in the righteousness of their actions and in
i8. Poem by Qatari b. al-Tuja'a quoted in Gustave von Grunebaum,
Medieval Islam, (Chicago, 195k) p 122.
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the certainty of salvation in the event of their being killed in
action. By long and arduous military training, the same men
possessed the skills, qualities and strength that ensured success.
Assassin propaganda loaded the dice so that whether a fida'i
perished or survived in the course of an operation, the Movement was
able to benefit, Death brought the pious executioner immediate and
eternal bliss in the next world and a place of honour on the roll of
martyrs in Alamut. Survival provided scope for mocking the
impotence of authority. Hasan's Ode recorded:
None of these warriors for the cause of the sacred Word
received any injury in this affair from the arms of the
enemy.
All. three came back, with the help of the Qa'im, bringing
victory and happiness to all sides. 19
The choice of a victim seemed to be governed by two
considerations; the elimination of the particular functionary who
stood in the way, the direct physical effect, and the terrorisirig of
others against following the same course, the indirect propaganda
effect. 20 There is ample evidence to show that the propaganda
pay-off was often great. Fear of being next on the list prompted
elaborate security measures, which themselves discredited authority
and advertised the Assassins' prowess, and many important individuals,
impressed by the fida'is' proven ability to penetrate even the most
thorough security screen, bought their safety by adopting an
ambivilant or frankly passive attitude towards Nizari Ismailistn.
After the da'is had converted some Seljuk troops, 'No commander or
officer dared to leave his house unprotected; they wore armour under
clothes, and even the vizier Abu'l-Hasan wore a mail shirt under his
clothes'. 21 The ex-Caliph al-Rajhid probably believed himself secure
while recuperating in Isfahan, attended only by his trusted servants.
Only when death was upon him did he discover that some of his
19. Ode by Hasan, lines 20-21.
20. Which corresponds with the ancient Chinese dictum 'Kill one,
frighten ten thousand'.
21. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi'l .-ta'rikh, edited by C J Tornberg,
(Leiden-Upsala, 1851-76), Vol X, p 220, quoted Lewis, p 51.
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employees were in fact fida'is. Sa].adin's two narrow escapes caused
him thereafter to sleep in a specially constructed wooden tower.
This climate of fear and grudging respect for Assassin efficiency
sometimes obviated the need for violence. Many were the tactical
alliances, tacit or acknowledged, that cleared the road to Nizari
I8xnailiam. Sometimes it was necessary to coerce. 'Rasan-i Sabbah
would send ambassadors to seek peace but his offers were not
accepted. lie then by all manner of wiles bribed certain of the
Sultan'e courtiers to defend him before the Sultan; and he suborned
one of his eunuchs with a large sum of money and sent him a dagger, which
was stuck in the ground beside the Sultan's bed one night when he lay
in a drunken sleep. When the Sultan awoke and saw the dagger he was
filled with alarm but not knowing whom to suspect he ordered the
matter to be kept secret. Hasan-i Sabbah then sent a messenger with
the following message: "Did I not wish the Sultan well, that dagger
which was stuck into the hard ground would have been planted in his
soft breast". The Sultan took flight and from then on inclined
towards peace with them ... In short, during his reign they enjoyed
ease and tranquility.'	 As with princes, so with academics. In
his lectures to theologica]. students the great Sunni theologian
Takiir al-Din specifically attacked Nizari Ismailism, undermining the
da'ia' propaganda. The reader will hardly need to be told that a
fida'i was despatched from Alamut to deal with him.
According to the story23, the assassin joined Pakhr al-Din's
class and bided his time. After seven months he found an excuse to
see his teacher alone in his study. Drawing his dagger, he threw the
older man to the ground, sat upon. him, and cursed him for insulting
the New Preaching. After extracting a solemn undertaking from
l'akhr al-Din that he would revise his sermons, the fida'i produced a
bag containing 365 gold dinars. These represented the first payment
of an annual remittance offered by the Da'wa in exchange for the
theologian's neutrality. The terrified Fakhr al-Din accepted, and
22. Juvayni, Vol II, pp 681-2.
23. Rashid al-Din, p 170-3, quoted Lewis, pp 75-76.
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thereafter dropped all offensive comment about the Nizari Ismailis.
If this account is essentially accurate it demonstrates subtlety
and flexibility on the part of the Assassins. Presumably they
calculated that the killing of so renowned and respected a figure as
Fakhr al-Dip would rebound to their discredit, and they may also have
foreseen the propaganda value of a sympathetic moral stance towards
Ismailism by this famous teacher. Apparently it had its effect, for
we are told that at some later date one of the students asked
Takhr al-Din why his views had changed. 'It is not advisable to
curse the Ismailis', the theologian replied, 'for they have both
weighty and trenchant arguments'.
Propaganda Methods
Our examination of possible Assassin strategies leaves one
important question unanswered. If, as this study tentatively
concludes, the main thrust of Nizari policy was in the direction of
mass conversions to the New Preaching, what methods were used to
bring about such conversions? Hasan-i Zabbah was trained as a da'i
by the Isinailis and as chief of the Persian mission under that
authority he undoubtedly trained his da'is in an identical fashion.
The switch from the Old to the New Preaching would have involved changes
in the content of the teaching by Nizari da'is. It is, however, rather
unlikely that at so critical a moment Hasan would have changed
their organisation and methods, which had served so well in the
past. If this assumption is correct we can learn precisely how
the Assassins spread their propaganda from an eleventh century
2kdocument describing the ideal virtues of the Isinaili da'i.
It is clear from this evidence that the responsibilities of the
da'i were tremendous, and the candidate had to possess exceptional
talents to be fit for the duty. Once he was appointed, however, he
was given full authority. He had to use his own discretion,
conforming with the general tendency and spirit of his mission, and
he was not encouraged to bother his superiors with trivial and routine
2k. Sayyid-na Ahmad, The Virtues of the Da'i According to
Al-Himma, translated by W Ivanow, see Note 25.
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matters. With authority went responsibility for results. 'If God
asks the Imam to account for the welfare of the community, the Inm
refers Him to the da'i in charge, who takes upon himself the whole
responsibility for this.' 25
The document begins by stressing the high personal qualities
needed by a da'i and the need for correct and zealous ideological
convictions. 'The highest virtue of those who carry on propaganda in
favour of the Saints of God, their greatest work, and the highest
attainment - is their own righteousness arising from sincere devotion,
self control based on religious feeling, convincing preaching, soul
healing admonitions.126 The da'i was warned neither to slacken in
the discharge of his duties, nor to allow his own personal example
to falter. Moderate in his needs, he was required to cultivate an
active mind, broad vision and indifference to his own fate, while
developing inspiring leadership. The dictum that familiarity breeds
contempt was applied: 'He must strictly observe his own actions so
as not to give any reason to them (his converts) to treat him
lightly, or lose respect to his orders ... But his imposing manners
should be accompanied by a real attitude of goodwill, quiet dignity,
kindness to everyone, inviting address and pleasant companionship.'27
In short, he needed to have leadership qualities.
Within his allotted territorial or ethnic preserve (jazira,
literally island) the da'i's first task was to study his community,
know its affairs and aspirations, and tailor his propaganda to the
consumers, 'in such a way as not to overtax the intelligence and the
patience of his audience ... He must learn to observe the p:eople,
recognize the state of their minds, their abilities, extent of their
endurance. This is the moat important knowledge needed by the da'i for
the organisation and training of his followers.28 In today's
25. W Ivanow, (ii) 'The Organisation of the Fatimid Propaganda'.
Article in Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society, Vol 15, (Bombay, 1939), p 1. The Article contains the
translation described in Note 2k.
26. Abmad, p 15.
27. Abmad, p 16.
28. Abmad, p 15
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terminology, he had to assess accurately the receptivity and
susceptibility of his target audiences. If there were influential
persons whose ideas and opinions could not safely be disregarded the
da'i might make tactical alliances even if their standards and ideals
were far removed from his own. The technique we now term entryislnh
was not overlooked. A da'i was encouraged to associate with local
religious authorities, professing respect for their ideas of piety,
so as to appear friendly and helpful, while all the time using this
close association as an opportunity to divert their loyalties
towards his own preaching.
	
Amongst the converted, the principle of 'carrot and
	 was
to be applied. 'Re must treat nicely those who do their best, giving
them the position which they deserve according to their behaviour
but he must punish those whose behaviour is not good, and of whose evil
actions he comes to know.' 29
 Punishment could be harsh. Sinners were
to be excommunicated and boycotted until they begged repentance, more
serious offenders would be flayed alive: 'others to be executed in
some other way for their mischief ... The da'i should punish his
followers for every error, leaving nothing neglected or overlooked.
In this way he disciplines them'. Just as the da'i's authority over
his converts was absolute, so it was his duty to preserve peace
between his followers aM reconcile their disputes. For an Ismaili to
turn to the sultan or qadi, the secular and orthodox religious
leaders respectively, was a sin deserving condemnation. Thus the
established authorities for law enforcement, justice and spiritual
guidance were usurped, and the 'alternative regime' began to emerge.
A follower's loyalty might be put to the test by the da'i ordering
him to kill his own brother or some other relative. 'Those who are
sincerely devoted must do this, however hard such orders may be. And
if they do not comply, the da'i should excommunicate them. Those who
	
sincerely obey such test orders, receive great blessing.' 	 Echoes
of Abraham? Ritual murder of this kind was postulated eight centuries
later by Dostoyevaky in his book The Possessed. Stavrogin explains to
hesitant conspirators:
29. Ahmad, p 17.
30. Ahniad, p 17.
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All that business of titles and sentimentalism is a very good
cement, but there is something better; persuade four members
of the circle to do for a fifth on the pretence that he is a
traitor, and you'll tie them all together with the blood they've
shed as though it were a knot. They'll be your slaves, they
won't dare to rebel or call you to account. 31
The attribution of treachery to the intended victim of nineteenth
century Russian revolutionaries may be seen as a concession to
squeamishness that was thought either unnecessary or undesirable
in a circle of secret converts to Iainailism. But the end purpose of
the rite ,
 was the same - the burning of bridges by the killer and
others implicated. After obeying such a command, there could be no
turning back.
Although directed at today's problems, Professor Ellul's remarks
on this form of propaganda are remarkably apt:
For action makes propaganda's effect irreversible. He who acts
in obedience to propaganda can never go back. He is now
obliged to believe in that propaganda because of his past
action. He is obliged to receive from it his justification and
authority, without which hia action will seem to him absurd and
unjust, which would be intolerable ... The man who has acted in
accordance with the existing propaganda has taken his place in
society. From then on he has enemies. Often he has broken
with his milieu or his family; he may be compromised ... 32
Conclusions on Strategy
It seems reasonably safe to conclude that the strategy adopted
by the Assassins was remarkably similar to that of modern terrorism.
Realisirig that a minority sect was unable to overthrow the established
regime by direct armed attack, Rasan and his successors set out to
subvert the loyalty of the population to the point where the old
establishment could no longer function, and a take-over would be
possible. This process would take time, and the propagandists also
needed some form of protection against effective counter-measures.
31. Fy-odor Dostoyevsky, The Possessed, translated Constance Garnett,
(London, 191k) p 351. (For an historical example of this type
of behaviour, see Wilkinson, p 101.)
32. Ellul (i) pp 29-30.
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Both were to be provided by the supporting actions of the killer
squads, whose spectacular deeds would enhance the credibility of the
Nizari Ismailis and diminish the legitimacy of the Seijuk government.
Terror also deterred officials, soldiers and teachers from their duty.
We may never know how many attacks on the Alamut bases were called
off by frightened leaders or how often the work of da'is went
uninterrupted for fear of vengeance, any more than we can tell how
many airlines today pay protection money to Palestinian terrorist
groups. We have seen, however, that in present-day Italy it can be
difficult to persuade judges and jurors to serve, and that in Northern
Ireland witnesses will not always come forward. Terror as a weapon
of survival is common enough today, and may have accounted for the
Assassins' ability to operate for so many years. If this
interpretation is correct then it upsets the generally accepted
wisdom which argues that, tyrannicide apart, the origins of modern
terrorism lie in the nineteenth century. 33 The Assassins, it would
seem, were the archetypal terrorist group. Theirs, moreover, was an
international movement. They established missions in Syria,
Afghanistan and India, besides their main centre in Persia. Killer
squads from Syria struck in Egypt and once, somewhat surprisingly,
in Persia. Later, when the Syrian mission was temporarily disorganised,
a Persian team from Alamut killed the Turkish ruler in Damascus.
We are left to ponder why, in spite of their ideological
dedication, disciplined propaganda organisation and impressive
military capability, the Assassins failed. The da'is made many
converts. Yet in the process they seem also to have alienated
majority opinion; hence the lynching of the Ismaili envoy as he left
the Sultan's palace in Isfahan and the readiness of non-Nizaris to
indulge in massacres. The fida'is' success in curbing official action
against the Assassins may also have produced side-effects unforeseen
by and unwelcome to the Lords of Alamut. When ordinary people suspect
that their leaders are evading their responsibilities and allowing a
minority, quite literally, to get away with murder, resentment becomes
acute. Conceivably the killings that were intended to facilitate
33. See, for instance, Walter Laqueur (Ed) The Terrorism Reader
(Philadelphia, 1978).
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conversions by the da'is indirectly raised a psychological barrier
between the converted and the orthodox.
These possibilities provide only part of the answer. To find
the primary reason for Nizari failure we must consider the main thrust
of their attack, propaganda. Against such an assault the soundest
defence would have been strong, convincing counter-propaganda.
Hasan-i Sabbah launched his rebellion in the face of a great Sunni
revival, brought about by the threat from the soon defunct Patimid
Ismailism. This misfortune was compounded by the Seljuks' strong
sense of duty to Islam, as the new protectors of the Caliph and
masters of the Muslim world.
	 Unfortunately for Hasan the tide of
revolution was already on the ebb when in 1081 he returned to Persia
ready to begin his mission. Nevertheless, his combined use of politics,
propaganda and terrorism for revolutionary ends posed problems for
authority that were only eventually solved by outside intervention,
and he left us, in Juvayni's words, a tradition in the world.
Discrediting the Assassins
History has play-ed tricks with the Assassin's story, both in
Islam and Christendom. One of the ways that men humiliated by
Nizari. terror took revenge, was to blacken the reputations of their
tormentors. All the contemporary historians wrote from the orthodox
Sunni viewpoint. There was no radical, investigative author writing
'from the other side'. The Assassins planted more than humiliation
in the hearts of their enemies. They created a seething indignation,
a sense of outraged decency. Hasan-i Zabbah's terror tactics had
broken all the unwritten rules of warfare that tend to expose the lower
orders end junior officers to the greatest risks and protect the
privileged and senior. The fida'is reversed this graduation, exposing
the frailty and impermanence, and often the cowardice, of the
supposedly grand and elite. On top of these secular considers tions
the need remained to expurgate a heresy.
One worrying facet of the Nizari heresy was the Movement's hold
over its members. The dedication of the da'ia and the fanatical zeal
3k. Lewis, p 32.
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of the fida'is, for whom death was of no consequence provided the
mission was accomplished, posed unanswerable questions to the
orthodox. Rather than admit the possibility that a heresy might
inspire so strong a commitment, myths were invented to explain away
the tenacity and the courage. The most enduring of these
conceptions arose in Syria, where the Arabic word hashishi was
attached to the Nizari Ismailis, in Lewis's opinion almost certainly
as an expression of contempt for their wild beliefs and extravagant
behaviour rather than a description of their practices. The meaning
of the word is rather obvious, one who uses Indian Hemp or Cannabis.
In no time the potential of this word to discredit and to explain
led to the connection being reversed, and the story being applied to
the entire Nizari movement. In the revised version the insurgents
really did take drugs, and the drugs accounted for their behaviour.
The term of contempt 'hahishi' became widely used as a name for the
Nizari sect: after appearing in variant forms 'assassini' and
'aseisaini', it settled in the name we know today - the Assassins.35
Marco Polo travelled through Persia in 1273, only seventeen years
after the surrender of Alamut to the Mongols. Already, the version of
Nizari motivation 'sold' to him by his hosts relied heavily upon drug
abuse. The Venetian recorded the story faithfully and in due course
spread the word in Europe, where the acts of the Assassins had already
aroused much interest. Like all good myths, this one is better than
reality, hence its enduring appeal. Marco Polo wrote:
The Old Man thought of an unheard-of wickedness, that he should
make men bold murderers, who are commonly called assassins, by
whose courage he might kill whoever he wished and be feared by
all. He dwelled in a most noble valley shut in between two very
high mountains where there was abundance and delight. There were
set to dwell ladies and damsels the most beautiful in the world,
all trained in making all the dalliance and allurements to men
that can be imagined.
Sometimes the Old Man, when he wished to kill any lord who made
war or was his enemy, put some of these youths into that Paradise
by fours and sixes and by tens or twelves and by twenties
together. He had opium to drink given them by which they fell
35. In the same way, the urban guerrilla movements mentioned in
the introduction to this chapter were referred to by Imperial
Iranian authority, collectively and dismissively, as 'Islamic
Marxists'.
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asleep as if half dead immediately, as soon as they had drunk
it, and they slept quite three days and three nights. Then he
had them taken in this sleep and put into that garden of his,
into different rooms of palaces, and there made them awake, and
they found themselves there.
And when the youths were waked up they believe that they are most
truly in Paradise. And the ladies and damsels stayed with them
all day playing and singing and causing great enjoyment, and
they did with them as they pleased, so that these youths bad all
that they wished. And after four or five days when the Old Man
wishes any of his assassins to send to any place and to have any
man killed, then he has the drink opium given again, and when
they are asleep he has them taken into his palace which was
outside the garden. When the youths are awakened the Old Man
asks them whence they come, and those say that they come from
Paradise. And the Old Man answered them, son, this is by the
commandment of our prophet Mohomet, that whoever defends his
servant he will grant to him Paradise; and if thou art
obedient to me thou shalt have this favour. Through this means
he 80 inspirited all his people to die that they might go to
Paradise that he whom the Old Man ordered to go to die for his
name reckoned himself happy, with sure hope of deserving to go
to Paradise, so that as many lords or others who were enemies
of the Old Man were killed with these followers and assassins,
because none feared death if only he could do the commandment,
and they exposed themselves like madmen to every manifest
danger, wishing to die together with the King's enemy and
despising the present life. And for this reason he was feared
in all those countries as a tyrant. 36
Other stories told of the 'Old Man of the Mountains' ordering his
bodyguards to march to their deaths off the ramparts of Alamut, as an
after-dinner entertainment for his guests.
Throughout their campaign the Assassins doubtless saw themselves
as soldiers in a sacred cause, battling the forces of evil, while the
Seljuks and Sunnis regarded the fida' is as fanatical criminals of a
most treacherous, ruthless and dangerous kind. This dichotomy, common
to all insurrections, baa no easy resolution; more often than not the
historians have had the last word, approving of the rebels as heroes
when they have triumphed and dismissing them as ruffians when they
failed. 37
 Europeans, free of bias concerning the Islamic ideological
36. Marco Polo, The Description of the World, edited by A C Houle and
Paul Pelliot, (London, 1938) Vol I, pp 129-132.
37. Ellul writes: 'Proof through history is nowadays regarded as the
proof. Ue in whose favour history decides, was right. But what
is it 'to be right" when one speaks of history? It is to win, to
survive, ie, to be the strongest. This would mean that the
strongest and the most efficient, nowadays, is the possessor of
the truth.' (Ellul (i), p 23k).
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dispute, were impressed by the bravery and fanatical devotion of the
Assassins, and initially connected that name to unswerving loyalty
and service. Only later did the association shift from the spirit
to the act, and the word became synonymous with political murder.
It is perhaps ironic that our modern usage of the word assassin has
been stretched to include the injury suffered by the Nizari Ismailis
as well as the fate they imposed upon their victims. When we speak
of 'character-assassination' we twist the knife in the wound.
Discussion
Propaganda was evidently an important part of the Assassins'
revolutionary strategy, possibly the most important. It was used
to spread the New Preaching amongst 'neutrals' and sometimes among
'enemies', the Seljuk forces. Against the converted, 'friends', it
provided discipline, commitment and passionate devotion. Towards
'enemies', that is to say the government and its agents, it was
assisted by the instrument of terror and paralysed effective responses.
Propaganda was thus both 'strategic', to bring victory through
ideological conversion, and 'tactical', to keep the campaign alive
and weaken resistance. As this was a religious movement, the message
style would probably have been mainly emotional, but quasi-rational
argument was possibly drawn in when economic and social grievances were
exploited. Most forms of propaganda were directed inwards at domestic
audiences, enjoying the strength inherent in this form of
communication. The difficulties of addressing messages to foreign
target audiences in India, Syria and other outside areas were overcome
by enlisting locals into the movement, who became the propagandists
for their own territories. Everywhere, organisation was a vital
ingredient. Adherents were made to commit themselves beyond the point
of no return, and then became totally subject to Nizari discipline and
teaching, needing more propaganda to su8tain their actions and
self-respect. The recruitment of new members by cells of oath-bound
converts is a method sometimes called horizontal propaganda,
recognised today in two forms, that of Chinese propaganda and of
group dynamics in human relations. Ellul sees both as integration
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propaganda, 8
 in our case moulding recruits into obedient and
willing disciples.
Within the movement,propaganda themes created a sense of absolute
righteousness (Saints of God), an aura of mysticism and discipline,
and an intense hatred of Seijuk and Sunni domination (Devils).
Killing became an act of piety (Bliss) and martyrdom in the service
of the Da'wa, a certain passport to eternity. With these convictions,
courage was readily available and acts of courage created the fida'is'
reputation for irresistibility. Resistance was made to seem hopeless,
and co-operation, desirable. The ultimate triumph of the revolution was
said to be inevitable. Other themes included terror, the mocking of
security force endeavours, the legitimacy of the 'alternative regime'
and the credibility of its power, and the spreading of a 'climate of
collapse'.
The Seijuk response to the threat posed by Assassin tactical
propaganda and the terror that gave it its strength was feeble.
Officials lacked the individual and collective strength of will to
stand up to violence and the threat of violence, and because of their
weakness the problem grew worse. Short-term convenience, it would
seem, prevailed over long-term solutions. If the Assassins were our
archetypa). terrorists, the Seijuk authorities may have set a pattern
too often repeated by governments confronted by such a threat. Against
the strategic propaganda, the religious subversion, the Sunni response
was evidently good. By mounting a revival of faith amongst the people,
the orthodox beliefs outlived the Nizari Ismaili challenge. The power
of propaganda to blacken reputations and distort history was amply
demonstrated by subsequent events.
38. £llul (i), pp 80-8i.
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CHAPTER III
PROPAGANDA 07 THE DEED
THE 1916 EASTER RISING
I have turned my Face
To this road before me,
To the deed that I see 	 1
And the death I shall die.
These lines, written in 1912 by a Dublin barrister-turned-
schoolmaster, foretold with remarkable accuracy the events of
Easter 1916. A handful of violent Irish nationalists led by
Patrick Pears., the schoolmaster-poet, were to commit a deed and die
deaths which together would create a myth of massive and enduring
strength. It is probably true to say that. Ireland would never be the
same after Pearee had fulfilled hi. own prophecy.
This chapter examines Irish revolutionary propaganda in the period
leading up to Easter 1916, the 'propaganda of the deed' that occurred
in Holy Week, the exploitation of the deed for political purposes, and
the reactions of the United Kingdom authorities.
Spring 1916
In the early Spring of 1916 Ireland enjoyed greater prosperity,
better government and happier relations with the English than anyone
could remember. Irishmen could vote, join the Civil Service,
practise religion as they pleased and enjoy constitutional rights
equal to any in the United Kingdom. The political struggle for
Home Rule had triumphed in the House of Commons and there was reason
to hope that the measure would be implemented as soon as the war against
Germany was over. This bad been achieved by John Redmond's Irish
Parliamentary (Rome Rule) Party, and majority opinion was firmly
behind this leader.
Ireland's youth had responded eagerly to the massive recruiting
drive launched by Britain's armed services in 191k. The propaganda
1. Patrick Pearse'Renunciation Verse 5, quoted Ruth Dudley Edwards
Patrick Pearse, The Triumph of Failure, (London, 1977) p 156.
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themes of the rape of Belgium, and of manhood held cheap by those who
did not volunteer to resist Germany, caught the imaginations of Irish
men and women as actively as they captivated English, Scots and
Welsh. By late 1915 there were a quarter-million Irishmen fighting
with the armies in Trance and GaUipoli. The war had also brought
prosp•rity to Ireland. Thigland'. need of food and wool, as well as
labour, meant income and Jobs. Th. British Ad{n(stration, based at
Dublin Castle, was anyt h4
 but oppressive. The Chief Secretary for
Ireland was Augustine BirreU. As a member of Prime Minister Asquith' a
Cabinet, Birre].3. divided his ties between London and Dublin, leaving
the day to day work in the relaxed hands of the Under Secretary,
Sir Matthew Nathan. Both men were genuinely fond of Ireland and
dedicated to th. task of good dm4n4stration, though realistic in
their assessment of grass-root opinion. 'Irsl*nd', wrote Birrell in a
memo to Nathan in 1915, 'is, I am sure, in a rotten state - rip, for
a row, without leadership' . 	 Besides these administrators there was
a Lord Lieutenant, the lingi s representative without executive power,
a post at that time filled by Lord Wimborne.
The Administration was seriously concerned about two things,
the anti-r.cruiting campaign conducted by a political party called
Sinn T6in and the fsar that extremists in Ireland might plot mischief
in conJunction with Germany. Evidence of the first danger was to be
seen on most street corners in the form of literature, posters or
speech-makers: evidence of the second threat cropped up in
intelligence reports from Germany, America and various sources inside
Ireland. In dealing with these problems Birrell and Nathan had to
tread warily. They knew that Ireland'. surface tranquility and loyal
respons. to the call to arms were one side only of the coin. On the
reverse was an Ireland that could become virtually ungovernable
overnight.
Revolutionary Sources
Popular myth instructs us that for sight hundred years Ireland
struggled valiantly against the Anglo-Nor' . ns and later the ngliah,
2. Quoted by Leon O'Broin Ci) Dublin Castle and the 1916 Rising,
(Dublin, 1966) p 51.
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and that the events of the twentieth century were a triumphant
cul 4n*tion of a long drawn-out war. There is truth in such a view,
but also an over-simplification that die torte the truth. A. often
as not thers were more Irishmen fighting with the English than
against them end even in some of the wars which bad the greatest
appearance of national struggles, there were a great many Irishmen
on the English side. In th. English army which opposed
Hugh O'NeiU in 1598 two-thirds were Irishmen. At lineal. in 1601,
a great part of )4ountjoy' s horsemen were Irish, and in 1798 the
rebeUion was 1nIy defeated by th. newly-formed Irish militia
regiment.. No less than 210 of the 220 crew of the British warship
that stopped Wolfe Tone's ship on it. way to America in 1795 turned
out to be Irish.3 These facts do not deny or excuse the oppression
of Ireland by th. English, but they do suggest that th. historical
background to the events of 1916 was less straightforward than has
ecetim.e been suggested:
In th. right corner virgin Lire, virtuous and oppressed,
in the left the bloody Saxon, the uniqu. source of every
Irish ill, and malaise; round eight, the duration of each
round a hundred years ...
Wolfe Tone, through his Society of United Irishmen, had sown the
seeds of Irish separatism, based more on his admiration of the Prench
revolution than on any deep affinity with native Irish aspirations.
He taught hatred of England as the mainstay of his political
philosophy, a hatred originating not so much from England's treatment
of Ireland as from a British prime minister's blunt refusal. to back
his plan to 'devastate the territories of Spanish America and plunder
the Churches'.5 Separatism, and the hatred, were kept alive during
the nineteenth century by the Teniane, a movement that drew strength
from Irish emigrants in North America as well as from violent
nationalists at home. The Great Famine of 18k6-k7 had forced mass
exodus end thereafter the Irish revolutionary movement possessed a
3. Francis Shaw 'The Canon of Irish History - A Challenge', in
Studies 1 An Irish Quarterly Review, (Dublin & London, 1972), p 1k3.
k. Shaw, p 117.
5. Shaw, p 12?.
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trans-Atlantic dimension. Th. Yenian rising of 1867 was a dianui
failur, but nevertheless the organisation behind it remained intact.
In 1873 it adopted the titi. Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), and
remained a secret, oath-bound organisation dedicated to a violent
overthrown of British rul., closely linked to conspirators in the
United States. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century
ngland gav, further cause for hatred by the Act of Union, unfair
and oppressive laws on franchise and land tenancy, indifference to the
consequences of famine, and general maladministration.
In America, newspapers such as Irish People, Phoenix and Irish
American stirred the pot of revolution. There were voices favouring
non-violence, but generally the extremist view prevailed. The
American wing of the IRB, now called Clan na Gad, almost certainly
sponsored a terrorist group in Irland known as the 'Invincibles'
who were later to murder the Chief Secretary for Ireland and his
Under-Secretary, just as it encouraged the 'Skirmishing Fund', the
Fenians dedicated to killing landlords and their agents. 6 Peasant
resentment at their miserable treatment by landlords bad created a
real revolutionary situation. Fortunately for both countries, the
general election of i868 brought the Liberal Party under Gladstone
to power. 'My mission', the new prime minister told Queen Victoria
when he went to accept office, 'is to pacify Ireland'. 7 By the
time he finally resigned office in 189k he had gone far towards
accomplishing his mission. Bill. reforming religious status, land
and franchise had been passed. Two Home Rule Bills had been
introduced, th. first being defeated in the Commons, the second in the
Lords. The successes disarmed the threat of peasant revolt: the
failures encouraged the growth of middle-class militancy. The taste
of freedom acted as a stiumulant rather than as a palliative to the
hunger pangs of Irish nationalists. During Gladstone's premiership the
Irish Parliamentary (Home Rule) Party, under its leader Parnell, played
an effective role in the constitutional struggle for Irish freedom.
Unfortunately th. disgrace of Parnell followed by his death in 1891 led
6. Edward Myams erroriets and Terrorism, (London, 1975) p 89.
7. Norman Atkinson Irish History i8k8-1950, (Dublin, 1972), p 16.
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to a split in his party. This, and the return to power in
Weet'.4n'ter of a Conservative Government opposed to Rome Rule, made
many Irish doubt the effectiveness of the constitutional process.
It was in this political climate that Arthur Griffith in 1905
founded a new party named Sinn Thu ('Ourselves Alone').
Sinn Tin at its inception provided a rallying point for
middle-of-the-road Irish nationalists, those who had grown
impatient with Westminster and who rejected the assumption that
Ireland must wait, if necessary forever, until their Lordehipe in the
Upper Eons. felt inclined to permit a modicum of independence, but
who nevertheless avoided the extreme policies of the IBB. As its
name implied, Sum Tin was a go-it-alone movement that argued that
Ireland should assert her existence in the world and establish in
Dublin a legislature endowed with th. moral authority of the Irish
nation. This was a revolutionary doctrine, in the politics], sense,
especially in it. leaning. towards the setting up of parallel
hi.rarchies, but the party did not favour revolutionary violence.
At the ease time that Sinn loin was gathering strength the Rome
Rule Party was recovering its cohesion under its new leader,
John Redmond. The return to power at Westminster of a Liberal
Government in 1906 restored hope in the constitutional road to
self-government, and thus checked the threatened decline of
Redmond's influence. In 1911 the Lords' power of veto was replaced
by the lesser power to suspend legislation for two years. In 1912
the new Prime Minister, Asquith, introduced a Home Rule Bill. This
was passed by the Commons end rejected by the Lords, so that after
two years, in 191k, it could becom. law. 'The Irish problem'
seemed on the verge of a solution.
Unionism had long been a political force in Ireland, directed
towards the maintenance of Weatin"ter rule. It. strength lay with
the Anglo-Irish in Dublin and the Protestants of the Northern
counties. The former possessed influence disproportionate to their
numbers, through newspaper. and political position, but in real terms
their power to control events was s *11. The latter had achieved
political and economic dominance in parts of Ulster, an advantage
that seemed threatened with reversal if they were to be absorbed into
a self-governing Ireland. me Orange Order, formed at the end of the
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eighteenth century, provided an orgenisationa]. framework of
propaganda and d.iscipline that cut across class divisions,
•mphaaising instead the religious divide between Protestants and
Catholics. The Unionist Party used the Orange Order as an instrument
of integration propaganda, to create a distinct and separate
Protestant Irish identity, and as the purveyor of agitation
propaganda, whenever it was necessary to excite members to
revolutionary action.8
Such activity was deemed appropriate by the Ulster Unionist
liader Sir Edward Carson to deter and if necessary repel Home Rule
legislation. In April 1912, just as the Home Rule Bill was about to
go before the Commons, Carson reviewed 80,000 members of his illegal.
'Ulster Volunt..rs', a pars-military force raised to resist majority
Irish rule. Thi. revolutionary act wa.e seen by many in England as a
demonstration of loyalty. Asqizith, who from the frequent use of the
phrase was later to acquir. the nickn ame 'Wait and see', waited.
Some Ariiy officers indicated their unwillingness to move against
'loyalists'. Th. Conservative Party decided to turn Irish Protestant
aspirations to imperial and party political advantage, hoping that
opposition in the North would make the whole idea of Home Rule
impossible. A myth has arisen that these mac h4n*tions created rather
than assisted Ulster eeparatiem, an idea that ignores hundreds of
years of history. The myth has survived because it provides sincere
Irish nationaliats with a comfortable explanation for the otherwise
inexplicable and emotionally unacceptable fact that one million Irish
men and women refused to share the Catholic Irish dream of a single
independent Irish nation. What the machinations did do was to
undermine respect for lawful authority in Ireland and to reinforce
instead deference to the power that grows from the barrel of a gun.
The formation of the Ulster Volunteers led, not surprisingly,
to the creation in the South of a similar force to protect majority
interests. The 'Irish Volunteers' were founded in 1913 under the
l.adership of Professor Zoin MacNeil, a moderate. Redmond was
worried that this organiaation might fall under extremist control
8. The terms 'integration' and 'agitation' propaganda are used here
in Professor Ella]. a meanings. See p i8.
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and h. arranged with MacNeil]. for twenty-five representatives of his
Parliamentary Party to join the existing twenty-five members of the
Volunteers' committee. He had not,however,given sufficient credit
to the IRB's ability and determination to exploit this new force for
their violent revolutionary ends. Another 'private army' was formed
in October 1913 when the militant socialist leader James Connolly
put his followers into the uniform of the 'Irish Citizens Army',
a tiny Dublin-based force,9
On the outbreak of war in 191k the British Government suspended
the Home Rule Bill for the duration, receiving the support of
Unionists in the North and Redmond's party in the South. In September
Redmond decided to throw the strength of the Irish Volunteers
behind Britain's war effort and ninety-five per cent of the members
responded, becoming the National Volunteers. The rump organisation,
the Irish Volunteers, was left with only 11,000 members, still under
MacNeill's control. Sinn Tiin, the Irish Volunteers and the Citizens
Army overtly opposed Irish participation in the European war, while
the IRB' a Supreme Council secretly vowed that 'there must be an Irish
insurrection before the end of England's war' .o 	 se were the
currents of unrest and the sources of potential violence that
threatened to make Ireland ungovernable and thus inhibited the
Administration in Dublin Castle in the early months of 1916.
Patrick Pearse and the Irish Republican Brotherhood
Patrick Pearse belongs to a group of unconventional individuals
whose force of character and, whose accomplishment. have left
controversial but indelible marks on history. In Pearse' s time,
T £ Lawrence, end in the next generation, Orde Wingate, may be seen
as belonging to this same category. Some admired and others
disliked them, but few were able to ignore them.
9. See F X Martin (editor) The Irish Volunteers; recollections
and documents, (Dublin, 1963) and Sean O'Casey The Story of the
Irish Citizen Army, (Dublin, 1919).
10. quoted Charles Duff Six Days to Shake an Empire, (London, 1966)
p 62.
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Pearce had a complex persona].ity; in his writing., warm hearted
and sentimental, but in hi. dealing, with other men, often cold,
withdrawn and unapproachable. In lov• with a romantic myth of ancient
Ireland, he threw himself recklessly into whatever great patriotic
ch11eng. for the time-being beckoned him. Chief among these in his
earlier life was his school, St Enda's, where he taught his 'New
Testament of Irish Nationality'. Pearce was a keen supporter of the
Gaelic League, a cultural movement begun in 1893 to preserve the Irish
language and encourage its use in modern literature. One of the
League's objectives was to unify Irish peopl. of different social,
political and religious backgrounds. Cultur. can make strong
integration propaganda and it may be regretted that so little progress
was actually made in reconciling differences between the two main
religious communities, the native Catholic Irish and the Protestant
children of the Ulster Plantation. Such bridge-building was made
iapoeeible by nationalist extremists who used the League as a
platform for agitation propaganda against England, effectively
alienating the Northern loyalists. So far as these activists were
concerned, independenc, must come before all else, and the Protestants
could lump it.
Pears. was one such activist. Although he was not admitted to
the B until late in 1913, his work as a propagandist for the cause
of revolution and separatism began many years earlier. Violence
requires justification, a sense of grievance and an enemy to hate.
It was only natural that Pears., who believed that 'God spoke to
Ireland through Tone' 11 , should write that 'Irish hate of the
English is a holy passion'. 12
 Other themes expressed in hi. superb
English included the glorification of war, th. need for blood
sacrifice in the nationalist cause, and the elevation of patriotism to
a form of holiness. 13
 At the time these propaganda efforts lacked
11. Patrick Pears. Collected Works of Padraic H Pearce, (Dublin, 1917)
Vol II, p 293.
12. Pearce, Vol III p 126.
13. Shaw, pp 122-126.
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credibility, there being no conflict, no oppression, no facts to
bring the themes to life. Later, his collected works would acquire
immense power and him rejuvenated myths would outshine truth.
In Ireland in 191k the Irish Republican Brotherhood had some 1660
members, many of them intellectuals.
	 The poet William Bu±%er Yeats
and th. playwright Sean O'Caeey both belonged at various times. It
wai a condition of membership to subscribe to the idea of armed
revolt. Doubtless many brothers took comfort from the Article of
their Constitution which stated that the 'IRB shall await the
decision of the Irish nation, as expressed by a majority of the Irish
people, as to th. fit hour of inaugurating a war against England'
In the main the IRB was a ginger group, keeping alive the separatist,
physical force tradition, using influence to obtain help and support,
and making propaganda. Gnly a minority were real revolutionaries of
the sort who go out and start revolutions. Those that were of this
stamp cared nothing for the Articles of the Constitution.
When in 191k the Supreme Council of the IRS decided that an
insurrection should be launched during the course of England's war,
there were dissenting voices. So the true revolutionaries on the
Council voted for the creation of a 'Military Committee' to turn the
resolution into reality. When this motion was passed, the militants
ensured that Committee men would all be extremists, and thereafter
this group virtually superseded the Supreme Council. Working in
secrecy, they decided what was good for the IRB, and through the
Brotherhood, for the Volunteers, and through the uniformed force,
for Ireland.16 The new Committee was composed of the relative
newcomer, Patrick Pea.rse, the physically delicate 'military
tactician', Joseph Plunkett, the old Fenian veteran of dynamite raids
and English prisons, Tom Clarke, Eamonn Ceannt and Sean MacDiarmada.
Late in 1915 these men decided that a fit hour for inaugurating a war
against England would be Easter 1916. They ordered reliable IRS
ik. Leon O'Broin (ii) Revolutionary Underground, The Story of the
Irish Republican Brotherhood, (Dublin, 1976), p 155.
15. Quoted P X Martin 'Eoin MacNeill on the 1916 rising' in Irish
Historical Studies, March 1961, p 239.
16. O'Broin (ii), p 156.
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members in all areas to infiltrate the comm'tnd structure of the Irish
Volunteer., and they themselves took key positions near th. top.
James Connolly, the leader of the Citizen Army, was co-opted to the
Committee in January 1916 and Thomas MacDonagh early in April. Thus
the body eventually numbered seven. These men were to be the seven
signatories to the Easter Proclamation of the Irish Republic.
Plane for Rebellion
The Military Committee planned to involve the Irish Volunteers,
complete, and the Citizen Army. The latter's co-operation was not in
doubt once Connolly had been won over. The full-scale involvement
of the Volunteers was, however, a formidable problem, considering that
n•ithr its leader, I4acReill, nor the mass of it. r.n1 and fils
favoured revolutionary violence. The IBB men reckoned that their
agents at battalion and company level would follow orders, and that
their subordinates would obey their local leaders. Once in a fight,
the Irish would always fight on. The principal problem, therefore,
was how to plan the rising, promulgate orders and command the operations
through the governing body of the Irish Volunteers, when half of that
body' a members were neither IBB men nor necessarily sympathetic to
rebel causes. The solution of this problem rested upon Pearse's
appointment as Director of Organisation on the Volunteer EQ staff,
in which capacity he could order exercises and manoeuvres by units
throughout the country, and Plunkett' a appointment as Director of
Operation.. The outline Easter Rising orders could be published under
the guise of an exercise, without arousing suspicion. Parallel orders
confined to the secret IRB network were issued orally, converting the
mobilization exercise into a full-scale rebellion.
Th. revolutionary plans of the IBB had, from the outset, two
quite separate and in some respects contradictory purposes; on the one
hand, to win a military victory that would overthrow British rule by
force and on the other, to redeem Ireland's soul by violence, however
that endeavour might end. The first ambition has been seen thus:
In the War then raging in Europe Germany appeared to be doing
remarkably well and many of the leaders believed that the
War would end very soon. It was believed that if a military
insurrection took place before th. end of the War, Ireland 17
could claim a seat at the Peace Conference, as a belligerent.
From this hope a plan emerged. Sir Roger Casement was a
distinguished British civil servant torn between hi. loyalties to the
Crown and to Ireland. At the outbreak of the war the second loyalty
won and he offered the Germans a rebellion in Ireland in return for a
promise of assistance. This help was arranged initially by
Clan na (Mel, through the German Ambassador in Washington, and was
central in the IRB's planning. Two German submarines would take part:
oni would escort two supply ships to a rendezvous of f the coast near
frale.; th. other would wait till the Rising had begun and then make
its appearance in Dublin Port. The supply ships would unload the
'Irish Brigade', Irishmen recruited by Casement from German
prisoner-of-war camp., German officers to lead the Volunteers, and a
massive arms consignment. Then, on the evening of Easter Sunday, the
action could start. Operations would involve units in Dublin,
Limerick, Cork and all the south and west. Key points would everywhere
be seized, an Irish Republic declared, the police and military taken
by surprise and whenever possible disarmed. If necessary the rebels
would take to the hills and fight a guerrilla war. Help from
Irish-Americans, whose adopted country was still neutral in the
European War, might be expected. Connolly remarked that 'the chances
against us are a thousand to one' ,18 words that have often been
interpr.t.d as an expression of hopelessness. Another interpretation
would draw the opposite conclusion, that the leader of the Citizen Army
viewed the coming struggle with realistic anxiety, but saw a slim but
positive prospect of success. In one respect the planners apparently
anticipat.d the revolutionary theories of such latter-day exponents and
writers as Che Guevara and Regis Debray, who have recommended abrupt
plunges into revolution, with the mobilisation of mass support occurring
during th. ensuing conflict.19
17. Zogham O'Neill 'The Battle of Dublin 1916' in An Cosantoir,
(Dublin) p 215.
18. Duff, p 1,8.
19. See Mao Ts.-tung and Cli. Guevara Guerrilla Warfare, (London, 1962)
and Debray, op cit.
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The second purpose of the Rising was understood most clearly,
and perhaps exclusively, by Patrick Pearce. In 1911 V P Ryan described
him as 'a scholar with a child-spirit, a mystical temperament, and a
Celtic nature, in the heroic and constructive sense' .
	 Perhaps these
characteristics equipped his to appreciate instinctively that the
sobilisation of the macsee was an achi.v.ment worth fighting for on its
own, even in the full realisation that defeat in the short-term was
inevitabi.. Re seems to have anticipated another modern revolutionary
activist and author, Canoe Marighella, who taught that, in response to
urban guerrilla warfare, the 'government has no alternative except to
intensify repression. Th. police networks, house searches, arrests of
innocent people and of suspects, closing off streets, make life in the
city unbearable ... The people refuse to collaborate with the
authorities, and the general sentiment is that the government is
unjust, incapabl. of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply
to th. physical liquidation of it. opponents' •21	 Sometime before
the Rising, Pearse said to hi. mother: 'The day is coming when I 8h11
be shot, swept away, and my colleagues shot like me' . 	 This is a
view different from Connol1ys, the view of a man seeing the uprising
in exemplary rather than practical terms. Th. verse that heads this
chapter seems to suggest that he appreciated the revolutionary potential
of blood sacrifice, and the inevitability of such a sacrifice if the
deed was correctly performed.
We might conclude that the Easter Rising, in the fore origin*ily
planned, was primarily intended to break Britain' $ hold over Ireland
by force, with a secondary aim of uniting public opinion in favour
of re-oationary violence. A switch of prioritie, came only at the last
moment, as a result of a chapter of accidents that made th. first plan
unworkable.
20. V P Ryan The Pope'e Green Island, (London, 1912) p 291.
(It is unclear whether or not Ryan was aware, when calling
Pearse 'Celtic' that he had an English father.)
21. Marighella op cit, pp 39-40.
22. Quoted Duff, p i8.
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Order and Counte?-order
On Easter Sunday, 23 April 1916, two meetings took place in
Dublin to review plans in the light of unforeseen circumstances.
One was held in Vice-regal Lodge, the residenc, of Lord Wimborne, the
Lord Lieutenant; the other in Liberty Hall, the Labour headquarter.,
well defended by men of the Citizen Army. The unforeseen circumstances
necessitating both meetings arose from an attempt on Easter Friday
to land arms and ammunition near Tralee. The plot had been foiled
by the Royal Navy. The solitary supply ship bad been scuttled by
its crew, and a group of conspirator. put ashore from a German
submarine had been captured by the police. Among these men was
Sir Roger Casement.
The Chief Secretary was in London so it was his Assistant,
Nathan, who led the group of officials summoned by Wimborne. The
Lord Lieutenant was convinced that the attempted landing of arms was
in preparation for some uprising, and that notwithstanding the loss
of the supplies, the insurrection would go ahead. He tried to persuade
his officials to take pre-emptive action by arresting known activists
forthwith. Nathan knew that such action would involve severe risk of
bringing about the rebellion they hoped to avoid. Having shrunk in
1912 from moving against the Ulster Volunteers, the British Government
had felt unable one year later to act one-sidely against the Irish
Volunteers and the Citizen Army. The country was consequently being
governed on a basis of trust, or hope, that these militias would
remain passive. Nothing could now be done that might provoke these
'private armies' without full-scale military backing, and this would
take time to arrange. Nathan pointed to these difficulties and
promised to raise the matter with the Chief Secretary upon the latter's
return to Dublin. Unaccountably, nothing was done in the meantime to
put the police and military on the alert.23
The group meeting in Liberty Hall was the Military Committee, B.
Their troubles had begun on the previous Wednesday when MacNeill,
Chief-of-Staff of the Volunteers, had discovered that a rising was
planned for th. coming weekend. lie had immediately set about trying to
23. For a full and detailed account, see O'Broin (i).
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learn more, and to forestall action. Pearce and his IPB colleague.
had then decided that the beet course open to them was to .xplain
everything to MacNeill and try to win his support. If persuaeion
failed, he would have to be kidnapped until the operation was under
way, a fate that overtook one moderate who persisted in his objections,
Bulmer Robson. The Committee therefore explained to MacNeill their
plans for rebellion, and the expected arrival of weapons. German
assistance was by this stage considerably lees than discussed earlier.
No submarine was to be sent to Dublin and only one supply ship was
headed for Tralee. This would carry the consignment of arms and
ammunition, while it. escort submarine would bring Casement and other
key men. But ther, would be no Irish Brigade, and no German officers.
MacNeil, impressed by the detail of the pinning and, particularly,
by the promise of German arms, agreed to hsind over control to Pearce.
'Zntryism' bad enabled the IRB to take complete charge of the Irish
Volunteere without the rank and file being any the wiser.
MacNeil's co-operation was short-lived. When on Saturday evening
he learnt that the weapons had been lost, thus leaving the volunteers
in ths south and west virtually unarmed, he decided that the rebellion
could not possibly succeed and must be stopped. 'Volunteers completely
deceived', he wrote, pointedly, in his urgent despatch. 'All orders for
tomorrow Sunday axe entirely cancelled.' 	 To be doubly certain, he
placed a notice in the next day's Sunday Independent forbidding
volunteers to parade. On th. face of it MacNeill had thwarted the
IBB plans, and this was the muddled situation that confronted the
Military Council on Sunday morning. Now was the moment when these
leaders demonstrated their fanaticism, their disregard for other people's
opinions or other	 lives, as well as their own high personal courage.
They decided to go ahead, although on a limited scale. The country
battalions would be overtly ordered to obey MacNeill' s despatch and
For a full and detailed account, see O'Broin (ii).
25. The handwritten note is reproduced as a photograph in
Redmond Fitzgerald Cry Blood, Cry Erin, (London, 1966) p 69.
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stand down; the Dublin battalions and the Citizen Army would be
covertly instructed to postpone action 2k hours, end then to operate
26
as planned.
In modern military parlance, H Hour would now be at noon on
Easter Monday, 2k April. In the terminology of revolution,the
Rising had lost it. military purpose and was instead to be
'Propaganda of the Deed' .
	 It is unclear whether or not the
Council members appreciated this switch of aim that the changes in the
plan had inevitably brought about, a cosmon enough reversal of
planning thrust in a fluid situation. However Connolly was left in no
doubt as to the practical implications. Next morning he remarked
quietly to William O'Brien: 'We are going out to be slaughtered.28
The one chance in a thousand had gone. Connolly went on: 'There is
noth4ig that you can do now, but you may be of great service later
O'Brien was proprietor of the Cork Tree Press weekly, and
Connolly' a words implied that he, too, was beginning to see public
opinion as the decisive weapon.
The original plan drawn up by the Coittee's tactician,
Joseph Plunkett, had required volunteers to hold a solid defensive
line across Dublin, from which the rebels could withdraw inland if
and when British attacks become overpowering. But because the
sequence of order and counter-order had led inevitably to a degree of
disorder, the number of volunteers actually available on Easter Monday
was down to some 1250 men, not enough for linear defence. So the
smaller force was ordered to occupy a number of buildings, important
symbolically or tactically or both, and to defend them as long as
possible. This decision passed the initiative to the Security Forces,
who would be forced to instigate violence and destruction in the
middle of a crowded city, and it endowed the rebels with the inherent
strength of the defence, a strength that i. multiplied tenfold in a
26. At 8 pm on the Sunday evening couriers were again sent to the
country battalions this time bearing the message 'We start
operations at noon, Monday - Carry out your instructions'. Only
in rare cases did this vague instruction succeed in bringing the
Volunteers outside Dublin into th. fight.
V. See p 22.
28. William O'Brien James Connolly and Easter Week 1 916, (Dublin,
undated, published in 19'+9) p 23.
29. O'Brien, p 23.
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built-up area. Nevertheless it was clear from the start that this
deployment could never bring victory. All it could do was to postpone
defeat, while the world looked on.
The Deed That I See
The authorities were taken completely by surprise. At noon on
Easter Monday most rebel objectives were seized without opposition
and it took the police and military some hours to realise what was
afoot. Th. Four Courts, The South Dublin Union, Boland's Mills and
Factory were taken according to plan. Rarcourt Street Station,
W.etland Row Station and. the North Dublin Union were also occupied.
Barricades war. thrown up across th. streets. The Citizen Army took
possession of St Stephen's Green. Dublin Castle, centre of British
government in Ireland, was not taken, the small rebel force assembled
for th. attempt being unaware that it was, in fact, virtually unguarded.
Peares made hie headquarters in the General Poet Office. There he
declared the Provisional Irish Republic, with himself as President.
Es also promoted himself Commanding in Chief of the Republic's Army
and appointed Connolly Co-'ndant General of the Dublin Division. The
general public viewed the whole spectacle with astonished scorn, and
sometimes, disgust. An eye witness reported how one man tried to
recover his barrow which th. rebels had comm-'ndeered as a barricade:
"Go and put back that lorry or you are a dead man. Go before
I count four. One, two, three, four ...
A rifle spat at him, and in two undulating movements the man
sank on himself and sagged to the ground
At that moment the Volunteers were hated. The men by whom I was
and who were lifting the body, roared into the railings:
"We'll be coming back for you, damn you." 30
Further excesses and mistakes marred the initial operations. Dublin
constables J Brian and N Lahiff were murdered in cold blood. Neither
was armed. During an abortive raid on the Magazine Tort in Phoenix Park
Garry Holohan shot dead the young son of the British Commander. Five
30. James Stephens The Insurrection in Dublin, (Dublin and London,
1916) pp 2I-25.
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members of the Veteran.. Corp. were killed by rebel gunfire before
these old men were correctly identified.
The British troops stationed in Dublin numbered about 1200,
and at the start of the Rising moat were off duty, many attending the
Fairyhouse Race.. The senior officer on duty in the city was an
adjutant. Th. Dublin Metropolitan Police were unarmed, and the
routine guard on the General Poet Office had rifles but no
aunition. When he discovered what was happening, Colonel Cowan,
who was acting in comm*nd during General Friend's leave in England,
telephoned Belfast, the Curragh, Templemore and Atbione and asked
for reinforcements. Some time afterwards, the C-in-C Home Forces
ordered two brigade. from England.
Cowan's plan was straightforward and sound: sake contact to
eatablish th. whereabouts and strength of rebel posts; contain and
if possible isolate these positions; with the help of artillery, and
using reinforcements from England, reduce all defended areas and
force their surrender. By Tuesday he had succeeded in establishing a
line of posts from Trinity College to Dublin Castle and on to
Kingabridge Station, thus dividing the rebel forces in two. On the
next day he drew a cordon round the centre of the town. His troops were
for the most part raw English recruits and none had received training in
street fighting or in conducting 'counter-insurgency warfare'. Many of
the rebels were in plain clothes and their supporting services of youths
and women volunteers took advantage of their age or sex to pass through
fighting lines. These methods infuriated the British troops and led to
a number of vengeful acts that discredited their otherwise good record.
There was one act of madness that few people knew anything about at the
time. Captain Bowen-Colthurst first slaughtered a loitering passer-by
and then ordered three journalists shot. One of his victim, was a much
respected pacifist called Francis Sheehy-Skeffington. There was also a
great deal of looting by the civilian population and, to counter this,
martial law was pronounced on Thursday 27th. Moat of Dublin's
population remained opposed to the rebels. Even if they read 123
propaganda, at this stage most people disregarded it completely.
The main component of rebel propaganda was the Rising itself. This
was intended, at leant by Pears., to begin the mobilisation of the
Irish masses for the independence struggle. Inside this action
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propaganda aimed to crystallise issues, create legitimacy for the
rebellion, and establish ref.renc. points for the future. The
central document was the Proclamation of the Provisional. Government.31
This is a fine piece, dignified, stirring, and imaginative. It reaches
back into history and points to a Republican future. By talking of an
'Irish Republic' which did not then exist, the Proclamation created an
aura of legitimacy for the rebel acts. This had two purposes. The
first was made clear in th. text: 'The Irish Republic is entitled to,
and hereby claims, the allegianc. of ev.ry Irishm'm and Irishuomen' ,32
The second purpose was to clear the consciences of volunteers over
killing those who stood in their way, and over indirectly bringing
about many more deaths and injuries.
Bulletins were issued by Pearee and Connolly during the fighting,
seeking the support of the Dublin public and reiterating the purpose of
the violence. Connolly concentrated on raising morale among the rebels.
In hi. final bulletin issued on 28 April Pears, paid tribute to his
followers and stated that 'Isa satisfied that we have saved Ireland's
honour' .33 The only formal propaganda issued was one copy of
Irish War News, printed on the Liberty Hl1 Press, and published on the
Tuesday.3k Moet of the copy had apparently been prepared prior to the
Rising and the only mention of th. event itself appears in a 'Stop
Press' on the back page. With a tiny circulation, this was weak
propaganda. According to an early booklet about the rebellion, 'the
insurgents seized the School of Wirlesa Telegraphy, at the corner of
Lower Abbey Street, and spread th. news over the earth'. 35 In fact
these efforts had litti. effect but they were not needed. 'Propaganda
of the deed' always relies on intermediaries for its dissemination.
The British authorities did not try to suppress news of the Rising and
the IRB had their message carri•d to a huge public through the newspapers
31. Reproduced in The Sini7in Revolt Illustrated, (Revolt) (Dublin, 1916)
p 27.
32. Revolt 3rd paragraph of Proclamation.
33. Revolt, p 27.
3k. Revolt. A facsimile of th. paper wae issued with the Illustrated.
35. Revolt, p ko,
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of the world, many of which published the text of the Proclamation.
Impressed by the scale of the fighting, the British Government was
meanwhile selecting someone to cope with the situation.
The suppression of insurrection is first and foremost an act of
government administration. The security forces have important roles
to play, but only within a political framework. 10 see it otherwise,
to concede through th. nature of government response that a state of
war exists, is to go far towards accepting the claims of legitimacy
invariably advanced by revolutionaries and set out in this case in the
Proclamation of the Irish Republic. As the Easter Rising crumbled
befor. the Army's attacks, a need arose for firm but subtle political
angement, under Cabinet direction. Mr Asquith, it would seem, failed
to appreciate this need. Instead he virtually handed over political
control to a soldier. Through Lord Kitchener, the Minister for War,
the Government made known their wish that a general should be sent to
assume overall control. The C-in-C Rome Forces selected
Sir John Maxwell. The directive issued to this officer might have done
for Oliver Cromwell, calling for 'the prompt suppression of the
insurrection in Ireland'. Perhaps Asquith thought that he could afford
to 'wait and see', before committing himself politically.
Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell was a conscientious and
capable officer, but hardly what might be termed 'politically aware'.
At th. early age of 37 he had commanded a brigade in the campaign in
the Sudan against the MaMi. Later he had been the Duke of Connaught' a
chief-of-staff in Ireland. 6 His moat recent appointment had been
GOC in Egypt, where at times he had shown his determination to back
his own udgement rather than refer politically sensitive matters to
the War Office or to the local political advisers. 37 His recall from
36. See Sir George Arthur General Sir John Maxwell (London, 1932).
37. In 1915 General Maxwell, GOC Egypt, had been approached by the
correspondent of theRousakiya Wiedomosti, Mr Vladimir Jabotinaky
(see pll7), with a proposal. to raise an all-Jewish unit. Without
bothering the War Office, Maxwell had agreed. (This may be seen,
according to one's interpretation of Israeli history, either as
the start of the Irgun Zwai Leumi or the Israel Defence Force, or
both.) See PRO file 32/11/3k8, minute 2, WO 20/Gen/38k4.
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Egypt, he had written, was because 'th political people have got their
knives into me' . When he arrived in Ireland on Friday, 28 April 1916
the General possessed sweeping power., which he evidently intended using
without the inconvenience of political advice.
Maxwell oversaw the final operation.. against the rebels, whose
situation was now desperate. In the GPO, wher. Connolly lay wounded,
Pearce issued his final bulletin. Then flames engulfed the building and
on Friday afternoon the defenders withdrew. The next day, at about
half-past three in the afternoon, Pears. surrendered his sword at the
post in Parnell Street to Brigadier General Lowe. Within another
2 hours the Rising had .vezywher. ended in failure. Some 300 men and
women were dead, 120 of thea police and military, 56 volunteers, the
remainder civilians. Nearly a thousand were wounded, in about the same
proportion. Damage to buildings by fire, artillery, close-quarter
fighting, and looting, represented nearly one-third of Ireland's total
annual rvenue. Tram the improvised prisoner compound in which they
had spent their first night in captivity the captured rebels were
marched away, booed and jeered by Dubliners. It must have seemed to
many of them that the entire enterprise had been a catastrophe.
Pearce, however, bad not yet finished with his deed, and what was to
come would begin a process leading to the accomplishment of his
ambition.
The Death I Shall Die
During the i9ik-i8 War more than 300 British servicemen were
executed for offencee such as cowardice and desertion. 39 The scale
and nature of the fighting imposed such strains that only harsh
discipline could hold armies together. In 1916 the struggle was not
going in Britain's favour. For United Kingdom subjects at such a time
to side with the enemy, murdering 120 police and military, forcing the
38. O'Broin (i), p 115.
39. Ministry of Defence, P82(c) (Army), Information provided to writer.
(Th. breakdown was desertion (2+7), cowardice (18), quitting
poet (6), murder (19), mutiny (2), disobedience (3), striking
superior (5), shamefully casting arms (2) and sleeping at post (1).
The figures include 3 officers and 36 Commonwealth and Empire
troops.)
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redeployment of many unite in order to deal with the situation, and
in the process bringing death and destruction to an important city,
was a matter of the utmost gravity. From the viewpoint of authority,
a view shared in the immediate aftermath of rebellion by many Irish,
the rebels were guilty of serious crimes and their leaders deserved
exemplary punishment. It is scarcely surprising that Maxwell
decided to take a firm line, and in this decision he is hardly to be
criticized. Where criticism may be valid is over the methods employed
and the ].ngth to which the line might have been taken.
The General seems to have been impressed by knowledge, gained
presumably during hi. earlier tour in Ireland, that after the collapse
of the 1867 Fenian rebellion the spirit of revolt had been kept alive
for months by speeches in defence of captured leaders at their public
trials. He evidently favoured quick, secret trials by courts-martial,
immediately followed by executions where appropriate. This at any rate
is what occurred. On 3 May Patrick Pearse, Thomas MacDonagh and
Tom Clarke were executed by firing-squad following trial on the previous
day. On the kth, Joseph Plunkett, Edward Daly, Michael O'Eanr,n and
William Pearse, Patrick's young brother, suffered the same end. Only
one man died on the 5th, John McBride. On 6 May it was announced that
death sentences passed on Countess Markiewicz and several other
participants in the rebellion had been commuted to life imprisonment.
Eamonn Ceannt, Con Colbert, Sean Heuston and Michael Mallin were shot
on the 8th, and Thomas Eent on the 9th, a total at this date of
thirteen. A proclamation issued by Maxwell's headquarters on
11 May spoke of German intrigue and propaganda, loss of life and acts
calculated to imperil the realm, and hoped that 'the most severe
sentences on the known organisers of this detestable Rising' would
deter intriguer..	 The inference was that the executions had run
their course. However on the 12th two more convicted men were shot,
James Connolly and Sean MacDiarmada. The fifteen dead included all
seven members of the IBB'. Military Council, one man convicted of
murder, five senior field commanders, one quite minor deputy commander,
and William Pearce.
kO. 'Proclamation issued by EQ Th. Forces in Ireland', 11 May 1916,
quoted Dudley Edwards, P 325.
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Maxwell' a secrecy extended in all directions, so that neither Asquith
nor the Lord Lieutenant were much better informed of what was going on than
the public.k1 These men became increasingly uneasy about the toll in
lives, and the sinister manner in which each day brought another terse
announcement, while no one from the Prime Minister to the humblest
citizen knew when this painful process would end. In th. oft quoted
words of Zlizabeth,Countese of Tingall, it was 'as though they watched
a stream of blood coming from beneath a closed doors.b2 Before the
executions were over Asquith attempted to recover some of the political
control be had so recklessly abandoned when he delivered Ireland into
unknown military bands. 'Maxwell should be reminded', he directed through
th. War Minister, 'that any wholes.]. punishment by death might easily
cause a revulsion of feeling in Britain and lay up a store of future
trouble in	 By side-stepping political control, even when he
had been given the power to act independently, Maxwell undermined Asquith' e
confidence in the policy of suppression so recently begun. This lack
of confidence would prove as unhelpful to the General's endeavours in the
security field as Maxwell'. style over the executions would be ruinous to
the Prime Minister's hopes in the political arena.
The condemned rebels played out their roles with courage and dignity
to the end. It is sometimes said that the advertising agencies of
Madison Avenue are staffed by failed poets. Of the seven signatories
of the Easter Proclamation three, Pearse, Plunkett and MacDonagh were
poets, and not necessarily failed ones, whose talents made then
powerful natural propagandists. 'Gentlemen of the Court-Martial',
Thomas MacDonagh had said at his trial, 'I choose to thttr that you have
but done your duty, according to your lights, in sentencing me to death.
I thiink you for your courtesy. It would not be seemly for me to go to my
doom without trying to express, however inadequately, my sense of the
high honour I enjoy in being of those predestined in this generation to
die for Irish Freedom ... '.
	 Joseph Plunkett was an invalid recovering
from glandular tuberculosis when he joined Pears. and Connolly at the GPO.
ki. O'Broin (i), pp 13O-13i.
k2. Quoted Dudley Edwards, p 323.
43. O'Broin (i), p 130.
44 Quoted Duff, p 192.
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His health was worse by the time of his sentencing to death. But at
1.30 am on the morning of his execution he was married in th. chapel
of &i]sAinh*m gaol to Grace Gifford, sister of l4aeDonegh'e wife.
Th. sincerity of this union is not open to question. Nevertheless,
the poignancy of the ceremony provided wonderful. material for
subsequent propaganda. Pears. 'a address to the court-martial included
these words:
First among all earthly things, as a boy and as a men, I have
worked for Irish Freedom. I have helped organize, to arm, to
train, and to discipline my fellow-countrymen to the aol. nd
that, when the time came they might fight for Irish freedom.
The time as it seemed to me, did come and we went into the fight.
I am glad that we did, we seem to have lost, we have not lost.
To refuse to fight would have been to lose, to fight is to
win, w• have kept faith with the past, and handed a tradition to
the future. k5
It is difficult to see how the Government, whatever its methods in
the aftermath of the Rising, could have avoided bringing the
ringleaders to trial, and it is equally hard to imagine any outcome of
trial different from what occurred. Conceivably an imaginative act of
mercy on the part of the authorities could have commuted the death
sentences, possibly as part of some political act of reconciliation.
Such an act would hay, raised its own dangers, both in England and
Ireland, and even might have compromised military discipline in the
field. Tempting though it is to say with hindsight that such mercy was
obviously the sensible course, missed by the blind and heartless
English, such a conclusion lacks honesty. We may more accurately deduce
that Pears. always knew th. penalty of his deed would be shooting, and
that his death along with some of his colleagues was a necessary part of
the deed. The English co-operated in the final act, but it was part of
Pearse's design that they should have no easy alternative.
On the evening after he had sentenced Patrick Pears. to death, the
President of the Court-Martial, Brigadier-General Blackader, said with
regret:
I have just done one of the hardest tasks I have ever had to do.
I have had to condemn to death one of the finest characters I have
ever come across. There must be something very wrong in the state
of things that makes a man like that a Rebel. i6
k5. Quoted Duff, p 191
6. Quoted Dudley Edwards, p 319.
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The 'propaganda of the deed' was already beginning to work, even against
an enemy.
The Aftermath of the Deed
Writing about the period of the executions, an Irish historian
has noted:
Many do find it inexplicabi. that the first thirteen to be
executed went to their death, without a significant Irish
voice, at home or abroad, b.ing raised in protest. Such
factually is historical truth. In terms of appeals for
clemency, or reasoned vindication of the motives of the
inaurrectionista, it was the period of "the Great Silence".
U. may suggest that there are periods of incubation before a new idea
takes hold of the mind. There is, too, a period of shock following an
unexpected and traumatic experience, during which the senses tend to
be numbed. It also needs to be remembered that most of the Dublin
daily newspapers were owned by Anglo-Irish of ascendancy stock, inclined
to establishment attitudes. Dublin itself was in 1916 a very 'English'
city. Many of the working folk who had jeer.d the captured rebels had
sons or husbands in the British Army and depended on the Government in one
way or another for their livelihood. Maxwell was no doubt encouraged
in his policy by th. Irish Times 1-3 May issue which insisted that
'the rapine and bloodshed of the past week suet be finished with a
severity which will make any repetition of them impossible for
generations to
	 Dr Tom Garvin sees it as 'an odd
characteristic of Irish society that its intellectuals and journalists
are often very out-of-touch with public opinion' and suggests that this
say have been so in i9i6.19 If this was the case, papera like the
Irish Times may have done an inadvertent service to Pears.' s cause by
putting the British authorities of f their guard against the real
dangers of a swing of opinion towards sympathy with the executed leaders
and the rebel cause.
k7. N O'Dubhghaill Insurrection Fires at Easter Tide, (Cork, 1966) p 290.
'i8. The quotations from contemporary Irish newspapers are taken from
Appendix I (The Irish Times) and Appendix II (Cork Examiner, Free
Press and Irish Independent) to Owen Dudley Edwards and Fergus Pyle
(editors) 1916 The Easter Rising, (London, 1968).
k9. Dr Tom Garvin Ci), University College, Dublin, letter to the Writer
dated 30 June 1977. (Quoted with kind permission)
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Country districts were probably more pro-rebel than Dublin.
Here, however, there may initially have been an inhibiting sense of
shame at the failure of the plan for a nationwide revolt. On
29 April William O'Brien's Cork Free Press complained that 'Ireland
was given arms to get massacred for doing the dirty work of the
half-beaten German Empire' and on I May the Cork Examiner argued
that 'Amnesty in this case would not be generous. It would only be
just', views very different from the Irish !imee.
The Dublin Irish Independent could not be published until
6 May because of damage to its works. When it reappeared, it
denounced the Rising. Maxwell' a I May proclamation, hinting that the
executions were complete, evidently worried the Independent's
capitalist owner and gave rise to a remarkable article on 12 May.
'Certain of the leaders remain undealt with and the part they played
was worse than that of acme of those who have paid the extreme
penalty. Are they because of an indiscriminate demand for clemency
to get off lightly, while others who were no more prominent have been
executed?' Th. target of this outburst was James Connolly, the
militant socialist. The Independent need not have worried. By the
time the edition was on the streets Connolly was dead.
The 'indiscriminate demand for clemency' referred to had begun,
characteristically, in England and then spread to Ireland. On 6 May,
after eight executions, the Daily News had followed the lead of the
Daily Chronicle in pleading for mercy. On 10 May George Bernard Shaw
wrote to the Daily News asserting that 'an Irishman resorting to arms
to achieve the independence of his country is doing only what
Englishmen will do if it be their misfortune to be invaded and conquered
by the Gerutens in the course of the present war' .° This subtle
propaganda in the revolutionary cause was exactly what Pearse might
have hoped for. It was worth more than a German expeditionary force.
Next day in the House of Commons the Irish 14P John Dillon denounced
the shootings. Irish papers other than the Independent changed their
50. Quoted Dorothy Macardl.e The Irish Republic, (Dublin, 1951)
pp 186-187.
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tune after the first 13 deaths. The secrecy, and the consecutive
nature of the executions, spanning nine days, greatly affected public
attitudes. James Stephens wrote these lines:
And day by day they told that one was dead,
And day by day the seasons mourned for you
Until that count of woe was finished,
And Spring remembered al]. was yet to do.
Such sentiments were reinforced by errors of judgement on the part of
Maxwell and his staff. Neither William Pears. nor John MacBride
played leading parts, 52
 and their executions appeared vindictive, as
though th. former's relationship to Patrick and the latter's leadership
in 1900 of Irishmen fighting with the Boere had singled them out for
death.53
 Th. shootings of the desperately ill Joseph Plunkett and
th. wounded James Connolly also offended. On the day that Connolly
died, 12 May, Asquith visited Dublin to ss for himself what was going
on.
During the course of his tour the Prime Minister asked to see some
captured rebels. It is easy to understand his purpose; he was trying
to find out what motives lay beneath the Rising, as part of a general
survey of opinion. We may wonder ,nevertheless ,how far Asquith was
influenced by rebel propaganda assumptions on th. one Kad and a
sense of embarrassment or shame at the recent executions on the other.
If he had really believed his own Government' a declared assumptions,
would he have been likely to visit a group of murderers and criminals?
By talking to them man-to-man, he unwittingly strengthened their claims
to legitimacy. As one historian has put it; 'AU at once the
prisoners saw that they had not fought in vain' .	 The deed was
casting it. spell on another enemy, and when he returned to Westminster
Aequith told the Commons that the system of government in Ireland bad
broken down.
51. quoted Warre B Wells and N Marlowe A History of the Irish
Rebellion of 1916 (Dublin and London, 1916), p 205.
52. William Pearse apparently tried hard his court-martial to convince
the court that hi. role was more important than was the case, and may
have succeeded too well.
53. Concerning John MacBride and Ilaud Gonna, see O'Brien (ii).
5k. U A Phillips The Rebellion in Ireland, (London, 1923) p 107.
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On 17 May Irish newspapers published an open letter from
Edward O'Dwyer, Roman Catholic Bishop of Limerick, to Maxwell, in which
the Bishop denounced the executions. This worried Maxwell, who was
beginning to realise that opinion was changing in Ireland, and caused
him to write to Aequith. 'I am afraid this action (by the Bishop) has
done some harm and incited others to defy authority. I am getting
reports now from the RIC (Royal Irish Constabulary) that priests are
offering Masaea for the repose of the souls of those who have died, or
been executed, martyrs to their country's cause, etc. It is an
exceedingly difficult matter to deal with this question, and I think
if his Holiness the Pope could be induced to advise the Cardinal
Archbishop and the Bishops in Ireland to prevent priests from mixing
themselves up with matters political, seditious or unconnected with
their spiritual position, some good might come of it.'
Besides the executions, th. security forces' task of rooting out
disaffected elements and suspected supporters of the Rising was
affecting the genera]. public. Although many were quickly released,
319 men and 77 women were arrested by police and military. 1862 men
and 5 women were interned in England, in addition to 160 prisoners
who had been convicted by court-martial. In a mAnner that Pearse would
surely have approved, and may have foreseen, the aftermath of the Deed
made ordinary Irish people feel the weight of military occupation.
The slow process of conversion of opinion from fierce criticism
of the Rising to grudging respect and sympathy, and finally to
uncritical praise, was assisted by propaganda. This was generated by
Sinn Tin, IRB members, the Gaelic League (which was effectively under
IRB control) and that diffuse but persistent current of Irish opinion
that needs only to be scratched to exhibit anti-British sentiments.
Journalists, poets, political agitators and authors played their
separate roles, not for the most part as obedient cogs in a giant
publicity machine, but as individuals whose fine-tuned ears knew
instinctively the appropriate chords. No account of the Easter
Rising seen by this writer pauses to reflect on the mechanics of
opinion-forming that consolidated the achievement of the Deed, yet the
final effects may have relied as much on propaganda as the initial
55. Quoted Arthur, p 261.
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effects depended on the execution.. This may be due to some Irish
nature]. talent in this direction, and it may be because certain key
figure. in the operation appreciated that propaganda is one of the
forms of conflict whose heroes must forever go unsung.
The 'Great Silence' that lasted throughout the first
13 executions was probably du. to shock and revulsion, strengthened
in Dublin by Protestant attitudes and English sympathies. If we
knew the names on the IRB membership list at the time we might find
an editor and a leader-writer her. or there, and this might lead us
to ask why such individuals published nothing that might have saved
their friends. In any case we can ask why none of the IRB's sore
influential members wrote letters to the press, or canvassed
political leaders, or called meetings, or even threatened revenge, in
an effort to prevent capital punishment. One answer that springs to
mind is that in the aftermath of a disastrous uprising the paramount
need was to preserve the Organisation, and that a 'low profile' was
th. order of the day. Another answer, which does not necessarily
conflict with the first, says that the IBB realised that Pears. and
hi. colleagues had to die, if anything of value was to be salvaged
from the
There was soon a thriving cottage industry in heroic relics
commemorating the executed men and the epic of the Rising: mourning
badges, Sinn Yin flags, facsimiles of the dead men's last letters,
poems and statements, postcards of heroes and battle scenes, holy
symbol. and national emblems. Th. old rebel songs were heard every-
where. This propaganda, designed to raise the status of the Rising
as an example to be followed in some future armed struggle, was
backed up by demonstrations at Requiem Masses, resolutions of public
bodies and the setting up of a National Aid Association to succour the
families of prisoners and internees. The poems of V B Yeats had
shattering emotive power. Once the dead leaders had been accepted as
martyrs, which given the history of Anglo-Irish relations was
56. Th. willingness in later years of the Irish Republican Army to
allow and even encourage its members on hunger strike in prisons
to die, suggests that the second answer is credible.
102
virtually inevitable in the circumstances, it was a short step to
see the rebels as soldier-heroes fighting in the noble cause of
Irish freedom. Not to have been with them became a cause of shame.
Parallel with all this, themes were developed to discredit the
British authorities and Army, beyond the obvious exploitation of the
executions. No conflict has ever been fought without acts of
cruelty and stupidity on both aides. By burrowing into every such
act committed by the British in the suppression of the Rising,
propagandists succeeded in shifting the burden of guilt for the
whole affair from Republican to British shoulders. This offensive use
of propaganda ha. special powers. It can undermine confidence in
authority among 'neutrals' and 'enemies', in this case, particularly
and respectively, the United States and the United Kingdom. By
pressing authority to conduct enquiries into alleged misconduct the
revolutionary or his front organisation. are certain to win
propaganda points. If the authorities refuse, they exhibit guilt and
a contempt for justice; if they agree, they will either prove the
alleged crime, in which case they publicise their own shame with
greater credibility and to a wider audience than any other methods
could possibly achieve, or they disprove the allegations, in which
case they can be accused of a cover_up, of dishonesty, and so on.
Furthermore much police and army effort is diverted from the role of
countering insurgency to the task of investigating the alleged
offences, and security force morale is apt to suffer.
The key issues in this campaign were the murders by
Captain Bowen-Colthurst of Francis Sheehy-Skeffington and three
other innocents, alleged murders of civilians in North King Street by
unknown members of the South Staffordshire Regiment, and the use by the
Army of artillery during the fighting, with inevitable widespread
damage. Th. first case was eventuai.ly brought to trial at which the
captain was found, on the medical evidence of two Dublin doctors,
'guilty but insane'. However the trial, which helped to satisfy
public indignation, was convened only after delay and procrastination,
not to mention efforts at various levels to hush the whole matter up,
so that the indignation went round the world to Britain's discredit
before being partially disarmed. The second case was never
satisfactorily resolved. The probability is that troops fresh from
103
Kngland, many of whose opponent. in savage street fighting used
plain clothes to infiltrate British position. and then fire at the
soldiers from the rear, lost their self-control. As for the
artillery fire, this was often inaccurate, but no more so, one may
imagine, than in many engagements. Better trained troops might have
manRged with less and co uiinders mor. concerned for public opinion
might have tried not to use it at eU. In the circumstances ae they
were, the requirements to minimise military casualties and to reduce
rebel positions quickly dictated it. use. The Deed brought on the
damage, and the damage worked for the Deed.
AU this made a sharp propaganda weapon, which was thrust at
Britain up to the hilt. Wishing on the one hand to support hi. troop.,
and on the other to reply to criticism, Maxwell adopted the worst
possible course. Re tried to belittle the accusations. When this
failed to still the clamour he made partial admissions that some of the
stories might be true. Finally
 he convened courts of inquiry into
specific cases. By this time the scent was cold and nothing definite
was proved. Thus Maxwell was made to appear insincere and incapable.
'Great capital is being made out of these (North King Street deaths)',
the General wrote to Asquith, 'but the cold-blooded shooting of
soldiers, police and civilians by rebels is passed over in silence'
The cruel realities of propaganda warfare were being borne home to
the perplexed Maxwell, for once the rebels were seen by Irish opinion
as soldier-heroes, their violent acts were automatically justified.
Murder is expurgated by favourable propaganda. On the other hand the
British, being seen less as fellow citizen. of the United Kingdom and
increasingly as alien oppressors, were by the same means deprived of
more]. authority. According to Bishop O'Dwyer, the executed leaders
'had been shot in cold blood'.58
A. opinion in Ireland hardened behind the Republican cause,
Redmond's Rome Rule Party lost it. power. The philosophy of Pearse
became widely accepted and his writings were taken seriously. Now that
oppression and conflict were real for all to see, the New Testament
of Irish History, the cult of violence and the hymn of hatred were
57. Quoted Arthur, p 260.
58. Letter from Bishop O'Dwyer to General Maxwell quoted O'Dubhghaill,
p 318.
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acceptable to people who a year earlier might have laughed them to
scorn. The ancient myths had come to life again. The British had
used the term Sins Fin.r as a catch-all for Fenians and rebels of
all shades of green. In the month. following the Rising
Arthur Griffith's Sins Tim Party, which had played no part in the
insurrection, became the focus of revolutionary loyalty. The
internee. and prisoners who were released from British camps and
prisons in December 1916 and June 1917 were welcomed home as heroes.
Soon their leaders were influential in Sinn Fin politics or were
organising an underground movement for future armed revolt, the Irish
Republican Army. In December 1918 a general election brought a
landslide victory for Sins l'o'in, whose propaganda machine completed the
mobilisation of the Irish masses by the skilful exploitation of unwise
British attempts to introduce conscription to Ireland. In the guerrilla
war for independence that began in January 1919 propaganda was the
decisive instrument, working on the guilt feelings of the English,
which the Deed had fanned, and by indirect leverage through the United
States. The treaty of 1921 brought independence to Ireland, but only
to the 26 counties that shared Pearse' a myths and wished to follow his
'tradition to the future'.
The British Response
The men who ran British propaganda during World War I were gifted
amateurs drafted for the duration. On the Home Front, in America,
end against the enemy, they did some effective work. Their brief was
to support the war effort against Germany; internal politics and
subversion were no concern of theirs. Working in mysterious secrecy,
they hid themselves as far as possible from the hostile gaze of civil
servants and servicemen, few if any of whom understood the power or
the workings of propaganda. Thus it would never have occurred to
Maxwell or to any of the Dublin Castle administrators to request
expert assistance in this field. Instead they relied upon the
negative powers of censorship. 'Propaganda of the deed' cannot be
stifled in this way.
No attempts were made while the Courts-Martial were in session
to emphasize th. enormity of the event, th. innocent lives lost and
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the suffering, of the Dublin poor, and thus to justify in advance the
penalties being inflicted. On the one hand the British tended to
ridicule the Rising and dismiss it as an extended street brawl, an
argument distinctly at odds with 'the most severe sentences on the
known organizers', and on the other hand they over-stressed the
German involvement, presenting it as the driving force behind the
movement instead, as many in Ireland knew it, as an available means
to an Irish end. By pressing this argument on an audience that
recognised it as over-stated, the British lost credibility.
Tor hi. responsibility towards the executions of 'Immortal
Patriot. Newly Dead"9, as one poem called the dead leaders, the
General earned the propaganda name 'Bloody Maxwell' • He was not
equipped by training, experience or temperament to conduct a war of
words and ideas, least of all against the Irish. Indeed it is
doubtful if any Bngliehmnn
 could have competed successfully in this
arena. What the British needed were Irish voices speaking
convincingly in favour of moderation. The executions and 'suppression'
effectively prevented this. Even as A.quith's chat to the prisoners
had implied 'prisoner of war' status, Maxwell's own utterances suggested
that he too saw the military action that crushed the Rising as war
rather than 'duties in aid of the Civil Power'.
The General sent his main report of the incident to London on
25 May. Next day he deepatched a follow-up dealing with the
allegation, of misconduct by troops. The paragraphs concerned with
North King Street read as follows:
(k) No doubt in districts where the fighting was fiercest,
such as in the North King Street, parties of men, under the
great provocation of being shot at from front and rear, seeing
their comrades fall from the fire of snipers, burst into
suspected houses and killed such male members as were found,
it is perfectly possible that some innocent citizens were
shot in this manner, but it must be borne in mind that they
could have left their houses and passed through the cordons bad
they so wished.
(5) Th. blame for such casualties must b. on the shoulders of
those who engineered rebellion in the city.
59. Joyce Kilser'. poem quoted O'Dubhghaill, p 333.
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(6) The number of such incidents that have been brought to my
notice is happily few, less than I expected, considering the
magnitude of the task. 60
It is one thing to see the provocation of half-trained soldiers as a
strong mitigating factor for any offences committed, something to
be held in their favour when tried by court-martial; it is quite
another to accept the soldiers' reactions as being perfectly normal,
something to be expected and condoned. Carried to its logical
conclusion, the latter view implies not only a state of war, that
relieves th. soldier of the 'peace time' legal constraints of
'duties in aid', but also a war without the restraints of
international conventions. This in turn undermines the assumptions
upon which the rebel leaders were brought to trial. Maxwell, it
would seem, wanted to have things both ways. Fortunately for the
British argument, his report was never published in its original,
forthright and potentially damaging form.
Asquith' a only alteration to Maxwell's report was to remove the
words 'killed such male members as were found' from paragraph (k).
However other more cautious eyes scanned the pages and by the time the
London Gazette published the reports on 21 June 1916 the three
paragraphs were down to two:
(k) Whilst fighting continued under conditions at once so
confused and so trying it is possible that some innocent
citizens were shot. It must be remembered that the struggle
was in many cases of a house to house character, that sniping
was continuous and persistent and that it was often extremely
difficult to distinguish between those who were or had been
firing upon the troops and those who had for various reasons
chosen to remain in the scene of the fighting instead of leaving
the houses and passing through the cordons.
(5) The number of such incidents that has been brought to notice
is very insignificant. 61
This version saw the killings as mistakes, tragic incidents in the
fight to restore law and order, and was safe.
60. PRO file 79/Iriab/i93. W032 9510.
61. PRO op cit.
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It would be unfair to pile too much blame onto Maxwell for the
failure of Government propaganda in the aftermath of the Deed. He
was sent to Ireland to suppress, not to seduce. Asquiths surrender
of control at a critical moment was as fatal to Britain's interests,
as Psarse's deed was decisive to Ireland's future.
Perceptions of the Deed
V I Lenin's r.actions to the Rising were summarised in a thesis
written in July 1916 and published in October in Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata.
He chided those on the political Left who had dismissed the Irish
rebellion as a 'putech' and expressed the opinion that 'the struggle of
the oppressed nations in Europe, a struggle capable of going to the
length of insurrection and street fighting, of breaking down the iron
discipline in the army and martial law, will "sharpen the revolutionary
crisis in Europe" infinitely more than a more developed rebellion in a
remote colony' 6z He concluded that the Rising had come too soon,
since the 'European revolt of the proletariat has not yet matured'.6
Nevertheless, Lenin attached value to such a premature movement for
its de-stabilising effect, hoping no doubt that the eventual outcome would
be the dictatorship of the proletariat. In fact the Irish rebellion
of 1919, like the 1916 Rising, was nationalist and Republican in
character, being for the moat part organised by middle-class,
politically conservative leaders. The socialist philosophy of
James Connolly did not die with him, but it has never gained wide
acceptance in Ireland.
Although the Rising did litti. for the cause of socialism, it
changed many Irish political perceptions. There is disagreement
among historians as to whether the Deed represented the culmination of
a long tradition or the imposition of a new ideology. The first view
is generally accepted. This argues that prior to 1916 the people of
Ireland had been in an unpatriotic slumber and had lost the
consciousness of national identity. Without the Deed, this
interpretation goes on, Ireland would have been fobbed off with a mere
semblance of Home Rule. The second, revisionist viewpoint is that
62. Quoted Edwards and Pyle, pp 191-195.
63. Ibid.
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Pearse's myth. were largely of his own invention and were
artificially grafted onto the Irish consciousness at the expense of
finer	 It is argued by this school that the many
thousands of Irishmen who died bravely in the Allied cause in the
191k-18 War were, by the Deed, virtually deprived of honour in their
own land. Ever since the Rising caught hold of the Nation's
imagination, these critics continue, Irishmen have been 'asked to
disown their own past ... to censure as unpatriotic the common
Irishmen who were not attracted by the new revolutionary ideas, but
who adhered to an ancient tradition ... to apologise for their
fellow-countrymen who accepted loyally the serious guidance of the
Church ... to despise as unmanly those of their countrymen who
preferred to solve problems, if possible, by peaceful rather than by
violent means'.6
The truth may lie midway. Certainly the consciousness of Irish
nationality was very old indeed, as were the historical myths and
th animosity towards England. These provided the necessary
pre-propaganda. The Rising on the other hand imposed one new
ideological ingredient at least - the myth of the Deed itself. Fused
with the old myths and exploited as mobilisation propaganda, this
created an intolerant climate of public opinion, as Professor Ellul
explains:
We are here in the presence of an organised myth that tries
to take hold of the entire person. Through the myth it
creates, propaganda imposes a complete range of intuitive
knowledge, susceptible of only one interpretation, unique and
one-sided, and precluding any divergence. Thi. myth becomes
so powerful that it invades every area of consciousness,
leaving no faculty or motivation intact. It stimulates in the
individual a feeling of exclusiveness, and produces a biased
attitude. The myth has such motive force that, once
accepted, it controls the whole of the individual, who becomes
immune to any other influence. Thi. explain. the totalitarian
attitude that the individual adopts - whenever a myth has been
successfully created - and that simply reflects the totalitarian
action of propaganda on him. 66
6i. Revisionists include the late Rev Professor Shaw and Dr Cruise
65. Shaw, pp 117-118, 151.
66. Ellul Ci), p ii.
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The reviBionists have had a hard task trying to penetrate bias, and
in their endeavoure have perhaps over-stated their historical
arguments. Th. real debate may be leea about facts as interpretation.
Here the totalitarian after-.ffects of the propaganda still confuse.
If in today'. Ireland the myth has to live alongside academic
scepticism, the worst it has to face in England is ignorance and
disinterest. Insofar as the ordinary Englishmen thinks about the
Rising at all, he does so in mindless acceptance of chauvinistic
Republican propaganda, of the sort offered by writers like
Redmond Titzgerald6
 and Constantine Fitzgibbon. 68 In America
ignorance owes lees to dieinter.st and more to careful protection.
Having done so much to support the IRB and encourage rebell ion, Irish
Americans are reluctant to allow a relapse towards rationality, and
they are helped by the wider American sentiment that sees all forms of
opposition to British 'oppression' in a favourable light. Thus
Professor Norman Cantor can writ, in an introduction: 'Protest in the
twentieth century has led to social change and,more often than not,
to social melioration; revolution baa been the road to chaos, civil
war, and new tyranny.' 6
 Then in the chapter of the same book that
deals with 1916 he can say: 'The Easter Rising was the model for all
liberation movements against Western imperialism in the twentieth
century and for all protest movements generally. Endless debate,
piecemeal reform, tedious compromise - they did not bring social
liberation and personal exultation, which can be achieved only through
immediate confrontation, no matter how futile, and martyrdom, no
matter how certain.' 70 Thi, indulgent attitude must account, too, for
Leon Uris's remark, as offensive, surely, to Pearse and his colleagues
as to the English:
It seems that the British might have learned something about
the Irish after all their experience. It is on. thing to kill
enemy soldiers in battle but one just doesn' t go around shooting
poets. 71
67. Fitzgerald, op cit.
68. Constantine Fitzgibbou Out of the Lion's Paw; Ireland wine her
Freedom (London, 1969).
69. Cantor, p XIV.
70. Cantor, p 40.
71. Jill & Leon Uris Ireland, A Terrible Beauty (New York, 1975), p 1k9.
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Discueion
Several hundred years of the English connection had created by
the mid-nineteenth century powerful revolutionary pro-propaganda in
Ireland. This rested in part upon nationalism, in part on religious
sectarianism, and in part on social factors, particularly the
'agrarian tratition' •72 Efforts by Irish leaders to build upon this
foundation tended to waver between the constitutional and
unconstitutional, and sometimes both courses were used at once.
Separatist Irish Republicanism originated late in the nineteenth
century as a modern political ideology and tended to attract support
from ardent advocates of the unconstitutional method. In the early
years of the twentieth century these men discovered that many
ordinary Irishmen showed a reduced enthusiasm for the use of
violence, a change brought about by British constitutional measures
that had satisfied many needs and seemed about to grant Home Rule.
For the Irish Republican Brotherhood, whose raison d'etre had always
promoted means above ends, the trend was worrying. Agitation
propaganda was needed to awaken the masses from their 'unpatriotic
slumber' and lead them into violent action. Only in this way, the
IRB argued, could Ireland win real freedom.
Patrick Pearce's propaganda focused the diffused light of this
philosophy into a bright narrow beam. His primary target audience was
the mass of Irish people. No doubt he would have liked this mass to
include Protestants as well as Catholics, but finding no way to
attract the former he put them out of his mind and carried on as though
they did not exist. The 'propaganda of th. deed' of Easter 1916 and
its aftermath raised Republicanism to pride of place in Irish politics,
discredited the constitutional course, and began the mobilisation of
popular support for full-scale revolution. All the pre-existing
attitudes and fundamental trends of Irish opinion, formed and nurtured
by centuries of pre-propaganda, were by the Deid shaped and intensified
to the point where ordinary men and women would take up arms, kill,
risk being killed, and give total allegiance to a cause that most had
previously ignored or even ridiculed.
72. See Tom Garvin (ii) Nationalism, Secret Societies and Mass
Political Mobilisation in Ireland based on a paper before the
ECPR Workshop on Nationalism and Territorial Identity,
Strathclyde, (8_i l, January 1978).
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Pe&ree began with three advantages. Through the 123 and the
larger associations covertly controlled by the Brotherhood, he had
organisation. His target audience wore 'friends', that is to say the
Catholic Irish, to whoa he could communicate effectively. And below
the calm surface of Irish political life lay the pro-existing
attitudes and trend.. Hi. problem was th. lack of facts to back the
case he wished to argue. The Rising provided some of the necessary
facts and the British reaction appeared to make real the facts of
oppression and cruelty. So far as 'friends' were concerned, Pearse's
propagewi was extremely successful, going even as far as shifting
the attitude of the Church to one of support of a movement that was
increasingly seen as 'legitimate'. 'Neutral' reaction in such
countries as America was mixed, but the Rising provided a reference
point that was to be important as a propaganda symbol in 1919. A
remarkable outcome of the Deed was its effect on the 'enemy' - the
English. Partly through th. efforts of Irish spokesmen in London,
and partly through the skilful use of 'guilt transfer', ambivilance,
uneasy conscience and a sneak4ng acceptance of the legitimacy of the
Rising began to grow. Propaganda began, but did not in this case
end, at home.
The message style was essentially emotional, backed by
quasi-rational arguments. Techniques included nostalgia - Pearse' s
New Testament, appeal - to the old animosities, glittering
generalities - the Proclamation of the Republic, purity of motive -
P.arse's court-martial address, embolism - the exploitation of the
dead men's relics, character assassination - 'Bloody Maxwell', and the
bandwagon - by which Siun Tin directed the mobilisation begun by the
Rising. Themes used were m*inly thos. appropriate to the mobilisation
phase of revolution and included hatred, the righteousness and
legitimacy of the cause and it. inevitable triumph, allegiance, moral
certainty, guilt transfer in connection with counter_productive
measures, the glorification of heroes and of violence, and security
force incompetence. Rebels received protection by the themes of
innocence, special status, and the security these conjured up against
retribution.
As for the British counter-measures, the main lesson may be
that surrender of political control over a tense political situation is
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likely to lead to problems in all areas, including the war of words.
Another observation is that awareness of the power, aims and methods
of revolutionary propaganda is as important an asset to politicians,
civil servants and security forces involved in countering insurgency
as any other body of knowledge. Expertise in the field of
propaganda is desirable, but often it is not the utterances of
authority that affect public opinion so much as the actions of police,
soldiers and administrators. In 1916 it was Maxwell's style of
action that was particularly damaging. An expert on his staff could
have prevented the propaganda defeat only if Maxwell had been prepared
to accept advice in areas far removed from what most people would see
as the preserve of the propagandist.
In, their efforts to influence Irish opinion in the aftermath of
the Deed the British were handicapped by having to address a foreign
target audience. Any English propaganda in Ireland was bound to be
weak. After they had lost their contact with the Irish people through
respected Irish political, leaders, the British could govern Ireland
only by force. After Pearse's deed, force was certain to be reciprocal.
Propaganda brought violence back to Irish politics, dashing the hopes
of the Dublin pacifist Francis Sheehy-Skeffingham. The words that
follow were part of an open letter which he wrote in 1915 to
Thomas MacDonagh, published in the Irish Citizen. One year later the
author, like his ideal, was dead.
You justify no war except a war to end oppression, to establish
the right. What warmonger ever spoke otherwise 'when it was
necessary to enlist the people? ... European militarism has
drenched Europe in blood; Irish militarism may only crimson
the fields of Ireland. For us that would be disaster enough
I want to see the manhood of Ireland no longer hypnotised by
the glamour of "the glory of arms", no longer blind to the
horrors of organised murder. 73




TEE VOICE OF ISRAEL
PROPAGANDA FOR A JEWISH STATE
Background to the Study
Throughout the nineteen hundred years of their dispersion around
th. world the Jews retained hope that they would one day return to their
ancient homeland, Israel. The expression 'Next year in Jerusalem'
sustained this aspiration, but until late in the 19th century the idea
existed in vague hopes rather than in practical schemes.
Dr Theodor lierzl gave the notion political form by creating Zionism, a
ove.ent dedicated to the establishment of a Jewish State in the
territory that was then called Palestine. During the first world war
Britain ejected the Turks from the Levant, proclaimed in ambiguous
terms her support for a Jewish National Home in Palestine 1 , and
assumed the governance of that land. In 1922 the League of Nations
formally awarded Britain the Mandate to rule Palestine on the League's
behalf, with terms of reference that confirmed the right. of the Jews
to establish their National. Home provided 'that nothing should be done
which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing
non-.Jewish communities in Palestine' 2, who were, for the moat part,
Arabs. Thus was created an opportunity for Britain to enhance her
strategic position in the Near East at the price of administering what
was, from the outset and by its very nature, an incurable dichotomy.
Under the terms of the Mandate Jewish immigration was to be
facilitated by the Palestine Adin{atratjon. This was done until 1939,
by which date the Arab population had expressed, by means of a full-scale
rebellion, their displeasure at having what they regarded as their land
invaded by foreigners. While this insurrection lasted the Arabs seized
control of 'liberated areas' in the hj]j country, terrorised their own
community into supporting the revolt, and brought death, destruction and
1. The 'Balfour Declaration' 2 November 1917, reproduced Doreen Ingram
Palestine Papere 1917-1922 (London, 1972) p 18.
2. Mandate for Palestine, League of Nations, 2I July 1922 (Reproduced
a. Appendix to John Marlowe (i) Rebellion in Paleetine. (London, 19k6)
Quot. i. from second paragraph of preamble.
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near-anarchy to th. whole land.' This experience caused the British
to look carefully at Article 6 of the Mandate, dealing with
iiigration, and to note that the Mandatory was required to encourage
immigration only so long as 'the rights and position of other
section.. of the population are not prejudiced' 	 These words were
used to justify the British Government's White Paper of 1939, which
restricted Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the subsequent five
years, after which there was to be no sore immigration without the
consent of the Arabs. This 'White Paper' policy came at a time when
Hitler'. anti-semitic schemes were injecting the Zionist purpose with a
desperate urgency. As it was only too obviously a concession to Arab
violence, many Jews concluded that the White Paper policy could be
overturned only if they resorted to the sass means. In September 1939
World War II broke out.
The Zionist leaders appreciated that Nazi Germany was the Jew.'
first enemy, and consequently adopted a policy which Mr David Ben Gurion
put into the words: 'We shU fight th. war as if there were no
White Paper and we .h st l fight the White Paper as if there were no
war' .5 Ben Gurion was gradually assuming effective leadership of the
World Zionist Organiaation from its distinguished champion
Dr Chaim Weizaann. The new leader's war-time policy was to take all
possible steps to open Palestine to Jewish fugitives from Hitler' a
tyranny, by means both legal and illegal, to build up the strength
and efficiency of the Jewish Agency's illegal 'private army',
Haganah, but otherwise to avoid conflict with the British. The Jewish
Agency was a body created under the terms of the Mandate to advise and
co-operate with the Mmnd*tory in matters affecting the Nations]. Home
and act as a liaison between international Jewry, especially the World
Zionist Organiaation, the Jews of Palestine and the Palestine
Administration.
During the course of the ar news of the massacre of Jews leaked
from G.rman-occupied Europe. The emotional impact upon world Jewry
and particularly upon Palestine Jew., the Tishuv, was great, giving rise
3. S.. Marlowe (i).
i. Mandate for Palestine, Article 6.
5. Quoted Tiga]. Allon The Making of Israel's Army (London, 1970)
p 15.
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to revolutionary fervour of an unusual. kind, something stronger and
wider than any rebellion against the apparatus of a state. The fervour
expressed Jewish indignation agaixi.at the helplessness and
etateleesness of the Jews, endured since the Romans crushed Bar Cochba' a
rebellion in AD 1 1+0, a situation that Zionists believed could not on any
account be allowed to endure any longer if the survivors of Nazi death
camps were to be saved and if Jews were to protect themselves from
further outrages. It was a global revolution, although the focus of
Zionist ambition was the land of Palestine.
In 191+2 the Zionist Congress resolved to strive for unlimited
immigration, unrestricted land purchases from Arabs, and a Jewish
Stat., 6
 thus going much further than a mere rejection of the Whit.
Paper. More and more Jews were beginning to feel that they should if
necessary resort to force, although the Jewish Agency tried
desperately to hold the door open for peaceful negotiations with the
British. Prominent UX politicians favoured the Zionist cause,
including Mr Winston Churchill, the likely leader of any post-war
Conservative Administration. If the Socialists gained power, their
sympathy, too, seemed assured. At their 191+1+ Conference the Labour
Party voted to 'let Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such
numbers as to become a majority'. 7 There was thus good justification
for Zionist leaders' hopes that a satisfactory settlement would be
negotiated after the war. Nevertheless the revolutionary forces within
Zionism continued to mount. Foremost within these forces were the
Revisionists.
Quite early in the Jewish resettlement of Palestine there arose
within Zionist ranks a right wing party that demanded revision of the
Mandate to include Tranajordon in the scope of the National Home. Under
their leader, Vladimir Jabotinaky, the 'Revisionists', as the party
was called, acted, at least, as a kind of 'ginger group' within
Zionism and, at moat, as a revolutionary force seeking to impose its
authority over the Yiahuv. In the second capacity the Revisionists set
up the 'New Zionist Organisation' which challenged the World Zionist
6. At the Biltmore Hotel in New York, John Marlowe (ii) The Seat of
Pilate. (London, 1959), p 17k.
7. Quoted Christopher Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel (London, 1965),
p 311.
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Organisation for leadership of international Zionism. During the
1930s revisionists penetrated Hagenah, eventually sponsoring a
break-away 'Haganah 'B" from which was created the Irgun Zwai Leumi,
the National Military Organisation, or 'Irgun' for short.
Revisionist youth was organised into a semi-sports club 'on the
Fascist model', 8
 known as Brith Truuipeldor or Betar. Branches of the
adult and junior wings of Revisionism were formed amongst Jewish
communities in America, South Africa and Europe. This division within
Zionism was to exert a profound influence on events leading up to
the creation of the state of Israel.
This chapter attempts to assess th. role of Zionist propaganda,
both Official and Revisionist, in the period leading up to the
establishment of modern Israel, and also considers British counter-
measures.
The Poet-War Situation
In the last full year of th. second world war Mr Churchill's
War Cabinet attempted to find a solution to the Palestine problem.
In January 19kb they agreed in principl, a scheme of partition.
However by 20 May, when the Army Council Secretariat briefed the
Secretary of Stat. for War in thee. clear terms, the scheme was already
doomed:
In view of the difficulties attendant on any partition scheme,
it may be wondered why the project has been revived. The
reason briefly is that it is now quite clear that no modne
vivendi between Arabs and Jews will ever be reached; that the
British Government are irrevocably committed to the establishment
of a national home for the Jewe in Palestine; and, this being so,
the rights of the Arabs must be preserved so far as possible.
The only possible solution is Partition. 9
Sadly, the brief went on to explain that the Foreign Secretary, who had
reserved judgement in January, had since expressed fears of 'enduring
disturbances in an area where internal tranquility is of the utmost
8. Marlowe (i), p 136.
9. Army Council Secretariat Brief for Secretary of State for War,
20 May 19kb (WP (kk) 253) referring to Plan of Partition P (14)(13) ik. PRO Pile 0176/727 (Palestine Policy), WO 32-10260.
ii8
strategical. importance'. 1° The 'only possible solution' was shelved.
We may regret, with the benefit of hindsight, that the course proposed
was not adopted. British prestige and power were in 1911k at their
height, Zionist leaders were still anxious to co-operate, Palestine
Arab leaders, having backed the Germans, were discredited. If the
i9kk partition scheme was the only solution, i9kk-19k6 was also perhaps
the last period when Britain could have imposed that or any other
schema.
The war against Germany ended in May 19115. A July election
brought the Labour Party to power in Britain, raising in Jewish Palestine
high hopes that Labour Party resolutions would be translated into
Government policy. This was not to be the case. Confronted with the
realities and responsibilities of office, Mr Attlee's Cabinet gave the
Palestine problem a low priority, accepting Foreign Office and Chiefs
of Staff advice which continued to set the maintenance of Britain's
strategic interests in the Near and Middle East high above any
obligation to support Zionist ambitions. The strategic interests
which one year earlier had hinged upon the conduct of the war against
the Axis powers were now concerned with possible Soviet threats to the
Middle East. Russia continued to occupy Iranian Azerbaijan, and
threatened Gr.ece and Turkey. New regimes in Syria and Iraq might be
vulnerable to Soviet pressure unless supported by a British presence
close at hand. Although British defence planners saw Egypt as their
future main base in the region, they deemed it essential to hold a forward
base in Palestine.
In addition to thi. perceived need to retain naval, military and
air force facilities in Palestine, which might not have been
10. The Colonian Secretary, Colonel Oliver Stanley, had put forward
a scheme envisaging a Jewish etate incorporating Haifa, Acre Bay,
the Plain of Eedraelon, Tiberias, Beisan, and the coastal Plain
stretching south from Haifa as far as Qastina, roughly 20 km deep,
including Tel Aviv and Jaffa. The Arab State would have included
the Huleh, Northern Ga]illee, Nazareth and Acre, Samaria, with
Tulkarm, Jenin, Nablue and Jericho and, in the South, Rebron,
Beersheba, Gaza and the Negev north of Beersheba. The southern
Negev would have been a 'reserved zone' and the central area around
Jerusalem, including the Holy Places of that City and Bethlehem,
Ramallah and Lydda, would have belonged to a separate multi-national
'Jerusalem Stat.' still administered by the Mandatory. The plan
provided for possible mergers between the northern Arab territory with
Syria, and the southern, with Tranejordan. The southern Negev was
apparently intended for the Jews once Arab opinion had been mollified.
Only 7000 Jews lived in areas allotted to Arabs, while in their own
State the Jews would have been a majority. See PRO Report 20 Dec 191+3
CAB119/1k7 and War Cabinet Paper (k5) 306, Memorandum by Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 16 May 19115, CAB66/65.
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incompatible with Jewish aspirations, the British Government was
concerned to preserve its wider interests in the Middle East,
particularly the free flow of oil and rights to overfly Arab territory
in order to maintain garrisons further east. On 2? March i9e5 the
Poet-E:ostilitie. Planning Staff had written:
It is therefore of cardinal, importance that the policy of
His Majesty's Government towards the Middle East should aim
at creating a friendly and contented Arab world, by eliminating
every possible cause for dispute. 11
This aim waa incompatible with Zionist hopes. If Britain was to
regard Arab goodwill as all-important, then she could do little to ease
the White Paper restrictions on Jewish immigration, and she could do
nothing that might point in the direction of Jewish statehood. The new
Labour Government revived the hope that, miraculously, acme modus
vivendi between Arabs and Jews could after all be reached, and their
attitude toward Britain's commitment to establish a National Hose was
ambiguous. The policy so far as the Jews were concerned was not to
have a policy. This satisfied the majority Arab population of Palestine
but was obviously objectionable to the Tishuv and world Jewry.
On 211 August 19k5 Sir John Shaw, Chief Secretary for Palestine and
Senior official on the staff of the High Commissioner in Jerusalem,
wrote a despatch to the Colonial Secretary. After giving his assessment
of the internal security situation as 'not only gloomy as to the
present, but depressing as to the future', Shaw wrote:
If I am correct in believing that the Yishuv is being psychologically
prepared for what will be in effect armed rebellion, it must be
admitted that material preparations do not seem to lag behind.
(He assesses the Jewish terrorist potential) ... The picture is a
sombr. one. The young Jewish extremists, the product of a vicious
education system, know neither toleration nor compromise; they
regard themselves as morally justified in violence directed against
any individual or institution that impedes the complete fulfilment
of their demands. 12
11. PRO document PBP (115) 10(o) (Final), Annex to COS (115) 90th
Meeting 6 April 19k5, CAB 79/31.
12.PRO Letter, Chief Secretary for Palestine to Colonial Secretary,
211 August 19145, File 73156/75 'Palestine Annex - internal security
Palestine 19115', CO 733/1456 Part I.
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The Mandatory Power
British policy on Palestine was agreed in Cabinet and transmitted
through the Offices of State concerned with its implementation.
Principal. among these were the Colonial Office and the War Office,
which issued directives and instructions respectively to the High
Commissioner and the General. Officer Commanding British Troops in
Palestine and Tranajordan who had their offices in Jerusalem and who
were jointly responsibi. for security matters. The Civil Administration
controlled the Palestine Police, a powerful force which had managed the
enforcement of law and order virtually single-handed throughout the
war.
The Police Force was made up of British, Jewish and Arab personnel.
UK members served at all grades, unlike many Colonial Forces where they
served only as officers. Jews and Arabs in the force were exposed to
community pressures, and were reliable only in so far as their duties
did not conflict too harshly with native loyalties. Mr Efraim Dekel,
Hageneth's one-time Chief of Intelligence, has described how 'the
greatest contributions to the Haganah security and intelligence forces
were made by Jewish policemen and government employees who were also
members of Hagnh. They carried out their Haganah duties from a
realisation of their patriotic duty and without any need of special
encouragement or special orders. Their police or government jobs were
their field of duty within the Haganah, to which they had sworn
loyalty'. 13
 Sometimes, because of their senior rank in the government
service, Jewish spies were deliberately excluded from Haganah
membership, thus lessening the risks of their being uncovered. Dekel
makee it clear that .11 Jews were expected to put loyalty to the Jewish
cause above personal or other considerations. Against those who 'regarded
their government service as a personal career more important to them
than the needs of the people ... threats often had to be uned.1 During
13. Efraim Dekel SEAl: The Exploits of Eagana Intelligence
(New York, 1959), P 15. (Without disrespect to Mr Dekel, the
reader has to be warned not to place undue reliance upon the
account of an intelligence chief. Such individuals never really
retire, and much that is written in this book appears designed to
conceal the truth, rather than reveal it.)
ik. Dekel, pp 15-16.
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pre-war years, when the security threat was mainly Arab, the Police
had turned their attention in that direction. Tar more British
officers spoke Arabic than Hebrew. 15
 The mounting Jewish tension
had not caused a corresponding change in police attitudes. No doubt
the Jewish tendency to isolate themselves from the administration
dissuaded policemen from learning their language, with the inevitable
(and for the Jews, desirable) result that police intelligence
gathering within the Yishuv was hampered.
The determination of the Palestine Police to maintain law and
order single-handed was admirable, and had it been possible successfully
to sustain this policy in the post-war years no cause for criticism
would arise. In the face of a deteriorating situation, however, the
Force tended to cling to the principle long after the reality had
faded, and this gave rise to two areas of difficulty. In an attempt to
extend police capability into the military field, the Force set up the
'Police Mobile Force' equipped with armoured care, thus diverting effort
from the essential police tasks of detection, arrests and conviction
towards a para-ailitary role, and, in mistaken confidence that they
could handle security problems that soon became immense, the Police called
for military assistance only for specific tasks, instead o f involving the
Army in a properly co-ordinated joint counter-insurgency campaign.
Throughout most of the post-war Mandatory period the British Army
in Palestine consisted of two divisions and one independent brigade.
Th. divisions shared the territory by dividing it into North and South
Sectors, leaving the area containing Jerusalem to the brigade. One of
the divisions, the 6th Airborne, was originally sent to Palestine to be
16the Middle Last Imperial Strategic Reserve.
A. well as the two divisions and the independent brigade, many
base troops were situated in Palestine to support the strategic
interests that gave the country so much importance in the eyes of the
British Chiefs of Staff. Additionl1y the Royal Navy had an in8tallation
in Haifa and the Royal Air Force had stations up and down the country.
15. 21.3% spoke Arabic and 3.#% spoke Hebrew. PRO Palestine Police
Annual Administrative Report 19k6, Jerusalem, 197, p 6. CO 8ik/iO.
16. The writer served in this Division throughout it. tour' in
Palestine I 9k5-k8.
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The concentration of military in so small a land was high. However,
becase most were there for reasons unconnected with internal security,
the over-abundance of camps and depots was anything but an asset in
countering insurgency. Administrative units provided tempting
targets for saboteurs or raiders and imposed additional burdens on the
unite committed to keeping the peace. Moreover, the concentration of
installations was valuable to Zionist propaganda, since it swelled the
figures that could be counted as 'oppressors' and, in the glorification
of deeds, it increased the odds against which the heroes had
struggled.
In the aftermath of great world wars victorious armies are apt to
fall apart as the cause which inspired unity disappears. The British
Army in 1 9k5 was remarkably resilient to this tendency but nevertheless
th. competing requirements of early demobilisation of veterans and
large, continuing overseas commitments created difficult problems.
Experienced officers and soldiers were lost at a pace that made
replacement difficult. Morale, though high, depended rather heavily
upon prospects of early 'deaiob'. One officer has recalled how his
regiment 'settled down to a curious routine in which the new skills of
Internal Security operations were combined with both the tough,
rather slap-happy wartime attitude to soldiering and the beginnings
of the restoration of pre-war peacetime Regimental life. More time
17was spent on training and sport than on operations'.
The army was not prepared for counter-insurgency, either
psychologically or by training. All ranks saw the purpose of an army
solely in terms of fighting wars. A long pre-war experience of imperial
policing had been all but extinguished by five years of conflict. For
those who did remember it, the imperial experience was in any case of
limited usefulness. It related to two eventualities, riots in towns
and counter-guerrilla action in the countryside. In the urban situation
the army was prepared to move in if police could not cope with rising
violence, deal sharply with the unruly, and restore the situation so that
police could resume control. In the rural setting the army would be
conducting straightforward albeit limited military operations. The
17. Cohn Mitchell, Having Been a Soldier (London, 1962), p 55.
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concept that developed in the 1950. of prolonged joint police and army
counter-insurgency operation.. was unknown in 19+5. Consequently the
readiness of the Palestine Police to expand it. operation.. into the
military sphere, thu.. excluding the troops from close involvement in
countering insurgency, went for too long unchallenged by the Army
in Palestine.
In the sam way that r.beUion flourishes when led by an
alternative regime which directa a combined politics]., military and
psychological onslaught, so successful counter-insurgency policies need
similar ingredient.. The Palestine Government of 195 possessed strength
only in one of thee. compartments - the police and military. Politically
it waited for positive guidance from London, and none came. In the
psychological, field it was already in deep trouble, aa a result of
Zionist war-tim. propaganda against the White Paper. The Public
Information Office was a branch of the Jerusalem Secretariat, with a
staff in 195 of over one hundred. Outstation. existed in Lydda and
Haifa. Very littl. could, however, be achieved while London advised
that 'until 4G makes a new declaration of policy with regard to
Palestine, it is undesirable that our publicity should attempt to
18
cover future developments' • 	 Furthermore the staff and budget were
out at the end of hostilities. In London the Ministry of Information
was in April i9k6 replaced by the Central Office of Information, a
non-ministerial, non-policy making service agency. 19 The war-tinte
apparatus for government propaganda virtually ceased to exist and it
would seem from subsequent events that the will-to-ignorance on this
subject, which had dominated official attitudes between the wars,
returned with renewed force.
Zionist Resources end Strategy
A device often useful to revolutionaries is the 'alternative
government'. This attempts, usually from some secret hideaway, to
i8. PRO Overseas Planning Committee - Plan of Propaganda for Palestine,
2nd Revision of Aims and Objectives, paper No 576A, 1 June 195.
File 75893: Publicity i9k5. CO 733/k65.
19. 5.. 'Post-var activities of the Ministry of Information, 19k5-k6'
in PRO Inf 1/93.
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present itself as a better focus for the people's loyalty, obedience
and confidence than the legitimate administration. In proportion to
the alternative regime'. success in winning loyalty, obedience and
confidence, the legitimate government forfeits these advantages. If
this process goes too far, 'legitimacy' itself changes sides, and with
it the de facto moral right to govern. Under the terms of the 1922
Mandate the Tishuv was presented with what to all intents and purposes
was the apparatus of alternativ. government, to be recognised and
accepted by the Mandatory, in the form of the Jewish Agency. Prom the
earliest days the Tishuv was •ducated to regard the Agency as it. sole
protector, advocate and guide. Loyalty to the spirit of the League of
Nations Mandate, implying a measure of respect for and understanding
of the Palestine Administration, was discouraged amongst rank and file
Jews. Jewish leaders appreciated the value of being 'above ground', and
refrained from any direct challenge to the Mandatory Authority' s right
to govern. Nevertheless, the structure of embryo statehood was one of
Zionism's moat valuable assets.
The Jewish Agency's military organisation, Eaganah, had origi n1 ly
been a defensive force to protect settlements against Arab attack.
Havlageh, self-restraint, was the guiding principle. During the Arab
Rebellion of 1937-39 that principle gradually gave way before the need
to deprive the Arabs of the initiative, a need which was fulfilled by
offensive patrolling against Arab terrorists, their bases and supplies.
The British Captain Ord. Wingate was influential in this conversion.
In 19+1, with British approval, Haganah volunteers formed an
independent striking force consisting of nine companies regularly
mobilized for action. This unit was known as the Pa].mach (the initials
of the Hebrew words for 'striking companies') and was designed to
strengthen the defence of Palestine against any Axis attack and to
conduct offensive operations as required. 2° The Allies made
excellent use of two Palmach companies in the invasion of Syria and
Lebanon, and the Palmach made excellent use of the specialist training
and experience offered. Th. division of Haganah into two wings, the
large, regionally organised local defence organisation, and the
20. Lion, pp 16-17.
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relatively small, highly trained, better armed, Palmach, continued in
the poet-war years, until with independence both found their places
in the Army of Israel. The closely-knit, disciplined and militant
Yiahuv was by 19k5 an embryo state, with its own 'government' and
'army'. By its willingnes, to tolerate, and even encourage, Hagana
and other 'illegal' organisatione in time of war, the Palestine
Administration made its post-war tasic extremely difficult, not simply
becaus. of the training and material assistance provided to these
groups, but because of the transfer of legitimacy involved. It was as
unconvincing to tell Jewish audiences after May 191+5 that Hagana
and Irgun had always been illegal as it would have been to tell Britons
that the Home Guard had never been officially authorised.
The events in Palestine between Autumn 191+5 and the British
departure in 191+8 are often depicted as a 'war of national liberation'
or an 'anti-colonial struggle'. In fact the Zionist endeavour was more
complicated than either expression suggests, and the continued use of
such labels says more for the lasting effect of propaganda than for
truth. The Jews wanted their own state in as large a part of
Palestine as they could get and, knowing perfectly well that the Arabs
would never accept this arrangement unless forced to, they needed armed
protection before, during and after the birth of their National Home.
Such protection might be provided, in the event of a negotiated
settlement within the terms of the Mandate, by the Mandatory Power. If
on the other hand it turned out that the only way to establish the
National Home was by forcing Britain to relinquish the Mandate, it would
hardly be likely that the departing British soldiers would fight the Arabs
on the Jews' behalf. Thus any such policy of coercion would need fine
timing between on the one haxrl the coercion, and on the other, a necessary
build-up of Jewish military capability. Only by immigration, arms
purchase or manufacture, training and discipline, could the Yishuv
achieve superiority over whatever forces the Arabs might eventually
range against them. Lacking these eBsentiaLe a successful struggle
against the British might swiftly be followed by annihilation by the
Arabs. This was a problem much more subtle than any straightforward
war to eject a colonial regime. The Zionist aim in 191+5 was to set up
a new state in the chosen territory against the wishes of the two-thirds
majority Arab population. To do so, the protection of the Mandatory
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was necessary until such time as Jewish strength was sufficient for
self-defence, and at that moment the Mandate had either to be
drastically modified or be ended.
Professor Tigal Allon has explained the various courses
considered by the Jewish leaders. The possibility of open warfare was
ruled out immediately, as was 'the strategy of classical guerrilla
warfare' •21 No Jewish leader imagined that half a million Jews could
win a military victory over Britain. Instead, they sought a strategy
aimed at 'forcing the problem on all parties concerned, and forcing
them to seek a positive solution ... The struggle was, of course, a
means, not an end; it was intended to prepare the ground for Zionist
political activity in London, in other capitals, and in the United
Nations, directed and co-ordinated by the Political Department of the
World Zionist Executive in Jerusalem'. 22 Three alternatives were
considered '(a) at one extreme, terrorist tactics, directed without
discrimination against all British targets and personnel; (b) at the
other extreme, a	 struggle, which renounced military action,
and confined itself exclusively to bringing in illegal immigrants,
establishing new settlements in prohibited areas, and holding mass
demonstrations; and (c) the 'middle way' in fact adopted: this
rejected personal terrorism, both on moral and practical grounds (it
was considered immoral because it was against the Jewish ethical
code, with its respect for human life, and impractical because it could
provoke counter-terrorism), and accepted the second alternative -
illegal immigration, new settlements in prohibited areas, and mass
demonstrations - as the best way of conducting the struggle,
supplemented however by direct military action based on guerrilla
tactics' 23
This chosen strategy of 'Constructive Warfare' picked a difficult
course between the two Zionist needs of statehood and security.
Immigration, besides being vital as a means of resettling Europe's
destitute Jews, would slowly bring the Jews in Palestine to numerical
parity and then to superiority over the Palestinian Arabs. For all
that the Mandatory Administration and security forces opposed illegal
immigration and limited it 50 far as they were able, their presence in
21. Allon, p 23.
22. Allon, p 25.
23. Ailon, pp 23-2k.
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th. country and their apparent opposition to Zionist policy could
be relied upon to eootlt Arab fears and prevent violence from that
potentially dangerous quarter. For similar reasons the setting up of
new settlements in prohibited places was unlikely to attract Arab
reaction. These settlements would extend the defensible perimeter of
promised land, and were tactically sited. Mass demonstrations would
bring large sections of the Jewish community into angry confrontation
and possible conflict with British police and military, consolidating
the •ffecte of preliminary propaganda, hardening attitudes, cementing
discipline and unity, and justifying in Jewish eyes whatever violent
acts Haganah might perpetrate in support of the chosen strategy.
Haganah's role would meanwhile strengthen and test the embryo army.
Thus, by a single policy, Zionism hoped to build up its defences against
whatever Arab military challenge might later emerge, exert controlled
pressure against the Mandatory Power in a manner calculated not only to
permit concurrent political dialogu, but also to bring about political
change at the moment, and not before, that the Nation could stand on its
own feet, and impress friends and neutrals by demonstrations of
disciplined military capability and unbreakable National will.
'Constructive Warfare' depended upon a mixture of politics,
controlled para-military violence or threat of violence, and propaganda.
Before the Second World War the main thrust of Zionist persuasion had
been towards Britain, the Mandatory Power. This had rested upon rational
argument, and the means chosen were personal contacts at Cabinet level,
lobbying, and pressure groups. Yew appeals were made through the news
media at the general public. Appreciating ,no doubt ,the likely shift of
world power brought about by the war, the Zionists during the conflict
turned their attention increasingly towards the United States of America.
Rational argument was dropped in favour of emotional appeals backed up
by a pretense at rationality, and, although lobbying played an important
part, the main effort was a propaganda campaign aimed through all available
media at the public. The offensive was inspired by the Jewish Agency' a
political department, which aleo controlled propaganda themes and messages
in Palestine. The organiaational framework necessary for propaganda
operations in the US and elsewhere overseas already existed in the form
of the World Zionist Organisation. Committed activitists in every main
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centre of population worked to mobiliee Jews of the Diaepora.2
Gifted and industrious, and often occupying key positions in the
fields of mass communications and entertainment, such talent armed
Zionism with what was to prove to be overwhelming propaganda strength.
At hose the Jewish Agency's Political Department, jointly with
Haganah, published the newspaper Eehnab (Window). Commenting upon the
Palestine news media on 25 September 19k3 an official in the Mandatory
Administration had written: 'Eehnab is the most efficiently edited and
through its apparent judiciousness ii the most insidious of the three
(underground publications).' 25
 The views expressed in Eshnab were
given an international audience through the two Jewish Agency sponsored
press services, Palcor, and the Palestine Telegraphic Agency.26
Both the Palestine Post, the English daily, and the Palestine Tribune,
an English weekly, were Zionist in editorial outlook, as were nearly
all the 18 Hebrew weeklies and 11 Hebrew dailies. The British Embassy
in Cairo brought to the Foreign Office's attention the fact that every
British daily but one employed Jewish correspondents in Palestine, who
tended to 'play down the degree of tension prevailing due to terrorism' .
On 9 March i9k5 an illegal radio transmitter began short but regular
broadcasts in English, Hebrew and Arabic.28 It called itself 'The
Voice of Israel', or Kol Israel, and like Eshnab it was really another
Jewish Agency outlet. Because, however, both the act of unlicenced
broadcasting and much of what was said contravened the law, the
transmitter had to be attributed to the illegal Haganah rather than the
officially recognised Agency. These outlets could be aimed, directly
or indirectly, at the Yiehuv and Jewish communities overseas ('friends'),
2k. Diaspora, dispersion, used collectively for the dispersed Jews after
the Babylonian captivity, and also in the apostalic age for the Jews
living outside Palestine; now, for Jews outside Isreal. (Chambers
Twentieth Century Dictionary, New Edition, 1975.)
25. Letter from Mr Robert Scott, Chief Secretar y's Office, to Mr Boyd,
Colonial Office, dated 25 September 19k3. PRO Tile 75969/k llegal
Organisations - Illegal News sheets i9k3-kk. CO 733/k66.
26. Op cit.
27. Letter, Egyptian Department, British Embassy Cairo, to Foreign
Office, k January 19k5. PRO Tile £ k622. TO 371/k5376.
28. Dekel devotes a chapter to Kol Israel.
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at 'neutral' audiences in America and Europe as well as Palestinian
Arabs, and at the 'enemy', British administrators, police and military.
During the early course of the World War the extremists of
Zionism, the Revisionists and their para-military Irgun Zwai Leumi, had
lost influence in Palestine. In the United States they were still
relatively strong, through branches of the New Zionist Organisation and
Betar. In 1939 the Irgun, like Haganah, had agreed to throw its
weight behind the Allied war effort. Some Irgun members carried out
missions behind enemy lines. One of these operations cost the life
of the group's leader, David Raziel. This loss undermined Irgun
morale, which was already weakened by years of inaction. Membership
dropped and the outlook for the group was bleak. Any hope of revival
rested upon positive leadership and headstrong action. The arrival in
Palestine in 19112 of Mr Menacbem Begin, a Polish refugee, provided
both.
Begin had commanded Betar in Poland until imprisoned by the
invading Russians in 1939, a fate which put en end to a fantastic but
nevertheless serious Revisionist plot to arm and train the Polish
Betar youth for a military invasion of Palestine. 	 Begin's
personality was marked by a fierce determination never to entertain
any argument or belief contrary to his own. He was a fanatic. Yet
within its ideological confines his intellect was brilliant. Thi. and
hi. compeiling personality, utter dedication to his cause, and
unyielding determination fitted him for revolutionary leadership.
Command of the Irgun passed into his hands late in 19113 at the
request of Yaakov Meridor, who had been struggling to keep the group
together since Raziel'e death. Begin severed Irgun's overt ties with
the Revisionists, believing that the political movement had lost it.
vigour since the death in l9IO of its founder, Vladimir Jabotinaky.
Thereafter, Begin was a political as well as a military leader 30, and
the Revisionist Movement was slowly taken over as an international
'front' organisation for the Irgun.
29. J Bowyer Bell (i), On Revolt, Strategies of National Liberation,
(Harvard, 1976), p 39.
30. Samuel Katz, Daye of Fire, (London, 1968), p 83: 'Irgun was to
be its own political organisation, using force as occasion
required'.
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Begin faced a dilemma. Either he must revitalise the Irgun or the
process of disintegration that began after Razie].'s death would soon
progress beyond recovery. Violent extremists have no group purpose
other than extreme violence. In Begin's words, 'We fight, therefore
we are'. 31
 Yet, with World War II still at its height and Zionist
hopes still pinned to a British Government that might be sympathetic
to their aims after the war, any unilateral action by Irgun would
certainly be opposed by the Jewish Agency. Begin resolved his problem
in the only way his personality permitted. Whatever else might eutfer,
the Irgun had to be kept alive. Re decided to appeal over the heads
of the official Zionist organisations directly to the Yiehuv and then
to begin a revolt intended to 'militarise' the Palestine situation.
The revolt was proclaimed during January l9kk and armed attacks took
place soon after. In all respects but one, Irgun' s go-it-alone
strategy was a disaster.
Attacks were made against police stations and similar targets and
many were successful. The propaganda offensive, carried out by the
Revolutionary Propaganda Force' had rather less success. The Yishuv
paid more heed to the numerous Jewish Agency and Haganah outlets than
to the Irgun wall-newspaper Herut (Freedom). The Jewish Agency
attempted to persuade Irgun to cease their attacks. When these warnings
went unheeded they ordered Haganah to suppress the 'dissidents' by
all means short of bloodshed or denouncing them to the Mandatory
authorities.
At first, not much action was taken. Then, in rather the same
way that the Irgun offensive had upset the Jewish Agency's strategy,
yet another group, acting independently both of the Agency and of Irgun,
committed a crime that had a similar upsetting effect on the Irgun's
campaign. In Cairo, two members of the breakaway 'Stern' group
murdered the British Minister, Lord Moyne. Responsible opinion everywhere
was outraged. The Jewish Agency removed the second of the two
restraints on Raganah action and information was passed to the Palestine
Police that enabled them to arrest scores of Irgun and Stern members.32
The go-it-alone war ended in defeat.
31. Menachem Begin, The Revolt, (Log Angeles, 1948) p b6.
32. For an Irgun viewpoint of this period, see Katz, pp 83-87.
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In his book, Menachem Begin claims credit for preventing a Jewish
civil, war by refusing to allow his men to fight back against Ragana.h.33
Considering that the risk of civil war arose entirely out of his
deliberate defiance of the Zionist Leadership, this claim is spurious.
What he could fairly claim was that, having resurrected the Irgun by
committing it to a fight, he then saved it from total extinction by
refusing battle with Haganah. When the Jewish Agency called off 'the
Season' as the anti-dissident campaign was called, the Irgun framework
was still intact, with improved morale, enjoying a measure of respect
in the Yishuv, and experienced in th. art of surviving 'underground'.
This was the sole achievement of the otherwise disastrous 191+4 campaign:
for Begin, it was enough. Henceforth the 'alternative government' of
the Jewish Agency would be challenged by an alternative 'alternative
government', the Irgun.
By the autumn of 191+5 the Jewish Agency and Kagnah leaders had
evolved their 'Constructive Warfare' strategy. They were naturally
anxious to avoid seeing this strategy undermined by independent action
by the 'dissidents', Irgun and Stern. Negotiations began for a merger
of Irgun into Hagin h, a course resisted by Begin. 'What will be the
result?' he asked the Haganah representative, 'a new split after
unification? What do we want all these complications for? Let us
rather accept the dictates of reality. The Raganah baa just entered
on the fight. We have been waging it for a long time. Let us
therefore, in spite of all that has happened in the past, establish a
united front'.	 1(6 doubt believing this solution to be the best
they were likely to get, the Zionist leaders accepted. The Tenuat
Hainerl. (United Resistance Movement) came into existence, placing the
Irgun and Stern groups under Haganah' a operational control, but
reserving to Begin the right to order raids on arms stores on his own
initiative. Although the alliance lessened the dangers of factional
strife within the Tiehuv and strengthened the para-military forces
nominally obedient to the Agency, it effectively destroyed all chance
of success for the chosen strategy of 'Constructive Warfare'.
33. Begin, pp 133-153; Katz, pp 86-87; Bowyer Bell (i), p 51.
k. Begin, p 184.
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Zionist Pre-Propaganda and Revolutionary
Propaganda Assumptions
Soon after Britain published the White Paper in 1939 the Zionist
Movement began a propaganda campaign to discredit it. The shocking
revelations of Hitler's genocide made the British immigration policy
seem doubly obnoxious, while the influence of Revisionism tended to
convert the anti-White Paper crusade into a much wider campaign of
vilification and hate. The villain of the piece was Britain, first
as the author of the White Paper, but later on as the perpetrator of
numerous evils, real or imagined. Britain's immigration policy was
presented by Zionist propaganda as being a betrayal of pledges
contained in the 1917 Balfour Declaration, in which support for a
Jewish National Home in Palestine had originally been expressed, and also
of Britain's obligations under the terms of the 1922 Mandate. Neither
allegation stood close inspection, since both documents were written
in a miner that left them free to be interpretated in favour of
either Jews or Arabs. Effective propaganda does not, however, allow
close inspection of any argument or fact unfavourable to the conclusion
desired, and there was su.fficient 'positive' material in these documents
to convince susceptible audiences. Thus Britain was shown to be
acting improperly against Jewish vital interests. As such, she became
identified as the enemy. Once this relationship had been established
it was a short step to encourage hatred which in turn justifies murder.
This wartime pre-propaganda35 did not, however, seek to impel its
audience into action, only to prepare them for this at a later time.
Row effectively the vilification campaign was conducted can be
seen from a brief study of one propaganda exercise which occurred in
191+0. The Palestine Administration had requisitioned a ship called
La Patria to take unauthorised immigrants who had just reached Haifa to
Mauritius, where they were to live for the duration of the war. The
Agency decided to cripple La Patria before she left Haifa port, thus
embarrassing the authorities and possibly preventing the wretched
would-be immigrants from being taken away. Eaganah was therefore
ordered to undertake the mission and the plan adopted involved
35. See p 18.
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disabling the ship's engines by an explosion. The operation miscarried.
The charge was too powerful and inexpertly positioned, so that it tore
a hole in the ship's side beneath the water-line. La Patria heeled
over and sank in just over an hour. 202 refugees and 50 crew and
police perished in the explosion or by
Hasty improvisation was called for; the Jewish Agency lacked
neither imagination nor audacity. After a rapid check to confirm that
the saboteurs had evaded detection, the Agency declared that the
sinking of the ship was an act of mass-protest by its unwilling
passengers, an attempt, in part successful, at mass suicide. The
event was presented to world opinion as an heroic 'propaganda of the
deed'. Once this story was established in people's minds it was too
popular to be shaken by facts showing it to be untrue.
Mr James Callaghan has said in recent times that 'a lie can be half way
round the world before truth has got its boots on'. 37
 The first
account to be published is often believed longest. Truth, hobbling
up from behind, is easily dismissed as an official 'cover up', if it
is listened to at a]].. In this case truth got one boot on two months
after the tragedy, when the Commission of Inquiry established beyond doubt
that the explosion had been the work of a group operating from the
shore. As the culprits were unknown, suspicion fell upon extremists
such as Irgun or Stern. This discovery should at least have put an
end to the 'suicide' story, yet as late as 19k9 Arthur Koestler was
still promoting it.
	 Truth's second boot was finally laced on in 1960
'when the Jerusalem Post disclosed the real instigators'. 39 By the
nature of their cover-up, the Jewish Agency turned their bungled plot
into a masterly example of 'disinformation'.1
The theme of opposition to the White Paper was, of course, backed
up by the reality of the terrible plight of Jews in German-occupied
36. For a first hand account of the placing of the charge, see M 14 Mardor
Strictly Illegal, (London, 196k), pp 56-76. Another account appears
in Jon and David Kimche, The Secret Roads, (London, 195k ), pp 53-5k.
37. Mr Callaghan, Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Commons
1 November 1976. Kansard Vol 918, No 176, Colm 976.
38. See Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfilment, (London, 19k9).




Europe. The general unwillingness of 'neutrals' to accept the
survivors into their own societies made these audiences particularly
receptive of Zionist propaganda that argued for resettlement in
Palestine. Thus by the Autumn of 19k5 many free world audiences had
been conditioned to accept uncritically Jewish claims for free
immigration into Palestine on humanitarian grounds and to regard
British obstruction of this ambition as cruel and unjust. Jews,
particularly the Tiahuv, already half identified Britain as the
enemy, and felt justified in any action to assist immigration or
otherwise advance the Zionist cause. Those who had been subjected to
Revisionist pre-propaganda had reached a condition in which murder was
easily justified. It was therefore simple to switch from pre
to revolutionary propaganda, and to advance from assumptions which the
pre-propaganda had made credible.
Official Zioniet revolutionary or 'constructive warfare'
propaganda advanced from three main assumptions; that the Jews had an
historical, legal and moral right to establish a National Rome in
Palestine, that these same considerations, reinforced by events in
Hitler's Europe, justified unlimited immigration and land purchase, and
that the Tishuv, having the right to survive, must therefore have the
right to defend itself. These assumptions were accompanied by one
basic denial. Arab claims to Palestinian territory were illusory and
alleged Arab opposition to Jewish settlement was a British invention.
Thus in October 19k5 Ben Gurion stated: 'We repudiate that there is
friction between ourselves and the Arab Middle East ... We regard our
constructive undertaking as integrated with the historical needs of
this part of the world. We are fulfilling a historic mission in
developing this region.hI1 This line was important when played back
to 'neutral' audiences, as a means of discrediting the argument that
full acceptance of Zionist demands would almost certainly lead to
conflict between the Jews and Arabs, and that caution was needed if a
peaceful solution was to be found. The overall aim was to prove to
the world, including British public opinion, that injustice must give
way to righteousness, so that the world would persuade the British
Government to change its policies or quit.
41. Palcor News Agency, Bulletin, 29 November 19k5. PRO File
75156/151A, 19+5, Pt II, Item iok. CO 733/k56.
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Th. assumptions behind the Irgun' s revolutionary propaganda were
far bolder. The Jewish right to Palestine was historical and moral
only, not legal. Legal right. arising from British promise. and the
small print of the 1922 Mandate made supplicant. of the Jews and,
by the same legal. process, denied their full and unfettered claims to
the whole territory which by Revisionist insistence included
Trans jordan. By the same reasoning, Britain had no right whatsoever
to administer Palestine, or to station troops there, let alone to
obstruct the historically inevitable and morally sound processes of
immigration, settlement, defence and statehood. Thus the killing of
British policemen and soldiers was a courageous act of liberation
while the arrest of extremists was an illegal and hideous act of
oppression. Most hideous of all. was the execution of Irgun members
convicted of capital of fences. The Arabs were ignored in Irgun
propaganda, their claims being extinguished by historical and moral
forces. If Arabs resisted, the psychological weapon of terror would
be turned against them. The essential differences between orthodox
Zionist and Irgun propaganda assumptions, therefore, lay in the area
of legitimacy. Th. Jewish Agency could pursue most of their lines
while remaining 'abov. ground', since their game was played within
the rules of legitimacy provided under the Mandate. The Irgun's
lines rejected the Mandate and the legitimacy of any authority within
Palestine other than Jewish authority: they had to be pursued
'underground'. Begin wanted the Agency hierarchy to go underground
and embrace the Irgun' s philosophy. 'We should be prepared at any
moment to accept the discipline of Ben Gurion', he stated, 'If he
would take the lead in the struggle for national. liberation
The orders of a Ben Gurion sitting in Jerusalem and in effect
recognising the White Paper, we would not carry out. But we would
gladly carry out the instructions of a Ben Gurion sitting, say in
Deganiah calling for a revolt against the regime of the oppressor' k2
Although the assumptions of the two purveyors of propaganda
overlapped, the areas of difference were important. 'Constructive
Warfare' was essentially a persuasive strategy, aimed at British
opinion as well as the outside world, and designed to change Government
Al2 Begin, pp 1k9-150.
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policy by a process of political arm-twisting. There was a strong
revolutionary thread running through it, but Zionist leaders did not
seek a showdown, not at least for the present. As Allon put it:
'it was hoped, in short, to prove to Britain and the rest of the
world, that an unjust and unworkable policy (the White Paper) may
cease to be a policy at all; and thereby to induce Britain to change
it for a better one - or, alternatively, for a worse one, in which
case the Jews would receive fresh impetus to continue the struggle
for a solution'. 	 Some of the cruder forms of pre-propaganda bad
already blurred the picture the Agency wished to paint, by the
identification of Britain as an enemy, and by the encouragement of
hate. These perceptions might be fine for a full-blown revolution,
but this was not what the official leaders had in mind in 19L5,
They were of course precisely what the Irgun and the Stern Group
needed to support their strategies. Their propaganda and very soon
their actions intensified these themes. This activity would in time
rob 'Constructive Warfare' of any chance of appealing to the British
public, whose reactions to slander and murder were exactly the
opposite of what the Jewish Agency was hoping to achieve by relatively
non-violent persuasion. The strategy selected by the Jewish Agency
and Raganah was extremely sophisticated and delicate and could not
succeed if pushed and pulled by extremists within the United
Resistance. With hindsight it can be said that the day when the Agency
called off 'the Season' without having obliterated the alternative
'alternative government', it lost control of events. As is frequently
the case in a volatile situation, the more extreme elements thereafter
called the tune.
Propaganda washes minds but leaves little visible evidence in the
form of documents and statements that chart the course of political
activity, or of damage and casualties that are the hallmark of
military action. Therefore it is often impossible to say with any
degree of certainty what the effects of propaganda have been. The fact
that few people like to admit that they may have been influenced by
propaganda compounds this difficulty. When the British Government's
attitude to the Palestine problem in the autumn of 19k5 is considered,
Allon, p 25.
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one aspect defies explanation. This i. their apparent inability or
unwillingness to see the poet-war Jewish refugee problem as an
important new factor in the Palestine immigration issue. One
possible solution can be proposed, although it cannot be proved. It
is that wartime Zionist propaganda against the White Paper policy,
which developed strong anti-British overtones, offended British
policy makers and closed their minds to the very factor that, on the
world stage, the propaganda bad set out to magnify. If this was the
case, then the extremists within Zionism had already undermined
'Constructive Warfare' and set the stage for conflict rather than
persuasion.
An Outline of Events, i9i5-i9k8
1: Political
British attempts to find a solution to the Palestine problem were
inhibited in several ways. Her imperial interests required the
retention of bases in the territory. This need not necessarily have
been incompatible with Jewish and Arab aspirations; however, these
same interests also needed the free flow of oil, and communication
rights, which depended upon Arab goodwill. This imposed obvious
limitations on Jewieh hopes. Economic weakness made Britain dependent
upon American aid and, therefore, American goodwill. This goodwill
might be lost if Britain ignored Zionist requirements. Economic
weakness combined with pressures to demobilise servicemen as quickly
as possible also discouraged the acceptance of any solution that might
have to be imposed by force. The search was on for some answer to
the problem that satisfied the Jews and the Americans without
antagonising the Arabs and which left Britain with a relatively free
hand in Palestine without undue cost. Since no one in Westminster or
Whitehall could suggest such an answer, the problem was referred to
a committee.
k+. It is ironic that a special. branch for Jewish propaganda had
been set up by the British Foreign Office in 1918 within the
Department of Information. Controlled by 'a very active Zionist
propagandist called A Hyamson', the branch prepared leaflets
that were dropped by planes over German and Austrian territory
calling on Jews in the Central armies to desert because 'the Allies
are giving the Land of Israel to the people of Israel ...
See Ingrams, p 19.
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In November 1945 an Anglo-American Committee examined the question.
Before they began, violence had broken out. Not liking the
recommendations of that first committee, the Government in July 191+6
put forward a scheme of 'provincial autonomy', which was a watered-down
version of the 19 1+3 partition plan. Violence by now had increased.
The Arabs would not accept this scheme, and the Zionists could only
agree to their own counter-proposal, which envisaged partition along
lines somewhat similar to the Israel boundaries that emerged from the
War of Independence in 191+8. While negotiations dragged on, violence
in Palestine grew still worse, undermining confidence and destroying
trust. Moreover a new Palestine Arab policy directed by the Mufti of
1+5
Jerusalem hardened Arab opposition to any solution that might be
acceptable to the Jews. Christopher Sykes remarked: 'To the end the
Government had clung to bi-nationalism, to a wishful picture of Jewish
and Arab workers and politicians blithely hand-in-hand. Mr Bevin
(the Foreign Secretary) could never see why two peoples showed no wish
to fulfil that dream.' 1+6 One week after these negotiations finally
broke down, on ik February 1947, Mr Bevin, tacitly admitting that the
problem defied solution within Britain's terms, announced that the
Mandate was to be referred back to the United Nations Organisation by
the British Government without the latter recommending any particular
solution. A Tm Special Committee was formed which recommended an
extraordinary partition scheme which the Zionists, perhaps tongue in
cheek, accepted, and the Arabs rejected. Britain refused to implement
any scheme unacceptable to both communities and announced her intention
to withdraw. Issued partly as a threat,	 the announcement had to be
honoured as a promise. On 15 May 191+8 the Mandate ended and the State
of Israel came into existence.
45. The Mufti, an admirer of Hitler, had led the 1937-39 Arab Revolt.
46. Sykes, p 370.
47. 'The Foreign Secretary thought it conceivable that the
announcement might induce Jews and Arabs to co-operate.' (Minutes
of Chiefs of Staff (47) 117th Meeting, 8 September 1947.)
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An Outline of Events, 191+5191+8
2: Military
The period from 31 October 191+5 to the end of the Mandate was one
of continual violence. Particularly grave events punctuate the record,
but on the whole the level of Jewish violence rose steadily until late
in 191+7, when the United Nations voted in favour of partition. Thereafter
the level rose very rapidly, but now the emphasis was on violence between
Jews and Arabs.
The two-year campaign of Jewish attacks on the British can be
divided into two phases. The first, from the end of October 191+5 till
late Summer 191+6, was the era of the United Resistance Movement.
Thereafter, the extremists, Irgun and the Stern, operated on their
own. Illegal immigration took place continually during both phases,
and was Hagiinh's priority task.
Referring to the United Resistance, Yiga]. Aflon has written:
'The British counter-actions had the character of police actions
rather than full scale military operations. At a later stage in the
conflict, the British were indeed obliged to intensify their
counter-operations, extending them beyond the Haganah units to
civil settlements and the arresting of national leaders. These more
severe (and more successful) police actions, however, already marked
the beginning of the end of British rule in Palestine. For they proved
that the British were fighting not merely isolated small groups of
militant extremists but a national liberation møvement which embraced
the entire community. They alienated world public opinion, and
turned their pars-military victory into a political defeat.'	 This
British 'victory' will be considered shortly. First it is necessary
to trace the course of the United Resistance.
The strategy of 'constructive warfare' was vulnerable in two ways.
If the British employed really tough tactics they might break the
Jewish leaders' willingness to expose the Tishuv to hardship. And if
by any means the British weakened Haganah below the level necessary
for national defence against the Arabs, all might be lost. The Jews
relied upon British national character and world public opinion,
1+8. AUon, p 28.
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instructed by the Zionist propaganda machine, to neutralise the first
danger. Against the second, they relied upon the hope that limited
violence might be met only by limited counter-measures, and as a second
line of defence they devised wonderfully effective concealment for
the precious arms.
'Constructive Warfare' conducted jointly by Haganah, Irgun and
Stern, began on 31 October 191+5. A a general rule Haganah limited
its sabotage operations to targets such as coaatguard stations that
directly affected illegal immigration. On 31 October, however, and
again eight months later, it made widespread raids to demonstrate its
power to the authorities. The first involved hundreds of explosions
cutting railway lines; the second destroyed bridges throughout the
length and breadth of Palestine. Irgun's and Stern's tactics were,
in contrast to Haganah'e, elitist and sensationalist. Irgun raided
airfields and destroyed 'planes and Stern murdered seven soldiers
in a Tel Aviv car park. The brutality and spitefulness of the
extremist actions changed completely the tone of 'Constructive
Warfare' as originally envisaged by the Jewish Agency. Instead
of exerting controlled pressure on Britain, the spasm violence was
generating mutual hatred. Whilst the Sternists remained throughout a
tiny fringe element, devoted to assassination, Irgun's strength and
prestige grew with each new and bold venture. The threat posed to the
'alternative government' by this rival must have worried the Agency
leaders. Moreover, by their indulgence in murder, the Irgun forced
the British Government to sanction the very type of large-scale
counter-measures that the Agency had hoped would not be justified by
a subtle campaign. Until June 191+6 countering insurgency remained a
police responsibility. The Army was constantly involved, but always
in a reactive manner. Except when so deployed, the military
concentrated on training and such diversions as sport and sight-seeing,
and soldiers off duty went unarmed. On 18 June, however, Irgun seized
five officers from the Jaff a Club as hostages. Coming hard on the heels
of Haganah's attacks on bridges, this was too much. A massive
counter-strike was authorised.
Operation 'Agatha' was aimed at Kaganab, about whose leadership
the CID was well informed, and at the Jewish Agency. Not unreasonably,
the Administration took the view that since Eaganah co-ordinated the
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United Resistance, they should be held responsible for all insurgency,
and since the Jewish Agency controlled Haganah, certain leaders should
be held responsible for the political direction of the campaign. The
police and military would, of course, have liked to get their bands on
the dissidents too, but intelligence on Irgun and Stern was proving hard
to come by. 'Agatha' involved almost all field force Army units in
Palestine in a well. co-ordjnated dawn swoop on thousands of addresses.
Deception and security were carefully controlled, and early on
29 June i9k6 military signals personnel took over civilian telephone
exchanges to block warning messages. The lessons of previous
experience had been learned. By excluding Jewish policemen and
officials from knowledge of the plan, complete surprise was achieved.
Operation 'Agatha' was a success. Although a few senior Kaganah
leaders escaped in time, according to Dekel because of a tip-off by a
sympathetic EnglishmAn,' commanders at field level were arrested in
numbers that virtually immobilised Palmach as an effective military
force. Agency leaders made no efforts to evade arrest, as going
'underground' would have destroyed their mask of innocence and
disqualified them from future negotiations. Nevertheless the detention
of senior leaders weakened Zionism at a vital moment since it
excluded these individuals from decision-making. In July the
British Government announced its proposals for 'provincial autonomy'
and events appeared to be moving towards some kind of climax. With
Palmach incapacitated at a moment when Arab violence might suddenly
explode, the release of Zionist leaders was something for whish the
remaining Agency hierarchy were willing to pay a high price.
On top of the arrests came another blow to Haganah. More by good
luck than special knowledge, troops searching the settlement of Mesheq
Yagur unearthed a series of arms caches, recovering 600 weapons,
including machine guns and mortars. 50 In the process, secret methods
of arms concealment were revealed and representatives of all British
units in Palestine visited Mesheq Yagur to learn where to look in
future. This further weakening of Haganah's ability to defend the
1i 9. Dekel, pp 1k2-151.
50. Gregory Blaxland, The Regiments Depart (London, 1971), p 38.
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Yishuv, and the implications for the future 51 made many Haganah
leaders as anxious as the Agency to seek an accommodation with the
British that would end the pressure. If either Agency or Haganah
still had doubts, Irgun on 22 July resolved them. By blowing up a
wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem housing the Government
Secretariat with the loss of 91 lives, many of them Jewish, the Irgun
made stark the choices open to the Zionist leaders. Either they ended
their alliance with the extremists or they must associate themselves
with all-out 'terrorism'. In the latter case the Agency leaders would
have to go underground, disappearing from the world political scene.
In such circumstances, might not the more experienced, more ruthless
Begin emerge triumphant? On 29 October the Inner Zionist Council
condemned terrorism and called on the Yishuv to take action against the
extremists. The British responded by liberating the Agency leaders,
calling off the offensive against Raganah, and permitting the entry
into Palestine of 2,800 illegal immigrants detained in Cyprus. The
Agency ended the United Resistance and. ordered Haganah to refrain from
further violence. Haganak signalled this fact by attacking the
dissidents in their propaganda. The British had won their
'para-military victory'.
This success need not necessarily have been doomed to end, in
Allon's words, in political defeat for Britain. The Army's successes
in 1938 and 1939 had paved the way for a political settlement with the
Arabs. The climb-down by Zionist leaders in October i9k6 might have
been the prelude to a similar solution. Unfortunately the British had
insufficient to offer the Yishuv. Their plan for provincial autonomy
had been published, perhaps unwisely, in the immediate aftermath of
Operation 'Agatha', and by October was already half-way consigned to
the museum of rejected Palestine 'solutions'. Even if the Jews had
liked it, Britain's unwillingness to enforce it in the face of Arab
objections robbed the exercise of reality. Britain's plan, so far as
the Jews were concerned, was still not to have a plan, and this made the
task of administration and security in Palestine impossibly difficult,
51. In August 191 6 troops searching Dorot settlement in the Negev
made another considerable arms find. See R D Wilson, Cordon
and Search 1
 (Aldershot, 19119), p 79.
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just as it deprived moderate Zionist leaders of hope of restraining
the extremists.
Had there been real hope for a settlement, this might have led
the Jews into honouring the Central Executive's call to take action
against the extremists, which in reality needed a decision by the Agency
to order Haganah into action against Irgun and Stern. Without a
political settlement, the Agency did nothing of the sort. In
Dr J Bowyer Bell's view, the Agency was well aware that, 'if the
united resistance ceased, the Irgun and the Stern Group would keep up
the pressure in any case, leaving the Agency free to negotiate with
clear hands'.52 In other words, the Zionists could benefit by the
violent coercion, without being held responsible: the Irgun could
attract the full force of British counter-measures, and any losses
they might suffer would, weaken their position as a rival to the
Agency. 'Constructive Warfare', in the form dictated by the alliance
with extremists, had failed. Persuasion would now be abandoned in
favour of coercion, which would make use of Irgun and Stern terrorism
to make British opinion sicken for its Mandatory responsibilities, and
of World Zionist political leverage, mainly through the United States,
to force a pro-Jewish solution.
Irgun's operations were marked by outstanding originality,
detailed planning and daring execution. The operations officer,
Amihai 'Gideon' Paglin, was both tactical end technical innovator,
creating such now familiar devices as the car and lorry bomb, the
electrically detonated roadside mine, various types of explosive
charges equipped with sophisticated anti-handling embellishments, and
for special actions, special equipments such as the barrel-bomb that
demolished part of the Central Police H in Haifa. The Irgun's most
famous exploits included the attack on the Goldsmith Officers Club in
Jerusalem which killed 13, the Acre Gaol break of i May 19'+7, and the
murder of the hostages Sergeants Martin and Paice in July 19k7. The
Stern group's contributions were mainly in the form of individual
murders, usually 'soft targets' such as off-duty servicemen, but they
also harassed the railway traffic and in one such attack managed to
kill five.
52. Bell U), p 59.
Against the Agency-sponsored United Resistance the security
forces had been able to respond with some success by broad front
tactics. Against the dissidents, needle-sharp thrusts were needed to
eliminate the underground fighters. Without good intelligence, such
thrusts could seldom be made. During reactive operations the troops
sometimes achieved successes. After an Irgun attack on Yibna
railway station, the raiding party was hunted down and 30 armed Jews
surrendered to ten paratroops. 'This was one of the few occasions on
which British troops fought an action with the dissidents in the open.
Whenever such engagements took place the outcome was never in
doubt.' 53
 In the immediate aftermath of the Acre Gaol break, a
military bathing party on a nearby beach provided the only effective
counter, killing four Irgun attackers and five escapers, and
capturing thirteen. Such spirited exploits could not, however,
compensate for complete loss of the initiative to the insurgents.
When police methods of collecting information fail, due to the
force no longer enjoying consensus support from the community, one
method of redressing the situation is for the army to make 'contact'
and build up intelligence by their own methods. In conventional war
'contact' means simply to close up to enemy forces and keep them
constantly under observation, and is important to any commander both
as an insurance against surprise and as a source of information on
which to base his own plans. To be out of contact is to court
disaster. In much the same way army units can be deployed permanently
in the midst of a civil community that is shielding insurgents.
Working within the law, trained soldiers remarkably quickly get to know
everybody, see every event, notice every unusual occurrence.
Insurgents can no longer feel safe and their presence becomes
unwelcome to many erstwhile supporters. Their style is cramped and
they make mistakes. Slowly, the initiative is wrested from them. The
Army in Palestine deployed in something approaching this manner only
when it was too late, when the United Nations partition scheme had set
Jews and Arabs at each others' throats. It is possible that military
contact at an earlier stage might have made things much more difficult
for the extremists.
53. Wilson, p 45.
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In January 19k7 the Cabinet authorised new terms of reference
for counter-insurgency in Palestine. The Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, Field-Marshal Montgomery, was satisfied that if the new powers
'were fully used and the military authorities were enabled to keep the
initiative against the terrorists, they would be able to bring terrorism
under control'	 The Cabinet went so far as to assure the Palestine
authorities: 'Such action as you may take to implement the policy
will receive the full support of His Majesty's Government.'55
Mr David Charters has seen this directive as a 'blank cheque' for
illegal security force activities, inevitably leading to disaster.6
There are two ways, in addition to 'contact', by which security
forces whose normal intelligence sources have failed may seek to defeat
insurgency - special surveillance and counter-terror. The firet calls
for personnel of very high calibre and special training who infiltrate
covertly, gather information, and provide a substitute for ordinary
police informers. Acting on the information thus obtained, conventional
security force units are able to arrest insurgents. Special surveillance
operates within the law and is perhaps the most demanding role
imaginable. It can be extremely effective. Counter-terror, on the
other hand, involves placing police or military above the law, in the
manner resorted to by the British in Ireland in 1920 and the French in
Algeria in 1957. Control is almost impossible and abuse inevitable.
Short-term gains are quickly extinguished by long-term reverses.
When the forces of law and order adopt unlawful tactics their moral
and legal authority dissolves. The campaign is lost by the methods
employed. Clearly, whenever special surveillance is authorised, the
operating limite imposed by law must be understood by all concerned.
The role and operations of the special group set up by the
Palestine Police in March 19k? have never been fully disclosed.5'
5k. Minutes of 6th (+7) War Cabinet Meeting, 15 January 19k7, 'Palestine -UT Armed Forces', File 0176/727 (Palestine Policy), WO 32-10260.
55. Cabinet meeting (k7) 6th Conclusions, 15 January 19k7, CAB 128/9.
56. David Charters (i) 'Special Operations in Counter-Insurgency: The
Farran Case, Palestine l9+7', article in Journal of the Royal
United Services Institute for Defence Studies,. Vol 12 !&, No2 (June, 1979).
57. Charters is the best account published so far.
ik6
During the summer the Jewish newspapers campaigned for an
investigation into the alleged abduction and murder of a Stern group
youth, and the international press soon joined the hunt. At the
centre of this furore was a distinguished Army officer,
Major Roy Farran. On 1 October he was tried by court martial and,
although he was acquitted for lack of evidence, 'the gallant career of
an exemplary officer was allowed to end in wretched confuaion'. 8 One
may object to the double standards of those who, while protecting the
insurgents in their midst from the law, used that same law to discredit
and destroy a threat to the security of murderers. Nevertheless the
blame for this sorry incident must lie with those responsible for
directing, or misdirecting, the special group. 59
 It seems possible
that Farran's terms of reference were ill-defined, so that he
operated in a certain manner believing that he would be supported, but
was disappointed. In a diffused way, this is rather what happened to all
Britain's security forces who atmve , for two and half years, to
support in Palestine a British Government policy that did not exist.
The Propaganda War
1: The Zionists
It is possible that the adulteration of wartime Zionist
pre-propaganda by Revisionist extremism flawed the strategy of
'Constructive Warfare' before it was put into effect. Too much hatred
may have been concocted in Jewish hearts, and too much suspicion and
resentment in the minds of British officials, for so subtle a policy to
have much chance of success. If this was the case, then here was an
occasion when propaganda ruled policy, instead of the reverse. Zionist
leaders seemed to have been aware of this danger, and tried to compensate
by addressing different messages to various target audiences. Thus,
in Mr Christopher Sykes's words:
58. Sykes, P 367, Also Times (London, 2, 3 October 19k?).
59. See PRO file 75015/9k Secret Police Anti-Terrorist Measures
CO537/2270.
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It became a Zionist habit to speak not only in two but in
several voices, to run several lines of persuasion at the
same time. A result was to debauch the movement with
propaganda to an extraordinary extent so that Zionists,
pre-occupied with higher truth at the expense of the yet more
essential lower truth, got a not undeserved reputation in the
world for chronic mendacity. 60
In fact, as we have seen in earlier studies, there is nothing
uncommon in a Movement addressing divers messages to 'friends',
'neutrals' and 'enemies', but it is always important not to be
caught out in blatant inconsistency. Evidently the Jewish Agency
was. This may have been due in part to the unusually complex
intermingling of these audiences, and to the conflict of understanding
within Zionism over whether the British Government and public was to
be considered 'neutral', and open to persuasion, or 'enemy', to be
coerced. It was probably not until the collapse of 'Constructive
Warfare' late in 19k6 that the Official Jewish leaders reluctantly fell
into line with the extremist view. Even then, they left it mainly to
the Irgun to apply the coercion for them, retaining in their overt
actions the semblance of their original strategy.
We will never know whether or not 'Constructive 	 if
conducted without the handicaps of over-stated propaganda and extremists
within the Zionist camp, could have succeeded. In the Autumn of 19I5
the British people, no less than any other, pitied the plight of
Europe's surviving Jews and admired the achievement of Zionism in
Palestine. We can understand the Zionist leaders' disappointment when
the Labour Government disowned its party's recent resolution.
Nevertheless the fact that such a resolution had been passed illustrated
the power of the pro-Jewish lobby within the Labour Movement. Helped
by a great surge of public demand, which persuasive propaganda in
conjunction with 'Constructive Warfare' might have produced, these
elements might have overturned the policies of Bevin and his advisors.
We may see it as a singular failure of Zionist strategy that this
reservoir of goodwill was turned instead into hostility. The savage acts
of Irgun and Stern, unrestrained by the Yishuv, soured British opinion
and saddened British Jews. This community, in their hearts as anxious
60. Sykes, p 26.
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as any to see the National Home established, was disgusted by the
murders and retreated into political isoiation.61
Similar ineptitude marked the reception by the Yishuv and the
Jewish Agency propaganda machine of the 6th Airborne Division when it
appeared in Palestine in the Autumn of 19k5. Its arrival was denounced
as a brutal provocation. Before setting foot in the country, its
soldiers were described by the Jewish press as belonging to the Gestapo.
This struck the men concerned as remarkable, it being only six months
since they had led the Allied advance across Germany, in the process
freeing many survivors of Hitler's 'final solution'. The soldier 'was
intensely mystified by the attitude of the Jews towards his country
and towards him as a soldier. If he had expected to find an atmosphere
of friendliness and hospitality, he was disappointed$.62 Properly
directed, Zionist propaganda could almost without doubt have made
friends out of this aggressively 'non conformist' division, and who can
say where such an achievement might have led. The men who controlled
this propaganda were apparently sufficiently under the spell of their
earlier inventions that no course more subtle than demonology occurred
to them. This exactly suited Irgun and Stern, since it served to justify
murder. At that stage at least, murder was not part of the Jewish
Agency's scheme. Again, propaganda was dictating policy, to the
detriment of 'Constructive Warfare'.
Agency and Haganah propaganda in support of 'Constructive Warfare'
was founded upon the basic assumptions described earlier and dealt with
such issues as immigration, Jewish national unity and resolve, British
injustice, and the disciplined power of Haganah. The final objective
of statehood was muted, with the immigration issue being used as a
tactical or interim aim. Haganah's main task was assistance of
immigration and a wonderful international network was established to
bring Jews from Europe by aU imaginable means. This task was a clear
and noble duty to Zionists, necessary for reasons of humanity and
national strength. Immigration also provided a propaganda harvest of
huge proportions. Whenever a batch of illegal immigrants6
 evaded the
61. Histradruth, the Zionist Labour Movement, did try, with small
success, to influence the British Government through the TUG.
62. Wilson, p 15.
63. For a full account of this traffic see Kimche, Op cit.
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Royal Navy and coaetguards and was smuggled to safety in the Tishuv,
the whole community rejoiced and belittled the Mandatory Power:
whenever an immigrant ship was boarded by the Navy, or when luckless
refugees were caught stumbling across some i-emote Palestinian beach,
bathos was made from what was, without embellishment, a real human
tragedy. One account of this embellishment makes the point clear:
If casualties had been suffered during the boarding, these
were displayed, including the dead. The length to which the
striving for propaganda was carried is illustrated by the
example of the exhibition on one occasion of a one year old
child who had died at sea several days previously, with the
statement to the Press:
"The dirty Nazi-British assassins suffocated this innocent
victim with gas". The sotto voce remark, "It's not against
you,	 for the Press," made by one of the more moderate
passengers to some of the troops, hardly compensated for their
satanic lie. 6k
The climax to this campaign came in the summer of 191f7, in the form of
an immigrant ship named Exodus 19k7.
Exodus was boarded by the Royal Navy as soon as she entered
Palestinian waters. A she approached Raif a the Haganah activists on
board broadcast emotive messages to the Yishuv. News agencies picked
these up and the ship became news. Previous British practice had been
to deport illegal immigrants to camps in Cyprus. On this occasion the
Foreign Office decided that the passengers should be returned whence
they came, Toulon. It would seem that European governments were to be
discouraged from allowing this traffic through their ports. In a
spotlight of publicity the immigrants were tranahipped onto three
vessels in Raifa port, each with a military escort on board, and the
convoy sailed westwards.6
At Toulon the French expressed willingness to accept the Jews ashore
if they would disembark voluntarily. When they made this offer the
French may already have been aware that Haganah'a agents, who had got
to Toulon before the ships, would see to it that no one volunteered.
This at any rate was what happened, and the British authorities were
6k. Wilson, p 110.
65. For a Zionist account, see David C Holly, Exodus 19+7
(Boston, 1969).
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embarrassed. Making the beat of a bad job, the Foreign Office
eventually decided to send the ships to Hamburg, in the Zone of
Germany then under British Military Government. There it would be
possible to remove the passengers forcibly. During the long journey
the Jews grew to respect their British escorts, finding it strange
that the barbarians for which Zionist propaganda had prepared them
were sympathetic and kind. On the last leg of the voyage, the militants
who intended to demonstrate on arrival apo].ogised in advance for the
resistance which they were determined to put up at Hamburg, and
explained that its object would not be directed at the troops, but
their Government?66. In all, the drama of Exodus 1947 ran for two
months, enabling Zionist propaganda to wring the last drop of
emotion out of an opportunity so gratuitiously provided by London's
failure to think the problem through.6
The 'mobilisation' of the Tiahuv had begun the moment the Jewish
Agency was set up under the terms of the 1921 Mandate. Official Zionist
control was complete in all rural districts and in all the Kibbutzim.
Irgun influence through the existence of cells and the spreading of
their propaganda was limited to urban areas, particularly the main
cities, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa. Even in the towns the mass of
the Yishuv was obedient to the Agency and loyal to Raganah. Their
loyalty to Irgun, where it existed, was like affectionr an errant
younger brother: it did not affect relations with father. National
discipline and determination do not in themselves make news or
propaganda. These qualities need to be demonstrated in dramatic form
before the world will take notice. Early in the campaign it was
evidently decided that citizens should be brought into conflict with
the Security Forces, both to provide 'propaganda of the deed' and, if
successful in temporarily destroying Mandatory rule, to erode British
authority , and confidence.
In November 19k5 the youths of Tel Aviv were organised, almost
certainly by Eaganab, for riot, arson and confrontation. The Palestine
Police were unable to control the situation and called for military
66. Wilson, p 138.
67. In fictionalised form the drama continues to this day, in the
book and film of that name, by Leon Uris.
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assistance. First one and later three parachute battalions were
deployed in the city. 68 Every effort was made to disperse the mobs
without bloodshed. The Jews, bravely but unwisely, virtually forced the
troops to open fire. When the riots ended, six Jews were dead.6	 No
doubt the controUed and disciplined military response disappointed those
Zionists who had hoped that soldiers would run amok, and certainly the
unyielding British reaction deterred further massed demonstrations in
cities. Nevertheless the confrontations and the deaths were ammunition
enough for a propagamda pay off. One example is sufficient.
Mr Meyer Levin of the New York Poet reported that British troops, while
singing the Nazi Horet Weseelsong, had deliberately shot twenty
children aged 8-16 and expressed the desire to 'pop-off' more.7°
The confrontation technique was kept alive in settlements, as a
means of shielding wanted men from arrest, obstructing arms searches,
involving Jews of all ages in 'resistance' and making propaganda.
Children were drilled to spit and shout insults at troops and to
crowd around water taps so that no one else could get near. 71 Women
were thrust to the front of crowds blocking entrances, so that they had
to be physically removed by the soldiers. On one occasion a zealot led
a massed surge from horseback against a platoon of troops. 72 The
Jewish Agency' a propaganda service ensured that news reporters were
taken to such settlements as quickly as possible after the troops had
left, to see and hear 'evidence' of British atrocities. Wherever
possible, photographs would be taken by a settlement photographer
during the search, showing troops and civilians in conflict, to be made
available to the press. Villagers would tell lurid tales of
brutality and vandalism, suitable for public consumption, especially
when supported by 'Nazi slogans' chalked on walls 73, supposedly by soldiers.
68. The writer was a platoon leader in the first battalion to be called out.
69. Wilson, pp 26-29.
70. Overseas News Agency Report on Action by British Troops in Tel Aviv,
20 November, 19k5, PRO File E 9183, TO 371/k5386.
71. Described to the writer in 1966 by a major in the Israel Defence
Force, who in 19k6 had been a boy in Deganiah.
72. Blaxiand, p 33.
73. Dekel, p 165.
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Haganah's large-scale operations against railways and bridges, as
wall as many smaller actions, had the objectives of training the force,
in some cases of securing military advantage in the course of illegal
immigration, and of advertising the military strength available to the
Jewish leaders. flaganah did not attempt to make Palestine appear
ungovernable: it was content to demonstrate a potential. International
propaganda dividends from Haganah actions were, however, overshadowed
by the spectacular and horrific deeds of the extremists, and were
weak. Through their radio station 'The Voice of Israel', Haganab
also addressed Palestinian Arabs, supporting the line laid down by
Ben Gurion. The Jews, these broadcasts said, bad a quarrel with
Britain, not with the Arabs. Britain was to blame for communal troubles
and Arabs should form a united front with the Jews against the
Mandatory power.
Overseas the Official Zionist message was amplified by the World
Zionist Organisation's branch offices and, through them, by local
supporters. Funds were gathered in the USA by the American-Jewish
'Joint Distribution Committee', usually known as 'the Joint'. During
the pre-propaganda phase in World War II the British Embassy in
Washington had been sufficiently alarmed by this amplification to seek
assistance. The Ministry of Information transferred Miss Freya Stark
from the Near Last to make a lecture tour of North America. Her
account testifies to the effectiveness of Zionist emotion-based
propaganda. Audiences, she said, were 'full of rock-like integrity
impervious to sense'. 75
 Although the official Zionists bad superior
control over the Yishuv, the Revisionists, through the New Zionist
Organisation, succeeded in achieving a disproportionate influence in
many places overseas, especially America. Between 19k5 and 19k7
Menachem Begin managed to convert these Revisionist strongholds into
Irgun support units, for the purposes of fund-raising, arms supply and
propaganda.
In the summer of 19k0 a young man called Hillel Kook, who had
worked as Irgun representative at the New Zionist Organisation
headquarters in London, moved to the United States where he adopted the
7k. 3 Parachute Brigade Intelligence Summary No 2, 21 November 19k5,
Pt I - Illegal Broadcasting by Kol Israel. PRO WO 169/19705.
75. Freya Stark Ci), p 205.
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alias of Peter Bergeon. 6
 Bergeon set up the 'Hebrew Committee for
National Liberation' (HcNL) as an additional Irgun front orga.nisation,
in the process evolving an extraordinary propaganda line of his own,
disliked by orthodox and revisionist Zionists, which split Jews
between 'Hebrews', who wished to join the National Home, and 'Jews'
who did not. The idea was to free American Jews from the fear that
to support Jewish independence in Palestine would undermine their
identity as Americans and require them to emigrate.
In March 19116 British military intelligence reported 'that five
US Corgressinen met together and agreed that America would be well within
her rights in taking unilateral action by using American ships to move
displaced American Jews into Palestine. Peter Bergson, Chairman of
HCNL, declared that the people of Palestine must take matters into
their own hands "by a kind of revolution" and get displaced persons
into the country. Re proposed that America support the use of
Hebrew ships, manned by Hebrew personnel, to get Jews into
Palestine'.7
	Earlier, when reporting that Senator Gillette was to
work as an advisor to Bergson'a Committee, an official in the
British Embassy, Washington, noted that 'Bergson is described as a
semitic Himinler'. 79
 HCNL itself was merely an eight-man committee
which acted as the governing body of the 'American League for a Free
Palestine' (ALFP), also headed by Bergson.80 The ALFP mobilised
mass support for Irgun, claiming by August 19117 i11O,000 members.81
Mr Samuel Katz, Begin's chief of overseas propaganda in Palestine,
claimed that, by Bergeon's efforts, a powerful body of support among
congressmen, senators, and other public figures was built up and many
gave liberally of their time and energy to press the Jewish cause upon
76. Katz, p 66.
77. Katz, p 71.
78. PRO General Staff Intelligence Middle East Forces, Appx 5,
WO 169/22882.
79, Memorandum on Jewish Affairs in the US 1 10 September 19115. Item 5k,
PRO File 75ö72113k. CO 733/k63 Pt I.
80. Samuel Ealperin, The Political World of American Zionism, (Detroit,
1961), pp 318-320.
81. PRO File E 7k62, FO 371/61860.
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the government and upon American public opinion. The Bergson group
was also extremely effective with American Jewish intellectuals who
had previously shown little interest in Zionism; Ben Hecht,
Louis Bromfield, Konrad Bercovici, Francis Gunther, Stella Adler,
and many others became active exponents of the cause of Jewish
nationaiismi.82 Revisionist groups also attracted support from such
notable figures as Herbert Hoover, William Randolph Hearst,
William Allen White, Jimmy Durante, Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, and an
unknown young actor called Marion Brando.8
	 Charters has also
written an interesting article on the international financing of Irgun
terrorism, in which he reveals how the American criminal underworld
donated parts of its ill-gotten gains to Irgun. In one dinner in
Los Angeles alone, where Hecht was the keynote speaker, $ 200,000
was raised from the local lite of crime.8k
Public figures won over to the Zionist cause lost no time in
publicising their loyalties. The comedian Eddie Cantor took a page in
the New York Times which attacked Britain under the heading 'I thought
Hitler was Dead'. 5
 Not to be outdone, Bergson banged the Irgun drum
in the liberal New York paper PM. Under the heading 'Proclamation on
the Palestine Resistance' 86 he described an Irgun Fund-raising scheme
which was to be run by the New York-based 'Palestine Resistance
Committee' (another of Bergson's fronts). The notice stressed the
Committee's total independence of the Jewish Agency and went on: 'The
Jewish underground soldiers need helps Wounded need medicine, bandages
82. Katz, p 68.
83. Robert Silverberg, If I forget thee 0 Jerusalem; American Jews and
the State of Israel, (New York, 1970), p 325.
8k. David Charters (ii) so-far unpublished monogram Mandate for Terror:
The International Operations of the Irgun Zwai Leumi, 19k6-47,
1978. (The writer of this Thesis has been fortunate in that he has
worked at King's College, London at the same time that Mr Charters
has been researching Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Palestine
191+5_19k7. Through Mr Charters's unselfish assistance information,
references, insights and advice have been made freely available.
Short-cuts to references, 11, 12, 15, 18, 25, 27, ki, 70, 7#, 78,
79, 86, 107, 108, 110 and 111 have been taken by this assistance.)
85. Sykes, p 353.
86. Advertisement sponsored by the American League for a Free
Palestine in the 2 December i9'+6 edition of PM, New York. PRO
File E 11991, FO 371/52571.
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and surgical instruments The Patriots in the field (and those in
prisons) need food as weU as many other necessities required for
successful ACTIVE RESISTANCE to the British occupants and oppressors'.8
Hecht wrote a play for the New York stage called 'A Flag is Born'
which stressed the martyrdom of executed Irgunists, and became infamous
in Britain for his advertisement in the New York Herald Tribune and
fourteen other papers headed 'Letter to the Terrorists of Palestine'.
Part of the letter read:
Every time you blow up a British arsenal, or wreck a British
jail, or send a British railroad train sky high, or rob a
British bank, or let go with your guns and bombs at the British
betrayers and invaders of your homeland, the Jews of America
make a little holiday in their hearts. 88
The text illustrates nicely the Irgun propaganda assumptions listed
earlier: 'your homeland' implying historical and moral rights that
extinguish Arab and other claims; 'British ... invaders' denying
the legitimacy of the Leagu. of Nations Mandate. It shows how
propagandists seldom argue their assumptions but simply advance from
them. Thus Hecht was able to encourage murder and the gloating
over victims without his message seeming so crude, at least to his
susceptible American audience. Although perhaps not appearing crude,
his message was certainly dramatic and therefore newsworthy.
Newspapers all over the world picked his advertisement up and turned
it into a news item, multiplying the propaganda effect. In return for
this help, Irgun named their immigrant ship Ben Hecht.
In Palestine Samuel Katz organised the publication of Irgunpress,
which appeared in English, French, German and Italian editions. He
also wrote books in praise of the underground and translated Irgun
broadcasts. As 'official spokesman' he briefed such journalists as
Lucien Frank of Agence France Presse, Carter Davidson of Associated
Press, Moshe Brilliant of the New York Times and Ruth Gruber of the
87. Sponsors listed were the United Zionist Revisionists of America,
mc, the American League for a Free Palestine, mc, the National
Jewish Council, the Brith Trumpeldor of America, mc, the American
Sea and Air Volunteers for Hebrew Repatriation, the Asirai Zion
Fund, Thc, the Palestine Emergency Fund, mc, the League for Jewish
National Labor in Palestine, mc, and the National Jewish Youth
Council and Nordau Circle, Inc.
88. Advertisement inserted by Ben Hecht in New York Herald Tribune,
(is May 19117).
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89New York Herald Tribune.
	 Begin heap8 praise on Quentui Reynolds,
'an old friend of the fighting underground, one of the most active
supporters of the American League for a Free Palestine'.
	 With
allies like these, it is perhaps hardly surprising that Begin was able
to boast that 'Zretz Israel was a centre of world interest. The
revolt had made it so. It is a fact that no partisan struggle has
been so publicized throughout the world as was ours ... The reports
on our operations, under screaming headlines, covered the front pages
of newspapers everywhere, particularly in the United States'.91
The Irgun valued this publicity mainly for its political leverage
effect, but in addition it was seen as 'a kind of invisible lifebelt
round the Jewish population' that supported the Yishuv against the
possibility of rough British counter-measures. 92
 The whole
strategy of the Irgun' a revolt depended upon two contradictory
propositions: British evil justifying murder and British merit
ensuring that murder would go unxevenged. Not only did this
promiscuity survive unchallenged during the struggle, it lives on in
the propaganda histories. If the first proposition fades, aU that
the apologists of the Irgun are left with is murder.
Begin's 191+1+ proclamation of his revolt was, within the terms
dictated by his assumptions, a sensible and convincing outline of
future strategy. Moreover he never wavered from it. The British, he
forecast, would be forced to quit Palestine not by the 'controlled
pressure' of the Agency's 'Constructive Warfare', which involved a
process of persuasion, but because they would have no other option.
Other options would be demolished by Irgun violence that would make
Palestine, both in fact and in appearance, ungovernable, at least by
any methods acceptable to British consciences or to world opinion.
Although the 'invisible lifebelt' would protect the Yishuv from
counter-terror, the struggle would nevertheless force the authorities
into policies that would offend world opinion. Properly interpreted
and amplified, these offences would create political leverage in
89. Katz, p 130.
90. Begin, p 311+.
91. Begin, p 55.
92. Begin, p 55.
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America and the United Nations Organisation that would puah Britain
towards a decision to abandon the already ungovernable Mandate. From
being seen as an asset, Palestine would increasingly be seen by the
British as a liability. This 'Asset-to-Liability-Shift' was the crux
of Irgun strategy, which was essentially psychological. Rebel leaders
often claim in memoirea to have planned their campaigns in the way that
events turned out, ignoring the element of chance which more often than
not determines the outcome. In Begin's case it really does seem that
however careless his strategy may have been with Zionist unity, and
however much it depended upon indirect effects, he had a clear policy
and stuck to it:
History and our observation persuaded us that if we could
succeed in destroying the government's prestige in Eretz
Israel, the removal of its rule would follow automatically.
Thence forward we gave no peace to this weak spot. Throughout
all the years of our uprising, we hit at the British
government's prestige, deliberately, tirelessly, unceasingly.
In these studies the word 'credibility'implies more than just a
reputation for speaking the truth, useful though this may be as a
starting point. It suggests intelligent leadership, a strategy with
some hope of achieving success, the capability of applying the
strategy, and the will to see the struggle through to the end. Begin
perfectly understood all these aspects and throughout his struggle he
valued the accuinmulation by the Irgun of credibility above all else.
'We did not soil our mouths or our pens with falsehood', he wrote,
'We told the truth. Good or bad, pleasant or annoying, it was always
the truth. This policy lost us temporary rewards, but in the long run
it gained us the trust of the people and of the world. They all learnt
that our statements were facts. They all learnt that our warnings were
fulfilled.'	 By the skilful matching of facts to earlier forecasts,
the Irgun's credibility endowed these extremists with the mantle of
apparent irresistibility. Begin's campaign had the character of
propaganda of the deed with a third dimension, movement, which carried
his world audience smoothly from one conclusion to the next. 'The
chief bearer of the Irgun message was the Assault Force. To it was
93. Begin, p 52.
9Z4.. Begin, p 85.
158
allotted the task of "hitting the enemy with new weapons in order to
disintegrate alien rule".' 95 This strategy worked much as planned.
Irgun attacks inside Palestine were backed up by activities elsewhere.
In the autumn of 191+6 the British Embassy in Rome was damaged by a
bomb, giving the campaign an international flavour. Each deed
undermined British preStige, supplied evidence that Palestine under the
Mandate was ungovernable, raised the coat to the British of
attempting the impossible, and hastened the process of turning a
strategic asset into an economic and diplomatic liability.
The Propaganda ar
2: The British
The British response in the war of words and ideas was flawed
throughout by the lack of a forward political policy on Palestine.
Answers to revolutionary propaganda can be effective if based on a
defence of a political status quo, provided that the political
situation to be defended has positive virtues, or they can be
effective if related to the introduction of new policies, in the
manner of counter-revolution. Britain's search for a Palestine
settlement demonstrated that she was dissatisfied with the existing
arrangements: her failure to find an acceptable compromise deprived
her of any new ideal. Both the security campaign and the
propaganda war were therefore defensive or negative in character, and
thus gravely handicapped.
The strongest counter to Zionist arguments was the need to protect
Arab interests in Palestine. The Jews tried to dismiss this as a
British invention to divide and rule. The British Government could use
the Arab theme in political dialogue. They could not use it in
propaganda, except in a muted and subtle way, for fear of seeming to
take the Arab side in a dispute over which the British claimed to be
acting impartially. Nor dared they prod the Arab leaders into
arguing their own case, for fear of bringing on racial strife or
rebellion. It was, of course, from the Arabs that a firm propaganda
counter to Zionist claims ought to have come, although without an
international network like the Diaspora, it is doubtful if they could
have matched the Jewish publicity machine.
95. Begin, p 93.
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The arguments that were advanced by Britain concerned strategic
interests. These stressed to Western audiences that a free flow of
Middle East oil and the containment of Soviet expansionist policies in
that area were as important to the USA, France and other free nations
as they were to Britain, and should not be put at risk by too hasty
support of Zionist aims. In the State Department and other government
circles these points were broadly endorsed. It was nevertheless seen
as convenient to rely upon Britain to defend these interests without
offending pro-Zionist pressure groups at home. Thus Britain got
little or no diplomatic support, and was to discover that 'strategic
interests' counted zero in the propaganda war, and could even be used
to discredit her before audiences that had been educated either to
oppose the concept of Lnpire per se or to envy the British imperial
achievement against their own.
Had the Zionists limited their propaganda to rational argument
then Britain's rational counters might have been effective. One of the
weaknesses of rational. propaganda is its vulnerability to such a
response. The Jews probably realised this and turned instead to
emotional propaganda, which advertisers call the 'hot sell', and
which can only be countered on the same level. This is a typical and
an effective revolutionary technique. Whereas the rebel, the underdog,
working through front organisatione and underground outlets, can use
the crudest emotional stimuli, the authorities, respectable,
accountable and law-abiding, are relatively constrained. In the case
of the Mandatory Authorities, there was an additional moral impediment
to any resort to 'name-calling'. After all that the Jewish people
had endured, to say things that might be interpreted or misinterpreted
as 'anti-semetic' would be grossly offensive to opinion almost
everywhere. It would seem to imply approval of Nazi policies and
methods. Apart from the moral objections, the propaganda side-effects
would obviously be dreadful..
It may be thought that one thing that British propaganda could have
tried to do was to drive deeper the wedge between the extremists and
the rank and file of the Tishuv, between Begin and Ben Gurion. Here
again, the lack of forward political policy made such an ambition
difficult to achieve, since without being able to show the Yiahuv
positive benefits from restraint, Agency leaders lacked the means to
discredit extremism. Nevertheless, it was possibly mistaken to say or
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do things that pushed the Yishuv into the arms of the extremists.
This may have been the undesirable outcome of what would otherwise
seem to have been the one important British success in the
propaganda war.
Between September and November 19k5 British security services
had intercepted telegrams between the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem
and Zionist leaders in London. These gave away completely Haganah's
alliance with Irgun and Stern, and the Agency's control over the
United Resistance Movement. One telegram from Jerusalem began:
We have come to a working arrangement with the dissident
organisations according to which we shall assign certain
tasks to them under our command ... 96
For nine months the British kept this intelligence to themselves.
It must have made the High Commissioner's dealings with the Jewish
Agency rather like those of a husband who knows of his wife's
adultery, but who bides his time before confronting her. Suspicion
and mistrust are sharpened, and imagination is given free rein. It
seems likely that the British, knowing of the alliance but unaware of
the strains within that union, gave up all hope of isolating the
extremists. The severe disagreements between the Irgun and Stern
groups on the one band, and Hagana on the other, so clearly exposed
in Begin' a book97, were known at the time only to a handful of
leaders in those three organisations.
On the night of 25 April 191f6, seven soldiers of the 6th Airborne
Division were murdered by the Stern group in a Tel Aviv car park.
Major General Cassels, the divisional commander, summoned the city's
mayor to tell him that restrictions were to be placed on the Jewish
community as a whole. 'My decision', Cassels explained, 'has been made
both in order to maintain public security and because I hold the
community to blame. There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that many
members either knew of this project or could have given some warning
before it happened. Further, I am quite certain that if you, as
96. Telegram No 5, To London From Jerusalem - 1st November l9L45.
Quoted in Palestine, Statement of Information Relating to Acts of
Violence, Cmd 6783, IDISO, July 19146, p 5.
97. Begin, op cit.
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representative of the community of Tel Aviv, chose to do so you could
produce sufficient information to lead to the arrest of the
criminals' .
The General' a remarks expressed the furious indignation felt by
every soldier in Palestine, and by most of British opinion at home.
They seemed justified to those audiences at the time, and probably
were justified by the events. However, as a psychological action the
words may have been counter-productive. In April i9k6 many Jews in
Tel Aviv and throughout Palestine were horrified by the murders
perpetrated in their name. By being held collectively responsible for
murder, and punished accordingly (if very leniently), such moderates
must have felt that, whether they liked it or not, in the eyes of
authority they and the murderers were all of one kind. A sense of
belonging can develop into a duty to support. A more subtle reaction
might have been for Casse].s to draw the mayor into schemes of
co-operation with the Police, to see in his expressed regret a
willingness to encourage his citizens to supply information that might
lead to the arrests of the murderers. It should be added that to be
effective such a reaction would have needed to be part of an overall
psychological policy directed at the highest government and military
level, not an isolated act, and it seems probable that the discovery
of the alliance prohibited this. We ought also to acknowledge the
difficulties that apparently 'wet' responses to such outrages might
have created in the fields of police and military discipline and morale.
Even as it was, the car park murders gave rise to one of the rare
(and fortunately brief) occasions of unlawful vengeance by soldiers
against Jews and Jewish property.99
The British Government finally published the incriminating
telegrans10° in July 19L4.6, immediately after Operation 'Agatha', using
them to justify the arrests of Agency leaders. Although this
disclosure robbed Zionist protests of much of their moral force and
helped convince the UK public that the operation had achieved a useful
purpose, publication may also have signalled the end of hope in
98. Quoted Wilson, p k7.
99. Wilson, p Lf8.
100.Cmd 6783.
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Westminster that moderates and fanatics within the Zionist movement
could be kept apart.
Within days of the disclosures the Jewish Agency, already
branded as an accomplice in murder, was to be further embarrassed by
the Irgun's King David Hotel outrage. Ninety-one more victims lay at
the feet of the Tenuat Harneri. The Agency's predicament was, however,
eased by another military statement, which provided a much needed
diversion. Published in angry haste by the General Officer Commanding,
General Sir Evelyn Barker, this document urged troops to make Jews
'aware of our feelings of contempt and disgust at their behaviour' by
boycotting Jewish restaurants, cafes, shops and places of entertainment
in order to 'punish the Jews in the manner this race dislikes most;
101by hitting them in the pocket'.
	 Denounced as anti-semitic, 'these
foolishly ill-considered orders of General Barker were blown up into
atrocity proportions by skilful propaganda manoeuvres. In Palestine,
Europe and America the orders were given well-planned publicity which
resulted in Barker's minor misdemeanour completely over-shadowing
Irgun's one'. 102 This was an example of quick-witted reaction by
skilful propagandists, ever ready to turn the mistakes of the
authorities into propaganda victories.
The Irgun took this technique one stage further by creating
situations in which the administration had to choose between
unattractive options, either of which could be exploited for
propaganda effect. An unsuccessful Irgun bank raid, which cost the lives
of one policeman and two civilians, ended with the capture of
13 raiders. One of those convicted was under age, and was sentenced
to i8 years imprisonment and 18 strokes of the cane. Before the corporal
punishment was inflicted Irgun threatened in broadcasts by their
illegal radio and in pamphlets that, if the sentence was carried out,
they would flog any member of the Army who fell into their hands. The
prisoner was caned, and later Irgun kidnapped and flogged four service-
men. This sequence had four effects: it enhanced Irgun's credibility
101. Quoted Begin, p 221.
102. Sykes, p 359.
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and reputation for irresistibility, it undermined respect for
authority, by concentrating public attention upon the 'medieval
punislunent' 103 of caning the of fences of murder and robbery were
overlooked, and it brought to an end the use of corporal punishment.
Irgun and Stern were also anxious to save from death sentences
members who had been convicted of murder. No doubt they felt that,
if the deterrent effect of capital punishment could be removed, their
activists would feel able to take even greater risks. Imprisonment had
little impact, since all concerned in the underground struggle were
confident that in a. final settlement all prisoners would be released.
The method employed was blackmail. Whenever Irgunists were under
sentence of death the organisation would endeavour to kidnap
administrators or servicemen as hostages. Against this, the British
had to choose between giving way to the Blackmail, with obvious
consequences, and forfeiting innocent lives. The course chosen seemed
to be dictated by the pressures of the moment rather than principle,
swerving between compromise and rigidity. Several Irgunists were
executed, and eventually, in July 19Zf7, two hostages were murdered and
their bodies booby-trapped. The Irgun's announcement, translated into
English, is worth reproducing in full, as it illustraLes the
contortions into which Begin's propaganda assumptions had led him, in
order to justify what by any normal standards would be seen as a
brutal act of indiscriminate revenge.
The two British spies, MARTIN and PAICE, who were under arrest
by the Underground since 12 July 19k7, have been put on trial,
following the enquiry into their criminal anti-Hebrew
activities.
MARTIN and PAICE have been accused of the following crimes:
1. Illegal entry into our homeland.
2. Membership of the British criminal-terrorist
organisation known as "British Army of Occupation in
Palestine" which is responsible:
103. Quoted Wilson, p 88.
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for depriving our people of the right to live;
for cruel, oppressive acts;
for tortures;
for the murder of men, women and children;
for the murder of prisoners of war;
and for the deportation of Hebrew citizens from their
country and homeland.
3. Illegal. possession of arms, intended for the
enforcement of oppression and despotism.
k. Anti-Jewish spying, disguised in civilian clothes.
5. Conspiring against the Hebrew Underground, its soldiers,
bases and arnie, the arms of freedom.
The court has found the two guilty of all charges and sentenced
them to die by hanging on their necks until their soul would
leave them.
The request of the condemned men for clemency has been rejected.
The sentence has been carried out.
The hanging of the two British spies is not a retaliatory act
for the murder of Hebrew prisoners of war, but it is an ordinary
legal action of the court of the Underground which has sentenced
and will sentence the criminals who belong to the criminal
Nazi-British Army of Occupation.
We shall revenge the blood of the prisoners of war who have been
murdered by actions of war against the enemy, by blows which we
shall inflict on his head.
The Court of Irgun Zwai Leumi,
In Eretz Israel. 	 iok
The pretence at being belligerents is commonly adopted by
insurgents, although for propaganda purposes only. The practical
implications of belligerent status upon an underground guerrilla force
would be disastrous. Begin's propaganda fantasies went one step further
by combining his claim of belligerent rights for the Irgun with a
iok. Quoted Wilson, pp 133-13k. For a description of the hangings,
which were carried out by Paglin personally, see J Bowyer Bell
(ii) Terror out of Zion (New York, 1977), pp 236-239.
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denial of such rights to the British. Fantastic or not, these
assumptions were seldom questioned by audiences in such 'neutral'
countries as America, and served to justify barbaric acts. It hardly
has to be added that for those Irguniets who were executed, martyrdom
was switched on like a searchlight.
The essential prize to be defended by any Government threatened by
insurgency is the legitimacy of the regime. This becomes, in a
sense, the main propaganda assumption of the authorities. Its
protection depends less upon public relations exercises as upon the
whole conduct of administration and security operations. In Palestine
the Administration went far towards surrendering its claim to
legitimacy, and losing its credibility, by swerving between appeasement
and punishment, and by appearing to sway before terrorist threats.
The venture into unlawful counter-terrorism and various utterances by
senior officers contributed to this process. The chief strength of
the Administration in presentational terms lay in the quality and
behaviour of its security forces, particularly the Army, whose members
gave remarkably few genuine propaganda opportunities to the Zionists,
who therefore found it necessary to invent stories, fake injuries105
and engineer confrontations.
The Army in Palestine appreciated some of the dangers of hostile
propaganda, but was equipped neither by training nor organisation to
counter it. The need for speedy and accurate passing of information
was understood, but no apparatus existed to make really good use of
it. The headquarters in Jerusalem in December 19k5 issued an
in5truction1	 on press relations. This confirmed the right of all
reporters holding official press cards to move freely in the Mandate,
and to report as they wished. Army transport was to be provided for
this purpose. Each divisional and brigade headquarters was to appoint
a public relations officer. Apart from these specialists, no officer
or soldier was to give an interview with the press. The importance
of speedy reporting of operations was stressed by both divisional
105. See article by Cohn Mitchell, Sunday Express, (London,
3 November 1968), pp 8-9.
106. British Troops in Palestine and Tranajordan Operations
Instruction No 56, 31 December 19 Lf5. PRO. WO 169/1965.
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headquarters. 6th Airborne Division ordered that 'the importance
of rapid information from the political, point of view will be
impressed upon all commanders and staff. Speed, accuracy and, above
all., "Beat Reuter&' ,107 let Infantry Division pointed to the
dangers of deliberate misreporting by committed journalists and
mentioned how Reuters must have been tipped off by the Stern group
in order to get their first report of the car park murders on the
line 20 minutes after the attack began. 'It is the first "hot news"
that captures the headlines', the instruction warned. 'The agencies
are concerned primarily with the rapid passing of information and not
its accuracy. They wiU use the first story they get.108
Outside the Arab and Islamic worlds, press coverage of Palestine,
influenced by the Zionist propaganda organisation, gradually became
more and more pro-Jewish, and increasingly critical of Britain. The
Soviet Union supported Zionism, presumably because this movement seemed
capable of ejecting Britain from the Palestine base and of creating
an unstable situation throughout the Near and Middle East. Only in
Britain were newspapers generally opposed to Zionist ambitions,
persuasive propaganda being incompatible with murder. 'The British
Press was perhaps a little slow in the early stages in presenting a
true picture of the problems which the Army was facing', wrote the
Historian to 6th Airborne Division. 'But after a time this was
rectified. Thereafter the balanced reports produced by the majority
of British papers were one of the few compensations to the troops in
their unpleasant work.'109
Sympathy and understanding are useful assets, but they are no
substitute for confidence. As the months went by with no signs of a
political solution, with no evidence that the authorities had any means
to stem the rising tide of violence in Palestine, and with mounting
costs in lives, money and international respect, the British news
media questioned the wisdom of continuing the Mandate. On 2 March 1947,
107. 6th Airborne Division Operations Instruction No 14, 17 October, 191+5.
PRO WO 169/19685.
108. let Infantry Division letter 'Publicity' 8 May l9+6.
PRO. WO 169/19685.
109. Wilson, p 90.
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one month after Britain had referred the problem to the UN, the
Sunday Express reacted to fresh violence with the headline 'Govern
or Get Outt ' At this stage the British Government was still half
hoping for a UN plan that would leave Britain in effective control of
the Mandate. Leverage from within, combined with leverage from the
international community, helped put an end to such hopes.
British efforts to counter Zionist propaganda in the United
States were dismally ineffective. A early as November 1945 the
Palestine High Commissioner telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary
complaining that British policy would suffer un].ess the Government
took vigorous steps to remedy the situation. The Government took
no such steps, being content simply to repeat the telegram to
Washington. The British Ambassador in the US did nothing either,
and his reply said that he felt that misrepresentations were not as
widespread as they might have been and, in any case, the few
papers which violently misrepresented the British case were
110incorrigible.	 It was evidently beneath the dignity or beyond the
competence of His Majesty's Foreign Service to indulge in the necessary
task of countering the lies and slanders that were damaging the
National interest. Instead, Embassy staff relied upon the official
complaint as their only means of defence. After Bergson inserted
his Irgun fund-raising piece in PM they sent an aide memoire to the
State Department. This stressed the undesirable outcome of such
fund-raising in support of terrorism, pointed to the recent verbal
attacks upon such. activities by the Inner Zionist Council, and requested
a reply to this and earlier memoires. In London a Foreign Office
official thought the aide memoire 'a lamentably weak document', and
went on: 'One would have thought that as three previous protests have
gone unanswered, we could ... point out that the financing of
rebellion on the territory of a friendly power was just the least bit
steep?'. 111
 We may conclude that the 'lamentably weak document'
reflected a lamentably weak policy in countering hostile propaganda,
and for this the Foreign Office, as well as its Washington outpost,
was vulnerable to criticism.
110. PRO File 75156/15 1A, 1945, Pt II CO 733/'+56.
111. PRO File E 12099, Palestine and Transjordan FO 371/52571.
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Throughout the last years of the Mandate the Army and the
Palestine Administration were aware of what was being said by the
Zionist propagandists. War diaries and Colonial Office telegrams
recorded themes and lines and methods of dissemination. Yet in their
efforts to contain the situation it never seems to have occurred to
political or military leaders that this propaganda and the leverage it
exerted were the war-winning weapons of Zionism, and that the violence
on the streets and in the orange groves was there mainly in a
supporting role. Leaflets and broadcasts were studied by the British
as possible intelligence sources but their messages were largely
ignored. The significance of the 'invisible lifebelt', the need to
avoid being led into humiliating situations, the strategy of leverage
itself - all these ought to have occupied the minds of commanders and
staffs at least as much as road blocks and searches. When on
13 January 19k? the Chiefs-of-Staff considered the Government's proposal
to refer the problem, Yield-Marshal Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, thought it 'imprudent that we should, by submitting
the Palestine case to the UNO, take the risk of having to evacuate the
112
whole of our forces from that area'.	 Evidently the Chiefs were
the last to be affected by the 'Asset-to-Liability-Shift', although
how Palestine could any longer be seen as a strategic asset is
difficult to understand. The implication is that from their Chief
downwards the Army thought in terms of countering growing insurgency
by an ever increasing military response. Both official and extremist
Jews knew that such a reaction,properly presented to world opinion,
could only hasten their political victory. It was Zionist
understanding of the strategy of leverage coupled with Britain's
blindness in this area that settled the outcome.
Conclusion
Britain's decision to refer the Mandate to the TIN marked the end
of Phase I of Zionist strategy. Phase II would involve persuading the
UN Special Committee to recommend a solution favourable to the Jews,
Phase III would require UN endorsement of such a scheme and Phase IV
would imply the establishment and defence of the new State of Israel.
112. Minutes, Chiefs of Scaff (k7) 9th Meeting, 13 January 191+7.
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This study is mainly concerned with Phase I and with the British
decision not to implement the UN scheme. We may note in passing that
the seduction of the UN Special Committee was made relatively easy by
Arab reluctance to argue their case, and by the Zionist propaganda
already soaked up by Committee members during the long campaign to
gain international support and to discredit Britain, and that the
same propaganda, aided in the Soviet Union by a subtle political
campaign, served to obtain UN approval. 113
 During Phases II and III
the Irgun and. Stern continued and intensified their violence and,
through it, leverage against the British, thus ensuring that Britain
would refuse to implement the UN scheme and instead would quit. The
final Phase relied upon Jewish martial prowess. Integration propagandahlk
had prepared the Yishuv and its soldiers for this test and the
discipline and valour that were shown proved its effectiveness.
'Constructive Warfare' as originally envisaged by the Jewish
Agency and Haganah failed, being impossible to implement in alliance
with extremists who rejected the strategy and made it unworkable.
When apologists for the Irgun claim that it was Begin's strategy of
violent coercion and of leverage that forced Britain first to refer
the problem to the UN and later to quit, they may be right. It should
not necessarily be accepted, however, that this was the only path open
to Zionism, or that it was the best. Extremism invites an extreme
response, as the Arabs have subsequently shown. Furthermore, it was more
by Jewish luck than good judgement that Britain, faced with extremist
violence, held on to the Mandate as long as she did. Had she quit
earlier, the outcome of Phase IV would almost certainly have been in the
Arabs' favour.
Both strategies relied on propaganda to arouse world opinion and
both depended in various ways on British restraint. The Agency hoped
to generate sympathy and admiration and to persuade Britain that her
policy was unjust and morally insupportable. The Irgun set out to
fabricate worldwide hatred of Britain and to convince the British that
their policy was costly, futile and politically insupportable. Agency
113. See Arnold Krammer 'Soviet Motives in the Partition of Palestine




pre-propaganda slid in the Irgun's direction during World War II, and
this made restraint much more difficult afterwards. It may also have
hardened British attitudes. Some aspects of 'Constructive Warfare'
such as the Tel Aviv riots were ill suited to that strategy, since
they created tensions that could only benefit an all-out campaign of
terror, which the Agency and Haganah had rejected. Out of this
muddle a compromise seems to have emerged in which the Official
Zionist movement continued outwardly to strive towards a political
settlement while at the same time covertly tolerating the extremists'
campaign of coercion. Yigal Allon acknowledges that these groups
'contributed their share to the overall pressure that finally led to
the withdrawal of the British'. 115
 This balanced opinion contrasts
with Begin's view of the Irgun:
Few against the many, the weak against the strong. Hounded,
isolated, forsaken, abandoned ... Their life was struggle;
their death heroism; their sacrifice sacred; their memory
eternal.	 ii6
The ironic fact that Begin and his supporters never admit to is that
it was the Jewish Agency, their bate noire, that made the Irgun's and
Stern's campaigns possible. In his i94 public call to revolt Begin
had appealed to the Yishuv: 'Build a protecting wall around your
fighting youth. Do not foresake them
	
t 117 After 19k5 the Agency
allowed this wall to stand.
Discussion
The Zionist campaign against Britain illustrated both the power
and the dangers of revolutionary propaganda. Unchecked, it ceased to
be an instrument of policy and became instead the blind creator of
policy. Once the genie of hatred had been let out of the bottle, what
J Bowyer Bell calls 'the cautious, well-reasoned, eminently rational
strategy of the legitimate institutionsh18 was doomed to failure.
115. Allon, p 29.
116. Begin, pp 379-380.
117. Begin, p +3.
ii8. Bell Ci), p 70.
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In support of revolution per se, and of the Irgun and Stern variety
in particular, Zionist propaganda was powerful and effective. Both
wings used the emotional message style, and the message depended for
its effectiveness upon events in or en route to Palestine being
appropriately amplified and interpreted. Inside Palestine the
Zionist message provided strong integration propaganda which could as
necessary be turned into agitation propaganda. Within the ranks of
those committed to the struggle propaganda provided motive,
justification and congratulation, and was effective. Against
'neutrals' it was generally strong, being assisted by Jews of the
Diaspora who provided organisational bases inside the target
communities. Messages directed at 'enemies' made less impression,
except in terms of leverage. Jewish voices in Britain were silenced
by shame over extremist actions; in Arab audiences there was no effective
Jewish group to repeat the themes in forms that might make them
acceptable.
The Irgun campaign deserves study as a classic example of
leverage warfare. By the 'Asset-to-Liability-Shift Begin made
the British public anxious to be rid of the Palestine commitment,
at almost any price. While he was creating this shift of opinion
he used what might be termed 'survival propaganda' to deter harsh
security force responses. Irgun propaganda overseas, particularly
in America, demonstrated how far sophisticated audiences can be led
down the road to fantasy by the ruthless superimposition of facts
upon boldly stated assumptions.
Zionist propaganda themes included righteousness, allegiance,
moral certainty, terror, the 'counter-productivity' of security measures
and security force incompetence, martyrdom and the glorification of
heroes, the praise of violence, the justification of the rebel
violence and hence the need of 'special status', guilt transfer,
the legitimacy of the cause and its inevitable victory, credibility
of the revolt, cost and futility of resistance and, overshadowing all,
hatred.
For Britain the main lesson was the impossibility of conducting
any sort of campaign, politic-i, military or psychological, without
forward policy, and events in Palestine showed that in a revolutionary
situation delay usually aggravates the problem. These political
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aspects may have concealed the equally important counter-insurgency
lessons that pointed to the need for a government faced by rebellion
to possess an effective counter-propaganda apparatus and the
political will to use it. Effectiveness and will would depend upon
there being a wide understanding of the nature and importance of






PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN ALGERIA
The Cult
On 21 July 195k an armistice was signed in Indo-China that
brought French rule in that country to an end. After an eight year
struggle during which the Vietminh had adapted for their own purposes
the revolutionary theories expounded by Mao Tee-twig, the French had
been defeated. In an effort to find new and better ways of countering
anti-colonial insurrections in the future, a number of French army
officers who bad fought in Indo-China formulated a doctrine which they
called guerre revolutionnaire.1
The doctrine related to subversive warfare within a state, and it
held that in order to seize power, the revolutionaries must enlist 'the
active help of the physically and morally conquered population ,
and combine destructive with constructive techniques according to a
definite procedure. Long before armed force is used against the
security forces or other government targets, the insurgents must use
propaganda, agitation and organisation amongst part, at least, of the
civilian population to provide secure 'bases', political, financial
and manpower support, an intelligence network, and a climate of
opinion favourable to revolt. Guerre r6volutionnaire then expounded
principles and tactics for defeating revolution. The destruction of
enemy formed unite was seen as a necessary preliminary, but purely
military actions, it was argued, could never be relied upon to end the
revolt. The security force measures needed to be guided as much by
political and psycho].ogica]. considerations as by military ones. The
tactics of the guerilla had to be turned against him: the civilian
population had to be induced to play an active part in the government's
1. The writer's chief source on the subject of Guerre Revolutionn
is Peter Paret French Revolutionary Warfare from Indo-China to
Algeria (London, i96k). The quotations in notes 3, 39 and 52
below are taken from this book.
2. 'Ximenes' 'La Guerre re'rolutionnaire et ses donn(es
fondamentales' in Revue Militaire d'Information,
February-March, 1957, p 8.
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fight. If this was impossible to achieve, resettlement must deny
support to the enemy. Captured rebels had to be 're-educated' to rid
them of their mistaken ideology.
Much of this doctrine had already been applied by other nations
coping with insurgency. The British in Malaya co-ordinated their
politice.l,military and psychological action against the communist
revolutionaries to good effect. They- resettled civilians and
deprived the rebels of support. They outfought the jungle bandits.
Many communists were induced to surrender arid then led raids against
their erstwhile comrades. Finally, the British Government seized the
political initiative by offering the country independence provided the
communist threat was first overcome. The Malaya responded and
contributed handsomely to the final outcome. 3 But whereas the
British had stumbled upon their technique in their characteristically
pragmatic manner, the Trench officers who espoused guerre rvolutionnaire
cultivated it with almost religious fervour. The doctrine was to them
more than just a tactical method, it was an ethical and patriotic
duty - a cult.
Guerre r(volutionnaire did not confine its influence to the area
of direct conflict. Colonel Roger Trinquier insisted that 'the Sine
Qua Non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of
the popuiationu.L4 For the doctrine's advocates this meant the whole
population of Trance as well as the people in the combat zone. Thus
the army would take upon itself the task of mustering home-front
support for its overseas counter-insurgency campaigns, support which it
felt had been fatally lacking during the Indo-China struggle. Sustained
popular favour often requires an ideological commitment, and the final
step carrying g,ierre r-olutionnaire into the heart of Trench politics
might be the army's attempt to evolve ideological centrepieces for its
campaigns of counter-insurgency, more powerful than those which
inspired rebellion.
This new military cult was still in its infancy, and had been
embraced only by a small but influential minority of French Army
3. See Richard Clutterbuck (i) The Long, Long War (New York, 1966).
k. Roger Trinquier Modern Warfare (London, 196k), p 7.
176
officers, when an occasion for it to be tested arose. On the night
of 31 October 195k, only three months after the armistice in the
East, rebellion broke out in Algeria. The next morning the Cairo
propaganda radio station 'Voice of the Arabs' announced:
Brothers I Today Algeria launched her sublime struggle for
freedom and for Islam. Today - November 1 195k - Algeria
has once again begun to live with honour. A powerful lite
of the eons of Algeria have begun the struggle to rid
themselves of the tyranny of French imperialism. 5
This chapter looks at the role of propaganda in the Algerian war, with
particular reference to the cult of guerre rvo].utionnaire with ita
emphasis upon psychological counter-measures.
Outline of the Algerian War
The French ruled Algeria from 1830, and from the earliest days
they made determined efforts to colonise the territory with French
settlers or, when insufficient Frenchmen were available, with Spanish,
Maltese and Corsicans. These 'colons' were given the best land and
quickly became an economic, social and political lite. From 1833
onwards various ordinances proclaimed that Algeria was to be considered
as part of Metropolitan France. This notion of integration
distinguished Algeria from other French (or for that matter European)
colonial possessions. Generations of Frenchmen were educated to
believe that Algeria was a part of France. Such a belief excluded
any possibility of Algerian independence and denied the existence of
Algerian nationality. To ensure an indefinite future for such an
arrangement, France also needed to convince Algerians that their
country was a part of France. If both parties believed in integration
there need be no problem. In this they failed. On the one hand the
French themselves paid lip service to the notion of integration while
ruling Algeria pretty much as if it were a colony. On the other, the
Algerian Muslim masses were never won over to full acceptance that
their country was a part of France. Because inequalities between
Muslims and Europeans abounded, integration was always an empty theory:
5. Quoted Arsian Humbaraci Algeria: A Revolution that Failed
(London, 1966), p 3k.
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Wretchedly poor themselves, the (Algerian) Muslims saw wealthy
Europeans daily. A political gap paralleled this economic
discrepancy as one European vote equalled as many as eight
Muslim ballots. The natives could not be expected to accept
their inferior status indefinitely, and Algerian leaders had
long demanded that their people be given equality with the
Trench. While there existed an inherent danger of
revolution in such an unjust society, few men saw the problem
clearly. Virtually no Europeans admitted the possibility of
rebellion. 6
For more than a hundred years the French authorities could afford not
to care whether Algerians believed in integration or not. Heresy could
be ignored or stifled.
Disbelief became dangerous when fanned by Arab nationalism, by
resentment at Muslim living standards against those enjoyed by the
colons, and by an emerging awareness of Algerian national identity.
Nevertheless Muslim political parties seeking reforms quarrelled
amongst themselves and until 195k the French had little difficulty
dividing or crushing dissent. The organisation that inspired the
rebellion that began on the last night of October of that year was the
Front de Libation Nationale (National Liberation Front), the FLN,
and the guerilla soldiers who carried out the attacks styled themselves
the Arine de Libation Nationale (Army of National Liberation), the
ALN. The ALN was the military wing of the political movement TLN, and,
in theory at least, acted on orders from Cairo, where the FLN 'External
Delegation' initially established its headquarters. In practice it was
the military rebel leaders who tended to dominate the Movement at all
levels. The choice of the term 'front' was in itself a deliberate
attempt by the revolutionaries to create a mystique which would embody
the aspirations of all Muslim Algerians, while at the same time
obliterating the disunited nationalist past.
In apparent disregard of the sequence of revolutionary phases
envisaged by the authors of guerre rzolutionnaire, the ALN omitted
completely the preparatory programme in which, according to that
6. The writer' s chief source on FLN-ALN policy, organisation and
methods is Aif Andrew Heggoy Insurgency and Counter-insurgency
in Algeria (Bloomington, USA, 1972). This quote p 72. The
quotations in notes 20, 23, 29, 30, 50 and 51 below are taken
from this book.
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doctrine, rebels create conditions essential to success in later
violent phases. The tasks of propaganda, agitation and organisation
amongst the population in the base areas, the 'mobilisation of the
masses', the development of recruiting, financial and logistics
support, and the setting up of an intelligence network, were all left
to be tackled after the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. Action, not
words, was to rally the people, and French reaction was relied upon to
strengthen rather than reduce popular support for the revolution. Thus
French counter-intelligence was denied the opportunity to identify the
seeds of rebellion before the first sprouts of violence appeared above
the ground.
Although the Algerian nationalists surprised the French and 'broke
the rules' by an abrupt violent beginning of revolution, their strategy
was in other respects fashioned after the example of Mao Tse-tung and
Ho Chi Minh. FLN leaders did not imagine that French opinion, for so
long educated to think in terms of Algrie Française, could be
swung in favour of Algerian independence by a purely terroristic
campaign. Nor did they consider France vulnerable to 'leverage'.
Both terror and international pressure would have important supporting
roles in FLN strategy, but victory would come as a result of armed
force. The 'War of National Liberation' would progress from an early
'survival' phase through 'protracted' and 'mobile' periods, before
the final. 'conventional' confrontation on the Dien Bien Phu model.
This strategy failed because the French, benefiting from the lessons
of Indo-China, many of which were embodied in guerre rolutionnaire,
mounted what was in many respects a wonderfully successful
counter-insurgency campaign. However, in the course of fighting their
doomed war to defeat the French army, the FLN-ALN slowly became
aware that although they could not win in the manner originally
intended, they might nevertheless convince the French that the cost
of defending Algeria against Algerians was too great to be borne
indefinitely. Part of this cost was the political side-effects of the
doctrine of guerre r(voiutionnaire.
Between November 195k and about March 1956 the revolution was in
its 'survival' stage. The guerrillas harrassed the French and
terrorised Algerians into supporting the revolt, or, at least, into
withholding assistance from the French. The ALN achieved dominance
in its mountainous base areas and learnt to survive in the face of
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French security force counter-measures. During the final months of
this phase the FLN-ALN launched an effective 'hearts and minds'
campaign amongst rural Muslims, which succeeded in reinforcing the
terrorist hold over the population by an ideological commitment.
Religious leaders declared in favour of the revolt, thus strengthening
the secular appeal of national independence with the moral force and
binding discipline of Islamic feith. Throughout this early period the
Trench army was finding its feet and building up strength. Its
response was insufficiently effective to snuff out the spark of
revolution.
The delivery to the ALN of modern Czechoslovak weapons enabled
the rebels to move into 'protracted guerrilla warfare' in April 1956, a
phase which lasted until about December 1957. The Anglo-French 'Suez'
adventure of November 1956 caused a temporary diversion of French effort
from Algeria to Egypt, but nevertheless the army was reasonably
successful in countering ALN tactics by the system known as ouadrillage.
This placed all cities, towns and villages under military garrison,
the garrisons diminishing in strength according to the size of
population, in order to bring the army into 'contact' across the
entire 'front'. The system tied up vast numbers of troops, leaving
rather too few for the necessary mobile operations against ALN forces
in the mountains, but it did effectively hamper the ALN 'oil spot'
tactics which were intended to extend rebel-controlled territory.
Battles occurred continually, often on a considerable scale. By
October 1957, 30,000 ALN had been killed. At that time there were
more than kOO,000 Trench troops in Algeria. The policy of removing
people from areas under rebel domination bad resulted in 36k,000
Muslim civilians being housed in 'regroupment centres'. 7 The ALN
moved into Algiers and by terror attacks virtually brought that city
to its knees. The French in February 1957 ordered General Massu with
his 10th Parachute Division to restore order, a task that was carried
out with grim efficiency. On 21, September 1957 the ALN in Algiers
7. See Edgar O'Ballance The Algerian Insurrection 195k-1962
(London, 1967), Chapters 3 and k. (O'Bal].ance provides a useful
account that concentrates upon the military aspects of the
struggle.)
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virtually surrendered, abandoning their urban campaign. The
shooting war was going badly for the Algerian nationalists.8
Nevertheless they stuck to the Maoist formula, expanded the
size of their formed units, and attempted to move into Phase III -
'mobile warfare'. This ended in failure only six months later, when
the ALN was forced to return to the 'protracted' stage. By now the
neighbouring states Morocco and Tunisia, recently independent of
French colonial rule, were providing the rebel army with safe havens.
Beyond both boundaries the ALN established training and logistic
bases and built up the large units that were intended one day to force
the French army to surrender. The French, however, took steps to
block this design by constructing mined and electrified barriers along
the borders. Sizeable battles, costing hundreds of rebel lives, raged
when the revolutionary forces attempted to break through these
barriers. 'Mobile warfare' could not be sustained in the face of a
weU-trained, determined French army, equipped with arrnoured vehicles
and helicopters and the mobility and firepower that these provide.
with lowered morale, the ALN re-organised into smaller units and
returned to protracted guerrilla warfare. By now the number of
civilians in regroupment centres bad risen to 1+85,000.
On 1 June 1958 General de Gaulle returned to power in France.
Before the end of the year he appointed a new commander-in-chief
in Algeria - General Challe. Challe instituted changes in strategy
aimed at eliminating the ALN rather than simply containing the
rebellion as had been the case under 'quadrillage'. The 'Chelle
Plan' released a proportion of garrison troops from their static
role so as to increase the mobile striking forces. These were to
destroy the FLN units operating inside Algeria and to root out the
insurgent political and administrative organisation 'OPA' in the
towns and villages. The striking forces would be assisted by lite
commandos de chasse, each about 100 strong, whose role was to track
down and observe the rebel units. This s pecial surveillance would
direct the striking forces to best effect. Meanwhile the frontier
8. See Alistair Home A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 195k-1962
(London, 1977), Chapters 9 and 10. (Home deals in detail with
all aspects, particularly the political.)
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defences were to be strengthened so as to exclude from the struggle
the growing number of ALN units being formed and trained in Morocco
and Tunisia.
Against the ALN proper, the Challe Plan was successful. All
through 1959 the rebel units were reduced in number and effectiveness,
so that by the end of the year the guerrillas were once again in a
struggle for 'survival'. The ALN was at times losing 500 men per day.9
Yet during 1959 the ALN was able to re-eatabli8h itself in Algiers and
to bring terrorism back to the city. Against the nationwide FLN
political infrastructure the Challe Plan had only limited success.
Had it been launched early in 1955, before the FLN-ALN propaganda and
the nature of the struggle itself had hardened popular support for the
rebellion, the Plan's full ambitions might have been achieved. As it
was, it left the FLN-LN gravely weakened militarily, but with its
political strength at home and overseas still growing. It was this
fact that convinced de Gaulle of the need for a political settlement
based on the right of self-determination, and fighting died down in
mid-1960 as both sides awaited the outcome of negotiations. These were
long and drawn out, and it was spring 1961 before representatives of the
two sides met at Evian, and another year before agreement was reached.
On 3 July 1962 the French High Commissioner handed over power to the
Algerian Executive.
The Algerian war was costly and brutal. Mr Home quotes French
official sources which speak of 17,+56 military dead, about 3,000
European civilians killed, lkl,000 male Muslim combatants killed by
security forces, 12,000 members of the FLN liquidated in internal
purges, 16,000 Muslims murdered by the FLN plus another 50,000 abducted
and presumably killed. On top of these figures there were another
4,300 Algerians killed by the FLN or its rivals in metropolitan France
during the course of the war, and a far higher number, variously
estimated between 30,000 and 150,000, who were the victims of massacres
after the French withdrew from Algeria. These last were the unfortunates
who had been loyal to France in the struggle, against whom the victors
10
unleashed the utmost cruelty.
	 At least 1.0 million Muslims were
9. O'Ballance, p 135.
10. Home, p 538.
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uprooted from their homes or were forced to leave them because of
the fighting. Terror tactics struck indiscriminately, and with a
degree of savagery far surpassing anything seen in our earlier
studies. iIhen the colons in 1961 hit back wildly with their own
terrorist organisation, the OAS, their ruthlessness was of the same
order. In their struggle to obtain information the French police and
army's interrogation methods sometimes slipped into the dark world of
torture.
FLN-ALN Propaganda
The first tract issued by the ALN appeared on 1 November 195Lf and
read as follows:
Algerian people:
Reflect on our humiliating, colonized condition. Under
colonialism, justice, democracy and equality are but bait and
dupery. To these misfortunes must be added the bankruptcy
of the parties claiming to defend you. Side by side with our
brothers in the east and to the west, who are dying that their
fatherlands may live, we call upon you to reconquer your
freedom at the price of your blood.
Organise ycur action beside the Forces of Liberation, to which
you must give aid, comfort and protection. To take no interest
in the struggle is a crime; to oppose this action is treason.
God is with the fighters of just causes, and no force can stop
them now, save glorious death or National Liberation.
Long live the Army of Liberationl
Long live independent Algeria
This call to arms was addressed to Algerian Muslims, 'friends', nd it
contained the propaganda themes of mass mobilisation. These were
'righteousness of the cause', 'hatred of the enemy', 'join us in the
heroic, morally sound struggle where violence is glorious and death
brings martyrdom' and 'oppose us and you die'. This mixture of heroic
appeal and terroristic threat enabled the FLN, which started the revolt
unknown and unsupported, to seize control of the Algerian masses and
11. Quoted Michael K Clark Algeria in Turmoil (New York, 1966), p 111.
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eventually make Algeria ungovernable by the French by any means
acceptable to French and international opinion.
The largely apolitical and apathetic Muslim villagers never would
have provided the necessary support had the FLN not used terror. Throat
cuttings, mutilations, executions of hostages, extortion of money or
goods; these, as much as propaganda appeals, rallied the ranks. In any
reasonably well-adjusted society such behaviour might be expected to
be wholly counter-productive. The resort to terror would discredit its
originators, besides demonstrating the inadequacy of the revolutionary
ideology. However, French Algeria was less than well-adjusted socially.
In the mountain areas chosen for the initial ALM bases French
administration had never been much more than a theory. Thus the villagers
had no authority to whom to appeal for help and were obliged to serve
the rebels whether they liked it or not. Furthermore, although apolitical
and apathetic, Muslims had many reasons for disliking French rule. Terror
was needed to spur them into committing themselves but, once committed,
motives more positive than self-preservation kept them going. By the
time the FLN-ALN expanded their areas of influence to towns and
villages where their authority and. propaganda were directly challenged
by French equivalents, rebel esteem was such that terror was needed
more as a means of enforcing discipline than as the trigger to set off
revolutionary activity. Moreover by that time the FLN's guerrilla
attacks against the French had brought the French security forces into
action and, inevitably, much of what these forces had done was seen by
Muslims as oppressive. Primarily intended as blows in a war to defeat
the French militarily, ALN attacks were also important as 'propaganda
of the deed', freeing Muslims from a sense of inferiority via-a-via
the French, rebuilding national pride, and inspiring confidence in
final victory. Words and deeds were inextricably committed to the
struggle.
Terrorism was used from the outset not only as a means of enforcing
internal discipline, but as a device to force thepace towards total
polarisatiori. Besides the normal ambition associated with such action,
of driving the government to over-react and thus alienate the masses,
the FLN were concerned to discredit and destroy all French and
Muslim leaders who stood for moderation and canproinise. This might
be achieved if both communities came to view each other as barbaric
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enemies. The Phil ippeville massacres of August 1955 set this trend
in motion.
The peak of horror was reached at Ain-Abid, twentytour miles
east of Constantine, and at El-Ealia, a small pyrite mining
centre close to Philippeville ... The attackers went from
house to house mercilessly slaughtering all the occupants
regardless of sex or age, and egged on by Muslim women with
their eerie you-you chanting ... an entire pied noir (colon) family
called Mello perished atrociously: a seventythree year old
grandmother and eleven year old daughter, the father killed in
his bed, with his arms and legs hacked off. The mother had been
disembowelled, her five day old baby slashed to death and
replaced in her opened womb ... The Arab children, wild with
enthusiasm - to them it was a great holiday - rushed about 12
yelling among the grown-ups. They finished off the dying.
This horror had its desired effect. A French paratrooper recalled:
We opened fire into the thick of them, at random. Then as we
moved on and found more bodies our company commanders finally
gave us the order to shoot down every Arab we met. You should
have seen the result •. 13
The result, in mathematica]. terms, was 123 killed by the FLN-led mob,
of whom 71 were Europeans, and, by French accounts, 1,273 dead
'insurgents'. The FLN have claimed that as many as 12,000 Muslims
died in the backlash. In political terms, 'A sombre harvest of
hatred sprouted in the bloodshed. Terror dominated minds. Fr from
being brought together by the ordeal, human beings were going to
divide themselves and tear themselves to piecesi.1b The tactics of
terror had far outreached the doctrine taught by Carlos Marighella.15
The propaganda effect within the Muslim population was reinforced
by organisation and discipline.
From 1 November 195k onwards the insurgents developed their
control by a combination of pragmatism, Muslim proletarian party
organisations, and methodology borrowed from the communists.16 The
12. Home, pp 120-121.
13. Quoted Home, p 121.
1k. Jacques Soustelle, Governor-General at the time, quoted Home,
pp 122-123.
15. See p 86.
16. Heggoy, p 108.
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territorial units were, in descending order, Wilaya (provinces),
zones, regions, sectors, douars and fractions. Each wilaya was ruled
by a rebel 'colonel', who enjoyed supreme military and political
authority over the FLN-ALN within the province. Although nominally
subordinate to the External Delegation in Cairo, these colonels had
wide discretion in the direction of the revolt. At each level the
commander was supported by staffs responsible for political affairs
including propaganda, for military operations, and for liaison and
intelligence. ALN military units adopted French organisation, 80 far
as the conditions of battle permitted. These combatants were
supported by local auxiliaries of irregulars, the rnousseblin, and
by the Political and Administrative Organisation (CPA).
Borne describes how, at an early stage in the revolution, it became
a customary initiation ritual for a new recruit to be made to kill
a designated Muslim 'traitor' or Trench official, in the company of a
'shadow' who would despatch the recruit himself should he show any
sign of flinching. 17 The Martiniquais, Frantz Fanon, who committed
himself to the FIN cause, provided tortuous intellectual justification
for such policies, seeing them as a cleansing process. He and other
ideologues helped the FIN escape some at least of the international
opprobrium that their cruel methods may have merited.
Politics and propaganda were to all intents and purposes one and
the same thing, so far as the ILZJ-ALN inside Algeria were concerned.
The political affairs officer at each level of command was
responsible for keeping alive the revolutionary faith in each
militant. He was also concerned with the ideological discipline of
the entire Muslim population of his territory. His means for
accomplishing the second task was the CPA. It was the primary duty of
the CPA cells to undermine the French administration at every level,
gradually replacing it with officials and institutions of the
revolutionary party, the tentacles of 'alternative government'. Each
cell operated under the authority of a committee of three composed
of a president, a political assistant, and an administrative
assistant. The political assistant was in charge of the local FIN
organisation, popular education and psychological action, and was often
17. Borne, p 13k.
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aided by three other officials in charge of security, the policing
of the civilian population, and supply. FLN party members were
classified according to their leaders' assessment of their zeal and
reliability. Those who could be depended upon to do the party's
bidding without question were termed 'militants'; the less devoted,
regular attenders were 'adherents'; those who only paid their dues
were 'sympathisers'. Most of the militants served as irregulars in
the mousseblin or fida'iyin.
The fida'iyin corresponded almost exactly to the assassins of
medieval Persia. Sworn to die for the cause, they welcomed desperate
missions and were employed to kill selected enemies of the revolution,
whether French or Muslim. Algerian victims sometimes received a
warning, written on ALN headed and crested paper, inviting immediate
adherence to the rebel cause. Those who ignored the threat were then
killed and the order of execution, also bearing ALN letterhead and
symbol, was left on the victim. In this way the fida'yin
gained a reputation for irresistibility, which spread terror far beyond
its chosen victims. The FLN did not in the early stage of the struggle
need to win full ideological support from the entire Muslim
population; in any community they could operate with the dedicated
support of as little as twenty per cent of the people. The remainder
i8
could be controlled with ease.	 To this end the most outspoken
Francophules were murdered. Their followers then fled the country
or switched their allegiance, usually with plenty of attendant
publicity. The fida'iyin were plain clothes ELM militants, not ALN
soldiers. They took orders from the political affairs officers and
looked to the OPA for necessary support.
Aif Andrew Heggoy summarised the achievements of the FLN-ALN
infrastructure:
The FLN and the ALN, with their vast and complex chains of
institutions at every level, worked steadily for three
inter-related goals. For the purposes of the revolutionary
struggle, they aimed to subjugate the Algerian masses to the
FLN. Education, propaganda, terror and organization were but
the means to conquer the minds of men, and through these men
to wear down the French will and power to resist. Second, in
order to sustain the struggle, gifts had to be solicited, taxes
18. Heggoy, p 100.
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and dues collected. Third, it was necessary psychologically
to prepare the population for the war against France and for
its role in the future independent state of Algeria. Through
the rural and urban cells of the OPA, the local fronts, and
the trade unions, the nationalists succeeded in their attempt
to gain the loyalty of hundreds of thousands of Mus].irna in
every walk of life. 19
A constant theme of OPA propaganda was 'a bitter reply to the
paternalistic racism which all too often had typified the colonial
administration. Many tracts attacked those French laws which were
ill adapted to Algerian customs and conditions, proposing to replace
them with a new revolutionary code'. 20 The exploitation of security
force mistakes and weaknesses, so common to revolutionary propaganda,
was used to good effect by FLN.-ALN. Soon after the outbreak of
rebellion the French police seized leaders of an Algerian nationalist
political party MTLD, in the mistaken belief that they were behind
the violence. 'In an effort to extort confessions of complicity and
the names of accomplices in the uprising, the police tortured their
innocent prisoners. With their legs and hand bound to long boards
behind their backs, the accused men were immersed in bath tuba filled
with water until they nearly drowned. After prolonged sessions of
this kind many signed confessions, only to deny them when the
prisoners were later brought before courts of law.' 21 If there is
any act of security forces more counter-productive than torturing
terrorists, it is surely the torture of innocents. News of the police
methods could not be kept from the press. The French were discredited,
the FLN'a programme gained relative legitimacy, and many MTLD members
hitherto neutral in the struggle decided to join the rebels. When the
French army attempted to win back Muslim support it used all available
means to spread its message. One method adopted was to paint
propaganda slogans on the streets. Those concerned were presumably
unaware that, for Muslims, the Arabic script in which the Koran is
19. Heggoy, p 129.
20. R Eoche-Duval 'Aspects locaux et perspectives de la renovation
rurale en Algerie pp 3-4, Document 3631 (1961) of Centre de Hautes
Administratives stir L'Afrique et L'Asie Modern.
21. Heggoy, p 83.
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written is traditionally held in high esteem. To walk upon words
written in Arabic is to defile them. It thus seemed incredible that
the French should have exposed their own words to such treatment.
'Young Algerians stamped on the printed phrases, happily expressing
their contempt for the administration.'22
When in August 1956 rebel leaders met near Akbou in the Soumman
valley inside 'liberated' Algerian territory, much was said on the
subject of propaganda. By this date French psychological counter
measures were beginning to be felt by the ALN. The first decision,
therefore, stressed the need to ensure the safety of guerrilla bases,
in order to reduce the number of prisoners taken by the French and
'brain-washed'. The second point insisted that nationalist leaders
must always be on hand when security forces 'ravaged' a community.
Rebel cadres should nurse and comfort the suffering population,
interpret those depredations to the inhabitants, and above al].
maintain the political pressure of the Front among the local citizens
even under the most adverse conditions. In short, the Algerian
people had to see the ALN as their army, an army fighting to reconauer
their lost dignity and national independence.
A third objective of FLN-ALN propaganda was to contradict the
military picture painted by the French publicists. By a constant
insistence on the courage and sacrifice of the rebel soldiers, the
nationalist press service and political affairs officers hoped to
fortify the morale of the masses. Rebel propagandists also had to
be ready to attack French claims, while pointing to repressive
measures designed, according to the nationalist strategists, to wear
down Muslim support for revolution. Most important, all the
counter-propaganda of the front was to be based on truth, the
cornerstone of political credibility. 'This insistence on truth was
itself propaganda, as was the entire (Soumman conference) platform.
The disproportionate military advantage of the French forced this
reliance on propaganda, a fact the rebels themselves recognised.'23
22. Heggoy, p 207.
23. Jacques Duchemin Histoire du FLN (Paris, 1962),
pp 207-212.
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In parallel with the PLN's erection of an 'alternative regime'
in all Muslim communities, the ALN claimed the right to be regarded, by
the French authorities as well as by public opinion generally, e.s a
national army, rather than as insurgents. At the same time that rebels
captured by the French demanded prisoner_of-war status, they also
availed themselves of all the protection and legal aid which French
criminal law allowed. The contradiction worried them not at all;
by both methods they were simply continuing their war against France,
making propaganda even as they tied up the courts.
Although in the rural areas the FLN relied mainly upon
organisation and word-of-mouth propaganda to spread their message, in
the cities more sophisticated means were used. This was the era of
the newly-produced transister radio, a luxury that few Muslims had
been inclined to afford. When, however, the FLN started broadcasts
over their clandestine Voix de l'Algrie there was a rush to buy sets.
At first the French authorities tried to control sales, then jammed
transmissions, but were never for long able to prevent the rebels from
reaching mass audiencee.214 At the same time Cairo's 'Voice of the
Arabs' and 'Radio Damascus' poured out words inspired by the FLN
External Delegation. The rebel newspaper El Moudjahid was published
covertly in the Algiers Casbah until discovered by Massu's paratroops.
Afterwards it was printed abroad. Printing presses in Egypt and
Tunisia turned out all of the rebels' pamphlets, tracts and
literature, much of which was introduced into Algeria through
friendly consulates. Media such as radio and printed matter could,
of course, also contribute to the propaganda struggle on the
international front, influencing 'neutrals' and 'enemies' as well as
'friends'.
Chief amongst the Front's foreign friends were Yugoslavia, Egypt
and Syria and, when they achieved independence from France in 19%,
Tunisia and Morocco, This was the era of President Nasser's pan-Arab
nationalism and his widespread and sophisticated propaganda apparatus
served the interests of any Arab state struggling for independence.
Through Arab diplomacy, the Afro-Asian group of nations, whose
representatives conferred at Bandung in 1955, was persuaded to back
2k Home, p 133.
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Algerian independence. Through the Afro-Asians, the subject was
repeatedly brought to the attention of the United Nations. The United
States, the Soviet bloc and European nations other than France were
all 'neutral' targets, through whom it was hoped that pressure might
be applied against France, either directly or through the UN. France
was the 'enemy', but that did not mean that the FLN bad no friends
there.
To these overseas audiences the FLN addressed the themes that
Algeria was a colony, and no more a part of Metropolitan France than
the moon, that in a world that had rejected colonialism, the Algerians
had as much right to their freedom as any other oppressed, occupied
nation; that since France refused to recognise this right, the war of
national independence was a just war deserving of international
support; that once independent, Algeria would seek close and harmonious
relations with all countries, including France, out of which commercial
interests would flourish. The United States and France were reminded
of their own revolutionary histories and invited to draw parallels.
America, still full of naive idealism as yet untarnished by direct
involvement in countering revolution, was a susceptible target.
Federation of Labour leader George Meany was moved to protest to
France about the arrest in 1956 of Algerian trade union leaders.
Liberal-minded US journalists began to report the war 'from the other
side', that is to say from the standpoint of ALN propaganda
assumptions. By the end of 1957 the State Department itself was
unofficially briefing the media that the American function was 'to
ease the French out as painlessly as possible' •25	 Britain the FLN
found allies among liberals and socialists. The Observer's articles
caused offence in French official circles; Mrs Barbara Castle pushed
the theme of the justice of rebellion by explaining that 'terrorism
was the result of repression, not its causet , 26 an argument that
permits revolutionaries carte-blanche.
Against the 'enemy', France, these messages were overlaid by
propaganda designed to sicken the population of the war. Themes
included the impossibility of ever defeating the nationalist
25. Borne, p 24k.
26. Borne, p 2kk.
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rebellion, the unending cost in lives and treasure in trying vainly to
do so, the cost in international prestige and esteem of being seen as
the oppressor and of being accused of torture and other atrocities, the
guilt association arising from these accusations, and the practical
advantages to Trance of accepting a realistic, nationalist solution.
Liberal opinion and the Left were vulnerable to these arguments and
they in turn spread their doubts outwards into the mainstream of Trench
political consciousness. Church groups joined the voices calling for
peace once the torture allegations bad convinced many Christians that
what was being done in the name of France was incompatible with French
ideals.
An important stride in the propaganda war was taken by the FLN in
September 1958 when it formally declared its External Delegation to be
the 'Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria', thus
erecting the topmost fabric in the structure of the 'alternative
regime'. This step was not taken earlier because rebel leaders needed
to be confident that enough nations would recognise such a government
for the ploy not to misfire. In the event, their timing was shown to
be good. 27
 As world opinion shifted towards acceptance of Algeria
as a nation, so it moved away from the Trench notion of integration.
Even countries which did not at this stage recognise the Provisional
Government, such as the United States, allowed the rebels to open
Algerian offices of information in their capital cities, through which
the FLN was able to influence the media and indulge in political
canvaasing.28 As the war dragged through its fourth year a majority
of UN member nations, including some of France's allies, were willing
to vote for amended drafts which called upon both parties to negotiate.
For France to negotiate with the FLN on any terms agreeable to the
rebels was, to all intents and purposes, to surrender.
French Propaganda
When the ilgerian revolution was only two weeks old French
aircraft flew above the mountainous rebel base areas and dropped
leaflets which carried this short message:
27. See Borne, p 315.
28. See Borne, pp 2k3-2k7.
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Soon a terrible calamity will befall the rebels.
Then French peace will again reign. 29
The implication for the civilian population was obvious and the thinly
veiled threat played upon fears that lingered from 191+5. Muslim
uprisings immediate].y after World War II had been crushed with fearful
vengeance costing many thousands of Algerian lives. The leaflet
represented all too clearly the old style of French government in
Algeria - neglect and repression followed, too late, by limited reforms.
It represented too the old style of French military response, based
on operations to inflict severe punishment on the murderous rebels, a
criminal few, after which the troops would return to barracks and the
peasants would return to their fields. In this setting, French
propaganda needed only to frighten the civilian population away from
co-operating with the bandits.
Before the end of 195k some of the new style French soldiers,
the authors and disciples of guerre rêvolutionnaire, perceived the
true nature of the Algerian war and argued that a reinforced army
should make 'contact' with the Muslim population, for whose ainds the
struggle was all about. Paris, refusing to recognise that there was a
war in Algeria, put the military under tight civilian control and kept
the army from establishing direct contacts with the population. 'The
army was thus obliged to operate in a void against an unknown enemy
whom the civil administration protected.' 30 Thus the FLN-ALN was
able to outlive its most vulnerable period, the 'survival' phase, at
the end of which it had created the OPA and gone far towards winning
Muslim support by a mixture of terror and propaganda. When eventually
Paris did wake up to the reality of the threat posed by the rebels, its
reaction was to give too much power to the army. This pleased the
colons and the generals but tended to 'militarise' the Algerian
situation, a development welcomed by the rebels.
To combat the 02k the French in 1955 developed the Special
Administrative Sections (SAS) along the lines of the service des
Bureaux Arabes, an instrument of nineteenth century French colonial
29. Quoted Charles-Henri Favrod Le FLN et L'A].gèrie (Paris, 1962)
p 128.
30. Raoul Girardet La Crise militaire francaise: 195k-1962 (Paris,
196'+), pp 186-187.
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administration in which soldiers combined military duties with
civil affairs. The new SAS was designed to overcome a long-standing
colonial deficiency, the under-administration of vast areas
populated mainly by Arabs and Berbers, and thus establish an
institutional infrastructure capable of withstanding the rebels'
OPA. The SAS was intended to be temporary, to be replaced by an
Algerian-staffed civil administration, but this hand-over never
occurred.
Each section was commanded by an officer, usually a subaltern
or captain, and at least in the early days these men were carefully
selected from volunteers. There was also an assistant, generally a
non-commissioned officer or a civilian on contract, who served as
secretary-treasurer. A second secretary normally did double duty as
an interpreter. The last member of the team was a radio operator.
Working in remote and troubled regions, the teams needed protection.
This was provided by locally recruited maghzens, detachments of
thirty to fifty Algerian volunteers. LAS teams concerned themselves
with such projects as local administration, the building and staffing
of schools, adult literacy, health, and home defence, all designed
to win the respect and loyalty of Muslims and discredit the
TLN-ALN, all, in a sense, a political manifestation of 'propaganda
of the deed'. Operationally, the SAL provided invaluable
intelligence for the troops deployed in the area, and the teams could
also recruit native labour and hire transport when required.
At their best, SAS teams were a credit to France, an effective
instrument in the struggle for Muslim loyalty, and of genuine benefit
to the Algerians among whom they worked. The problems confronting the
teams were, first, that they started late, and could never quite undo
the work of the OPA; second, that being alien, they laboured under a
handicap not shared by the rebels; third, that there were never enough
teams to cover the territory infected by subversion; and fourth that
in their efforts to expand the SAL, the Trench were forced to lower
Btandards. In so demanding a role as this, only those with special
aptitude and dedication could hope to succeed. Heggoy summarised the
work of the SAL:
In spite of all its limitations the SAL experiment was often a
successful counter-insurgency institution. There were, however,
many weaknesses in the system. The legal authority of the SAL
19k
officers was never clearly defined. Success or failure was too
dependent on the persona]. qualities and abilities of the
officers, who at their best were benevolent dictators. If
they operated in areas inhabited by strong European minorities,
they had to be expert diplomats as well. Above aU else, they
were French soldiers who, in a non-military capacity, had to
convince Algerians that France was not the enemy. Moreover,
although it was one of the most effective components in the
overall French effort of counter-insurgency, the SAS could not
solve all the problems inherent in the colonial situation.
Finally, after 1958, when the regroupment program and the SAS
system were more tightly centralised and placed under the
absolute control of the French army, and when assigned officers
replaced volunteers, the SAS was lost. 31
Peter Paret saw the SAS, through the prestige associated with their
achievements, as performing an important function in maintaining
French morale. 'For the Army at large, and for the nation, their
achievements balanced the darker sides of the Algerian war. A not
unimportant secondary gain was the favourable impression their
activities made on Western public opinion. In the otherwise
universally unsuccessful French propaganda efforts, the SAS provided
the one bright spot.' 32
 However he concluded that, for all their
tactical successes, the long-term gains by the SAS were questionable.
'With the psychological-warfare services', he wrote 'the SAS shared the
difficulty of being engaged in a conflict that was fought along
racial lines, of having to win over Muslims and Berbers - whose
cultural inferiority few Frenchmen would deny - to a way of life
whose presumed auperiorities in no way increased its appeal to
strangers.
Although the SAS was created by French soldiers and administrators
more concerned with the day-to-day conduct of the war than with
counter-insurgency doctrine, the role of these teams did fit neatly
into the pattern envisaged in gierre révolutionnaire. This theory
was progressively applied to the French military commitment in Algeria
as sufficient troops became available and as senior and middle-rank
officers converted to the doctrine moved into key command and staff
31. Heggoy, pp 210-211.
32. Paret, p 51.
33. Paret, pp 51-52.
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appointments. Quadrillage was consonant with guerre rvolutionnaire,
bringing French troops into 'contact' right across the length and
breadth of Algeria. Another element was 'regroupement', which emptied
areas that could not be satisfactorily controlled by SAZ teams or by
guadrillage, and concentrated the inhabitants in new communities where
it was hoped both their physical and political security could be
guaranteed. In February 1955 the first training centre for psychological
warfare was set up in Paris, followed by the provisional formation in
Algeria of special staff branches to deal with psychological action and
psychological warfare, Bureaux Psychologigues. The French used the
term 'psychological action' to describe propaganda directed at 'friends'
in this case the populations of Metropolitan France and Algeria, other
than the rebels, and the French armed services, while psychological
warfare was propaganda aimed at 'enemies', the FLN-ALN and their
infrastructure. Wide though the interests of the Bureaux were to
become, the influencing of 'neutrals' in foreign countries did not
feature among their occupations.
The policy of regroupement created the need for additional SA$
teams to work in the regroupement centres. The French intention was
that the passive and dislocated human beings who had been uprooted by
the war should be turned into economically viable groups. Administration,
schooling, political indoctrinations and, eventually, instruction in
self-defence, were all taken care of by LAS teams. However, success
demanded a higher investment of high grade personnel, finances and
detailed staff work than the army could possibly afford once the
numbers affected by regroupement rose beyond six figures. Peasants
removed from their land and forced to live in new, alien misery
respond slowly to exhortations from agents of the government that has
moved them. They respond far more readily to the agents of an
indigenous movement promising freedom and dignity. Nevertheless, at
its best, regroupement worked remarkably well. It was defeated by the
sheer size of the eventual cozninitment.
In March 1956 the army opened an instructional centre at Arzew in
Oran province where officers taking up appointments in Algeria received
a concentrated briefing on the country, its people, history, culture and
3sf. Home, p 338, gives the figure as 'overone million' by July 1959.
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religion; on Algeria's place in world affairs; on population control,
psychological action, morale of own troops and intelligence
gathering; and on many other aspects of counter-guerilla warfare.
As French conscripts were being drafted to fight in Algeria, many
with liberal attitudes inimical to racist and colonial policies,
the political education of troops had become an important facet of
action psychologique. Robert Lacoste, Resident Minister for Algeria,
went as far as to direct that French troops should 'correct
misconceptions' about Algeria in their letters home. 'This led to
pressures and "guidance" on what the men wrote, from their Commanding
Officers.' 35
 In April 1956 the Minister of National Defence
established the Service d'Action Psychologiaue et d'Infortnation (SAIP),
concerned with press relations. As its first chief was Colonel
Lacheroy, author of several articles on counter-insurgency and a high
priest of the cult, SAIP quickly became an important agency for the
dissemination of guerre rvolutionnaire.
The campaign to retain the allegiance of 'friends' was
supported by numerous service publications. Bled, a weekly journal,
was issued free to soldiers. Printed both in Paris and in Algiers
this journal 'addressed itself specifically to the rank and file;
at times, it followed a frankly authoritarian iine'. 6
 Two better
quality monthlies, the Revue Militaire d'Information and Revue de
Dfense Natignale, provided more senior audiences with occasional
articles on the conflict. A whole series of corps magazines such as
Bellona, Cols-blues, Kepi-blanc, Revue des Forces
Terrestres, Revue des Forces Ariennes, Revue Maritime and Soldat
d'Outre-mer, provided additional approved reading. Guidance on
national and international issues affecting Algeria was contained in
Messages d'Action Psychologique published from time to time by the
Ministry of National Defence. To Algerian Muslims the army's message
was conveyed by loudspeaker, leaflet, films, music and face-to-face
persuasion, under the auspices of compagnies de hauts-parleurs et de
tracts, CEPT, raised on a scale of one for each of the three corps in
Algeria. In his 'General Directive No 1', issued on 19 May 1956 in
Guide Practigue Pacification, the Resident Minister defined the French
35. O'Ba].lance, p 96.
36. Paret, p 61.
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army's goal as 'bringing together the two local communities and
restoring their confidence in each other and in the mother country'.37
The troops were told:
Bringing back peace and calm to this portion of French soil
cannot be the result of power alone ... without psychological
action your effort and sacrifices will be doomed to
barrenness and the rebellion will, flare up from its ashes.
A handful of ambitious agitators, full of hate and without
scruples, will then succeed in separating you from the
unknowing population and throw them into misery and anarchy/
Although often effective in the short term, French efforts to win
Muslim loyalty were undermined in the long term by the absence of any
convincing ideological argument to counter the FLN' s Algerian
nationalism. For colons and for committed army officers, particularly
the gurus of guerre ré',olutionnaire, Alg6rie francaise was a concept
so complete and so satisfying that it blinded them to reality. The
reality was that, after failing for 100 years even to try to sell
integration to the Algerian masses, it was now far too late for France
to hope to succeed. In any case the contradictions inherent in the
concept deprived it of intellectual, force. One may ask, how could there
be a 'mother country', if Algeria and France were equally 'French
soil'? Alg(rie francaise was a gut belief, something to be accepted
blindly out of patriotism and therefore never to be questioned.
By its very nature it was bound, in the long run, to strengthen
rather than weaken the FUI's cause. The theorists of guerre
r(volutionnaire insisted that all internal, dissent in western
countries flowed from communist subversion. 'The war in Algeria',
wrote Colonel Argoud, 'forms an episode in the struggle between the
Communist and Western worlds.' 39 Other Frenchmen had argued that
Cairo-based pan-Arab nationalism was the sole cause of the revolt.
The dominating influence of politics upon the military struggle,
both in Algeria and internationally, posed difficulties enough for
the French army, as seen by M.Maurice Mé'gret:
37. Quoted Slavko N Bjelajac 'Psywar: The Lessons from Algeria' in
Military Review Vol XLII, No 12 (Kansas, December 1962), p 2.
38. Bjelajac, op cit.
39. A Argoud 'La Problme alg(rien - Solution francaise' in L'Express
(Paris, 10 May 1962).
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Le problme politique, par une singulire inversion, s'est
donc impose a la pense militaire, bien avant d'mouvoir lea
sphres comp6tentes; mais pré'cisxnent parce qu'il s'agissait
d'une terra incognita, interdict de surcroit, non pas
seu].ement par la tradition r4'publicaine la mieux observIe, inais
par des tabous corporatifs, la reaction de l'Artne 'a ce problbine
n'a ét ni univoque ni contrlee; ' plus forte raison a-t-elle
difficile suivre et ' interprter.	 iO
Officers who deceived themselves by the belief that the root cause of
the rebellion lay in Moscow or Peking or Cairo were vulnerable to that
part of the guerre rvolutionnaire philosophy that stresses the need
for total national commitment to the struggle. The army's job, it
could be argued, was to win the war. Without a correct policy firmly
applied and wholeheartedly supported by the entire nation the war
could not be brought to a successful conclusion. Therefore, might not
the army's duty lead it in the direction of changing French society?
In November 1957 the improvised Bureaux Psychologigue were given
formal status as 5es Bureaux in the staff organisation of all French
army formations and territorial commands, responsible for press
relations, psychological action and warfare, and 'national affairs'.
In July 1958 this staff echelon came into existence at the top level
of national command, when the General Staff of National Defence formed
its 5e Section. 'With little or no exception, key positions (in the
5es Bureaux) were occupied by proponents of the doctrine of guerre
r(volutionnaire'
The French campaign of guerre psychologigue against the
FLN-ALN was imaginative, aggressive and, in the tactical sense, highly
effective. On the broad front the struggle with the 'enemy' overlapped
the campaign to retain the support of Muslim 'friends' and was carried
out by guadrillage, by SAS teams, and by the CHPTs. In addition special
kO. Maurice M4ret L'Action Psychologiue, (Paris, 1959), p 19.
The writer's attempt at translation reads: 'Thus by a strange
inversion the political problem imposes itself upon the thoughts
of the military, well before it interests the appropriate
authorities; but precisely because this involved a terra incognita,
forbidden to boot not just by the best observed republican
traditions, but by the taboos of the military establishment, the
Army's reaction to this problem has been neither precise nor easily
pinned down; for this powerful reason it has been difficult to
follow and to interpret.'
Lfl. Paret, p 56.
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operations were mounted by the experts in the 5es Bureaux. These
aimed to persuade rebels to defect or to intensify struggles between
PLN-ALN and rival nationalist guerrillas, or to exploit divisions
within ALN ranks. Si Cherif, a former ALN battalion commander, went
over to the French side with 500 of his men in July 1957 and fought
well for the security forces in the Medea region. Another success
for psychological warfare was the defection of Belhadj Djilal, also a
battalion CO, who fought against his erstwhile comrades near
Orleansville. Mohmmed Bellounis, the senior military commander in
the 'National Army of the Algerian People', a rival to ALN, was
persuaded to turn the firepower of his ,500 fighters exclusively
against the FLN in the region of Aumale, Bou Saada and Aflou. 'With
vicious energy he fought the AIi, and also practised torture and extortion
in a big way, terrorising the inhabitants in the region. This was a
sharp setback for the ALN in that part of central Algeria. ,k2 The
5es Bureaux, in their efforts to exploit and deepen the rift between
the FLN's External Delegation and the ALN fighters within Algeria,
published numerous tracts exposing the life of ease led by migr FLN
leaders in Cairo and elsewhere, and alleging dishonesty in the handling
of cash donated for the cause.
	 Such material may have influenced
ALN soldiers to desert, and it is certainly true that many did desert
during periods when rebel fortunes were low.
Another special operation eventually controlled by the 5es Bureaux
involved the re-education of captured personnel. In July 1955
Jacques Soustelle, the Governor General of Algeria, issued
instructions on internment camps for such prisoners. Camps were to be
of two types: centres de triage et de transit, collecting points for
subjects taken in police raids and military operations, and centres
d'hbergernent, internment camps. At the first, prisoners were sorted
and either sent for trial, or quickly released, or passed on to the
internment camps for re-education. This consisted of brainwashing
(lavage de crane) followed by reindoctrination (bourrage de crne),
under largely military supervision. The French were able to claim
Lf2. O'Ballance, p 97.
See also Home, pp 221-223.
Li3. Heggoy, p 166.
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useful results, in one example quoted,
	 50 per cent rallying to
the French cau8e, kO per cent remaining neutral and only 10 per cent
rejoining the ALN. The FLN's concern expressed at the Soumman
Conference was proof positive that the re-education was effective at
least as a temporary measure. However, the absence of a credible
government ideology robbed this scheme, like so much of the French
counter-insurgency effort in Algeria, of its desired long-term
benefits.
It has been argued that the Ses Bureaux's greatest achievement
was the massive demonstration of French-Muslim friendship that took
place outside Government House in Algiers on 16 May 1958, during the
colon-army conspiracy to displace the Paris Government.
	 Action
psychologigue suddenly preached complete equality between Europeans
and Muslims, political and economic, and successfully engineered what
communist propagandists call 'a spontaneous demonstration of joy and
affection' to show France that their political demands were multi-racial.
The purpose and the short-lived nature of this exhibition were
characteristic of the Bureaux's political expediency. General Salan
the same day appointed Colonel Godard, a 5es Bureaux officer, Director
of Internal Security for Algeria.
France used her embassies abroad, more precisely the Service de
Presse et d'Information attached to the diplomatic missions, to
disseminate propaganda to 'Neutrals'. She was unsuccessful in
stifling Afro-Asian attempts to internatiorialise the Algerian problem
through action in the United Nations. In September 1955 the General
Assembly voted to include the 'Question of Algeria' on its agenda
in spite of the French argument, which received support from most of
her NATO partners, that the question was one of domestic jurisdiction
and therefore beyond the General Assembly'8 competence. The Algerian
problem was re-submitted by the Afro-Asian bloc in all succeeding UN
sessions until independence. This leverage was mainly propagandist in
character as the UN never voted for resolutions on the matter that
seriously affected France's political or military situation.
1i4. Paret, p 65.
5. Home, pp 3lZf_315.
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The Trench Government went to great lengths to solicit the
continued support of her NATO allies, especially the most influential,
the USA, when the prolonged war began to be embarrassing. French
propaganda rested on the concept of integration, at the same time
stressing, somewhat inconsistently, evidence such as rebel
atrocities and disunity that pointed to Algerians being unprepared
for independence. Other themes dealt with proposed political,
social and economic reforms. Incidents in which servicemen acted
without government authority, such as the seizing of four nationalist
leaders aboard a Moroccan plane which had made an unscheduled landing
in Algiers in October 1956, and the bombing of a Tunisian village in
February 1958, threw French propaganda onto the defensive. Soustelle,
sent to New York in 1956 to speak for Trance at the UN, was angered
by evidence of early defensive attitudes in the delegation. He had
found in the delegation office a cupboard stuffed with unused
propaganda material showing FLN atrocities. 'But', he complained,
'these were never used by us, for fear of offending the niceties of
diplomacy. So how could you win the diplomatic war when you were
fighting with your hands tied like this?' 6 Success has been
attributed to a French move that threatened countries allowing the
flow of arms to the ALN with exposure, although any reduction in this
flow may have been due more to the violent acts of 'Bureau 2k' and its
paid. killers, than to propaganda activities.' 	 Trench appeals against
support for the rebels could in any case be effective only so long as
Western public opinion, at least, regarded the FLN-ALN as terrorists
and their violence as morally insupportable. This essential plank
in the Paris platform began to crack when reports of the widespread
use of torture by French security forces began to appear in the
western news media.
The Side-Effects of Guerre R(volutionnaire
Rumours on the subject of torture and maltreatment of Algerian
prisoners multiplied during the latter part of 1956. On 5 April 1957
k6, quoted Home, p 2k6.
k7. Home, p 261.
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the French Government announced the formation of the Commission de
uvegarde des droits et des 1iberts individuels, more shortly, the
Safeguard Commission, to investigate the allegations. The Commission
submitted it report in September of the same year. The Government
did not publish the report but instead adopted the technique of
'leaking' the Commission's findings. This method combines a subtle
form of official censorship with the appearance of total (even
embarrassing) disclosure. The report allegedly said that there was
no general system or approval of torture by the French Army in
Algeria, but there had been many isolated incidents. These had been
investigated and disciplinary action against offenders taken.
Provocation had been great and decisions had been taken under stress,
particularly when lives depended upon information. The Commission had
found conditions in the internment camps 'satisfactory'. 	 However,
even as the Safeguard Commission went about its work, French
paratroops were fighting the Battle of Algiers.
On 7 January 1957, Resident Minister Lacoste issued a decree
to General Jacques Massu that conferred upon him and his 10th Parachute
Division all police powers and full responsibility for the maintenance
of peace in the capital.
The Battle of Algiers immediately entered its most violent phase.
In the next several weeks the two opponents appeared at their
worst. The Forces of Order tortured the guilty and the
innocent indiscriminately in an attempt to uncover all the
nationalist leaders. The rebels reacted to the execution of
captured friends and to use of torture by resorting to blind
urban terrorism. Massu and Lacoste, of course, tried to
excuse the brutality of the Forces of Order on the grounds of
expediency. Although a few innocent people suffered, they
claimed, the use of torture permitted soldiers to root out the
terrorists and thereby to protect many more innocent people.
The nationalists, in turn, justified their violence on two
grounds - first, they were not strong enough to fight the
French in the open. Second, they felt that without some
conspicuous successes they would be deprived of their popular
following. 9
When pressed on the matter of torture by newspaper reporters, Lacoste
replied sharply: 'Let us do our work. I ask only one thing of you
+8. O'Ballance, p 97.
14 9. Heggoy, pp 233_2314..
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foreign correspondents: it is to please not come and bother us'.5°
In the Battle of Algiers torture was no longer denied. Instead, the
French authorities on the spot rested their case on utility, and on
the ALN's greater evil. This change of tactic was reflected within
the army. Whereas maltreatment had previously been the work of
individuals acting on their own authority, sometimes with passive
approval from their superiors, sometimes at risk of courts-martial,
now orders had been issued referring to 'close interrogations,
which stated that there should be, at each level of the interrogation
system, well-trained personnel and 'sharp interrogation teams.S1
A nod was as good as a wink. No questions were asked provided results
were forthcoming. Later, a former captain of the 1st Foreign
Legion Parachute Regiment stated:
I don' t know what hell the man went through who gave the order.
But I know the rape it was for the young men straight from
St Cyr. All myths and illusions crashed together. They were
told that the end justifies the means, and that France's
victory depended on it. 52
To consolidate the success achieved by the paratroops, Massu set up
counter-terror gangs of FLN-ALN turncoats, the 'Blue Caps'. These
thugs were given a free hand, always provided results were
satisfactory.
France's political and moral justification for governing Algeria
rested upon the notion that Algeria and Metropolitan France were
one, and that French rule benefited Algerians in the same way as it
benefited Frenchmen. By insisting that the struggle in Algeria was an
internal, domestic issue, France committed herself to the parallel,
and in the circumstances absolutely correct theory that everything
that was done by security forces to suppress the FLN-ALN was an act of
government administration, answerable in law, and not an act of war
as such. The proponents of guerre rolutionnaire, on the other
hand, had always denied the limited, essentially political nature of
50. quoted Edward Behr Dramatigue Algrie (Paris, 1962), pp 112-113.
51. Patrick Kessel and Giovanni Pirelli Le Peuple algerien
(Paris, 1962), p 9k.
52. Report on trial of OAS terrorists Manchester Guardian
(Manchester, 3 August 1962).
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revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare, demanding 'a total
politico-military effort, the rejection of compromise'. 53 They had
their way in the Battle of Algiers. They won the struggle to eject the
ALN from the city. Arguably, their methods lost France what was left
of her 'legitimacy' and hastened the FLN's eventual triumph. 'The
question became a political, issue that gravely weakened the Fourth
Republic in France and definitely divided the Algerian population into
two groupe.'	 'So far as the war itself went, torture and the
unavoidable knowledge of it made a farce of pacification. In the end,
the recourse to such methods was an admission of defeat: atrocities
made re-education in a non-totalitarian sense impossible.'55
French recourse to torture also provided opponents of the war in
France with precisely the weapon they needed in their expanding
struggle to turn mainstream French opinion against supporting the war.
Amongst the prisoners tortured by Massu's men were two European
communists, Maurice Audin and Henri ttlleg. The first perished under
interrogation but Alleg survived to write a powerful propaganda
document, La Question, in which he described in vivid detail his
experiences. 6
 How much is true and how much 'documentary fiction'
it is impossible to say; however its convincing style and 'more in sorrow
than anger' manner disturbed French consciences. The final lines read:
'Al]. this, I have to say for those Frenchmen who will read me. I want
them to know that the Algerians do not confuse their torturers with
the great people of France, from whom they have learnt so much and
whose friendship is so dear to them. But they must know what is done
IN THEIR NAME.' 57 Conventional morality does not as a rule govern
a communist's behaviour and it is reasonable to assume that Alleg's
book was for him just another blow for a revolutionary cause.
Certainly Jean-Paul Sartre's preface, 5 which advances from a
53. Paret, p 30.
5. Heggoy, p
55. Paret, p 76.
56. Henri Alleg La Question (Paris, 1958).
57. Alleg (in English) The Question (London, 1958), p 96.
58. Alleg, op cit pp 11-31. Sartre's preface to the English language
edition had originally appeared as an article in L'Express.
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condemnation of Trench torture to the defence of FLN terrorism, exposes
that author's sympathies. These fine points of motivation did not,
however, deprive the torture propaganda of its force. Recognising
this, the Trench authorities did their beat to prevent the book and
newspaper articles discussing it from reaching Algeria and, after
several months during which La Question enjoyed massive sales in
Trance, the police seized further copies. This was apparently the first
time since the eighteenth century that a book had been confiscated in
Trance for political reasons. 59
 A motive in publishing the book
secondary to embarrassing Trance's whole Algerian policy may have
been a more tactical one. Heggoy tells us that French paratroopers
were the troops most feared by the ALN, 'which went to great lengths
to avoid combat with them.60 Propaganda discrediting these
excellent soldiers, and the methods that had caused the FLN-ALN to be
driven out of Algiers, was absolutely essential if the rebel organisation
was to escape total destruction. A cynic might argue that, having
suffered the political and propaganda disadvantages of unconventional
methods, the French might just as well have persevered and at least
benefited from the military advantages on a countrywide scale. Such
a cynic would, however, be half-way towards accepting the cult of
gierre ré'volutionnaire together with its totalitarian overtones.
Guerre révolutionnaire did not specify torture, it merely pointed
its soldier-adherents in a direction that could easily lead to that
destination. Nor did it advocate political coups. Yet the dynamics
of Algerian politics, particularly the colons' insistence upon an
Alg4ie franaise in which their privileged position vis-a-vis the
Muslims would be forever enshrined, created links between reactionary
politicians and certain military leaders. Through the 5es Bureaux,
reactionary views found expression in military psychological policy,
which as we have seen dominated a hugh audience. 'Between 1957 and
January 1960, the 5es Bureaux were almost entirely free of control
from Paris ... From a subordinate agency of the government and the
armed forces, action psychologigue changed into a policy-making body
whose members showed increasing readiness to interpret and even adapt
59. Alleg, Footnote to the forword, p 9.
60. Heggoy, p 113.
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policy to suit their view of the operational requirements in Algeria.61
Senior military officers were prominent in the crisis that toppled the
Fourth Republic and brought Charles de Gaulle to power in 1958. ihen
the new national leader, appreciating the cost and futility of an
extended Algerian war, promised that the Algerian people would be free
to decide their own future once the process of pacification was
complete, and when militant colons took to the barricades in Algiers
in protest, the army's loyalty faltered. Finally in 1961 four retired
generals, Salan, Challe, Jouhand and Zeller tried unsuccessfully to
harness the army in Algeria for their revolutionary purposes and ride
upon it to seize power in Paris. Amongst the officers condemned for
their parts in this attempted coup were Colonels Lacheroy, Argoud,
62Bro2.zat, Gardes and Godard, all devotees of the cult.
Discussion
The FLN-.ALN set out to destroy French rule in Algeria by military
means. They failed, but in the attempt they forced France to adopt
methods that destroyed the notion of integration. Because France's
military successes fell short of absolute victory, they left insoluble
political problems. Heggoy has concluded:
In spite of obvious difficulties, the French counter-revolutionary
effort was remarkably effective on the whole. On an international
scale, however, and in France itself, pressures mounted that could
no long be ignored or resisted. Public opinion in the mother
country showed a steady decline in support for the Algerian war.
In Morocco and Tunisia the ALN continued to maintain strong
forces that could not be destroyed without a drastic widening
of the Algerian conflict. To win militarily, the government
would have bad to convince a large majority of Frenchmen that
Algeria was worth the tremendous sacrifices that would be required
to defeat the FLN. To assure a political victory, France would
have had to defeat the Free Algerian Government-in-Exile by
propaganda and diplomacy; this she could not or would not do.
After the demise of the Fourth Republic the government was no
longer willing to continue the conflict at any cost. Frantz
Fanon was essentially correct when he wrote, in 1959, that the
revolutionaries had already won. 63
6i. Paret, pp 76-77.
62. Paret, p 113.
63. Heggoy, pp 26L+26S. (Quote is Frantz Fanon A Dying Colonialism
(New York, 1967) pp 29, 31)
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We may judge this a victory in which propaganda played an important
role.
FLN-ALN propaganda was effective because it won the support of
the Muslim population, the sympathy of many influential nations, and
the grudging respect of France. Governments of the Fourth Republic
lacked the strength and unity necessary either to implement their
assurances to the colons that Algeria, as a part of France, would never
be surrendered, or to face up to unpalatable but realistic alternatives.
By the time de Gaulle came to power in June 1958 it was too late to
restore the status quo ante. Instead he took what advantage he could
from the army's successes against the ALN to find new solutions.
These were costly for the colons and humiliating to those army officers
wedded to 'the deep conviction that wars undertaken to preserve the
•	 .	 •	 .	 ,Gkintegrity of the Union franaise are truly national wars • 	 The OAS
and the generals revolt arose out of these frustrated interests.
De Gaulle succeeded in saving France and her army from the worst
consequences of both.
The Fourth Republic governments of Messrs Mends-France, Faure,
Mollet, GaiUard and Pflimlin may be blamed for aUowing certain army
officers in Algeria to develop their own political philosophy and
disseminate this creed through the Sea Bureaux. Paret has conceded that,
'if some years of peace had followed Dice Bien Thu, military and
civilian experiences might have become synthesized into a doctrine of
psychological warfare not inimical to a parliamentary democracy and
applied by an agency under firm governmental control. The outbreak
of the Algerian rebellion with its sophisticated exploitation of
propaganda, both added new pressures and enabled the Army to dominate
the field' ,65 A parent who hands the keys of a sports car to a
child cannot easily escape blame for a subsequent accident, however
badly the child behaves. This writer rejects the implication that
somehow the pace of events exonerated French governments from
responsibility for what happened in Algeria. The government handed
to the army powers that should properly bwe been exercised by
politicians, closed its eyes to the consequences and failed to exercise
6k. Paret, p 28 (quote by anonymous senior army officer, 1956).
65. Paret, p 5.
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the tight control of policy that is essential in all forms of conflict
and doubly so in internal war. The army, partly under the influence
of guerre rSvolutionnaire, filled a political vacuum.
The doctrine of guerre rvolutionnaire came so close to beating
the FLN-ALN that its disciples can still proclaim its merit. This
is not an empty claim; subject to certain qualifications the theory
has many strong points. The chief flaws in the doctrine as preached
and applied by its originators may be seen as follows. It tended to
disregard the Clausewitzian dictum that all wars must be regarded as
political acts, and it overlooked completely his advice: 'Now the first,
the greatest and the most decisive act of the judgement which a
statesman and commander performs is that of correctly recognising in
this respect the kind of war he is undertaking, of not taking it for,
or wishing to make it, something which by the nature of the
66	 .
circumstances it cannot be.'
	 These omissions, linked with the belief
that every colonial insurrection was Moscow-inspired and Cairo-led,
led to the hopelessly mistaken 'total war' philosophy. This in turn
started the French army on a race to extremes which ended with well
over a million Muslims in regroupement centres, half a million French
conscripts in Algeria, and world public opinion sympathetic to the
rebels. For all guerre reolutiorinaire's emphasis on psychological
action, its adherents seemed incapable of asking themselves one
question before embarking on some new policy - 'Where will it end?'
Arguably, the race to extremes is undesirable in any conflict. In the
Algerian war, guerre rê'rolutionnaire's totalism could only have
succeeded, in Paret's judgement, had France been a 'totalitarian
nation within the framework of an aggressively anti-Russian and
anti-Chinese alliance' 67
The doctrine as applied in Algeria neglected the limitations
imposed by domestic public opinion upon military commitments that
are seen as less than vital to national survival. Few democracies
will tolerate high casualties, huge expense and severe criticism for
more than a few years. Thus, against an opponent willing to wage a
long war, government forces do well if they strive to limit the scale
66. Karl von Clausewitz On War (New York, 19k3), p 18.
67. Paret, p 123.
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of the conflict and thus reduce to a minimum its effects on national
manpower, economy and self-respect. The relevance of torture allegations
to this equation is obvious. The purveyors of guerre re'volutionnaire
might reply by insisting that, had their doctrine been applied at the
outset of the Algerian revolution, rather than after i8 months or two
years, and bad the security force response been total, the insurrection
would have been crushed so quickly that neither international nor
domestic public opinion need have been ruffled. Such a defence merits
careful consideration, since it is certainly true that the most
vulnerable phase for the FLN-ALN was the initial period of 'survival'
and that the French authorities' inadequate response enabled the rebels
to consolidate.
In answer we might agree that lack of 'contact' by the resident
security forces deprived the administration of vital intelligence, and
a failure to react even when the full extent of the threat should have
been evident threw away a unique opportunity. However, the security
force reaction that ought to have occurred needed neither political,
totalist, nor brutal overtones. If, in spite of rapid military
intervention, the rebellion had nevertheless prospered, soldiers ought
not to have wished to make the war something which by the nature of the
circumstances it could not be.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of guerre r(volutionnaire
is its prescription of politico-military-psychological counter-
revolution as the only effective remedy for rebellion, as opposed to
plain military counter-insurgency. Events elsewhere than in Algeria
have demonstrated the effectiveness of the triad. Why then did the
political component of guerre rvolutionnaire fail in Algeria? We may
find the answer in the contrast between the theory of integration,
implying equal rights for Algerians of all races and religions, and
the practice, which allowed a privileged colon class. The French army,
particularly the Foreign Legion, forged strong links with the colons
and was committed to perpetuating their superior status. The propaganda
/
of guerre revolutionnaire relied upon 'integration' as its political
centrepiece to undercut the appeal of Algerian nationalism. This could
not work effectively in opposition to facts that disproved its claims.
Counter-revolution should in any case be controlled by politicians not
soldiers. The apparent willingness of certain French army officers to
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use the 5es Bureaux to formulate as well as to disseminate political
policy plunged the armed forces deep into French domestic politics.
Algerian nationalist propaganda, like the rebellion itself, began
without the support of an existing organisation. It had to struggle
onto its feet as the revolution slowly got under way, and it had to
make do without the benefit of pre-propaganda. The absence of
pre-propaganda meant that the mass of Algerian Muslims had never been
made to live in a psychological climate that prepared them for
disciplined, violent action. They had no myths of nationalism, no
visions of desirable political or social objectives. The FLN-ALN were
terribly exposed during the early 'survival' period, not just on
account of military weaknesses but because they were only now
beginning to organise and rnobilise the mass behind the movement. They
achieved this aim under the difficult conditions facing them by the
ruthless use of terror. At the same time, by a remarkable understanding
of their 'friendly' target audience, and through the efficient
organisation of the CPA, they succeeded in sowing the seeds of real
allegiance, without which the rebels could never have survived the
seven and a half years of conflict or won the undisputed leadership
of the Algerian nation. For the battle itself the themes of
mobilisation, listed on page 183, were followed by the themes of
survival, conflict and victory.
Survival themes included demands for 'special status' for rebel
prisoners, terror against informers and pro-French Algerians, the
transfer of guilt and the assertion that various security measures
were 'counter-productive'. For conflict, the dominating theme was
national independence, in other words the 'righteousness' theme
carried over from rnobilisation, backed up by the assumed benefits of
'long war', linked to the 'inevitability of rebel victory' and
'security force incompetence'. The 'bad faith' theme often adopted
by revolutionaries to discredit government attempts to build bridges
between authority and the supporters of the revolt, was used by the
FLN to destroy the 'middle ground' of Europeans and Muslims who
sincerely wished for peace and sought a compromise solution. The
message style was the terror which struck Philippeville and the
counter-terror that this act set in motion. Ethically, both acts may
be seen as indefensible, the FLN's horrors being the worse because of
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their premeditated and cold-bloodied nature, in contrast to the
unscheduled and hot-bloodied French reaction. However, viewed as an
act of rebellion, the FLN's cool-headed trigger action, however
horrible, achieved its propaganda purpose, which was to detonate the
uncontrolled and, for the authorities, disastrous response.
It is sometimes said, usually with indignation, that when
government forces and revolutionaries are in conflict the former are
expected by the media and public opinion to behave like angels while
the latter may do as they please. There is an element of truth in
this complaint and a far greater element of misunderstanding.
Ordinary people in liberal societies who are not committed to the rebels
do expect an altogether different standard of behaviour from the
forces of law and order than they expect from insurgents: it would be
hardly flattering to the security forces were this not the case.
Instead of inspiring anger and indignation, this attitude could more
profitably be turned to advantage as the rallying-point around which
the lawabiding could be inobilised against the revolt. However the
price to be paid for such a policy is a sincere determination on the
part of the security forces not to act unlawfully and to make amends
when individuals overstep the mark. Every man has his breaking-point,
and this writer, for example, cannot say how he might have behaved had
he been one of the French paras on that hot August day in 1955. This,
however, is aside from the point, which is that by meeting terror
with terror, the French not only turned the slaughter into a major
victory for FIN propaganda, but destroyed the moral foundation necessary
for a convincing counter-propaganda campaign to discredit a movement
so deeply committed to barbarity. Thus the FLN-ALN were able to employ
terror s a key weapon throughout the war, undeterred by effective
world cer?tsure.
The final conflict themes of revolutionary propaganda involved the
accumulation of 'credibility', based initially on ALN prowess in the
field and, when this faded, on the potential of their armies in
Tunisia and Morocco, and of 'legitimacy', gained by the FLN's hold
over the Muslim masses and success in winning international support.
Equipped with these two advantages, the FLN-ALN were able to project
the themes of victory. These were, for metropolitan France, 'the cost
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and futility of resistance' and, for the colons and
administration in Algeria, 'the climate of collapse'. Just as
the over-reactions of police and military assisted early themes
by providing facts, the excesses of the OAS contributed, however




'IKE HORRORS OF ORGANISED MURDER'
PROPAGANDA OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA
When a war breaks out people say, "It's too stupid; it can't
last long". But though a war say well be "too stupid", that
doesn't prevent it. lasting. Stupidity bee a knack of getting
its way; as we should see if we were not always so such wrapped
up in ourselves. 2
Introduction
On 15 August 1971 the General Officer Com*nding Northern Ireland,
Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo, wrote to military units under his
co—.d to warn the. that the bullets and bombs aimed by the Irish
Republican Army were not that organisation' • only form of attack.
Revolutionary violence, he advised, was backed up by hostile propaganda,
and every soldier should be conscious of this threat. This warning,
coming as it did six days after the start of the Security Forces'
internment operation, was timely. With hindsight we may say that the
IRA's propaganda attack began more than 12 months earlier, and wa.e a
key factor in their strategy. One interpretation would se• their
campaign as one of leverage, as defined on p 28 , in which case the
violent acts can be demoted to a supporting role, as illustration. in a
book support the text, and propaganda hoisted to pride of place.
A study of the 1919-1921 war in Ireland, written by the C-in-C's staff
iediat.ly after the event, had this to say on the subject:
In one department, namely publicity, it (Sinn Fe'in) was
unrivalled. This department was energetic, subtle and
exceptionally skilful in mixing truth, falsehood and
exaggeration and was perhaps the most powerful and the
least fought arm of the Sian F(in forces. 3
1. Sheehy-Sketfingham, from the quotation on p 113.
2. Albert Caus Th Plague translated Stuart Gilbert (London,
19k8), p 37.
3. War Office Record of the Rebellion in Ireland (London, 1922)
Vol II, p
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Certainly it was leverage that beat the British then, and the ease
method was used successfully by the Zionists after World War
Ysry little seemed to have been learnt from these setbacks, however,
and in 1971 Britain endeavoured to resist insurrection in Northern
Ireland with neither the knowledge necessary to analyse the
propaganda threat nor the capability to react. During th. course of
the struggle this deficiency was appreciated and efforts were nade
to redress the situation.
This chapter examines aspects of Provisional IRA propaganda
in the Northern Ireland insurgency and reaction to it by security
forcee. The words and deed.e of other organisations, though important,
are touched upon only in passing. At the time of writing violence
sontinues. This chapter inevitably suffers from the defects
inseparable from 'instant history', being based on incomplet, evidence
and written sources some of which are partisan. To minimise these
difficulties the study concentrates on the period beg1ing in the
sver of 1971 and ending nine months later, in March 1972. Of the
sources quoted ther. is probably none that would be regarded as
unbiased by all partie. to the dispute. Mr Callaghan sight be
criticised by extreme Republicans and die-hard Protestants,
Dr Cruise O'Brien is accused by both wings of the IRA of supporting
British interests and has been assaulted by Protestants for the
opposite reason, but both are seen by the writer as authors whose work
is fair and impartial. Th. same may be said of Dr Hull,
Dr Clutterbuck, Messrs MawMey and Wells, Mr Charters, Mr Limpkin,
Miss Tracy and Mr Gereghty, and of Lords Gardiner, Widgery et al who
presided over various enquiries and tribunals. Mr Utley writes from
High Tory convictions and the army officers quoted speak from a
military viewpoint. Messrs Ienn"Uy and Preston, Dr Uris, the
National Broadcasting Corporation and most if not .11 of the Irish
newspapers quoted probably tried to be impartial, but seem to have
accepted Republican assumptions that may have coloured their accounts
an emerald green. In contrast, the Belfast Newsletter is bright
orange, as are the words quoted from the Rev Ian Paisley. Th.
Guardian's Mr Winchester and the Sunday Times 'Insight' team writ.
k, See Chapter IV.
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with what may b. seen ..a a Catholic or Republican bias. So do..
Miss McGuire, whose defection from the Provisional. was du. to
disagreement over means, not ends. Mr McCann speaks for the
Republican Left whil. the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau represents
the extreme view, of the Provisional. IRA. This account is written by
one whoa. p.reonal. involvement over the period discussed threatens
the detachment which he has nevertheless striven to achieve.
Background to the Conflict 1:
Provisions]. IRA Strategy and Tactics
Th. civil rights movement that brought Ulster Catholics into
conflict both with Protestant sobs and with the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC) in 1968 and 1969 was at heart reformist and, at
least by intention, non-sectarian. The violence that ensued did,
however, create an ideal situation for the overthrow of the Northern
Ireland Government, and thi. opportunity was seized by militant
Republicans.
The situation contained four main elements important to this study.
First, the one million Protestants of Northern Ireland felt more than
ever threatened by the three and a half million Catholic majority
population of Ireland as a whole. Second, the half million Northern
Catholics felt sore than ever threatened by the Protestants who
dominated the North politically and economically. Allegedly partial
behaviour by the RUC had aroused fears of armed Protestant attack which
in turn seemed to justify arming Catholics for defence. Third, opinion
in the Irish Republic awing hard behind 'our people', that is to say the
Catholic. in the North.5 Northern Protestants and the British were
seen in an unfriendly light. Influenced by the dominant myth.. of
1916 and 1920 relating to blood sacrifice and violence, extreme
Republicans in the South sponsored revolution in the North aimed at
achieving the re-unification of Ireland by force. The Irish Republican
Army, which bad veered towards the Marxist left, split. The Marxists
5. For a discussion of Irish perception.e of the conflict see Conor
Cruise O'Brien States of Ireland, (London, 1972). Following
Cruise O'Brien', lead the terms 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' are
here used sore in their tribal or political sense than in their
strict religious meanings.
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claimed official statue, and took that name: the Nationalist, called
themselves Proviaion'Th. The Provisional IRA was to pose initially
as a Catholic defence force in the North and, when th. tine was rip.,
launch into insurgency. 6 Fourth, liberal opinion in Great Britain
had been offended by report. of heavy-handed Protestant reaction to
the civil right. movement, particularly by television coverage of RUC
riot control, and th. Westinst.r Government intervened. 7 The 2UC was
disarmed and its part-tine back-up force, the 'B Special.', disbanded.8
The Northern Ireland Government at Stormont was encouraged to speed up
reforms demanded by the civil rights demonstrators. Coming at a time
when the Protestant population felt under threat, these measures
further polarised opinion and had a devastating effect on police
morale and effectiveness. Already in August 1969 troops had been
turned out 'in aid of the civil power', and the GOC Northern Ireland
had assumed overall responsibility for security. Humiliated, angry
and convinced in their own minds that they had been unfairly judged,
the Ulster Protestants henceforth relied for their security upon
policie, and actions approved at Westminster. 9 The corollary was
that such policies and action.. would be restrained by mainland public
opinion which was still unaffected by the Provisional violence and
which bad been part-way persuaded by the media to see Northern Ireland
Protestants as the villains of th. piece.
The Provisionale' strategy exploited the situation brought about
by civil rights confrontation. By posing as a Catholic defence force
they gained acceptance by th. anxious Northern minority, which had thus
6. Cruise O'Brien, Chapter 11.
7. S.. James Calleghen A Rouse Divided, (London, 1973) and Sunday
Times Insight Team Ulster (London, 1972).
8. For an extreme Ulster Protestant view of this action, see footnote
8k to Roger H Hull Th. Irish Triangle (Princeton, 1976), p 76, which
quotes the Rev Ian Paisley: 'The bulwarks of Northern Ireland were
the RUC and USC (' Specials). In order for the IRA to succeed,
both had to be destroyed, sinc• the IRA could never achieve it.
objective and never bring this country into a state of anarchy
unless it first overthrew these two forces.'
9. After March 1972 Protestants expanded their own pars-military
'Ulster Defence
	
and resurrected the more violent 'Ulster
Volunteer Force'.
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tar relied upon the army for its protection.° AU through 1970 and
the first half of 1971 the Provisionala (and, ieee obviously, the
Officials) laid the infrastructure for revolt: recruiting and
tr{ing; building an intelligence network; fund raising; the
purchase and importation of arms and explosives; domination of
Catholic areas by a mixture of ideological indoctrination and
intimidation; and the psychological preparation of Catholic opinion
for insurrection. This last prerequisite involved bringing Catholics
into confrontation with the army, the murders of soldiers, and other
sub-revolutionary acts designed to bring about military counter-measures
which could be interpreted as oppression.1 	 By mid-1971 thee.
objectives had been achieved and the insurrection began.
It was Provisional policy that their violence should seem to be
ais.d at targets that, within their revolutionary philosophy, could
be termed 'legitimate'. In a 1973 propaganda document Freedom
their bombing campaign was said to have had two aims:
Ci) to stretch the British Army to the limits of its
resources and to keep pressure off the nationalist areas;
(2) to weaken the economy by sabotage operations against
government and coercial property with the British taxpayer
picking up the bill for damage done.13
In practice it gradually became an all-out attack against Protestants
and Protestant property, with police, military and government targets
included only when tempting opportunitie. presented themselves.
The true aims of the violence were possibly to make Northern Ireland
appear to be 'ungovernable' thus undermining the authority and
confidence of Westminster and Stormont, to kill as many British
10. Brian l4awhinney and Ronald Wells Conflict and Christianity in
Northern Ireland (Berkhs.ted, 1975), p 87. See also Note 11.
11. Reviewing a book (Times, London, 20 November 1975) Cruise O'Brien
wrote on this period: 'The Provisionals set themselves to break
up that fraternization (between Catholics and Army) and events
lik, the curfew and search, which their armed activities provoked,
were exploited to that end.' See also Cruise O'Brien, op cit,
pp 2kk-2i5 and Insight Team, Chapter 12.
12. Irish Republican Publicity Bureau Freedom Struggle (Dublin, 1973).
13. Publicity Bureau, p 3k.
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s.rvicemen as possible, to impress upon Britain the cost in lives
as well ma the futility of the Ulster coitment, and to terrorise
Ulster Protestants so that in the event of a British withdrawal they
would acquiesce to unification. Al]. the violence was in a broad
sense 'propaganda of the deed' since no Provisional seriously imagined
that th. attack could inflict military defeat on the army or
physically drive one million Protestants into th. sea.
After her defection from the Pro'visionala Miss Maria McGuire
wrote s
The main examples followed by the Provisionals in deciding
to hit British soldiers were the guerrilla campaigns against
the British in Cyprpa in the 1950s and Men in the 1960. ...
The Army Council' .1' first target was to kill thirtysix
British soldiers - the same number who died in Aden. Their
target was reached in early November 1971. But this, the Army
Council felt, was not enough. I remember Dave15, amongst
others, saying: "We've got to get eighty". Once eighty bad
been killed, Dave felt, the pressure on the British to
negotiate would be immense. 16
This quotation provides a valuable insight into Provisional strategy
and tends to confirm the proposition that theirs was a campaign of
leverage.
Background to the Conflict 2:
The Security Force Response
The peculiar circumstances of Ulster in 1971 posed novel problems
for security forces and particularly for the army. British
counter-insurgency doctrine, developed and well tried over 25 year.,
insisted on political primacy in the direction and control of all
forms of operation - political, military and psychological - and
encouraged close co-cperation at all levels of coand between
administrator, policeman and soldier. The British Army had fared
best against insurgents seeking a military victory in rural areas.
The Badfan hills, the Malay and Borneo jungles, and the Troodos
Mountains in Cyprus had seen revolutionary gangs harried and smashed
ik. The 'Army Council' is the Provisional IRA'. governing body.
15. David O'Connell, a council member.
16. Maria McGuire To Take Arms (London, 1973), pp 69-70.
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by confident and efficient military unite. When rebellion broke out
in towns and villages, as in Jerusalem, Aden, Nicomia and Ismailia,
oa. of the confidence and efficiency faded. Highly exposed to the
news media, usually facing a foe in plain clothes, against whoa all
action must be of a police nature, such operations i*poeed unfamiliar
and unwelcome strains. Where the insurgent campaign relied on
leverage, with the necessary obligation on the insurgents to make
propaganda capital out of every action, the strains increased.
Nevertheless th. army's role in such conditions was usually to support
the police, upon whose shoulders rested the difficult task of keeping
th. operation legally sound. Provided the soldiers fulfilled their
allotted rol. sensitively and without error, all was well.
British Army understanding of the psychological element in
count.ring insurgency had been stimulated during the long campaign in
Malaya. In 1931 the High Commissioner had written: 'The answer (to
the rebellion) lies not in pouring more troops into th. jungle, but
in the h.arta and minds of the peopl•.' 17
 Concern for the opinions and
motivation of 'friends' and 'neutrals' in such situations became
an accepted military duty, taught at staff colleges and practised in
the field by the provision of medical help, the digging of wells and
other useful deeds. In Malaya and other theatres of insurgency email
psychological operations teams ware assembled on an ad hoc basis to
address messages to the 'enemy'. Surrender leaflets, offers of
amnesty, and themes to demoralise or mislead were their stock in trade,
end much effective work was done. However neither 'hearts and minds'
activities nor psyope aimed at jungle encampments touched upon the
topic of modern propaganda, of the sort that had been used by Sinn Fêin
after the first Great War and by the Zionists after the second, and
which by 1971 was in the process of demolishing what was left of the
United States' military credibility in Vietnam.
After the IRA had called off their cross-border campaign of
1956-62 the Northern Ireland Government had cut back the RUC's Special
Branch. Thi. had led to weaknesses in the 'intelligence cycle'18
17. Attributed by popular belief to Sir Henry Gurney, High Commissioner
for Malaya, 1951, but no written source uncovered.
18. S.. Prank Kitson Low Intensity Operations (London, 1971),
Chapter 6.
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and partial loss of contact between police intelligence and
revolutionary sources. Nor was there much real contact between
constables and ordinary Catholics in the hard R.publican areas. Toot
patrolling was too dangerous, and perfunctory vehicle sorties were
no good substitute. In the Bogaid. area of Londonderry the RUC
station had been closed down. After 1969, disarmed and somewhat
disorganised, the RUC's ability to enforc. law and order in the
Provisional IRA's chosen 'base areas' was virtually nil. The
willingness of the RtIC to co-operate with the military was never in
question, but thi. did not alter the fact that, apart from the work
of brave Special Branch officers, th. army was on its own in
Republican areas. Nothl ng in its •xperienc. since World War II had
prepared the British Army to act simultaneously in a polic, and a
military capacity. Nor were soldiers equipped by training to gather
intelligence from an urban civilian population, beginning almost from
scratch, in conditions that newsmen cal]. 'high visibility' •19 Although
the British Army was perhaps sbarp.r than most, any army is a blunt
instrument in a police role. The very least that was needed was firm
and consistent political control.
This, too, was absent. Political control was divided between
W.st'lnster and Storuont, and in Westminster responsibility was split
between the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence. 20
 Political
understanding of bow to conduct a counter-insurgency campaign seemed
confused. Instsad of seeing military, political and psychological
activity as weapons to be used in close and continuous harmony,
politicians tended to regard the military and political options as
alternatives. As for the psychological weapon, no one initially
seemed aware that it night exist. Certainly the British Government
in 1971 bad difficulties. The divided political responsibility for
security in Ulster was not of their making, and any attempt to remedy
it would have created grave political dangers. Sensibly determined not
19. See David Charter. (iii) 'Intelligence and Psychological
Warfare Operations in Northern Ireland' in Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies Journal September 1977, pp 22-27.
20. Se. Callaghan, op cit.
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to allow divided domestic opinion to deprive the army of moral support,
in the rnter that brok. the Americans in Vietnam, the Government
•.tabli.h.d a bi-partisan Northern Ireland policy with the Opposition.
Orig{n.slly deployed in a peace-keeping role between the warring
counitiee, the army had slowly to adapt its posture and tactics to
meet the growing insurgency threat. To defeat the Provisionala the
army tried to keep violence as low as possible while taking the
bombers, gunmen and violent activists out of circulation as quickly as
circumstances allowed. This involved the slow proces. of gathering
intelligence, arresting suspects for questioning, imprisoning
convicted terrorists, and exacting as high a price as possible for
IRA offensive action. Throughout this process they felt themselves to
be in danger of suffering defeat by the insurgent's indirect attack,
his use of leverag, to force political surrender, a fear that events
in Vietnam tended to encourage.
In the summer of 1971 the Provisional IRA held the initiative.
Bold raids occurred daily, with very few losses of Provisional
manpower, and intimidation of witnesses made a mockery of the courts.
The security force response appeared inadequate and ineffective.
Indignation and anger were rising in the Protestant population, whose
spokesmen demanded stronger security force action. The dangers loomed
of a 'Protestant Backlash' or of the Provieionals securing so strong a
military position that no action of troops short of full-scale warfare
could dislodge them. Either outcome, it seemed, might topple Ulster
into a truly ungovernable state.
Background to the Conflict 3:
The Eternal Triangle
This chapter is concerned with Provisional IRA propaganda and the
utterances of other violent groups receive only passing mention.
Nevertheless the triangular nature of the Northern Ireland problem
affected the security forc. response to Provisional violence and
cramped authority's style in countering hostile propaganda. In the
textbook setting one's 'loyal' population supports government policy
and identifies completely with security forces. They are the 'good
gays' and the rebels are the 'bad gays'. This simple, black and white
scenario is usually blurred to a greater or lesser extent in real
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situations, but often it can .till provide the basic ingredient of
the psychological campaign. In Northern Ireland, as one observer has
seen it, • the Army, which was supposed to be neutral in the conflict
between Catholic and Protestant, found itself fighting terrorism from
both sides. So it was difficult for the security forces to put out
a single, dirsct message drawing a clear distinction between "good"
• 21 
This handicap and th. need for the security forces
to be alert to threats from two directions, complicated both military
operation. and presentational matters. So far as threats by one
counity against the other were concerned, the army's neutral stance
wa.s clear. Rowever, insofar as the Provisional IRA mounted the only
full-scale rebellion, the army saw itself as protecting the entire
population, Protestant and Catholic, against thi. attack. The
Provisional. sought to persuade Catholics that by resisting their
insurgency the army was siding with the Protestants in the inter-
communal struggle, and the army bad to try to retain Protestant loyalty
in the fight against the IRA without encouraging the belief that this
equated to taking their side in civil strife.
Th. Media Battleground
In any campaign of leverage the principal objectives of
revolutionary operations are people's minds. The lines of approach to
those objectives are through the news media. Thus in a sense the
battlefield of the Ulster struggl. was made up of television.,
newspapers, radios, films, journals, pamphlet., posters and the voice
of the man in the street. This interpretation brings journalist.,
news editors, television reporters and feature writers, as well as
public relations staffs and propagandist., onto a central and
dominating feature of the battle landscape.
The role of the media is to present news, usually in competition
with rivals both as to speed and quality of content. The quality tends
to be measured in terms of public interest, which weighs heavily
towards the sensational, outrageous and debnnking. Events are treated
as	 , without too much regard for wider context or hidden
21. Charters (iii), p 23.
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implications. Television inevitably elevates the visually dramatic
above news items that lack such quality, a tendency repeated by
newspapers relying heavily upon picture coverage. Thus the blowing
up of an hotel, recorded on film and tape, is likely to overshadow the
arrest of the culprits, accomplished out of eight of news reporters,
and announced in a sober press release.	 Even when news editors do
their best, as they usually do, to provide a balanced cov.rage of
events, the lasting impressions on the public consciousness are likely
to be formed by the moat striking images. Events that do not happen
cannot, by definition, make news. Thus security policy may succeed in
preventing some disaster such as civil war without earning favourable
publicity. Th. public will nonetheless be made aware of any deaths
that do occur, nd they will watch from their armchairs as a public
house burns, anxiously wondering why it is that nothing is done to put
an end to these tragedies.
Investigativ, reporting attempts to uncover news items hidden by
the wicked, corrupt, bumbling or authoritarian, and expose to the
wrath of public indignation scandals that might otherwise remain unknown.
Sunday newspapers pioneered this form of journalism and television has
not been slow to adapt it for small-screen presentation. Features,
printed or in th. form of radio or TV documentaries, are concerned
to expand public understanding of the issues underlying the news.
More often than not these are used as vehicles for the writer's own
views and opinions. Depth of understanding and interpretation is
often lacking, particularly under the pressure that news media seem
to generate, that requires the writer or commentator to contribute
his share of sensation, usually in the form of a doom-laden summing-up.
There would be hardly any point in doing a half-hour piece on, say,
motorway accidents, if in conclusion the narrator conceded that
statistical trends were comforting. In all kinds of reporting, bad news
is news, good. news is nothing. It is safe for an investigative
journalist to probe behind police or army actions; if he tries this
behind terrorists he may get a bullet in the head.
22. See Maurice Dugwell 'Revolutionary Propaganda and the Role of
Information Services in counter-insurgency operations' in
Canadian Defence Journal 3, Autumn 1973, pp 28-33.
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Thi, factor of personal security was always present in the media
battleground of Ulster. TV teams and newspaper correspondents could
not adequately cover events without some measure of goodwill and
co-operation from th. local population. Reporters' sympathetic
handling of the civil rights disturbances had earned the. confidence
and friendship in Catholic areas and hostility in Protestant. So
far as reporting Provisional IRA activity was concerned, this
situation generally helped, since it was in Catholic areas that they
would otherwise be most at risk. As Provisional violence erupted
and casualities mounted the great majority of UK newsmen reacted in
the same way as any other person might - with revulsion. Nevertheless,
discretion often remained the bettsr part of valour, and in
'balancing' 23
 their reports, some journalists exhibited a measure of
ambivalencs that many soldiers felt was less than fair to security
forces. A much smaller number evidently decided to report the
struggle 'from the other side'.
Newspaper and television report.r. from the Irish Republic
included some in their ranks who glorified Provisional violence, at
least until March 1972. One Irish reporter, a personable and able
youth, seemed to devote much of his boundless energy to sponsoring
news conferences and generally making himself useful to the Republican
cause. Foreign newsmen came and went, seldom becoming resident
reporters. They varied from the extremely well-briefed experienced
Americans to nivs Scandinavians, cynical Frenchmen and suave
Russians. 2k
 The Southern Irish public was not solely dependent upon
RTE (the State radio and television) and the three national dailies
for their news. Many British newspapers were sold in the Republic and
both BBC and ITV programmes, as well as radio broadcasts, co'"ded
wide audiences there. In the North Protestants tended to read the
Newsletter while Catholics took the Irish Newe, representing Unionist
and Irish nationalist viewpoint, respectively, but some from both
comaunities read the Belfast Telegraph that stood in the middi..
Television from several sources, Britain, the Republic as well as the
23. Som. people object to the idea that reporting of law-enforcement
operation. should be 'balanced' between the two sides, thus blurring
the distinction between lawful and unlawful action. It is not a
simpi. issue, nor is it argued here.
2k. Writer's observations and personal knowledge in Northern Ireland
during the period under discussion (Personal, 1971-72).
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two provincial stations, influenced people of both persuasions.
Propagandists could not, therefore, aim messages to 'friends',
'neutrals' and 'enemies' through distinct and separate elements of
th. media. AU these messages bad to be scrambled and presented in a
form suitable for general consumption.
Pre-Propaganda
Pr.-propaganda has the objective of preparing audiences for a
particular action, to make individuals sensitive to some influence, to
get them into condition for the tim. when they will effectively, and
without delay or hesitation, participate in an action. It proceeds by
psychological manipulations, by character modifications, by the creation
of feelings or stereotypes useful when th. time comes. It must be slow,
continuous, imperceptible.26 Both the communities of Northern Ireland
had been subjected to such influences, such pro-propaganda, throughout
their entire liv.s. Catholics shared with their co-religionista in
the Republic the myths of Pears. and of the guerrilla war of 1919-21;
Protestants believed with equal certainty in the myth.. of ancient
battles and in their God-given right to re.Rin separat. from the South.
Th. organisation of Catholics and Protestants into distinct and
separate schools, clubs, sporting associations, political parties
and, of course, churches had two psychological effects that concern
this study. It made each audience extremely susceptible to messages
originating from within the group, and it insulated each community
from propaganda from any external source. Manipulation of emotions
and the leading of men into action were,th.r.fore, very easily
achieved in Northern Ireland, but only by leaders acceptable to the
community concerned, and only in accordance with the fundamental
currents and pre-existing attitudes created by pro-propaganda.
Outside of Northern Ireland the Catholic pro-propaganda was an
active force in the Republic, in Irish America, and in Catholic Irish
communities in Britain and elsewhere. To a certain extent it had also
seeped into British perceptions, mainly through guilt association.
25. See p18
26. Ellul (i), pp 30-31.
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Protestant pre-propaganda had receptive audiences wherever Orange
Lodges27 existed, particularly in ScotlRnI , but had made little or
no progress outside organised group..
The inter-communal troubles of 1968 and 1969 excited the interests
of various left-wing parties, who naturally sided with the group seen
to be against authority. Dr Cruise O'Brien has written:
The Catholic-Protestant relationship and the relation of both
communities to Britain hav• also been distorted or analysed out
of existence, by various "Marxist" or post-Marxist
interpretations adopted by some left-wing activists, in1y
from the Catholic community, and diffused by journalists end
others in contact with those activists. These interpretations
vary rather widely, but a common feature is th. effort to trace
the evils of Northern Ir•land and th. Republic, to a source
in British imperialism, apprehended as being as activ. a
force nov as at any tine in the past ... 28
Thus audiences in Britain and elsewhere conditioned by the
pre-propaganda of Marxism were ready to respond to stimuli from
acceptable spokesmen in accordanc. with their own fixed attitudes.
The Yremework of
Provisional IRA Propaganda
Th. insurgency that began in earnest in the summer of 1971 was
apparently aimed from the start at the forcible reunification of
Ireland.	 To have hop. of success the Provisionsle needed to
mobilis. the mass of North.rn Catholics in their support. This
audience was suitably prepared by pr.-propaganda and responded to
agitation propaganda backed up by the necessary facts. lacts were
sad. available by the security forces as they carried out searches,
patrolled streets and questioned suspects in their endeavoura to
arrest violent activists.
For all. the emotional strength of the unification issue, the
Provisionls evidently decided not to use it as the main theme of
their early revolutionary propaganda. Perhaps they doubted that so
27. See p 80
a8. Cruise O'Brien, pp 15-16.
29. Publicity Bureau, p V. Another Provisional, am was to overthrow
the government of the Irish Republic.
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ambitious an objective could be credible at that stage, and they
nay have observed that a great many Catholics in the North cherished
the ideal of Irish unity alongside a massive disinclination to
become pereon.Uy involved in it. attainment. Instead of unity the
Provisionals used interim aims as the main themes of their propaganda.
Thee. included 'equal right.', 'ewah Storsont rule' and 'British
troops out of Northern Ireland'.
Th. civil rights issue had been the cause uniting many
Catholics during 1968 and 1969. By infiltrating the Northern Ireland
Civil Rights Association (NICRA) the Provisional. captured a ready-mad.
theme that already enjoyed wide acceptance. Opposition to the
Protestant-dominated Northern Ireland Government based at Stornont Castle
was another point upon which many Catholics were agreed. The Social
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which attracted many of the
brighter political. figures in the Catholic community, shared this
opposition and also pursued the civil rights aim. Therefore there was
hope that the Provisionals' campaign might have tacit support by a
respectable political party. The theme of ridding Northern Ireland
of British troops was cleVer. At street level it meant no sore
armoured vehicles driving by at night, no more uniformed men searching
houses and back gardens, and an end to 'harassment'; therefore, it was
bound to be attractive. On another level the theme implied, but did
not explicitly demand, an end to the British connection and the
reunification of Ireland. It was consonant with pre-propaganda, it
drew strength from a cherished ideal without requiring immediate
commitment, but it prepared people's minds for such a commitment at a
later stag.. A fourth theme, never so described, was hatred. Like
Pears., the Provisional, evidently believed that hatred was a sacred
duty: like the IBB, they believed that violence offered the only
answer. 30
 To justify violence and murder, the Provisionels needed to
heap discredit upon the Northern Ireland Government, security foce
and .11 who stood in their way. Catholic school children had to rejoice
30. See Chapter III.
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at the eight of a corp.., provided it was that of an 'ene.' •31
Foreign audiencss had to believe that police and military deserved to
die in Ulster, bcause of their brutal. behaviour.
AU theme them.. were suitable for the important North American
audiences, to be reached through th.ir Catholic Irish communities.
Moreover there was never any need in that continent to be shy about
the reunification issue. )4cGuire' a remarks on the wooing of this
audience make interesting reading:
... we were quite ready to play for all, they were worth the
new Republican myths that were being created out of the
current campaign. And nowhers was it easier to capitalise
on them than in the United States, where whole communities of 2
Irish-Americana were watching th. struggle in the Six Counties
lik, spectators at a Morality Play, with right end wrong, good
and evil, delineated in black and white. After Joe CRh(1l's
failure to enter the USA in September, we had no further
difficulty, thanks to the intervention of Paul O'Dwyer and
Edward Kennedy's office. (On 19 October Kennedy had made his
speech saying that "Ulster was becoming Britain's Vie than".
We recognised it for the cynical piece of politics that it was,
and realised that it was directed primarily at the
Irish-American constituency of US politics; we wished too he
had said it much earlier.) It was in the United States that
our main fund-raising efforts were conducted - and the
visiting speakers, who included Ruairi and John Kelly, the
Dublin arms-trial man, were carefully briefed as to how the
audience should be played. There should be copious references to
the martyrs of 1916 and 1920-22 - the period most of the
audience would be living in. Anti-British sentiment, recalling
Cromwell, the potato famine, and the Black and Tans, could be
profitably exploited. By no means should anything be said
against the Catholic Church. And all references to Socialism
should be strictly avoided. 33
31. dive Limpkin, a Fleet Street photographer, quotes a Bogaide
child's remarks after a soldier had been murdered: 'Key mister,
d'you went to-photograph a dead fucker then? We've got a
bastard through the head. We shot his tucking head off ... D'you
want to photograph his brains, then. AU over the tucking
pavement then?' (Limpkin, The Battle of Bogaide (Harmonsworth,
England, 1972).( No pagination: four pages from the end.)
32. Because Republicans deny the legitimacy of Northern Ireland's
constitution they invariably refer to the 'Six Counties'.
33. McGuire, pp 103-1O4.
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McGuire'e la.t note of warning points us to the second important
external audience for Provisional propaganda, the political left. The
chosen themes were suitable here too, being in line with
revolutionary socialist assumptions. The left likened the Stormont
Government to a fascist regime and sometimes to a racist, fascist
dictatorship. British troops in Northern Ireland were, by Marxist
interpretation, foreign aggressors, instruments of colonial or
imperial repression. The official IRA was the wing with genuine
communist leanings, but the Provisional. also forged working links
in Britain with the International Marxist Group (1MG) and the
International Socialist. (Is). The Provisionals succeeded in passing
themselves off simultaneously to Americana as 'freedom fighters' for
'independence' and to the left as 'freedom fighters' for world
revolution.
The murders of British soldiers described by McGuire were to be
the chief form of communication by the Provisionals with their third
.xternel audience, the British. This target was to be coerced, and
the expectation was that the genera]. public would sicken at the cost
in lives and demand peace at any price. The second form of leverage
against the British Government was to come from foreign criticism
and diplomatic pressure fro. various governments, particularly America,
and from the United Nations. Direct propaganda against the British
would at the same tim. seek to intensify feelings of guilt and
futility and stress the inevitability of Republican victory.
These interim strategic aims and propaganda themes were backed
up by tactical propaganda. One sort was directed inwards, at
Provisional members, another was designed to help the gunmen and
bombers to carry out their tasks safely and to protect the organisation
itself. This involved so far as possible disarming effective security
force methods. Many other forms of tactical propaganda played lesser
roles which are not dealt with in thi, study. The two types mentioned
are best described in examples, which will come later. No real effort
was made by the Provisional. to direct propaganda against Northern
Protestants. Perhaps IRA leaders knew by experience or instinct
that the rival group was virtually impenetrable: perhaps, like Pearee
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and Connolly before 1916, the Provisionals chose simply to ignore
so inconvenient a fact as th. existence of one million Irish who were
opposed to unification.
Another element in the framework of Provisional propaganda was
organi.ation. We have already noted how the Catholic community in
Ulster was organised as a distinct group, and thus made receptiv, of
psychological, manipulation. To strengthen this mass and direct it.
emotions, beliefs and ideas outwards, towards the external, target
audiences, fronts were necessary. Some, like NICRA, existed already,
and had only to be pen.trat.d by th. Provisionals and used. Others
arose in response to sub Us pressures. By no means were all the
leaders or members of such groups Provisional supporters. They were
used, nevertheless, to spread stories, promote ideas and exert
pressures useful to th. violent cause, and their varied and
apparently innocent declared purposes disarmed suspicion and enhanced
credibility. Tenants' Associations, the Belfast Central Citizens
Defence Coitte., the Coiitte. for Truth, the Minority Rights
Association, the Catholic Ex-Servicemen' e Association, the
Association for Legal Justice, th. Northern Resistance Movement, the
Anti-Internment League, 'Peoples' Democracy' and a number of leading
Catholic politicians were .0 fro. time to time used in this way.
In America the Provisionals took partial control of th. charitable
fund-raising organisation 'Northern Aid', diverted its funds to arms
purchase, and used it as a propaganda outlet. In Britain 1MG, on behalf
of the Provisionals, set up the 'Troops Out' movement as a front that
could attract support from pacifists and others who might have
hesitated to assist an overtly Trotekyite group.
The final component that gave strength to thi. propaganda campaign
was the people themselves. Miss Honor Tracy wrote from her home in the
Republic with this impression:
The charitable might say that the Irish tend not to minimise
their suffering.; the candid that they are shocking old cry
babies. If anyone lays a finger on them the world must hear of
it with embellishment. And like children they believe in their
own fantasies ... Furthermore, nothing that happens, no action
3k. See Chapter III.
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of troop. or police, relates in any way to anything done by
themselves. Nothing is ever their fault, nor do they ever
do wrong. 35
As natural propagandist. thee. people wer wonderful, as many
journalist., observers and politician. new to Ulster were to
discover.
An Outline of Evente July 1971-March 1972
The nine month period that is the subject of this study began
with SDLP leader. threatening that their party would boycott the
Northern Ireland Parliament after two civilians had been shot dead
by troops in Londonderry riots. 36 It now seems clear that the
Party, which carried out it. threat soon afterwards, was intimidated
by the Provisional.. With it. elected representatives cut off from
normal political activity, the Catholic community could more easily
be persuaded to look to the Provisionala as their natural leaders.
The same action intensified the 'Smash Storaont' theme. The
Londonderry riots in which two man had died exemplified Provisional
tactics at that ti.., which aimed to bring the maximum number of
Catholics into violent conflict with security forces, to commit
them by their action.e to the propaganda of the cause. The deaths
also illustrated the dangers that exist when troops instead of police
have to deal with such situations.
Riot action was accompanied by increased sniper and bomb
attacks. The Electricity Board's headquarters in Belfast was blown
up, with many civilian casualties. Coming on top of 13k bomb attacks
in the period April-June, the violence angered Ulster Protestants who
demanded tougher and more effective security measures. Army and police
found it difficult to prevent IRA attacks, as the insurgents held the
initiative and enjoyed protection in Catholic areas. Intelligence was
weak, and even when the identity of activists was well known IRA
intimidation prevented witnesses giving evidence or juries convicting.
The security of Northern Ireland seemed to be slipping out of control.
35. Ronor Tracy, letter to Sunday Telegraph (London,
a8 November 1971).
36. See Insight Team, Chapter 15.
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In an effort to restore the situation and regain the initiative, the
Weetinster and Stormont governments sanctioned the introduction of
internment. This was an administrative measure enabling known extremists
to be detained without norms]. legal processes. The idea was to mount a
larg. arrest operation that would round-up so many leading Provisiona].s
and Official IRA members that th. violent attack would be blunted, and
by careful interrogation of key internees to gather th. badly needed
intelligence. The operation began early on th. morning of 9 August 1971.
32 suspects were arrested. Th. IRA reacted unwisely in the military
sense by coming onto the streets of Belfast and fighting open gun
battles with troops, in which they lost heavily. In th. propaganda
field their reactions,wbich are described later, were much better.
With hindsight the internment operation, at any rate in its timing
and size, can be seen as an over-reaction by the authorities which
played into Provisional hands. According to some accounts, senior
army officers expressed reservations prior to the event, which were
overridden for political reasons.
Between August 1971 and the end of that year the Provisions].
campaign relied upon the actions of 'active service units' and the
publicity so gained. Tb. technique of mass confrontations took
second place and Catholics were persuaded to back the IRA by refusing
co-operation to the security forces, and by making propaganda. The
active service units made dozens of bomb attacks, sniped at troops
and police, set mines and booby-traps, assassinated political
opponents, and created as much mayhem as they were able. The security
force response relied upon arrest, interrogation and, where
appropriate, internment, in an endeavour to build up intelligence and
thin Provisional ranks. In October a massive effort was made to
block unauthorisad crossing-places between Ulster and the Republic,
but this bad almost no effect in reducing the import of arms and
explosives or in stopping cross-border raids by IRA unite based in
the South.
As the months went by and the IRA lost many of its key leaders
and operators through internment it showed signs of fearing for its
credibility as a military threat to Northern Ireland's security. The
Westm(nster and Stormont governments were also under pressure bcause
successes in the security battle had been gained at some cost in
international prestige and domestic confidence. By the end of 1971
revolutionary propaganda had persuaded sections of the Westminster
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Opposition that security policy in Ulster was unjust and
'counter-productive'. The issue of cr.dibility thus became crucial
to both sides.
In th. New Year the Provisionala apparently placed renewed
emphasis on mass confrontations between Catholics and security forces.
NICRA and other groups were possibly encouraged to challenge authority
by organiaiug illegal marches. On 30 January 1972 thirteen civilians
were shot dead by the army in the aftermath of such a march in an
incident known as 'Bloody Sunday'. Many Catholics North and South
reaot.d by renewing their support for IRA violence, and international
opinion was critical, of Britain. On 2k March 1972 the British
Government suspended the Stormont Government and appointed a Secretary
of State to t4{niater 'Direct Rule' over the Province.
Aspects of Provisional Propaganda
Th. Provisionale in August 1971 had anticipated the introduction
of internment, which bad been used earlier both in Ulster and in the
Republic. 37 Besides arranging for important members to evade arrest
they laid th. groundwork for an efficient propaganda campaign to
discredit the measure th. moment it was introduced. They also relied
on the combined affect of the facts of internment and their
interpretation of those facts to complete the •obilisation of the
Catholic masses behIid their rebellion. Internment became an important
tactical propagid* theme, contributing to the tasks of discrediting
the security forces and inciting hatred. This section examines aspects
of Provisional propaganda that characterised the psychological
campaign in the nine months under study.
The Provisionale appreciated that their credibility depended upon
their being able to sustain a high level of violence, to deprive the
security forces of success, and to ehift th. burden of guilt from
their own shoulder. onto others, and to demonstrate that a Republican
victory was inevitable. Continued violence would only be possible if
activists could be kept alive and kept out of prison. Tactical
propaganda was used to cake the security forces' job mor. difficult
37. During the IRA campaign in the 1950a 187 suspects were interned
in Ulster and 206 in the Republic.
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and whenever possibl. to deter or discredit effective weapons,
methods, unite and leaders. In the case of weapons, the technique
was either to condemn as lethal or ridicule an ineffective. The
lines that follow, from a book written after the events, catch the
spirit of this attack.
The author described the soldier'. self-loading rifle as
'a weapon of unbelievable power and range, ill-suited for urban work
and a killer by shock if not by direct hit' .
	 Tor riot control
when lethal. effects were not required, security forces relied upon CS
amok. to clear the streets of trouble-askers. CS smoke, however,
was 'choking, drifting, alientating, political, radicalising' .
In their search for something lees 'political', the soldiers
introduced rubber baton rounds, fired fro. riot guns. These however
were condemned, as 'a strange, Alice-in-Wonderland sort of weapon ...
"I just don't know what they're coming to," muabled one reporter
fro. the Observer at the press show, "firing bullets made of rubber.
Soon they'll be lobbing grenade. full of confetti, and guns that
fire rose petals" '.	 IRA weapons, on the other hand, were
described in lyrical terms. 'To watch the ball of fire weaving
softly through the late afternoon light, smashing on the ground in
front of a soldier who became covered in a mass of liquid gold and
sent running and falling back to safe groond, his uniform dropping
off his legs in great gobbets of fibred orange, was ample testimony
to the strength of the (fire-bomb) weapon.1L1
The Provisionals drilled the Catholics to cover up whenever
security force. shot an insurgent. Almost invariably such an event
set this procedure in motion. The man's weapon wan spirited away.
The victim was taken where he could be cleaned of any forensic or
other evidence indicating the use of a firearm. 'Eye witnesses' were
briefed and presented to news reporters. Their evidence hardly ever
varied: the civilian had been unarmed, innocent of any offence, and
38.Simon Winchester In Holy Terror (London, 197k), p 86.
39.Winchester, p 69.
40.Winchester, p 88.
ki. Winchester, p 8.
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the soldier's shot had been unwarranted. In short, the army had
committed murder. This, it was hoped, would discredit the army and
deter soldiers from opening fire on terrorists in future. Reporters
are accustomed to confused and contradictory versions of any incident,
It is one of their skills to sort out truth from error. Few newsmen
oould bring themselves to believe that every civilian was lying.
In consequence th. army's case, often resting on a single witness, was
routinely called into question. Only after many months in Northern
Ireland did one experienced reporter conclude:
I speak as someone of Irish extraction on both sides, yet
even I am surprised on occasions at the instant and expert
mendacity to which journalists and no doubt other interested
parties such as the police and security forces are treated
in episode. of this sort. k2
Tb. internment issue fitted easily into the Provisionala'
propaganda. Detention without trial did offend many consciences in
Britain and elsewhere and by guilt association the measure could be used
as a means of under.ln4ng confidence in the whole legal and moral
basis of the security operation.k3 The very fact that it bad been
introduced with some reluctance by a Government that was anxious as
soon as possible to abolish the measure made it difficult to defend,
other than on the grounds of sheer necessity, which in itself
strengthened insurgent credibility. To Catholic and foreign audiences
it could be presented by the IRA as evidence of British repression,
and the fact that it was used initially only against Catholics assisted
this argument. In the Republic a pop group recorded a song entitled
'The Men Behind the Wire' which becam. immediately popular amongst
k2. (7er,k4ij , symposium 'Terrorism and the Media' at the Royal
United Serv-fces Institute for Defence Studies (London,
6 July 1977). (From the transcript).
k3. The ethical aspects of internment are not argued here. It may
however be noted that in 1974 Lord Gardiner headed a commission
of inquiry into the system and reached the conclusion that
detention (another name for internment) was essential in the
circumstances, and that on 18 January 1978 the European Court of
Euaan Righta found that internment did not involve the derogation
of normal rights beyond 'the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation'. (reported Times (London,
19 JanuarY1978), p 5)
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Catholics North and South. Beginning with 'Arsoured care and tanks
and guns case to take away our sons the lyrics ended, 'Every man
will stand behinA the men beh ind th. wire.'
As time went by the Provieional..s appeared divided in their own
minds as to whether internment was of benefit on account of its
propaganda value, or a menace because of it.s weakening effect on
their military capability. The sane debate, in reverse, occupied
security leaders. During the period of this study, it is likely that
the dnmage to IRA effectiveness was the overriding factor in
Provisional leaders' minds, and the propaganda campaign to end
internment had a practical as well as a psychological purpose. The
booklet Belfast, August 71: A Case to be Answered, published by the
Independent Labour Party shortly after the introduction of internment
provided publicity helpful to this campaign. Allegations of
security force misbehaviour were by this publication carried
to a wide public by authors whose credibility was high. Th. fact
that police and military had made no plans to defend their
reputations, being at that time still insensitive of the propaganda
threat, exposed thee to many attacks of this sort. Moreover
insufficient care was taken to ensure that stupidity and rough
behaviour were completely absent from the internment operation, with
the result that Republican propaganda contained the grains of truth
essential for success. Many Catholics were shocked because some
of those arrested were known members of civil right. or other
non-violent organisations. The authorities insisted that such
individuals were also covert aembere of the IRA. Friends and
relatives, aware only of the non-violent association, were genuinely
outraged at arrests that seemed aimed, in a sectarian anner, at
political and counity organisatione. The insurgents balanced their
imaediate losses in manpower by a tide of sympathy which stimulated
recruiting and area support.
Internment had been expected but the method of interrogation
used by the authorities against selected suspects had not. Nevertheless
the Provisionala reacted quickly, presumably appreciating both the
Danny ICennally and Eric Preston Belfast, August 1971: A Case
to be Answered (London, 1971).
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value of the material offered as propaganda, and the threat to their
organisation posed by an efficient intelligence tool. Of the
12 individuals subjected to what is now known as 'interrogation in
depth', one was released immediately afterwards as being unconnected
with violence. The other 11 were interned in the Long Kesh camp where
visitors were permitted. McGuire describes how statements by the
11 were smuggled out of Long Kesh and passed to the Sunday Times
'Insight' Team of investigative journaiiats.
	 Secrecy made this
an exciting 'story', strengthened by official denials and evasions.
All this was on top of the brutality allegations arising from
internment. In the face of public disquiet, the Government ordered an
inquiry. With two exceptions civilian witnesses boycotted the
proceedings, but security force witnesses gave evidence. When the
report was published, the interrogation methods were listed in full.
Security forces were ordered not to use them further, the moral.
foundation of the security operation suffered, and, because on this
key issue the allegations had been proved correct, all the stories
of ill-treatment attracted a little more attention. 8
 The
credibility of the 'Insight' Team was lifted and the antual advantages
to journalists and Republicans of joint operations of this kind did
not go unnoticed.
The man who bad been released after interrogation had a special
propaganda value. Here was a spokesman who could claim with honesty
to be innocent of violent association but who had been 'tortured' by
the security forces. The National Broadcasting Corporation of America
k5. No Guire, p 73.
1,6. Home Office Report of the Enqiai
out ox' events on tne 9 August 1971, cmn '+O,3, U.iofllofl, 1971).
k7. Prime Minister's Office Report of the Committee of Privy
Counsellors appointed to consider Authorised Procedures for the
Interrogation of Persons suspected of Terrorism, Cmnd k901 - The
Parker Committee (London, 1972).
1,8. The debate over whether or not the interrogation methods amounted
to 'ill-treatment' or to 'torture' reached its legal limit on
i8 January 1978 when the Luropean Court of Human Rights ruled by
13 votes to k that 'the five techniques did not constitute a
practice of torture'. Times (London, 19 January 1978), p 5. By
that time, however, the damage to Britain's reputation was done.
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had a film crew in Belfast and the witness was hurried before the
camera. His piece supported perfectly one of the themes projected
in the film, that ill-treatment was meted out by British soldiers to
Catholics for no reason other than their being Catholics."
This brutality propaganda was not completely to the Provisionale
advantage. Tales of torture under interrogation and cruelty by
police and military affected IRA rank and file as well as the general
public. Here they inspired fear, which had th. effect of making
arrested members 'sing' the moment they fell into police or army
hands.	 Thu. the military side of the security operation gained a
little from the unwanted side effects of an over-successful.
revolutionary propaganda theme.
As the security operation squeezed the Provisionale, a series of
tactical propaganda targets were engaged by the Republican front
organimations with a view to easing the pressure. Any method, unit,
or individual that was particularly effective was singled out for
attack. The part-time Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was high on
this list, being seen perhaps as a bulwark against a Provisional
seizure of power in the event of a British withdrawal. This volunteer
force was non-sectarian in its obligations, operations and original
compoeition. In order to weaken and discredit it, the Provisionale
mounted a campaign to terroriee Catholic members, many of whoa had in
practice to choose between resignation and death. This was largely
successful, and after its first year the Regiment was left with few
Catholic members. Immediately the Republican propaganda machine
claimed that the UDR was a tool of Protestant domination, which
should therefore be disbanded. Amongst full-time units, the Parachute
Regiment was singled out for the most bitter attacks. Brigadier
Prank Kiteon, commander of the brigade in Belfast and author of a book51
on countering insurgency, was slandered, possibly because his methods
were proving particularly successful.
Since the army was having to do the police job in Catholic areas,
it adopted certain police methods. Patrolling in uniform or in military
k9. NBC film Suffer the Little Children, (New York, 1972).
50. Charters (iii), p 2k.
51. See Kiteon, op cit.
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vehicles was useful for certain purposes and essential for some.
The limitations were obvious: such patrols proclaimed their identity
and enabled insurgents to take evasive action, and they also provided
easy targets for snipers waiting in ambush. McGuire noted that
'British soldiers were very vulnerable, as are any uniformed force in
guerilla war. Our Volunteers could recognise them; whereas they
could never be sure who amongst the civilian. around them was a
friend, who enemy'.52
 No policeman who wanted to keep a discreet
lookout for a dangerous suspect in a London public house would operate
in uniform. Thus for certain tasks the army patrolled in plain
clothes. Presumably because this was successful, it was attacked.
Plain clothes patrols were described as 'Special Assassination Squads'
and this theme was taken up by some Irish papers. Concern was shown
by several UK news reporters, who seemed incapable of distinguishing
between belligerent status and a. police action, and were apparently
willing to grant the IRA all th. advantages of both, while reserving
the disadvantages to the army.53
Also under attack were elements of intelligence gathering, such
as the accumulation of data on house ownership and occupation,
patterns of activity in IRA 'base areas' and personal information about
suspecta. All this was described as 'harassment' and was made the
subject of continual complaints by respectable spokesmen, many
speaking from sincere concern, to all who would listen in government,
police and military circles. It is a government servant's duty to
listen to such criticism, and endless time and energy was devoted to
trying to uncover the truth about this complaint or that. In all
probability, some complaints were true. No instrument as blunt as an
army can be used fox such a delicate task without mistakes of policy
or execution, or without some of its members from time to time acting
stupidly or unlawfully. One outcome of the Provisionals' propaganda
was to deny justice to the genuine, by swamping the apparatus of
52. )1cGuire, p 70.
53. An interview of Lieutenant-Colonel Evele gh by Nicholas Woolley,
BBC Radio on 27 September 1972 showed that the theme outlasted
the period of this study. Woolley saw it as illegal, and if
not illegal, improper for the army to operate in plain clothes.
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inquiry with a mane of bogus allegations. The IRA prevented Catholics
from giving statements to the IWC that might lead to legal action,
from fear that such action might restore confidence in the impartial
administration of justice in Ulster, which their propaganda denied.
Writing about the propaganda tussle, Dr Cruise O'Brien noted that
journalists:
were more likely to hay, been conned by Catholics than by
Protestants, because Catholics - in common probably with most
underdogs - are more given to ingenious explanations,
things-are-not-what-they-seem theory and all those forms of
'inside dope' that best deserve that description ... The
Catholic cause might be thought to benefit by this, and so
it does - in terms of the media. But in fact the community
that stand. in the greater danger from the worsening of the
crisis is the minority community - the Catholics - and it.
short-term propaganda victories worsen its danger and increase
it. tribulations. 55
Early in the campaign a senior army spokesMen remarked that the
gun-fights that had followed internment together with the arrests
thema•lves had seriously weakened the IRA. Technically, he was
correct. However the news media interpreted th. statement as being an
official claim that the Provisional, were nearly beaten, which their
continued acts of violence showed was certainly not the case. This
caused the same sort of friction between media and military that had
existed in Vietnam prior to the Tet offensive, a resentment at what
newsmen considered to be official attempts to paint a rosier picture
than circumstances justified. The Provisionals were alert to the
benefit. to be gained by acts timed to upstage any security force
word or action that smacked of self-congratulation. During the same
army press conference at which th. contentious remarks were made, the
Provisional lader in Belfast, Joe Cahill, boldly invited journalists
to hi. rival conferenc. in another part of the city. Tour months
later, when the GOC was speaking to the press at his headquarters,
twelve bombs were let off in nearby Belfast. Of this exercise
Maria McGuire wrote: 'We drove him off th. front pages of the
Belfast Evening Telegraph with a dozen bomb explosions in Belfast,
demonstrating v.ry clearly just who was winning in the Six Counties' •56
51+. Personal, 1971-72.
55. Cruise O'Brien, p 263.
56.Mc Guire, p 75.
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These pro-arranged demonstrations were on occasions supplemented
by 'off-the-cuff' reaction to steal the headline. back from the
security forces after the latter had scored a success. A quick bombing
operation, timed to catch the 9 p. television news and next morning'.
newspapers, was the commonest form, but ingenuity did not end there.
On 13 November 1971 the army in Belfast arrested two much-wanted
Proviøionals, Martin Meehan and Dutch Docherty. That evening the
Press Association in London received a call from the Provisional, in
Londonderry to say that a private soldier in the Royal Anglian
Regiment, whom they named, bad deserted to them and had passed on
information which would enable the. to arrest an Irish-born military
agent operating in their midst. The Press Association checked the
story with the army's Northern Ireland Information Desk. There was no
way that the information officer could give an immediate answer: he
had to contact the Regiment. In the event the Royal Anglians responded
rapidly and were able to report that the soldier named was on leave in
Essex. However he had, thre• weeks earlier, lost his paybook, and
this had evidently finished up in IRA bands. Responsible reaction on
the Agency's part coupled with quick checking by the army killed the
story. Nevertheless the inventiveness, plausibility and timing of the
propagandist concerned excite admiration.57
Some of the themes and techniques already mentioned are more
easily understood by em pie. The relatively small, tragic event
described below illustrates how Provisional propagandists strove
to sake capital even out of operations that had gone awry in the
military sense.'
At 1+ am on the morning of Saturday 23 October 1971 a car driven
by a man with two women in the back seat crashed through an army
check point in Cape Street, Lower Tall., Belfast and as it
continued on up the road two shots were fired out of the car at the
soldiers. The fire was returned and the two women occupants were
killed. Th, car was stopped some distance fro. the troop. and was
inediately surrounded by local Catholics. One such, a member of the
57. The writer visited Northern Ireland in October 1977 to research
this chapter, (Visit, 1977); this story researched then.
58. Personal, 1971-72.
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Central Citizens' Defence Committee (CCDC) was on hand to take
photographs, and it transpired later that he had been taking a tape
recording of the incident. Any weapon used in the car was evidently
removed and the crowd when questioned were agreed that no one in the
car had been armed, and that the army's shooting had not been
justified. The two victims, it was said, were innocent of any
violent connection.
The facts were reported by the military in the normal way to
headquarters. During the course of the telephoned account it was
mentioned that the two dead women were dressed in slacks, in a rather
masculine nnr. Anguished no doubt by the deaths of women in the
course of military action, the duty officer who received the message
placed undu. emphasis on the masouline style of dress. He passed the
report to th. information desk with the observation that the
deceased 'had both been dressed in tab, clothes' • The information
officer composed what he believed to be a factually correct press
release which included those words. By so doing he inadvertently
weakened the army's position end exposed the statement to question.
One woman in fact had worn white slacks, boss blouse, navy
jacket and shoes; her sister (for that was the relationship) was in
blue jeans, black and white spotted blouse, navy jerkin and
knee-length laced boots.59 By no means were they 'dressed in male
clothes' other than by wearing unisex slacks rather than feminine
skirts. This flaw in the army's statement was seized by Republicans
and a journalist from the Republic organised a press conference under
CCDC sponsorship at which the army was accused of opening fire
without justification.
The army, although acting on the police's bhalf, was nevertheless
treated before the Law merely as a party in the incident. If the
soldiers' statements lacked credibility and the civilian version seemed
strong, then the ten who fired th. fatal shots might be prosecuted.
No other arrangement seemed possible if the security operation was to
be conducted within the law. If shots had been fired fro. inside the
car, chemical tests might have confirmed this. However this police
59. Irish Times (Dublin, 25 October 1971).
forensic evidence, which alone might have reinforced the
story, had to be kept confidential until called for by a coroner
or other authorised law officer. In the 'trial by television' that
was about to open, the army was to be without this evidence.
Reacting to the CCDC press conference, the army's Information
Staff arranged its own at the nearby headquarters of the company
involved in the shooting. The company commander had been close to the
action and he gave interviews to TV reporters and answered questions
from the press. One of the British television companies had its film
destroyed when their laboratory processed it in the wrong fluid. So
late in the evening the weary major had to speak out for his soldiers
yet again. The twist to the story is that, while waiting for the
second interview to be arranged, the TV reporter met someone with
inside knowledge of police matters. This individual told him that the
forensic tests were positive. Thus, at the second interview, the
interviewee felt sure that his soldiers had acted correctly but could
not prove it, while the interviewer had reason to think the same way
but could not say it. The strength of the army's case rested at that
moment on the credibility of its main spokesman, the major, which was
high. The Republican spokesman also made a convincing story. The
viewing public formed their verdicts around this evidence and their
own preconceptions.
Whilst the security forces were constrained by legal, security,
political, financial and other factors when arguing their case, the
Provisionals, too, had their problems. One arose during the incident
of the two dead women, and it forced them on the Monday after the
shooting to sweep the ground from under their own feet so far as
propaganda was concerned. Most recruits to the Provisional IRA were
Christians. Christianity forbids murder. To resolve the moral
dilemma the IRA claimed the status of an army, which was the main
theme of tactical propaganda directed inwards at the membership. Its
members were 'volunteers' or 	 carrying out military duties
in a 'just war'. Important to their morale were three beliefs.
First, that if 'taken prisoner' by security forces they would, by one
means or another, be set free at the end of 'hostilities'; second,
that reasonable care would be exerted to lessen the chances of their
being 'killed in action'; and third, if in spite of all, they were
killed, martyrdom awaited thea. The younger of the two dead women,
Miss Dorothy Maguire, was a 'staff officer' in the Belfast Provisionals.
Her sister, Mx's Meehan, dying with her in the course of an attack upon
'the British Forces of Occupation', had earned a share of glory. Family
pressures, and the need not to be seen by- their rank and file as
indifferent to the dues of martyrdom apparently caused IRA leaders
to agre. that proper respects should be paid. The Thesday 26 October
edition of Th. Irish News contained 81 obituary notices to the dead
women, Typically, one read:
MEIEAN - The Officers and Staff of Cuaann Na aBan, Brigade
Staff (Bealfeirste), regret to learn of the death of
Mrs Maura Meehan (shot by British Forces of Occupation), sister
of Staff Officer Dorothy Maguire and tender to her husband and
family their deepest sympathy. £ lash dheis Dc go rabh a
anamanne. 60
A military style IRA funeral followed1 The unspoken contract had been
honoured, at acme cost to credibility. A year later a coroner's court
made public th. forensic evidence.
Church leaders in both comaunities tried hard to lead their
peopl. away from violence. In hi. address on New Tear's Day 1972,
th. Bishop of Ardegh and Clonmacnois, the Moat Rev Dr Daly, said that
it was one of the sad paradoxes of our time that the desythologising
of war had been accompanied by what amounted to a remythologising of
revolutionary violencs. 'A new myth is being manufactured in our
time - the myth of romantic revolution ... the ideologues and
theoreticians are its promoter., the young and idealistic are it dupes,
the weak and the little men, the children, and the old and defenceless,
are its victims. ,62 However there were priests who saw things
differently. The Rev Patrick Campbell, of Swinford, County Mayo,
advised the Bishop that 'controlled violence can be used as a
counter-measure of existing institutionalised or legitimised violence
the IRA in this context have engaged in the use of controlled force' .
60. Irish News (Belfast, 26 October 1971).
61. A military funeral lends 'legitimacy' to the IRA. claim to be an
army.
62. Irish Times (Dublin, 3 January 1972).
63. Irish Times (Dublin, I January 1972).
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Security Force Counter-Measures
Neither the RUC nor the army' in Northern Ireland in 1971 was
equipped by organisation, training or experienc, to cope with the
propaganda weapon that supported the IRA's offensive. Haety measures
had to be adopted and new methods learned by trial, and error.
Normal army public relations staffs were skilled in dealing with press
enquiries and in promoting the army's image in a society free of mass
indoctrination. This was not the same as bearing the brunt of a
sophisticated propaganda attack. In the RUC 'PR' itself was a
completely new idea. At first there was a tendency, in the RUC, to
hostility towards a news media that seemed to many police officers as
implacably biased against the Force and, in the army, to disdainfulness
about IRA methods so far removed from the military ethic. Pressure
for change came from the troops and their of fic.r., wh, objected to
having their every act misrepresented without apparent challenge, and
from journalists, who explained their need of frank on-the-spot military
accounts if their reports were to be accurate.6k
On 22 August a military patrol arrested some wanted men fro. a
house in McCauley Street, Belfast. There was no resistance and the
little operation went without incident. Later, a TV reporter telephoned
the army Information Service at Headquarters to say that his crew bad
just filmed the wrecked interior of the house concerned and recorded
interviews with witnesses alleging army brutality and vandalism. Did
the army bar. anything to say in it. defence? The unit was contacted
and facts ascertained: there had been neither violence nor damage.
So far in the campaign, the Information Desk would have been content
to issue a statement in rebuttal of the allegations, and even such a
statement might have been circumscribed by the obligation not to
pre-eapt any legal action or claims for compensation. Thus the
revolutionary propaganda would have gone out in the form of convincing
visual and aural evidence while the security force response, if given
at all, would consist merely of a hesitant denial by a faceless spokesman.
On this occasion, however, the information officer on duty took a bold
decision: he invited the company commander and the non-commissioned
6k. Vi.it, 1977.
2k7
officer in charg. of the arrest party to offer their versions of
events to the TV crews and press reporters. They were advised to
speak only of facts known first-hand, and to avoid being drawn into
speculation. The media responded, filmed or recorded the military
witnesses, and b&liuc.d their reports accordingly. The NCO was able
to show that th. windows of the smashed room had all been broken
outwards into th. street, a fact at variance with the statements by
Catholic witnesse. that the arms' had broken in through these
windows. Viewers drew their own conclusions. 65
This response may seem to the reader as completely straightforward,
and so it was, let at the time it involved a break with military
regulation and tradition that caused much anxiety. The rule, were
quite clear. No serviceman could speak to the news media on
controversial or political matters: a conding officer could speak
on purely domestic matters like unit sports, or amateur dramatics
within his own command.6' Beyond that, no utterance was permitted.
Anythiig that troops did in Northern Ireland was liable to be both
controversial and political, particularly if it was news-worthy.
Therefore comment was forbidden. The likelihood of commiiding officers
being on the scene of every controversial event involving men of their
units was small. To be credible, a witness must speak from first-hand
knowledge. Therefore the forbidden statement had to be made by a
forbidden spokesman. The policy that case to be adopted allowed such
statements when it seemed lik.ly that the facts known to a military
witness sight correct false versions put about by hostile propaganda.
The rules were bent, not abandoned. American experience in Vietnam,
where the apparently uncontrolled statements by a minority of
servicemen damaged the national reputation, discouraged the British
from any policy of laissez-faire.6
Interviews did not replace the need for police and military press
desks able to answer media enquiries promptly and accurately. Accuracy
65. Visit, 1977.
66. Ministry of Defence Queen's Regulations for the Army, 1961, paragraphs
J 12-015 - 12-021.
67. Personal, 1971-72.
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depended upon reliable reporting of facts up the chain of operational
command, backed up when possible by a direct check between th. press
desk at headquarters and the unit press officer, a lieutenant or
captain, on the spot. The army's credibility suffered on a number of
occasions am a result of lazy checking and reporting of facts,
leading to an incomplete or inaccurate press release which later had
to be changed. Such alterations were apt to be interpreted as
'cover ups' or contrivance, with consequent damage to credibility and
trust. In its performance over detail and accuracy, the British Army
in 1971 and 1972 exposed a weakness.
The need to counter hostile propaganda began to influence
military planning and operations at all levels. The 'public opinion
factor' found its way into those convoluted but efficient tools of
decision-making, the 'appreciation of the situation'. Briefings down
to private soldiers included warnings of likely Republic's,propaganda
attacks and the consequent need to avoid any word or deed capable of
misrepresentation. Th. staff attempted to analyse Provisional and
other militant propaganda themes so that all ranks, forewarned, might
be foreermed. The information staff continued to ieeue factual press
statements on incidents as they occurred, and fuller briefings were
provided when required for journalists and other opinion-formers,
designed to explain the purpose of various security force methods.
Each military unit appointed a unit press officer and courses were
arranged prior to Northern Ireland tours at which these officers were
l.ctured by professional newsmen so that the problems and needa of the
media would be appreciated. Army information staff officers were
posted to the three brigade headquarters in Ulster to complement the
endeavoure of the information staff at headquarters. Some officers who
were shortly to serve in Northern Ireland were trained to speak
effectively on television.68
Experience indicated that professionalism was best achieved by
staffs composed of professional military end police officers
temporarily involved in public relations, together with professional
journalists or PR men for the time being working with the army or
police. At all stages the military sought political guidance, when
68. Visit, 1977.
thi. was required, from the appropriate department of state, a need
which was much more easily met after the political roorganisation of
March 1972 than under divided control. The RUC information staffs
were, of course, bound by the law making the police solely responsible
to the Courts. This important distinction between police and army
statue made impossible the formation of joint RUC-Aray information
desks, on the lines favoured in earlier counter-insurgency operations.
Through their respective information staffs police and military
attempted to get false Provisional and other extremist statements
corrected by accurate report. and to offer for media consideration
facts, statistics, occasional interviews or press conference with
senior officers, and opportunitie. to see the work of security forces
at first hand. A journalist who blackened his face and hands and
accompanied a corporal and six soldiers on a patrol through darkened
streets threatened by terrorist snipers and booby-traps was better able
to judge for himself the behaviour and attitudes of the troops, the
provocation and danger, as well as th. security problem. of countering
insurgency?0 None of these measures worked miracles overnight but they
did deprive the Proviaional of their sovereignty in the field of
propaganda. Their 'most powerful and least fought arm' was
encountering competition.
Security force spokesmen stressed the themes that the IRA were
criminals guilty of murder and other offence., that the army was
operating in support of the police to restore law and order, and was
not fighting a war, that police and military were impartial between
Catholics and Protestants, and were opposing violence from wherever
it might come. Facts on IRA brutality were publicised, and lies
exposed. Catholic rejection of IRA domination, which began in earnest
after direct rule, was given publicity. Security forces felt that
they were retaining the loyalty and trust of the British population, for
all that many at home wished that troops could be withdrawn. So long
as British policy remained more or less in line with Protestant hope.,




however, there was a conflict of interest, that group was as
difficult to influence as the Catholics were throughout.71
No attempt. were made to direct the thoughts of officers and
soldiers serving or du. to serve in Northern Ireland. Instead the
Army Education Service encouraged study of as wide a range of
published work as practicable, from Bernadette Devlin to
James Callaghan, in the hope that military reaction to current events
would be informed by broad general knowledge and understanding.
Unhappily the soldier's lot was almost always to deal with extremists
and their supporters, so that a unit serving a tour in a Protestant
district tended to end up in sympathy with the Catholics, and vice
versa. Nor were the techniques of lavage de crne and bourrage de
crie72
 applied in the internment centres. Critics have generally
agreed that any attempt to force liberal ideas into bigoted heads
would have been mistaken. At the same time some have objected to an
arrangezent that apparently permitted senior extremists to dominate
the inmates and turn these centres into 'universities of terrorism'.
The Issue of Credibility
By the end of 1971 the issue of credibility seemed to have become
vital to both sides.73
 Th. Provisionals needed to end internment
and recover their best leaders and activists, but the need had to be
hidden behind a veneer of confidence and sustained capability. The
authorities, whose security campaign at that time rested upon
internment, had to convince the doubting British public and influential
opinion elsewhere that their strategy was working and deserved continued
support. In this struggle te IRA benefited from the instant
psychological effect of 'news', whereas the authorities needed tiae.
71. Personal 1971-72.
72. See p 200.
73. In December 1971 two journalists, one Irish and one British,
approached respectively a senior civil serwant and a senior Army
officer to ask their reactions to 'purely hypothetical terms' for
a ceasefire. (Personal, 1971-72.)
7k. See £].lu]. Ci), pp k5-k7: 'This situation makes the "current-events
man" a ready target for propaganda ... lacking landmarks, he follows
all currents. lie is unstable because he runs after what happened
today; he relates to the event, and therefore cannot resist any
impulse coming from that event.'
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The Provisionals, therefore, strained every nerve to keep up a high
level of violence, while striving to convince British opinion that,
besides being immoral, and in addition to its acting as a binding
force between the IRA and Catholics generally, internment was a
failure as a means of countering insurgency.
It was not too difficult to get such a message across in the
Republic. After describing a veritable blitz on Belfast
ripping entire buildings apart', the Irish Press reporter
Vincent Brown. remarked, 'The weekend certainly discredited recent
statements made by Lord Balneil, Mr John Taylor, Mr Harold Wilson
and Mr Cathal Gou].ding that the Provisional IRA was on its last legs
and that the end of violence was near'. 75 Subsequent events are
described by )4cGuire:
There was a further pres. conference due on 20 December - this
time it was th. turn of the Commander of the British troops in
the Six Counties, Major-General Sir Harry Tuzo, to give his
assessment of the campaign against us. And so, on 19 December,
we held our own press ccnfer.nce in Dublin, in which we said
that our organisation had not been seriously affected by
internment, our supplies of arms and ammunition were still
intact, and that the British Army was powerless to prevent our
operations. Naturally these claims were put to Tuzo the next
day - our tactic of compelling other people to react to us,
and not the other way round. 76
Aware, no doubt, that the Dublin conference might be less than
convincing for British audiences, the Provisionals on the same day
mounted what can be interpreted from hindsight as a special operation
designed to get their message across to this important target.
The Dublin audience were subjected to what may have been rather
blatant propaganda. Elsewhere, however, the shrewd and experienced
Mr Simon Winchester, Guardian resident reporter in Northern Ireland,
was treated to a far more subtle briefing by Provisions]. spokesmen.
His piece appeared next day under the headlines 'Provisional IRA in
Confident Mood' 77
 and illustrates rather nicely Dr Cruise O'Brien's
75. Irish Press (Dublin, 29 November 1971).
76.McGuire, p 75 (The GOC's correct rank was Lieutenant-General).
77.Guardian (Manchester, 20 December 1971).
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thinge-are-not-what-they-eeeii theory and all those forms of
"inside dope" that best deserve that description'. The report
incorporated the themes of over confidence on the part of senior
military leaders, the ineffectiveness of security force operations,
the failure of internment to erode the Provisiona].s' capability, the
strength of Catholic support for the IRA, army atrocities and
stupidity, the insurgents' 1971 success story, the paucity of
intelligence available to the authorities and the weak returns from
interrogation. Overlaying all these and repeated continually
throughout the piece was the key theme, the invincibility of the
Provisional IRA and that organisation' s capability to continue its
campaign indefinitely. 'But on the evidence of meetings I had. yesterday
with three leading officers and a number of volunteers from the Belfast
Provisionals, the British Army 8
 still baa a confident, capable, and
cheerful enemy with which to reckon', Winchester wrote, going on to
quote a Provisional as saying: ' "We can and will step up the campaign
as and when we like. Recruits are coming in all the time ... Above all,
the morale of the men is higher than ever before" '.
	 And so on. The
story nowhere stated where the meeting was held, but appearing under a
Belfast date-line one possible deduction was that Winchester had enjoyed
his 'pleasant and civilised lunch'
	 with the Provisional 'officers'
under the very noses of what readers were presumably expected to see as
incompetent, hamfisted security forces.
Three years later a book written by Winchester8l threw
interesting new light on the briefing. The 'pleasant and civilised
lunch' was held in the safety of Dundalk, a small town just south of
the border with the Republic. When it was nearly over the senior
Provisional host was summoned to the telephone to be warned by
John Stepheneon,82 the organisation's chief in Dublin, that Winchester
78. Republicans refer always to 'the British Army', implying that it is
an army of occupation in Northern Ireland.
79. Guardian (20 December 1971).
80. Guardian (20 December 1971).
81. Winchester, op cit.
82. Otherwise known as Sean MacStiofain.
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might be spying for the British, and was to be got rid of at once.8
'I began to worry', wrote Winchester, 'and to perspire'. 	 'My
contact was kept behind with the officer. for a new minutes, and then
ran out to join me, looking pale and sick. "Quick, drive north as
fast as you can", he yelled as he climbed into the car. "Those boys
think you're a .o1cuer" 	 One is left to ponder why this
dramatic and newsworthy part of the story was withheld from the
Guardian, and to contemplate what effect, if any, intimidation had upon
the integrity of journalistic reporting.
The issue of credibility was overshadowed at the end of January 1972
by an event which focused critical world attention upon Britain's position
in Northern Ireland and led tvoinonthe later to a change of policy.
'Bloody Sunday' and its Aftermath
In August 1971, responding to appeals from leading Catholics, the
Stormont Government had imposed a ban on marches in the Province. At
the end of 1971 NICRA, with the support of Miss Bernadette Devlin and
several senior SDLP politicians, challenged the ban and organised
demonstrations and marches protesting against internment and other
government measures. Some observers believed that the provisional IRA
encouraged and supported this move, seeing it as a way to bring the
Catholic masses back into the forefront of the struggle. The policy
got off to a slow start, but a clash between marchers and soldiers
outside a new internment camp at Magilligan, County Londonderry,
attracted publicity that ensured a good turn-out for a march arranged
by NICRA to take place in Londonderry on Sunday, 30 January 1972.
The Bogeide and Creggan areas of Londonderry, which together
compose most of the Catholic part of the city, had for several months
been without proper security force control as a result of an agreement
between security officials and community representatives. The hope had
been that restraint and inactivity on the part of police and military
would be matched by peace and quiet within the Catholic areas. The
83. Winchester, pp 183-18k.
8k. Winchester, p 183.
85. Winchester, p 183.
25k
IRA had filled th. vacuum and turned the districts into virtual
no_go1 areas or, in the jargon of rebellion, a 'liberated zone'.
It wee within the Creggan and Bogaide that NICRA planned to march
and, to avoid the near certainty of violent confrontation, the
security force. decided to halt the march if it attempted to leave
the Bogaid. for it. declared destination, the Guildhall, which was
in the Protestant-dominated city centre. The likely exit point would
be William Street, the site of previous hooligan and sniper activity.
Th. march began in the Creggan Estate and took a circuitous route
through South Creggan, Brandywell, south and north Bogaide and Lone
Moor Road. At their peak, the marchers numbered some 3000, being
orderly and well marshalled at least until the head of the column
arrived in William Street. Here the militant element broke loose
and ran ahead of the march to confront soldiers manning a roadblock
at the bottom of the street. The main body of the procession was
diverted into Rosaville Street and marched on past the Rossville Flats
to an assembly area at 'Tree Derry Corner' where speeches were to be
made. Meanwhile the hooligan.e at the roadblock were hurling missile.,
including a CS smoke cannister stolen at some earlier date, and making
life difficult for the troops. It was about k pm.
It was part of the Security Forces plan, which had. foreseen the
course of events including the confrontation in William Street, that
an attempt should be made to arrest as many hooligans aa possible.86
Care was taken, however, not to launch this arrest operation until the
marcher. proper were well separated from the rioters. This moment was
deemed to have arrived at ten past four and the 1.t Battalion,
Parachute Regiment moved in on the stone-throwers. The soldiers were
aware that the IRA had frequently posted snipers to cover such hooligan
activity, briefed to murder one or more of any group trying to make
arrests, and that the William Street area was favoured in this respect.
The paratroopers were, therefore, armed with rifles for self-defence.
None carried a fully automatic weapon. The events of the next few
minutes left 13 civilians dead and 17 wounded and drew down upon that
day the titi. 'Bloody Sunday' •87
86. These hooligans were not expected to include known IRA members. The
latter organised, but did not become involved in, street dieorders.
(Personal, 1971-72.)
87. For an account of the incident, see Richard Clutterbuck Protest
and the Urban Guerrilla (London, 1973), Chapter 10.
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W ithin minutes of the last shot, various allegations were being
made. Th. troops had 'burst into Roseville Street firing
indiscriminately. They fired on Red Cross personnel and people who
waved white handkerchiefs to indicat, they were only helping people' .
A priest said: 'It was a massacre, I saw no one shooting at troops -
if anybody had been I would have seen it. I only saw Army ehooting'.8
Another witness insisted that 'most of the peopi. shot in Derry
last Sunday following the British Army invasion of the Bogside were
shot in the back' .	 Seven Catholic priests issued a statement at
a Londonderry press conference that accused the soldiers of 'shooting
indiscriminately into a fleeing crowd, of gloating over casualties
and of preventing medical and spiritual aid reaching some of the
dying' 91 Most of these allegations turned out to be untrue. They
were, it seems, the emotional outbursts of shocked and ccnfueed people
who tried to express in words what their instincts told them must have
happened. Mr John Hums, Member of the Northern Ireland Parliament
for Poyl., expressed it beet when be said: 'Their action (the
paratroops) has left this city numb with shock, horror, revulsion
and bitterness'. 92
 Mise Bernadette Devlin coined the phrase;
This was our Sharpevill.'
For all that thee. stories were inaccurate, they formed the
first 'Bloody Sunday' myth, that th. paratroops had simply run amok,
with or without orders, and fired indiscriminately into the rear of
a peaceful civil rights march. The writer was in Canada on
30 January 1973. Th. radio news reader reminded listeners that it
was 'the anniversary of "Bloody Sunday" when British troops fired
into th. rear of a peaceful civil rights march, killing 13' . 	 For
88. Michael Canavan, quoted Irish Independent (Dublin, 31 January 1972).
89. Father Denis Bradley, quoted Irish News (Belfast, 31 January 1972).
90. Martin Brennan, quoted Irish Independent (Dublin, 2 February 1972) .
91. Report, News Letter (Belfast, 1 February 1972).
92. Quoted Irish News (Belfast, 31 January 1972).
93. Ibid.
9 i . Heard by the writer in Kingston, Ontario on Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation radio news 8 am, 30 January 1973.
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moat of th. world audience the first reports were the only ones with
impact and lasting impression. The subsequent investigations and
revelations were too tedious for all but the keenly interested, and
got brushed aside. "A lie can be halfway round the world ... '
Although the security forces had been ready for violence to break
out at any stag. during the day, and especially during the arrest
operation, the last thing anyone expected was a large number of
civilian casualties inflicted by the military. A senior officer,
unaware of the extent of the tragedy, told a reporter in a
Londonderry street minutes after the shooting that the troops 'fired
three shots at three men ... 	 At the army headquarters near
Belfast the information staff was unable to issue any statement to
explain the shocking event. All that anyone could do was to confirm
the deaths and injuries and to promise a full enquiry. As critical
reaction mounted the army in Ulster and in London emphasised three
points: the paratroopers, spokesmen said, had come under fire from
the Rossville Tlate, the troops 'did not fire lead bullets until lead
bullets were fired at them' (they had earlier fired rubber baton rounds),
and all shooting by the military had been directed at targets
ascertained as the source of hostile fire. 97
 The Westminster Government
appointed the Lord Chief Justice to head a one-man Tribunal to
investigate the circumstances giving rise to the 13 deaths. The incident
was on the front page of every newspaper and led every news broadcast.
Not unnaturally, the general conclusion reached was that the soldiers
bad over-reacted and killed innocent people.
The Provisionals joined forces with the Officials in making
capita]. out of the event. Within hours they called a joint press
conference in the Creggan where they threatened vengeance. 8
 Since
both groups bad for months been killing as many soldiers as they
could, what they were presumably saying to the assembled journalists
was 'now you must agree that future murders will be justified'. In the
95. See p13l.
96. Quoted Irish Times (Dublin, 31 January 1972).
97. Colonel Dalzell-Payne speaking at the Ministry of Defence, quoted
Times (London, 1 February 1972).
98. See Evening Standard (London, 31 January 1972).
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Irish Republic the IRA forced a week-long boycott against the import
of tJ papers, lest any official account might lessen the effect on
Irish opinion. After arousing the mob, the Provisionals on
2 February organised the burning down of the British Embassy building
in Dublin. The Officials meanwhile plknned their own vengeance, which
did not take effect until three weeks later.
The army could say very little in its own defence once the
announcement of Lord Widgery' s Tribunal had been made, since the
proper time and place to mak. statements would be before the Lord
Chief Justice. It had, however, pointed out that a].]. the dead were
men of 'military age', which it argued would have been remarkable
had they been victims of indiscriminate fire into a crowd containing
men of all ages, women and children. Evidently worried by this
argument, and no doubt concerned that, under oath, civilian witnesses
would destroy the 'firing into the rear of a peaceful march' theory,
Republicans changed their version of events.
The earliest version of the eecond 'Bloody Sunday' myth surfaced
in the Republic on 6 February in the Sunday Independent. Mr Joe MacAnthony
penned his name to the 'investigative' piece which announced that far
from being an occasion of indiecipline and indiscriminate firing, the
events of 30 January had been part of a criminal conspiracy. The
tactic of shooting 'any male of military age within the vicinity of a
shooting incident' 99, readers were told, bad been successfully applied
in Belfast and was used for the first time in Londonderry on the
fateful day. The article was republished three weeks later as a
special supplement 0° at a moment when evidence before the Widgery
Tribunal was pointing to other conclusions. A later edition of the
Irish Independent announced that the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs
99. Sunday Independent (Dublin, 6 February 1972).
100. Supplement to Irish Independent (Dublin, 1 March 1972).
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had ordered k,000 copies of the supplement for distribution to all
Irish ibassiea and missions and to news agencies, politicians, civil
servants end Church leaders. MacAnthony's version was perhaps
conceived in a fit of anger and frustration that could only be calmed
by an exercise of inventive journalism. Later, he was to write
fearlessly against IRA violence. It was because he was in no way
connected with violent organisations that his piece carried conviction.
This is the propaganda spin-off that insurgents hope for when
respected opinion-formere interpret facts.101
Another version of the second myth appeared at about the same time
as the special Irish Independent supplement, during the Tribunal's
hearings. 'What Happened in Derry', by Earnonn McCann, was published
in England as a Socialist Worker pamphlet by the International
Socialists1.02
 Mcan_n claimed that the army's plan had been to shoot
innocent civilians so that the IRA would be forced to defend the
Bogeide. The pamphlet explained that the plan miscarried because
'the IRA had not read the books and didn't understand that they were
supposed to act in the manner anticipated'.103
For audiences predisposed to believe the worst of British action
in Northern Ireland, such explanations could be accepted uncritically.
For anyone prepared to give them careful thought, they were scarcely
credible. These versions required their readers to believe that senior
commanders, staff and regimental officers, and some 500 soldiers were
all party to a conspiracy to murder 'men of military age', carried out
in broad daylight in front of 3000 civilian witnesses and half the
world's press. Efforts by Counsel for the relatives of the dec 3ased
to find evidence to back such notions at the Widgery Tribunal failed
and no evidence baa been produced elsewhere. Nevertheless we have the
distinguished author Leon Uris giving such myths respectability in his
101. On 23 July 1972, two days after a Provisional bomb attack in
Belfast, the Sunday Independent wrote in its editorial: 'We
fostered the men who planned the murders of innocent men, women,
boys and girls in Belfast on Friday. We fed these people with
propaganda. We took advantage, when we could, of their exploits
Now all of us must pay the price for this neglect ...
102. Since renamed the 'Socialist Workers' Party'.
103. Eaaonn McCann What Happened in Derry (London, undated), p 12.
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best-selling book on Ireland.1O4 From the imagination of a
propagandist, through the pen of a novelist, we can expect these
stories to find their place in 'history'. Provisional Sinn Fö'in' a
Manual of Publicity states 'The official papers of the movement are a
vita], long-lasting link with the public. The written word remains
long after the speech has been made or the heated arguments
concluded' 105
The facts uncovered by the Tribuna].106 convinced Lord Widgery
that no military plan existed to kill or capture members of the IRA,
and that th. move of soldiers into the Bogside was for the reason
given by military witnesses, to arrest hooligans who were disturbing
the peace. Th. weight of evidenc• indicated that shooting began when
a burst of automatic fire was opened on soldiers as they quit their
armoured carriers, '07 and that thereafter shots were returned at a
number of targets. There was strong suspicion that some of those
killed had been firing weapons or handling bombs: it wa.e also
virtually certain that many of those killed or wounded were fired at
in the mistaken belief that they threatened life and were in fact
innocent. Widgery concluded: 'There was no general breakdown in
discipline. For the most part the soldiers acted as they did because
they thought their orders required it. No order and no training can
ensure that a soldier will always act wisely, as well as bravely and
with initiative. The individual soldier ought not to have to bear the
burden of deciding whether to open fire in confusion such as prevailed
on 30 January. In the conditions prevailing in Northern Ireland,
however, this is often ine.capable'.
10k. Leon and Jill Uris,pp 220-221.
105. Provisional Sm Fein Manual of Publicity (Meitheamh, 197k).
106. Great Britain, Parliament Report of the Tribunal appointed t
incuire into the events, 30 January 1972, which led to loss
in connection with the Procession in Londonderrv that Day.
- The Wigery ribuna.L Uonon,
107. According to the transcript of evidence, Messrs Seymour, Wilkinson
and Campbell, all civilian witnesses, heard this burst of fire, as
did many military witnesses, and the writer, who was in Chamberlain
Street at the time. See also report by Mr Tony Martin in Irish
Times (Dublin, 1 February 1972).
108. Widgeiy Tribunal Report, p 39.
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The Tribunal's evidence and findings probably provide the beat,
and certainly offer the fullest, account of 'Bloody Sunday'
available at present. But any hopes that so rational a document might
provide a counter to emotional propaganda were soon dashed. In the
manner of such enquiries, critics selected items from the Tribunal
that supported their arguments while at the same time condemning
Lord Widgery for 'covering up' in some unspecified way. Like the affair
of La Patria109
 the truth behind the event may take some time to
surface. Republican propaganda found it necessary to •xplain why it
was that no IRA members came to the defence of the Bogside. The story
was that gunmen had been withdrawn that day to the Cr.gge.n estate
because 'the British Army might use this opportunity to invade and
seize the estate'. 11° As E11u1 might comment, the truth which pays
off may have been in the fact of such a withdrawal, and the lies, which
also pay off, may have been concealed in the declared intention.
Fear of a military invasion might be considered a lea. credible
explanation than fear that a known IRA member might be among those
killed or wounded. This second possibl, fear could only have been
present if IRA leaders anticipated shooting in the Bogaid. that
afternoon, and this would have been the case only if they had planned
to start it. There is at present no adequate evidence that this was
the case. In the summer of 1972 an IRA suspect told his security force
interrogator that on 'Bloody Sunday' he had fired two magazines from
a Ml carbine fro. the Roseville Flats, 111
 and on 27 January 197'+ a
letter from a 'former member of the IRA' appeared in an Australian
newspaper saying that 'the Bloody Sunday massacre was the most devious
bit of propaganda ever perpetrated by our group •• 	 The
suspect refused to expand on his statement when questioned further13
109. See p 1314.
110. McCann, p 12.
111. Personal, 1971-72.
112. Anonymous letter to Sunday Independent (Perth, 27 January 1971+).
113. When first questioned, th. suspect, newly arrested, spoke freely.
Unfortunately the interrogator did not see the significance of
these confessions and failed to collect details. When interviewed
a second time, the suspect had been disciplined by Provisional
leaders in the internment centre, and said nothing.
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and attempts to contact the anonymous author have failed. Untested,
neither fragment of evidence carries conviction, and it might be
misleading at this stage to suggest a conspiracy in the cause of
disinformation. As it was, the far-reaching propaganda and political
repercussions of the event were heedless of the underlying cause of
the deaths. The army was seen to be guilty.
The Soviets called 'Bloody Sunday' 'a crime unprecedented in its
brutality' in an account that told Russian readers that the 13 civilians
were 'gunned down by British "occupation" troops after they were
issued a "don't spare the bullets" directive by the British Government'.11
'The main effect of Sunday's shootings', wrote an Australian leader-
writer, 'is that they have ended whatever slim chance the British and
Stormont Governments had. of imposing a compromise solution on the
Catholic minority'. 115 In America, 'An Irish-American Committee said
yesterday that it would attempt to mobilise American and worldwide
u6
opinion against British involvement in Northern Ireland'.	 'The
bloodbath in Derry', speculated a Dutch journalist, 'has removed the
last remnants of respect that the Catholics of Northern Ireland - in
fact all Irish Catholics - had. for British soldiers'. 	 These
international reactions were mirrored in parts of British domestic
opinion. In particular, it seemed that the event bestowed apparent
verity upon what Mr T B Utley describes as 'the fundamental view which
lies at the very root of the Liberal tradition, that the lawful exercise
of force by the State is pre-destined to fail and will always in the
1l8
end prove to be... counter-productive '	 which he sees as linked with
'an inordinate belief in the efficacy of force when applied by rebels
ll. Izvestia (Moscow, 1 February 1972).
115. Australian (Sydney, 1 February 1972).
116. Reported Irish Independent (Dublin, 2 February 1972).
117. Dc Volkswrant (Amsterdam, 2 February 1972).
118. T B Utley Lessons of Ulster (London, 1975), pp 12-13.
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against the stat•'. 119
 It was perhaps with such ideas in mind that
Mr Harold Wilson, then Leader of the Westminster Opposition, visited
Dublin.
Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien tried to convince Mr Wilson that it would
be unwise for him to negotiate with the IRA at that time. 'It would
encourage them in the view that they were winning and that they were the
tm. heirs of 1921,.120 Mr Wilson evidently has a knack of getting
his own way, and he parleyed. McGuire wrote: 'Wilson seemed to be
more concerned with creating a favourable image, behaving in a very
hearty manner, slapping the three (Provisional leaders) on the back and
using words like "bloody" and "Christ". Presumably, he thought the
Provisionals swore in this way ... The real coup for us came a week
or so later when Wilson revealed that he had met the Provisiona].e
It was a considerable propaganda victory for us, that a leading
politician like Wilson should have talked to us - however unproductive
the talks themselves'. 121 Cruise O'Brien concluded: 'Mr Wilson,
like many another British statesman before him, 22 was helping the
argument of those in Ireland who held that power must come from the
barrel of a gnn' 123 It was people of this persuasion who decided that
vengeance for 'Bloody Sunday' should be carried out in England. After
that event the Official IRA had told its supporters: 'Stay free,
brothers and sisters. There'll be another day'. 	 On 22 February
their activists exploded a bomb at an Aldershot officers' mesa,
killing six civilians, five of them women, and a Catholic padre.
This writer cannot say whether or not the security forces' first
internment operation would have reduced Provisional violence to a
manageable level, or how long this might have taken, if it had been
allowed to run its course. As it was, internal leverage, in part
generated by the left, reinforced by international leverage resulting
119. Utley, p 13.
120. Cruise O'Brien, p 286.
121. McGuire, pp 96-9?.
122. See p 100.
123. Cruise O'Brien, p 287.
12k. Page from the Starry Plough reproduced on back of
McCann, op cit.
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from the disaster in Londonderry on 30 January 1972, may have been
important factors in bringing about the change of Government policy
which was implemented on 2k March. 'Direct rule' by Westminster
closed down the Northern Ireland Parliament and effectively ended the
first attempt to control violence by the use of internment, even
though the measure itself was to remain in use for another 3 years.
Few observers doubted at the time that 'Bloody Sunday' had been a
crucial influence on these decisions.
Discussion
Provisional IRA propaganda relied for its strength upon the
organisation of Northern Catholics brought about by social
conditions which insulated them from outside influence and made them
receptive to messages from within, upon pre-propaganda in the form of
Catholic education, cultural myths and social conditioning, upon the
sense of grievance against real hardships, discrimination and fear
caused by Protestant domination, and upon the native Irish aptitude
for propaganda. When facts were provided by security forces in their
attempts to control insurgency, the interpretation of these facts
assisted the mobilisation of th. Catholic mass in support of
insurgency. Outside Ulster, Catholic Irish Communities were
susceptible to propaganda and through the political left audiences who
might otherwise have remained indifferent to th. struggle were moved
to act on the Provisionals' behalf. Throughout the period under
study, and until the suer of 1972 when the Provisionals gave so much
away, these groups tended to accept the Provisionals as the true heirs
of 1916 and 1920 and therefore believed their propaganda. 'Bloody
Sunday' provided 'facts' giving apparent substance to earlier
allegations, and raised the level of international sympathy.
Against the 'enemy' target audience, Britain, the main thrust of
Provisional propaganda was coercion, using the cost in lives and in
money as the means that might bring about the Asset-to-Liability-Shift.
In many ways the campaign was effective. Few Britons, it would seem,
really regarded Ulster as a vital issue, and many expressed the view
that Britain ought to quit Northern Ireland and leave the Irish to sort
out their own affairs. These sentiments were reinforced by the
persuasiv, component of the Provisional campaign, which used guilt-transfer
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to make many English feel that whatever their government and
security forces did in Ireland was wrong. Dr J Bowyer Bell has
acknowledged that all too often guerrilla-revolutionaries are driven
by an urge to act that suppresses recognition of the reality that the
action proposed cannot achieve any useful result. Without a credible
strategy the rebels are limited to tactics. 'Guerrilla-revolutionaries
often insist these are a strategy.' 125 Some compulsion of this
sort may explain why the Provisionals embarked upon a campaign that
ignored the practical difficulties for Britain in abandoning part
of the United kingdom to likely civil war, and the one million
Protestants themselves who might well fight in such a war. The result
was a campaign strong on violence and strong on propaganda, but weak
in political reality.
Against the Protestant community Provisional propaganda made
little impression, that group being as impenetrable to outside
influence as the Catholics. The Official IRA have hoped to break
through this barrier by appeals to working-class solidarity across
sectarian lines. So far Irishman have tended to view the b.ammer end
sickle with suspicion, and to ask before committing themselves
whether its backdrop is green or orange.
Techniques visible in the Provieionals' propaganda campaign
included Transfer of Testimonial through which the organisation claimed
legitimacy as the heirs to 1916 and 1920, so important to the morale of
members, and Glittering Generalities in their expressed concern over
civil rights, employment and community interests. Simplification and
Card Stacking were much in evidence, influencing many journalists, as
was Rationalisation, to explain what might otherwise be seen as murder.
Slogans, Vagueness, Name ..Calling, and Symbolism had their uses and
Appeal underwrot. unity. The main themes of revolutionary propaganda
used by the Provisionals can be grouped under three headings,
mobjlisation, conflict and survival. Mobilisation themes were
righteousness of the cause, using the interim aims of 'equal rights',
'smash Storuont' and 'British troops out' to conceal the main aim of
reunification, hatred of Britain and Protestants, the inevitability of
rebel victory, the duty of all Catholics to commit themselves to the
125. J Bowyer Bell (iii) The Myth of the Guerrilla (New York, 1971)
p 255.
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cause, and moral certainty, to convince activists that killing was no
murder. Nine themes of conflict can be identified: the glorification
of heroes; the praising of violence; the idea expressed by Father
Campbell, that revolutionary violenc, was justified as an
unavoidable reaction to state violence; security force incompetence
linked to the 'long war' theme that argues that because the
government cannot win quickly, it cannot win at all; government bad
faith in its dealings with th. Catholic population; the transfer of
guilt to the enemy camp by torture allegation.. and similar messages;
the legitimacy of the revolt; the credibility of Provisional threats
and deeds; and, towards Britain, the cost and futility of resistance.
In America and other 'neutral' target areas, the Provisional.
concentrated their propaganda on the issue of legitimacy.
Terror backed up the themes of mobilisation and conflict, but
another us• was to add strength to the final group of themes, those
of survival. We saw in earlier studies how, for instance, the
Assassins used terror as a means of protecting their propagandists
and of gaining time for new ideas to gain acceptance, and how the Irgun
Zwai Leumi took advantage of the liberal beliefs of their opponents and
used the 'invisible lifebelt' of world opinion to deter any drastic
counter-measures. The Provisionals refined this survival propaganda
by the exposure to world indignation of every act of security force.
that threatened to curb their violent activities, whether or not such
acts were legally or morally objectionable. The theme of
'counter-productivity' ran hard on the heels of guilt. Activists were
promised security by the pretence at belligerent status, and authority
was urged to treat convicted terrorists as 'political prisoners'.
Commanders, units and methods that served the government effectively were
each in turn subjected to propaganda attacks.
If the Provisional insurgency was strong on violence and
propaganda and weak on politics, it might be said that the government
response had strength in only one component of the triad - police and
military counter-measures. The political reply was divided between
Westminster and Stormont and therefore lacked clarity and conviction,
and the attempts to counter hostile propaganda suffered from lack of
prior awareness, planning, structure and skill, as well as from the
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obvious limitations imposed by th. three-sided nature of the
conflict. Some progress was made, particularly in the adjustment
of security force policies and methods to accommodate the 'public
opinion factor', and in the months following the period covered by





FREEDOM IS OUR AIM, AND ISLAM IS TEE WAY
COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA IN DHOFAR
Introduction
Arabs rule but do not administer. Their government is
intensely individualistic, and is successful or unsuccessful
according to the degree of fear and respect which the ruler
commands, and his skill in dealing with individual men.
Founded on an individual life, their government is impermanent
and liable to end in chaos at any moment. To Arab tribesmen
this system is comprehensible and acceptable, and its success
or failure should not be measured in terms of efficiency and
justice as judged by western standards. To these tribesmen
security can be bought too dearly by loss of individual
freedom. I
Thus wrote Mr Wilfred Thesiger of his Dhofari hosts when, in 19+5, he
was preparing to set out from Salalah on the first of his journeys
across the Rub at Khali or Empty Quarter. In the immediate post-war
years the Arab world lived under a Pax Britannica. Ties of one sort
or another linked most states to Britain, whose protection provided
relative tranquillity. As Britain surrendered her imperial role,
Arab nations that had preserved ancient ways of life found it
increasingly difficult to resist the wind of change. Nationalism
stimulated the urge to catch up with western materialism while, for many,
oil revenues provided the means. Modernisation could be achieved only
with the help of developed nations. Some turned to the Soviet bloc.
Those who regarded communism as incompatible with Islamic ideals or as
a threat to independence looked instead towards Europe or America.
Here and there, change was resisted.
Oman is a country situated on the eastern side of the Arabian
Peninsula. It incorporates the separated province of Masandam which
controls the narrow entrance to the Persian Gulf. For the most part,
Oman is composed of barren mountains and desert, although near to the
sea there are fertile valleys and plains. The population - nearly
half a million - is concentrated mainly in the north-east, where
stands the capital, Muscat. Only some 50,000 live in the south-western
1. Wilfred Thesiger, Arabian Sands, (London, 1959), pp k6-k7.
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province of Dhofar, isolated from the remainder by 750 kilometree of
inhospitable desert. Oman is ruled by a Sultan, and until 1970 his power
was exerted very much in the manner described by Thesiger.
Sultan Said bin Taiiaur had rejected the material and cultural features
of western society, preferring strict isolation and adherence to
Islamic Law. By his decree foreign goods, photography, dancing, music
smoking and the wearing of western clothing or sunglasses were forbidden.
Neither in education nor in medicine was progress allowed. He was
more successful than King Canute in ordering the tide, but his success
was costly and fragile. The material well-being of his people was
retarded to such an extent that even the independence valued by the
bedu scarcely compensated. Furthermore the compulsory preservation
of a way of life that was no longer altogether natural eroded the
cherished independence. Unrest at home was inevitable, and this was
encouraged by expatriate Omanie in Kuwait and Iraq, including eons of
wealthy Dhofari merchants who had been educated in the Gulf states.
Initially the cause of disaffection was apolitical and personal: there
was no complaint against the system, only against the way Sultan Said
worked it. However, the days were gone when a local grievance was
left to find its own remedy. First China and later Russia patronised
the groups seeking progress. As communists took over the leadership,
the movement' s purpose was distorted from domestic reform to Marxist
revolution.
This Chapter examines the role of propaganda in the Dhofar
rebellion, and in the Omani Government's counter measures.
The Revolutionary- Threat
The communist-led insurgents decided to concentrate their main
attack upon Dhofar, an isolated and disaffected objective. By no means
were ambitions restricted to this email province, as the movement's new
title adopted in 1968 indicated. They called themselves the 'Popular
Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf'. 2 One year
earlier Britain had withdrawn from the Aden Protectorate, thue in
2. Decision of the Second Congress of the Dhofar Liberation Front held
at Hamrin, Dhofar, in September 1968. See Documents of the National
Struggle in Oman and the Arabian Gulf (London, 197 k ), pp 9-11.
(Documents)
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practice handing over the whole south-western corner of Arabia to a
Marxist government subservient to Russia. Aden's port and airfield
were quickly taken into use by Soviet naval and air forces. In the
opinion of some Western observers, the conquest of Dhofa.r was
planned by communist leaders as the next step in a counter-clockwise
advance around the Arabian Peninsula: from the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY), as the old Protectorate was now called,
across the border into Dhofar, then on to Oman proper, including control
of the entrance to the Persian Gulf, the Gulf states, Kuwait. Saudi
Arabia would then be virtually surrounded. Iran would be isolated.
The Soviet Bloc, which is changing from being self-sufficient in oil
to being a major importer, would in this scenario become master of the
largest world source3
 and could bring Western Europe to its knees.
Although Dhofar was the primary objective of revolutionary forces
there was in 1970 another group, calling itself the 'National Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf' (NDFLOAG) active
in north-eastern Oman. This
	 operations were invariably
thwarted by the Sultan's security forces and in 1971 what was left of
1WFLOAG was absorbed by the Popular Front. The battle for Oman was
to be fought in Dbofar, where the objective conditions of successful
revolution were thought to exist.
By 1970, the revolutionaries' battle was nearly won. Benefiting
from Chinese training and weapons, the Popular Front in 1968 and 1969
had expanded its military action from isolated attacks against
personnel and equipment of an American oil company to the creation
of 'liberated areas' within Dhofar. 1
	Confident in the justice of
their cause and in the certainty of eventual victory, guerrilla
soldiers controlled nearly all the Jebel, the mountain escarpment
which dominates the coastline and the narrow plain where the main
town of Salalah is situated. Movement on the road north from Salalah
to Thasrait was all but denied to government forces, virtually
cutting land communications between Dhofar and the rest of Oman. In
3. See R Rockingham Gill, 'Soviet Oil in the 1980e' in Journal of
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies Vol 121, No 2,
(London, June 1976), pp 73-77.
4. For a full account of the earlier phases see D L Price,
Oman: Insurgence and Development, (London, 1975).
271
contrast, the rebels occupied the town of Rakhyut, 30 kiloinetres
east along the coast from the PDRY border, securing a line of
communication from their bases in that country to the area of
operations. This area was creeping towards Salalah itself. By
June 1970 experienced observers feared that the rot was too far gone for
restoration. Dhofar appeared doomed.
The battlefield was almost ideally suited to the needs of the
rebels, a feature not uncommon in revolutionary warfare, since rebels
can usually choose where to operate. In the west, along the PDRY
border, the Jebel rises almost straight out of the sea and stretches
inland some 100 icilometres. Further east the Jebel narrows to between
20 and 1+0 1cm, allowing more room in the south for a fertile coastal
plain, and in the north for the atone desert that separates the
mountains from the sand of the Empty Quarter. Neither the deserts
nor the plains saw much fighting: the battlefield was the Jebel
and its rolling foothills. This relatively small mountain area has
a feature that makes it unique along the 2,100 kilometres of the South
Arabian coast - regular rainfall. Some peculiarity of geography draws
the monsoon clouds and the coastal, southern slopes are covered with
mist and rain throughout the summer. In consequence during the
months following th. rain the foothills and ravines take on the
appearance of south-east Asia rather than Arabia, being lush green under
tall grass, jungle trees, jasmine, giant convolvulue, fig trees and
tamarinds.5
 During the dry season the grass withers and the jungle
shrinks but neither disappears completely. The deep ravines that dissect
the Jebel offer cover to small groups of men and animals in all
seasons; when they are green they provide hiding places for an army.
Apart from the main Thamrait road, motorable tracks existed nowhere on
the Jebel in 1970. There was water enough for small parties of men
but for larger military-size units this was insufficient, placing
reliance upon wells, which in 1970 were few and far between. Thus for
water and supplies of a].]. kinds the government forces came to depend
5. Further inland, on th. arid divide between J.be3. and desert, there
are frankincense trees, givers of the once priceless gum. In
ancient times Egypt, Assyria and the Seleucids fought for control
of the frankincense trade, and the Roman Emperor Augustus
despatched an army to conquer the source of this delight.
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on supply by air. The monsoon severely restricted flying. While the
rains lasted there was water in abundance but a detachment relying
upon supply of other commodities by air might have to be withdrawn.
The Popular Front was based in the PDRY where it set up its
political, military and propaganda centres, including the 'Lenin
School' 6 at al-Gheidha and a military training camp near the Omani
border, at Hauf. Its political strength came from its backers, first
China and then Russia, through whom it was able to draw support from
one or other of the communist blocs and, regardless of whether Peking
or Moscow held the tiller, from the New Left and those international
front organisations that tend to support any movement hostile to
Western interests. This powerful muster also handled the international
propaganda campaign on behalf of the Popular Front. Within the Arab
world, Syria, Iraq and Libya were foremost in the provision of vocal
support. Inside Oman the rebels' political credibility rested
entirely upon the old Sultan's mistakes. There was no broadly-based
communist or other revolutionary party active anywhere in Oman, only
small lites. The leaders in the Popular Front were by this time
communists, all influential dissenters having been eliminated. Many
of these commanders had been to Peking or Moscow for deep
indoctrination.
In military terms the Popular Front's 'People's Liberation Army'
numbered at any one time about seven or eight hundred armed guerrillas,
backed up, in Dhofar, by tribesmen (the 'People's Militia') who supplied
food and other necessities, and in the PDRY, by that country's armed
forces and communist bloc advisers. 7 Being on home territory, these
guerrillas could out-manoeuvre government troops. If hard pressed,
they could hide their weapons and merge with the local population.
For rest and retraining, they enjoyed the sanctuary of PDRY. Their
training was good and the tough Jebelis made brave and effective
fighters. Their persona]. weapon was the ubiquitous AK Lf7 Kalashnikov
assault rifle, supplied first by the Chinese and later by the Russians.
6. The school accepted for political indoctrination about 700 young
people from Dhofar. The name has since changed to 'People's School'.
7. See Penelope Tremayne Ci) 'nd of a Ten Years' War', in Journal of
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Vol 122, No 1,
(London,	 rch, 1917), pp h1i.-L.8.
273
Encounter tactics stressed the importance of gaining a psychological
advantage over government troops at the outset. To this end the
guerrillas were trained to fire complete 30-round magazines towards
their opponents, each in one long burst, thus forcing SAl' to ground
and leaving the insurgent. free to manoeuvre. 8 Their local knowledge
and popular support enabled them to operate in small groups, living
off the land and it. water, and thus remain potent throughout the
twelve months of each year. Their reliance upon communications with
the PDRY base increased later, when they received heavier and more
sophisticated weapons and fashioned their strategy around them.
For their internal propaganda campaign, the rebels also enjoyed
foreign help. Aden radio was at their disposal, pouring a torrent of
words across South Arabia and listened to by virtually every Dhofari,
as no Omani government broadcast servic, reached them. On the Jebel,
face-to-face propaganda and indoctrination was undertaken by the new
cadre of foreign-trained bureaucrats, the political commissars.
Besides harbouring the grievances arising from the old Sultan's
polities, the population of Dhofar was inevitably influenced by the
military prowess of the rebels and the apparent inability of
government forces to retrieve a deteriorating situation. The 'climate
of collapse' threatened to undermine the will to resist. The
'inevitability of Marxist victory' was a theme stressed on Aden Radio.
It was against this sombre background that Oman took the first
and most important step towards remedying its own grievances. On
23 July '1970 Qaboos bin Said, Sultan Said's only son, deposed his
father and became Sultan in his place.
The Counter-Revolution
The new ruler was half-Dhofari and was naturally concerned for the
future of this province. Re had been privately educated in Salalah
before attending Britain's Royal Military Academy. Commissioned into
the British Army, Qaboos served for some time in Germany before
returning to college to study government administration. His first
8. The writer visited Dhofar to research thia chapter in January 1977.
He toured the Jebel and was briefed by Government, Military,
Intelligence and Information executives. ('Briefing, January 1977')
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priority as Ruler was to free his country from the near-fatal
side-effects of ultra conservatism. Sultan Said had been neither tyrant
nor rascal. He had resisted change because be sincerely believed that
western influence would damage Omani spiritual values, an assessment in
which he may yet be proved to have been correct. The dangerous
complication arose from his failure to win his subjects' support for
his piety and, through rigid enforcement, his alienating the masses.
Despite its later alien overtones, the Dhofar rebellion began with
wide popular support.
Qaboos instituted what in practice amounted to a counter-revolution.
This was to function on political, economic, military and propaganda
fronts to disarm the enemy and recover Dhofar for civil development
within a progressive Oman.9
 Politics and economics led the way.
Oman's new oil wealth was to be exploited to provide advantages most
needed by the people - education, medical services, communications,
housing, and, in the barren areas, water. Irksome restrictions were
lifted and new links were forged between the ruler and his subjects.
Qaboos saw the Dhofari rank and file rebels as fellow-countrymen who
had been misled, rather than as enemies, a perception that was to be
crucial to the government's psychological planning. Throughout the
first year of the new Sultan's rule his armed forces were building up
their strength for the struggle to regain control of the Jebel. This
time was not wasted. It was used to lay down a propaganda barrage as
effective in its way as artillery fire.
Notice boards were set up in government controlled areas to display
counter-revolutionary propaganda and leaflets were dropped by aircraft
onto rebel-held areas. The messages were threefold: that the new
Ruler would set to right the grievances arising from his father's
policies; that communism posed a threat both to Isl9mic faith and
Omani independence; and, most important, that the rebels were offered
amnesty. This encouraged them to return to their proper allegiance,
without fear of retribution, and to benefit financially by bringing
their arms with them. These messages had an immediate impact on many
rebels, particularly those in the eastern Jebel. Arguments broke out
9. See Penelope Tremayne (ii) 'Oman: The Defeat of a Communist
Guerrilla Force', in Brassey's Defence Yearbook, (London, 1976),
pp 195-208.
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between the Marxist leaders and the nationalist rank and file;
authority was defied and men began to slip away during the night to
take advantage of the amnesty offer. The Popular Front faced a
difficult dilemma. As Marxists they had taken control of the
movement by 'entryism'. They possessed no ideological hold over their
members that might enable them to recover their allegiance by appeals
to loyalty. This left the leaders with two options: to watch their
'Liberation Army' disintegrate before their eyes, or to discipline
it by rule of terror. Given the nature of their political creed,
there was never any doubt as to which course they would adopt.1°
In a short, brutal operation, the communists fell upon the
doubters in their ranks and murdered them. Discipline was
re-established, but at a price. Disgusted by this terrorism, 201 rebels
defied their leaders and surrendered to the government. Popular Front
propaganda attempted to present this event as a 'reactionary
conspiracy' nipped in the bud by the rebel leaders, and they issued
a six-page statement along these lines. 11 The defections were not
mentioned.
Before 1970 was out the Government provided the Dhofari
listening public with an alternative to Aden Radio. A tiny 1 kilowatt
transmitter began to broadcast from Salalah. The authorities used this
to exploit the news value of the defections by putting surrendered
rebels 'on the air'. These men confirmed the sincerity of the amnesty
terms, recommended their erstwhil. comrades to follow their example,
and denounced those rebels responsible for murdering colleagues. As
time went by such broadcasts exposed the complete communist framework
that dominated the rebel command structure. During the period l9?0_7Lf
the Government's 'surrender policy' brought more than a thousand rebels
down off the Jebel to seek amnesty. These defections were particularly
valuable as a means of transferring the 'climate of collapse' from
Salalah into the enemy camp.2
10. Briefing, January 1977.
11. Documents pp k7-52, 'On the Reactionary 12 September Conspiracy:
the Attempted Counter-Revolution in Eastern Dhofar'.
12. Price, p 11.
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In the Autumn of 1971 the military began their offensive to regain
control of the Jebel, beginning in eastern Dhofar. The Sultan's Armed
Forces (SAF) consisted throughout the campaign of land forces organised
as the Dhofar Brigade and an equivalent force in Northern Oman, the
Sultan of Oman' a Air Force (SOAP), and a small Navy. Command was
exercised from SAP headquarters in Muscat by a seconded British
officer. The Dhofar Brigade was also commanded by a Briton and
consisted of between three and five infantry battalions, an armoured car
squadron, a regiment of artillery, a squadron of engineers plus other
logistic units, a total of 197k of about 8,500 men. 13 SOAP support was
always readily available in the form of ground attack, reconnaissance,
and communication or transportation in fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters. Salalah airfield was the centre for much of this flying.
Besides contributing experienced commanders, Britain gave military
assistance in the form of training teams staffed by the Special Air
Service Regiment, an engineer squadron end a field surgical team,
together with some junior and middle-rank officers and pilots.
Initially the military advantage still lay with the rebels, particularly
as the government troops were forced to abandon their gains during the
monsoon. Although these withdrawals were due to difficulties of supply
it was easy for the enemy to claim victories whenever a SAP post was
temporarily withdrawn. Under the banner headline 'People's Army
Crushes British Campaign', the Front's UK propaganda outlet Gulf
Bulletin announced: 'The British and the Sultan's forces were able
to make initial advances into the eastern region, but the PLA, fighting
a people's war, let them advance and then encircled the bases they had
set up. Qaboos himself came to visit the front lines but had to
retreat with his men'
	 This statement contained a continuing theme
of Popular Front propaganda which presented the small British
component of SAP as being full-scale British military intervention in
the war. SOAP planes were constantly referred to as 'RAP' • This
theme was doubtless important to the Front as a means of likening the
Dhofar wal to Vietnam, with the British cast in the same role as the
13. Military Press Brief, Dhofar (Dhofar, November 1976), p 10.
ik. The Gulf Bulletin, Issue No 3 (London, February 1972).
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Americana. Such 'colonial' or 'imperialist' connections were used
repeatedly in attempts to discredit British assistance to the
Sultan.
A. the amnesty policy forced the rebela to use repressive
measuree within their own ranks, the leadere of the Popular Front
appeared to lose their capacity for subtle and purposeful planning.
In military parlance, they were rattled. Certainly their action.
during the second half of 1972 implied poor judgement both in the
military and the political fields. On 19 July the People'.
Liberation Army mustered more than one hundred rebel soldiers for an
attack on the town of Narbat, at the eastern end of the Dhofar
coastal plain. No doubt they were desperate for a spectacular
victory to restore prestige and morale. The outcome was a disaster.
Tb. email garrison15
 made the most of the advantages enjoyed by the
defence, and their superior firepower, and shattered the attack.
Marbat held firm and the rebels suffered over seventy casualties.
Political mistakes followed in the Autumn, after a ten day visit
by a Vietcong delegation to the 'Liberated Zone'. The four-page Joint
Statement issued afterwards began with these words:
At the invitation of the Executive Committee of PFLOAG, an NLT
(National Liberation Front, or Vietcong) delegation led by
Comrade Vo Dang Gieng of the Central Committee of the NLF paid
a friendly visit to the liberated areas of Dhofar province from
i6 to 26 September 1972. The delegation was warmly welcomed
by the masses, the People's Liberation Army and the PFLOAG
leadership in the liberated area. 16
The statement went on to describe how the discussions took place
'in a friendly atmosphere filled with revolutionary .olidarity'.17
Omitted from the document was any mention of the political advice
offered by the Vietcong that, to their shame and grave disadvantage,
the Arab Marxists followed blindly. This was the need to impose
communist orthodoxy upon every living soul within the 'liberated areas'
15. Marbat was defended by the Wali of Dhofar'e askars, the Firqat,
and British Army training advisors.
16. Documents p 60, 'Joint Statement of the National Liberation Front
of South Vietnam and the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman
and the Arab Gulf', paragraph 1.
17. Ibid.
without delay, exception, or mercy. Terrorism of the civilian
population was the cornerstone of Vietcong tactics. How else could
communism triumph? For the Popular Front to tolerate independence
of thought or spirit amongst the Jebali tribesmen was to build upon
sand.
The application of these principles began immediately. Jebalis
who did not back the revolution, or who refused to renounce Mohammed
in favour of Marx, were rounded up for execution. Obedient party
members dragged their victims, including old men and youngsters, before
firing squads, or forced them to walk to their deaths off cliffa.18
In the ease way that Che Guevara' s efforts to export Cuban-style
revolution to Bolivia failed, so the attempt by the Popular Front to
impose an Asiatic revolutionary formula upon Arabs turned out to be a
terrible disaster. The tribesmen were horrified by what the Marxists
were doing. Par from strengthening the revolutionary base, the
Vietcong tactics left the rebels friendless and exposed. They could
still get what they wanted at the point of a gun. They could no
longer rely on local people not to co-operate with government forces,
a disadvantage that threatened their ability to survive on the Jebel.
The Firgats
Phase I of the Sultan's psychological offensive, begun in 1970,
employed the offer of amnesty to reduce rebel numbers and undermine
morale. Phase 2, which started in the following year, drew compound
interest on the results of the first operation. Surrendered rebels
were offered the opportunity to enlist in newly formed Firgats
(literally, a group of men under arms), which would return to the
Jebel as counter-guerrillas. Thus the Popular Front's 1058 would become
the Sultan's gain, and a vitally important gain it was to turn out to
be. Once established on the Jebel, the Firqats provided the
organisationa]. base necessary for Phase 3 of the psychological attack.
This we will come to later.
Firqats were organised by tribal groupings and operated for the
most part in their own tribal areas. Although initially recruited
i8. Price, p 11. (Although one surrendered political commissar claimed
knowledge of 300 execution8, this i thought to be an exaggeration.
100 is a more likely figure.)
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entirely from surrendered rebels, previous service with the enemy was
not made a condition of entry. By the end of the campaign the Firqat
strength was nearly 3000, of whom only one-third were ex-rebels.
The others were tribesmen who had resisted the Popular Front's
recruiting efforts. Tirqats operated under overall SAP' direction,
sometimes acting as raiding parties or as scouts for SAZ units, as
well as providing a security infrastructure throughout the parts
of the Jebel that had been cleared of enemy. On the mountain they
were 'at home' in every sense of the phrase. To see a Firqa,
accompanied by his wife and children, one of them carrying his rifle,
ferried by helicopter from Salalah onto a remote Jebel outpost, was
to witness an extraordinary alliance of things ancient and modern.19
The Tirqa experiment was not without its risks, but these bad been
carefully weighed by the authorities. The Popular Front's decision,
following the Vietcong visit, to adopt terrorism as a weapon against
hesitant Jebelis played into Government hands, because it made the
Firqaa all the more welcome to these unfortunate people.
Soviet Intervention
In the 1976 Strategic Survey the International Institute for
Strategic Studies wrote:
It was possible to state the importance of military strength
to the Soviet Union in even starker terms: economically
uncompetitive, culturally repressive and ideologically
increasingly barren, her primary claim to global power and
influence is military might. 20
This view of Russia as a world power was mirrored in the small
province of Dhofar as the war approached its climax between 1973 and
1975. Russia had replaced China21 as the main backer in 1972 and
immediately set about creating conditions for military victory.
Dhofari rebels were trained on modern weapons in the Soviet Union,
19. The writer's observation, January 1977.
20. 115$Strategic Survey 1976, (London, 1977), p 3.
21. It is widely believed that Iranian diplomacy persuaded China to
pull out of Oman.
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in Iraq and in Libya, and in the Palestine Liberation Front's bases.
Smaller numbers went to Cuba. Arms, ammunition and equipment poured
into Aden. In the PDRY Russians, East Germans, Cubans and of course
Yemenie provided training assistance. Where propaganda, terror and
political action had failed, brute force was now intended to triumph.
This rapid build-up of strength enabled the Popular Front to
resist the early efforts of SAP to eject it from the Jebel, and to
recover from some of the worst consequences of its own mistakes. It
was not until additional fighting units became available that the
Thasrait road could be opened and the 'siege' of Salalah lifted.
These fresh troops were Iranian, sent by the Shah to assist Qaboos
restore his authority throughout Dhofar. Thrusting north from Salalah
and south from Thamrait, the Iranian battle group opened the road and
held positions astride it. It was never again to be closed by rebel
action. Meanwhile LAP was applying a strategy of slow domination of
the Jebel through holding a series of posts which were in time linked
by barbed wire and minefields. These 'lines' set limits on rebel
mobility and hampered their supply. By improved helicopter operation
and extensive road construction, SAY and Iranian troops were able to
remain on their positions 12 months a year. The earliest 'line'
secured the dominating heights inland from Salalah; the next ran north
from Mugsayl, 35 kilometres west of Salalah; the third, set up by the
Iranians in 197k, moved the 'front' another 30 km to the west and,
beginning on the coast at the one-time rebel headquarters of Rakhyut,
extended northwards across the Jebel. In addition, a SAP post had in
1972 been established close to the PDRY border at Sarfait. For three
and a half years this post was bottled up by the enemy without
seriously interrupting the Front's supply lines. Regular PDRY
artillery unite bombarded the Sarfait positions, making manoeuvre
difficult, while total dependence on helicopter supply for all items,
including water, precisely defined the number of soldiers that could
be maintained on poet. Twice this small SAP detachment attempted to
strike south and sever the rebel supply route. It was beaten back on
both occasions. 22
 Meanwhile Soviet weapons and ammunition continued
22. Brigadier J B Akehuret CBE, Commander Dhofar Brigade at the time,
letter to the Writer, 11 July 1977, quoted by kind permission.
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to reinforce the rebels on the western Jebel, and the outcome of
the struggle continued uncertain.
Shortly before the first line of posts deprived the rebels of
easy access to the Salalah coastal plain the guerrillas mAnhandled a
122 mm ICatyuhka rocket launcher with a number of rockets to within
range of Salalah airfield. Although the projectiles found their
target, they did litti. damage. Nevertheless this bold exploit served
to underline the threat posed by Russia's arms supply. The Soviet aims,
it would seem, were first to save the Popular Front from defeat and
keep control of some at least of the Jebel, important as evidence of
the supposed revolutionary character of the war, which might otherwise
be seen as a PDRT invasion; second, to prolong the war and multiply
its costs to Oman and her allies in terms of lives and money; third,
to isolate Oman politically and bring about the defection of allies
and backers, so that the strengthened rebel force could no longer be
resisted. All this would amount to a repeat performance of the drama
then approaching its climax in Vietnam, but on a much smaller scale.
To defeat this threat the Sultan had to maintain the momentum of his
counter-revolution on the military, political and propaganda fronts.
His aims were to drive the rebels out of Omani territory, swiftly and
without excessive Loss to his own or allied troops, to integrate the
Jebel into the nation's bloodstream so that this region would no
longer harbour grievances or provide sanctuary to rebels, and to
retain international confidence and goodwill and the help of allies.
Clashes of wills were therefore likely between SAT and the People' a
Liberation Army over territory, between local government and the
Popular Front over the hearts and minds of the Jebalis, and between
the Omani Government and Moscow over world opinion. These will now
be examined in reverse order.
International Propaganda
Although the bulk of th, fighting was carried out on the Omani
aide by the Sultan's Armed Forces, the assistance provided by Britain
and Iran, and later by Jordan, 23
 was nevertheless vital to the overall
23. Jordan provided an engineer squadron for three years and a special
forces battalion for six months, and some Jordanian pilots flew
SOAF Bunters. (Briefing, 1977)
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strategy. Without British expertise and Iranian strength, the
reinforced rebel army, backed by Russia, Cuba, the PDRY and others
might have posed a dangerous threat. The power that grows out of a
gun barrel can only be held in check by similar power. It was
therefore only natural that Russia should order her powerful
propaganda service into action with the aim of depriving Oman of
British and Iranian assistance.
The Iranian connection was attacked in two ways. Oman was accused
of betraying the Arab cause by permitting Persian soldiers to operate
against Arabs on the Arabian PeninBula, and Iran was denounced for
'aggression'. In September and October 197k A]. Rayat (Lebanon),
A1-Akhbar (Lebanon), Ar-Rai al Amm (Kuwait) and Falastin-ath.-Thawra
(Syria) sang a chorus of castigation.214 Moscow radio's Persian
service appeared anxious to share an open secret with its listeners:
'We all know that if US and British imperialists and their allies did
not support the puppet reactionary regime of Qaboos, this puppet regime
could not remain in power for long. Without this support, says the
Sunday Times, the war in Oman would have ended in a matter of days'.25
Later this service talked of 'the moribund royaliBt regime of Sultan
Qaboos - a regime which enjoys tremendous military aid, and for which
an army of foreign mercenaries, including Iranian troops and officers,
are being mobilized ... It is no coincidence, therefore, that the
mercenary troops are becoming increasingly dissatiefied with their
involvement in the dirty war against the Omani people, often
described by the press as a "quasi Vietnam" ,26 Baghdad radio
broadcast in Arabic the text of a Popular Front statement that claimed
'that the military invasion of Omani territory is a flagrant chaUenge
to the Arab people of Oman. It is also a threat to all the areas of
the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula as well as a challenge to the Arab
nation's will'. 27
 Moscow radio's Arabic service pushed the same iine.28
2k. Price, p 9.
25. Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) SU/k927/Ak/1 of 12 June 1975,
Item (b).
26. SU/5016/Ak/3 of 25 September 1975.
27. Baghdad Radio in Arabic 115k GMT 20 December 1975 'PFLO Statement
Appeals for Support for Omani People'.
28. Tor an example, see SWB SU/k927/Ak/1 of 12 June 1975, Item (c).
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Britain's role was sniped at from a variety of directions. The
Gulf Committee, 6 Endeleigh St, London WCI, founded in 1971, described
itself as an independent group working in support of the liberation
movements in the Arabian peninsula and in Iran. The Committee
received propaganda material from PFLOAG, P0 Box 5037, Masla, Aden,
translated this into English, threw in its own contribution, and
presented the mixture in the form of a periodical, Th. Gulf Bulletin.
Small circulation publications can achieve an influence out of all
proportion to their readership by being put into the hands of
selected politicians, journalists and others capable of influencing
opinion. The March 1975 edition displayed a simple message on its
cover page that exposed the primary purpose of publication: 'British
and Iranian Troops out of Oman' .	 Organisations similar to the
London Gulf Committee existed elsewhere: In France, Comite de Soutien
a la Revolution en Oman; in Sweden, KROAV; in Denmark, Golf and
Pa].aestina Komiteen; in West Germany, Liga Gegen den Imperialismus,
Nah-0t Komitee, and AK Nah-Ost-Golf (Berlin); in Belgium, Comite
National Palestine; in the USA, Gulf Solidarit y. It might be safe to
assume that every opinion-former in the western democracies could be
reached by one or other of these propaganda outlets.
The Soviets did not leave matters entirely in the hands of such
organisations. Tass English language broadcasts, newspapers, and the
whole intricate machinery of State propaganda were directed towards
the same objective, to alarm the British public into believing that
they were being pulled tuto a Vietnam type situation in Oman, and thus
create an irresistible demand for the withdrawal of British personnel
on loan to the Sultan. The inevitability of revolutionary success,
the high cost in casualties of resistance, and the evil nature of the
Omani government were constant themes, overlaid by praise for the
heroic Popular Front. Quoting Pravda, Tasa concluded one broadcast
thus: 'The newspaper recalls that the PFLO's second Congress last
year called for the unity of all patriotic national forces in the
struggle for the country's liberation from foreign occupation, the
dismantling of foreign bases, the withdrawal of all foreign troops,
the complete eradication of vestiges of colonialism and the
29. The Gulf Bulletin Issue No 9, (London, March 1975).
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implementation of progressive social and economic
	 The
shorter title stood for 'Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman',
adopted in August 197k in an effort to enlist support from Gulf
politicians, some of whom had feared that the provision of aid to an
organisation openly dedicated to their overthrow might not be in
their own best interests.
When under the heading 'Exit from Oman War long overdue' the London
Morning Star turned its attention to Oman in January 1975 it toed the
party line to perfection. 'While 8k MPs protested last December at the
continuance of the Omani commitment', the 'Special Correspondent'
complained, 'the Labour government appears to be pursuing an identical
31policy to that pursued by the Conservatives before them'.
	 Nor did
the paper fail in its duty to stress the hopelessness of resistance,
even though its terminology may have been faulty: 'The People's
Front for the Liberation of Oman has intensified its action in the
western part of Dhofar ... where for over nine years that has been a
guerrilla war against the sultan and his British-officered army'.32
The 'protest' by MPs had produced a motion 'That this House, deeply
disturbed at the continuing involvement of members of Her Majesty's
armed forces in Oman (whether assigned to the British establishment
or seconded to the service of the Sultan) in military operations
designed to suppress the liberation movement in Dhofar province, thus
adding to the heavy burden of military expenditure overseas, causing
continuing suffering, destruction and death and conflicting with the
pledge in Labour's Manifesto to oppose all forms of colonialism,
deeply regrets the decision announced in the Defence Review not to
terminate the British commitment, and calls upon Her Majesty's
Government urgently to reconsider the matter'. 33
 Thus a military
problem bad been tackled in an unconventional manner. Seeing their
attempts at achieving military victory blocked by the strength of SAP
and its Iranian allies, the Soviets turned to propaganda as a means of
30. S\IiB SU/k927/Ak/1 of 12 June 1975, Item (a).
31. Morning Star, (London, 21 January 1975).
32. Morning Star, op cit.
33. Quoted The Gulf Bulletin, Issue No 9, (London, March 1975).
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weakening the Otnani defence. By generating indirect political pressure
for the withdrawal of outside help, Russia hoped to redress the balance
of power on the Jebel. This occurred at a time when Russia and her
clientag. were pouring military aid to the rebels.
The Omanjs could not match the size and sophistication of the
Soviet propaganda offensive. Nevertheless the Dhofar Information
Office, which was built up from a shoestring start in 1970 to an
effective and well equipped agency by 1975, did its imaginative best
to counter Russia's efforts. The Office pointed to SAF's military
successes and to achievements in civil development. The prime target
audience was the Arab League, many of whose members had either been
sitting on the fence or actively supporting PDRT and the Popular
Front. The information service encouraged visits by sympathetic
journalists, Arab ambassadors and other prominent people. They also
developed press outlets in the Middle East, Europe and Aaerica.
Integration Propaganda
The winning of Jebali loyalty involved combined military,
political, economic and propaganda activity,and it relied heavily upon
the Tirqae. Jebalis needed first of mU to feel secure from rebel
retribution. SAT's successes drove the guerrillas away, and the Firqas
defended the liberated 'liberated zones' from counter-attacks. Firqats
also contributed to security through the 'grapevine' that existed on
the Jebel, which often transcended the political commitments of
Jebelis fighting on either side. Jebalis also needed to feel that a
distant government in Muscat really cared about them, and here the
political and economic factors came to the fore.
The economic factor acted merely as a limitation on what could be
achieved politically. Thus the decision to devote considerable funds
to the Jebel was of importance. The money was then spent by local
government agencies. The instruments for Civil Development were the
Dhofar Development Committee, the Dhofar Development Department and the
Civil Action Teams. The Development Department organised road
building (a significant factor in the defeat of the rebels with its
3I. Briefing, January 1977.
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military, economic and social. effects), the drilling for water and
the institution of a beef cattle industry, which may revolutionise
the Jebalie' life. The Civil Action Teams were a stop-gap measure
between military re-occupation and the start of development proper.
They provided relief for refugees and set up government, or
community, centres which consisted of a temporary school, clinic,
mosque and a shop. They also co-ordinated the flying doctor service.
Tirqae acted as government agents in many of these enterprises, or
provided liaison between the local people and the outside experts.
In addition, SOPS aircraft carried everything from doctors to
casualties to sacks of rice to goats. Army engineers constructed
tracks, water troughs and schools. Army medical teams were also active
and military vehicles delivered water to isolated hamlets.
Given security and the prospect of an improved standard of living,
the Jebalis were receptive to Government propaganda. Such routine media
as information notice boards, mobile film shows and radio broadcasts
played their parts. The key medium, however, was the firqa.
Brigadier John Akehurst, who commanded the Dhofar Brigade during the
crucial part of the struggle, has put it in these words:
When we began the policy of restoring the Firqa to their tribal
areas with military security, water well, shop, school, clinic
and so forth we also created a news centre. People for miles
around brought their cattle and families into the news centres
and were there not only pumped for information but were
subjected to a good deal of indoctrination for the Sultan and
against the enemy. The Firqa were related to them all (as they
were to the enemy for that matterL) and communication was
therefore easy and effective. I personally think the establishing
of Firqa back in their tribal areas was a war-winner in that it
alienated the enemy and freed regular troops for major operations,
and a peace-winner in that it won hearts and minds and established
a form of management or government on the Jebel for later. 35
Thus from its first phase, amnesty, through the second, the formation
of Firqats, the Sultan's psychological campaign progressed naturally
to its third and final phase, the re-education and integration of the
Jebalis.
In Salalah the Dhofar Information Office continued to address
friends in the province and enemies in the PDRY. In 1973 a ten
kilowatt radio transmitter was installed, giving way in 1975 to one of
35. Akehurst, op cit.
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150 kw. Finally colour television was provided, a medium of
immense educational and political power. The Aden propagandists,
perhaps lulled into complacency by being so long unchallenged, found
themselves pressed onto the defensive. When in 1973 the People's
Liberation Army used its new Soviet rockets against Salalah airfield
it was not enough for Aden radio to state the facts. The
commentator had to go on to claim several aircraft destroyed on the
ground, massive casualties, fires, and so on. The airfield was
within sight of Salalah town. Many Dhofaris worked there. There was
no way the authorities could conceal damage, had it occurred. By
trespassing into the world of make-believe, Popular Front
propagandists not only destroyed their credibility but diminished the
effectiveness of a brave and menacing exploit.
Omani themes remained largely unchanged. The military success of
SAT and the Iranians, the benefits flowing from government policy,
particularly the work of civil action, and the threat posed to Islamic
values by Marxist subversion, continued as before. As the possibility
of rebel victory receded, the emphasis shifted to national unity and
future development. 'Freedom is our aim, and Islam is the way', which
'jingles' well in Arabic, became both a familiar radio catch phrase
and a genuine national aspiration. To the outward embarrassment of the
Dhofari Information Staff who had coined the words, many Dhofaris
believed them to be of ancient Omani origin. We can perhaps forgive
the authors if behind their embarrassment they enjoyed a moment of
quiet rejoicing.6
Military Finale
Soviet propaganda did not deprive the Sultan of his allies, and
on the Jebel, Oinani propaganda succeeded in winning the allegiance of
the once disaffected population. The final clash of wills was drawing
close, and this time the outcome would be decided by military prowess.
The climax came in the latter part of 1975 when SAT mounted an
operation that succeeded where earlier attempts had failed in blocking
the gap between Sarfait and the sea and cutting rebel supply tracks.
Isolated from their bases in the PDR! the guerrillas on the Jebe].
36. Briefing, January 1977.
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continued to fight stubbornly, supported at this stage of the
conflict by some 200 PDRY regular troops fighting on Omani territory.
Between Sarfait and the most westerly of the 'lines', running north
from Rakhyut, the Front possessed well hidden stocks of weapons and
ammunition: rocket launchers, heavy and medium machine guns,
anti-aircraft missiles, mines, grenades and small arms. This arsenal
kept the rebels in action even when supplies no longer got through
from the PDRY. The final large-scale operation of 1975 was the battle
to locate, capture and destroy these stocks.
These last actions near Sarfait and elsewhere on the Jebel were
tough. PDRY regular force artillery units, equipped with Soviet guns,
fired upwards of a thousand rounds per month against SAY posts
within range, particularly Sarfait. Rebels fired their SA-7
surface-to-air 'Arrow' missiles at SOAF helicopters and ground-attack
aircraft, destroying one of each. Between 15 October and 2k November
SAY artillery and SOAF Hunter aircraft retaliated against PDRY
artillery positions,ceasing when it was politically advantageous to do
so. By December 1975 most of the rebels had withdrawn northwards and
westwards, seeking sanctuary in Marxist Yemen. A handful of rebels
was still hiding in the hills, mostly on the eastern Jebel. Slowly
but surely, their numbers were reduced by patient intelligence
gathering and patrol action. 37
 PDRY shelling tailed off and finally
ceased. Civil development on the Jebel went ahead unimpeded. For the
time-being at least, the war was over.
	 The security threats still
facing Oman are serious and are fully discussed by Penelope Tretnayne39
and D L Price 0 in their respective essays. In essence they arise out
of the de-etabilising effects of a rapid change from near medieval
37. Accompanied by five other rebels, a senior guerilla leader surrendered
to SAY on 1k October 1977. He was Salim Mussalim al Awar Bait Said,
and he complained to journalists in Sa].alah that he had become
completely disillusioned with the extreme communism of the Popular
Front. He stressed, however, that 'there are still many (in PDRY)
who are determined to continue the fighting'. See Christopher Walker's
report in the Times, (London, 18 October 1977).
38. But not the propaganda war. Aden's Voice of Oman Revolution has
continued to broadcast PFLO military communiques. On 10 July 1977 it
broadcast a congratulatory cable of Irish Republican support for
the Front's armed struggle in Oman . (Follow-up to Briefing, 1977)
39. Tremayrte Ci), pp k5-k8.
10. Price, pp 15-17.
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backwardness to modern, oil-based affluence. Real though these problems
are, they are outside the scope of this study.
The war in Dhofar demonstrated, in the way seen earlier in Greece,
Iranian Azerbaijan, Malaya, the Phillipines and other places where
Marxist imperialism has been resisted, that the driving force of
successful defence comes from the threatened people themselves. This
implies wise and strong leadership, capable of inspiring the nation
through the use of appropriate propaganda. It has to be recognised,
however, that national will is often insufficient to stand on its own
against the onslaught of Soviet trained and equipped, and sometimes
Soviet-bloc led and reinforced, rebel armies. The threatened people
need help.
Invariably Soviet propaganda has presented such help as
'imperialism' or 'colonialism' or 'aggression'. A central theme of
Russian 'detente' tactics is increased support for subversion,
terrorism and rebellion in the non-communist world. Such activities
depend to a considerable extent upon widespread acceptance of the
'noble lie' of inevitable triumph that forms the centrepiece of Marxist
philosophy. Writing about Oman, Mrs Penelope Tremayne put it thus:
It is usually said that wars of this kind, with this support,
cannot be won by the legitimate forces in a country; and the
very strength of this belief has reduced the chances of
winning them nearly to nil. It is taken as axiomatic that,
however unacceptable their actions or their leaders, the
revolutionaries must triumph, simply because they are
revolutionaries; the morale of those who stand against them is
sapped at the start; the civil population see that the safest
course will be to co-operate; outside help is withheld, from
reluctance to back a losing horse; and in short the success
of the revolutionaries' campaign is made three-parts certain
irrespective of their cause or their capabilities. ki
Defeatist attitudes of this sort received a massive boost from the
American debacle in Indo-China. In contrast, Oman's brave defiance
could make the West aware that the Soviet tactics of 'detente' are
irresistible only so long as their victims, and the victims' friends,
believe them to be irresistible.
Tremayne (ii), p 195.
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Discussion
The Dhofar communist party leaders have attributed failure in the
Jebel campaign to too hasty attentpta to enlarge party membership, the
lack of a secure ideological base, and inadequate discipline within the
party organisation.'42 By the nature of the communist creed, they
could publish no other conclusion. For the creed teaches the faithful
that the success of communist revolution is inevitable. Since the creed
cannot be questioned, the only possible cause for a failed revolution
is lack of communist purity and zeal on the part of its eporters.
Thus the 'noble lie' is protected and blame attaches only to mortals.
No doubt the confused and often vicious nature of the rebel leadership
was a factor in their downfall. Mutual trust and respect between
leaders and followers are essential pre .-requisites for any endeavour.
Through stupidity and mendacity the general command of PTLO forfeited
these benefits. The reason for forfeiture was not, however, that they
were insufficiently communist in outlook and method, but rather that
they laboured their political dogma ad nauseam. The Popular Front might
have done better to have concealed their true colours under a
nationalist 'liberation' cloak, in the manner of Fidel Castro in Cuba,
until victory had been won. A useful lesson for the Soviet Bloc from
the Dhofar fiasco would be to accept the incompatibility of communism
with Arab traditional values and in future to delay the imposition of
proletarian dictatorship until all resistance has ended. In their
schizophrenic minds communists are capable of proclaiming one set of
lessons while inwardly digesting another. Therefore we should assume
that the useful lesson has been learned.
In its early days Dhofari rebel propaganda drew its strength
from the tight tribal organisation of the Jebalie, from the facts of
poverty, backwardness and neglect that gave reality to their themes
and messages, and from PDRY support on radio and other means.
Government ineptitude gave apparent righteousness to the cause, and
stimulated hatred of the regime and its agents. Recent revolutionary
success in Aden seemed to demonstrate that victory would inevitably
go to the insurgents. Allegiance was obtained half by conviction and
k2. Briefing, January 1977.
291
half by organisation and terror. These themes accomplished the
mobilisation of the Jebalia and influenced opinion in Dhofar Province
generally. They also provided the basis of 'legitimacy', valuable
both internally and for the international audience. The military
successes of the 'People's Liberation Army 'added credibility, and
by mid-1970 had begun the 'climate of collapse' in Salalah. The
Sultan's Armed Forces were mocked as a 'paper tiger' and the idea
that a 'long waz' transforms th. people and is a revolutionary asset
was canvassed. After the new Sultan had come to power the Popular
Front was forced to rely increasingly on terror instead of allegiance
for its propaganda aimed at so-called 'friends', and their
mobilisation themes were undermined by government deeds and appeals.
Their legitimacy began to rest almost entirely upon their bond with
international communism, which had its uses outside Oman but held
small attraction within. The Front's failure to solve the key
problem of keeping their mobilisation themes alive after the original
grievances had been redressed was an important cause of eventual
defeat. They were not even able to deploy successfully the theme of
'bad faith', which persuades rebels that all actions of government
aimed at reconciliation are shame.
Soviet and international propaganda support for the Popular Front
aimed at discrediting and isolating Oman, so that communist military
assistance for the rebels would be unopposed by Western help to the
government. Against nations that went to the Sultan's aid, particularly
Britain, communist fronts applied domestic leverage in an effort to
force withdrawal. The themes of guilt, certain rebel victory,
counter-productivity, and the cost and futility of continued involvement
were deployed. This campaign was potent, particularly since it
coincided with America's problems in Vietnam. However, on the one side
the rebels failed to inflict severe British, Iranian or Jordanian
casualties, and on the other, the Sultan's troops and their allies
avoided the type of tactics and methods that could be presented to the
world as atrocities. Soviet leverage therefore had little to bite upon.
After Sultan Qaboos began his reforms, counter-revolutionary
propaganda became an important element in the campaign to defeat the
Popular Front. In particular we may admire the three-phase offensive
to recover the Jebalis' loyalty: amnesty for rebels, their return to
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the Jebel as firqas, and their role in winning general acceptance of
Omani policies. Here we see the power of organisation as an
instrument in government propaganda. Under rebel domination, or even
if left on their own, Jebalis' susceptibility to Omani integration
themes brought to them by pamphlets and loudspeakers might have been
weak. It was the psychological factor of being, as it were,
encircled, integrated into a group, and encouraged to participate in
action that was decisive in the struggle for Jebali co-operation and
trust. In addition the offensive helped to create a crisis of
confidence in rebel raxke, to divide leaders from their followers, and
to throw the communists psychologically onto the defensive. Omani
themes were well chosen, involving the intensification of existing
trends such as Islamic faith and national pride, rather than the
introduction of novel concepts. Moreover these notions did not need
to be played down or discarded after the rebel defeat; they merged
naturally into the new integration campaign of Omani nation-building.
Although the role of propaganda in the Dhofar rebellion was, for
both sides, important, it would be as misleading to overrate its effect
as it would be dangerous to ignore it. Front propaganda depended for
its effectiveness on the political appeal of independence and the
military power of armed men. Unless Sultan Qaboos's new policies had
been wise and sincere, and unless SAl had possessed the will and the
ability to fight its way back onto the Jebel, the psychological
counter-attack would have been so much talk. It was the combination of
politics, military action and propaganda, the triad, that in turn posed
so dangerous a rebel threat and so effective a government response.
This study is interesting as an example of authority using the triad
efficiently, unimpaired, it would seem, by ignorance of the proper




DEDUCTIONS FROM TEE CASE STUDIES
PART I: A PATTERN OF REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA
There's no discouragement
Shall make bin once relent
Him first avow'd intent
To be a pilgrim
The first part of this chapter draws together the evidence
uncovered in the six case studies, compares one with another, and
through the matching of like strands attempts to uncover the pattern of
revolutionary propaganda. Starting at the beginnings, at the points
where Haaan-i Sabbah returned to Persia after his training in Cairo
and where Patrick Pearse decided to join the IRB, we find that
revolutionaries begin with very little. A measure of unrest among
the people, amounting in some cases to a predisposition to revolt, is
often their only asset. This was the case with the leaders who formed
the FIN, the Provisional IRA and the Popular Front. Zionism possessed
power and structure in the form of the Jewish Agency and Haganah
before 'constructive warfare' was launched in 19+5, but that was
because this movement had been at work for half a century. Nenachem
Begin, on the other hand, arrived in Palestine without power or
authority, and within a remarkably short time was challenging the
Agency and the Mandatory Administration. It seems clear that what
revolutionary leaders lack in terms of structure of government, armed
force, financial backing and recognised authority they make up for by
conviction. This in turn calls for a great act of imagination.
The imagination behind a revolution distinguishes it from violent
protest. By providing a purpose, a strategy to achieve that purpose,
and a motive force to carry the strategy forward, it shapes an
uncontrollable urge into effective action. Imagination has to
compensate for a lack of material advantages. Creating the motive
force may represent the greatest act of imagination, and this could
be seen as the first and most enduring task of revolutionary
propaganda. The motive force or cause, justification or propaganda
assumption comes frcm the leadership. If we consider the
1. John Bunyan (1628-1688), The Pilgrim's Progress, Part II.
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pre-.revolutionary situations facing the leaders of rebellion in the
case studies, the flight. of imagination required of each may be
thought remarkable.
Hasan had been trained as a subversive propagandist but
nevertheless the bold originality needed to form a break-away sect
to ch.flenge the established Islamic faith must have been huge.
Pears.' a ambitions were so far removed from ordinary people s . that
throughout Laster Week 1916 most Irishmen might have said that he had
lost touch with reality. Re saw not Home Rule but an independent
Republic. Likewise Begin imagined not a National Home but a Jewish
State throughout Palestine and Transjordan. The Algerian leaders bad
to rekindle the sparks of nationalism and social aspiration to justify
a policy the ordinary Muslim could otherwise hardly comprehend.
Provisional IRA leaders bad to see a vision of the six northern
counties freed of British influence, in which the power of the
Protestant majority would be broken. The Dhofari rebel comnders
needed to believe that an oppressive ruler could be defied, and their
communist successors had to imagine a Marxist state in part or all.
of Oman.
Th. link between the leadership and the motive force must act in
two waya. As well as creating the cause, the leaders must be
inspired by it. Raving imagined the New Jerusalem, they must believe
in it and be absolutely convinced that it can be built. Mere
confidence founded upon logical calculation i. insufficient. That
which is based on logic can be destroyed by logic. The worldly
adage that politics i. the art of the possible has no place in
revolutionary philosophy. Belief needs to be blind to all
discouragement. Followers will call this quality faith and detractors
will describe it as fanaticism. By any name, it i. the distinguishing
characteristic of revolutionary leadership, and also one that colours
revolutionary propaganda. This quality separates the revolutionary
propagandist from, say, the commercial advertiser. The latter makes
the best that he can of the wares he is promoting, whether or not he
is personally persuaded of their merits: the revolutionary propagates
from conviction. Some artiste insist that inside every block of marble
there is a fin. sculptur. waiting to be exposed. This exercise of
imagination flies close to the revolutionary's belief that he can turn
dreams into reality. Both begin with almost nothing, and proceed by
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inspiration to fashion what at first only they can see. Whereas the
artist works alone, the revolutionary needs others to share his dream.
It is here that revolutionary propaganda turns outwards from the
leadership to broadcast the motive force to a mass audience.
Sometimes the task of spreading the faith is assisted by
pre-existing trends and attitudes, by pre-propaganda working in
society, or by ready-made organisation and discipline by which the
messages can more easily be put across. The Nizari Isivailis took over
the organisation of the Old Preaching together with its tradition of
opposition to Sunni orthodoxy; the 12B made what use it could of
pra-existing prejudices and a revolutionary background both of which
had been nearly extinguished by 1916. They were, however, strong on
organisation, both through their own oath-bound structure and by their
infiltration of larger bodies. Pre-propaganda amongst Palestinian and
world Jewry prior to the autumn of 19k5 had all but taken control of
Zionist policy. It needed only to be touched to come alive in the
revolutionary cause. Jewish organisation in the Promised Land and
overseas was complex and strong. In contrast, the FLN began their
rebellion without the benefit of pre-propaganda, with few of the
desirable pre-existing trends working among the Muslim masses, and
with almost no organisation. By the calculated use of terror, these
handicaps were somehow overcome. This experience suggests that a
sense of grievance and a dislike of government do not necessarily create
a pre-revolutionary situation. Unless there is a purpose and hope,
oppression may be borne indefinitely. Pre-propaganda provides these
elements, and reflects the early work of the leader.
The Provisionals began with strong pre-.propaganda and massive
social prejudices and with community organisations that were easily
penetrated and used for revolutionary purposes. Prior to 1970 the
Dhofari rebels exploited real grievances and a vigorous tradition of
independence amongst the Jebalis, whose tribal organisation made them
receptive audiences. These advantages might have been developed by
the communists who assumed command of the Popular Front, but for various
reasons they let them slip through their fingers, into the waiting hand
of authority.
AU the studies confirmed the importance of organisation. Where
it already exists, it must be strengthened, in the manner demonstrated
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by Hasan, Begin and the Provieionale, and in the way that Sinn Fin and
the original IRA took over the orgenisational task after Pearse' a
death. Where it is absent, as in Algeria, it must be established as
quickly as possible. The OPA and other instruments of ALN-FLN
authority' illustrated how well these leaders understood
this need. By their failure to retain control over Jebali organisation,
or to develop an alternative, the Popular Front's communist leaders
exposed their movement to eventual defeat. We may conclude that
organisation is essential to effective revolutionary propaganda and,
in so far as our own area of research is concerned, agree with Ellul's
partial definition of propaganda, which stresses the organisational
factor.2
Conflict propaganda is usuai.ly directed at 'friends', 'neutrals'
and	 , and in wars between nations the three groups are usually
clearly identifiable. Revolutionary propaganda also addresses these
three target audiences. Inside a state, however, the dividing lines
are often indistinct and are liable to change. The revolutionary
propagandist may initially regard almost the entire population as
neutral, with the regime and its agents, particularly the security
forces, as the enemy. Friends are created out of neutrals, becoming
'militants, adherents or sympathisers', 3 while at the same time other
neutrals may opt to support the government and thus swell the ranks of
the 'enemy'. As opinion polarises, the middle ground shrinks until
there are few domestic neutrals left. The neutral audience is now
the external, overseas public. The propaganda campaign to win
members and supporters is generally known as the mobilisation phase.
It is the period when the leaders' motive force is let loose to
affect a wide audience.
2. Seep8.
3. See p 187.
k. Terrorist groups such as the 19th century anarchists and today's
German 'Red Army Faction' and Italy's 'Red Brigade' may be seen as
the creation of strong revolutionary motive forces that have taken
hold of the leadership and a small outs, but have failed to attract
mass support. Thus these groups tend to regard almost everyone
as 'enemies'.
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Mobilisation propaganda has the tasks of convincing its neutral
and friendly audiences that the cause is just and worthy of support,
that violence in the attainment of the goal is unavoidable and therefore
justified, and that all should commit themselves to a movement which
is bound to triumph. These objectives may be expressed in themes and
messages. Some typical examples from the case studies are listed
below. For reasons that will emerge presently, some of these
mobilimation. messages are also aimed at the 'enemy'. These samples are
illustrations only. They could be worded in many different ways, or
broken down into other components. They serve, however, to demonstrate
the pattern that emerges from this research. In whatever other form
they might be expressed, the sum effect would probably be much the
same.
)1obilisation Themes and Messages
Theme 1: 'Righteousness'
Message: 'Our cause (freedom, nationalism, ideology, religious belief
or whatever) is righteous. Our authority derives from the (divine)
right of our cause. Therefore, friends, prepare for the struggle;
neutrals, join us or support us; enemies, abandon hope. (The cause
is sometimes set out in a proclamation or manifesto. It provides the
basis of a later theme - 'legitimacy'.)
Theme 2: 'Hatred'
Message: 'The enemy (government, regime 1 etc) blocks the path of our
morally righteous aspirations. Ther. is no peaceful course that we
can follow. The enemy and his agents, therefore, deserve our hatred.
See also what the enemy have done to suppress u.s (examples are given).
These injustices cry out for vengeance. Since our cause is just, and
as no alternative method exists, we must resort to violence, which is
a form of justice. All who resist are evil. Friends, you have a right
and a duty to kill. Neutrals should see such acts as just.'
Theme 3: 'Inevitable Triumph'
Message: 'We, being righteous, are certain to win, because of "the
inevitable triumph of justice". Friends and neutrals, the spirit of
the mass is invincible. We shall overcome. Themies, your harsh
counter-measures serve only to drive more people onto our side. Therefore
the victory is bound to be ours.'
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Theme k: 'Allegiance'
Message: 'Friends and neutrals, commit yourselves completely to the
cause, or be seen as traitors or cowards.'
Theme 5: 'Moral Certainty'
Message: 'Friends, do not regard your violent actions as murder or as
other crimes. You are soldiers fighting a Just War. Enemies and
neutrals, take note.'
These five paraphrased themes or similar messages accompanied
the mobilisation phases of aU six cases studied. They express in
propaganda terms the motive power of the revolutionary leadership.
Only the first theme, relating to the cause, is essentially a theme of
ideas. This more than any other is the one that may need the help of
pre-propaganda and pre-existing attitudes and social aspiration.
Unless it can be made to stick none of the others is likely to survive.
If it is accepted, it lends weight to all the others, which derive their
logic from the idea of justice. Moreover themes 2-5 can all be
strengthened by organisation and by facts. Once absorbed into a group,
whether this be as an activist in the military wing or as a supporter
in some front, the individual can be 'surrounded' and manipulated
psychologically. Once committed by his actions, which may involve
the act of killing, in the manner of the Assassins and the ALN, or
some relatively trivial act such as refuBal to pay rent or writing a
letter to the newspaper, the recruit needs to justify his action.
Themes 2-5 provide justification. Propaganda then takes on a
progressive character, each message justifying the last act and
encouraging the next. The actions of members provide one sort of
fact that can assist mobilisation. The other sort that is needed must
be provided by the 'enemj ,by government and its security forces.
The importance of facts to propaganda was explained in the
introductory chapter and has been borne out in every case study.
They provide the truth around which lies of interpretation and
intention can, if necessary, be woven. They establish reference points
and they form the kernels of myths. Mobilisation must therefore take
place in a tense, pre-revolutionary or revolutionary situation.
Organisation brings the mass into conflict with the enemy as in
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Palestine and Ulster, or activists commit violent acts that bring down
retribution or stern counter-measures in the style of the FLN at
Philippeville - the l4arighella formula. 5
 This need of facts continues
throughout the rebellion and affects equally all the themes listed
below.
There is one theme of revolutionary propaganda which belongs
everywhere, yet does not fit neatly into any one compartment. It is
included now, as it can be important during the mobilisation phase,
particularly, as in the Algerian example, where a lack of
pre-propaganda caused the revolutionary leadership to rely upon harsh
measures to ensure obedience.
Theme 6: 'Terror'
Message: 'Oppose us, friend, neutral or enemy, and you die.'
This coercive message depends upon the support of capable
activists. It enforces discipline inside the movement, deprives
authority of information and other assistance from the civilian
population, and can partially paralyse the apparatus of government.
Skilfully applied it can strengthen theme 3, inevitable triumph. From
the Assassins to the Provisionals, it demonstrates the alliance between
action and words that is so important a facet of revolutionary strategy.
The theme was well described by the saying 'Kill one, frighten ten
thousand', and with today's news media the indirect effect can be far
greater.
The themes of mobilisation are continued as necessary throughout
the entire revolution. Ae the struggle gets fully into its stride they
are joined by what we may call the 'conflict themes'. These build
upon the work achieved by mobilisation propaganda, consolidating the
commitment of 'friends' and undermining the morale and certainty of
'enemies' • In war propaganda, the messages aimed at an enemy audience
are almost always designed to induce surrender. In revolutionary
situations (and in wars conducted by revolutionary armies) propaganda
aims to turn 'enemies' into 'friends' or, where this is impossible, to
induce ambivalence that may amount to a form of neutrality. Because
this ambition is always at the back of the revolutionary mind, the
5. See p 86.
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themes that accompany the mobilisation phase are directed in part at
the 'enemy'. A politician, administrator or soldier who defects to the
rebel cause provides by his act, and its subsequent publicity, much
valuable propaganda.
The conflict themes may surface in any order. This listing
reflects neither sequence nor relative importance.
Themes of Conflict
Theme 7: Glorification of Heroes
Message: 'Neutrals, see how our heroes challenge the mighty regime,
and bow their deeds prove the moral strength of the rebellion.
Enemies, question your previous assumptions and doubt the legitimacy
of your authority. Friends, be proud.'
Theme 8: In Praise of Violence
Message: 'AU, see how the spilling of blood purifies those who shed
it, freeing them from past inferiority and blinding them to the cause.'
Theme 9: Justified Reaction
Message: 'All, our violence is simply a justified reaction to the
institutionalised violence unleashed by the regime. Authority must
bear responsibility for whatever death and suffering our heroes inflict.'
Theme 10: Long War
Message: 'All, tims is on the side of the rebellion. To win, we have
only to survive. For the regime to win, they must eliminate every last
one of us and extinguish our ideology, and this is obviously impossible.
Moreover, because time is on our side,unless the government can win
quickly, it cannot win at all. Protracted war transforms the mass, and
is an asset.'
Theme II: Guilt
Message: 'Enemy, feel guilty. Ton brought us to rebel; you know in
your hearts that our cause is just; you know ,too ,that your methods and
intentions are rotten. Let guilt seep into your subconscious to under-
mine your resolve and paralyse your judgement.'
Theme 12: Bad Faith
Message: 'Friends, attempts by the regime to build bridges between
authority and the supporters of the revolution are traps for the unwary.
The regime is insincere, their offers are designed to turn you once
again into obedient slaves.'
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Theme 13: Security Force Incompetence
Message: 'All, the security forces cannot penetrate our secret
organisation and are blundering about like bulls in a dark china shop.
They arrest the innocent, shoot the blameless, terrorise the
defenceless. It is they, not us, who deserve to be called 'terrorists'.
The enemy is a Paper Tiger.'
Theme 1k: Legitimacy
Message: 'All, the regime has forfeited respect and its right to
obedience. Our alternative regime, being founded on justice and
recognised through the expressed will of the masses, inherits the right
to your respect and obedience. Henceforth, regard our authority as the
proper focus for your allegiance and trust.'
Theme 15: Credibility
Message: 'All, our statements are true, our promises are fulfilled,
our power to do as we wish is proven. The words of the regime are
empty and its actions futile. Because we have won so far we must win
in the end. Ours, being the credible authority, is a safe as well as a
proper focus for your allegiance and trust.'
These themes of conflict appeared in nearly but not quite all of
the six case studies. There is no evidence that the Assassins or the
Popular Front made use of themes designed to attack the conscience of
the regime, such as 'Justified Reaction' or 'Guilt'. Perhaps because
this type of appeal is effective mainly against enemies educated in
the Judaeo.-Christian tradition, its use is limited. They were used by
the FLN and their supporters against France (Mrs Castle's remark being
a good illustration6), and by the Popular Front's international network
against Britain. In Ireland Father Campbell 7 spelt out the 'Justified
Reaction' theme in copybook fashion. The 'Long War' idea has received
support from revolutionary authors such as Debray and Fanon, who link
it to the theme of 'Inevitable Triumph'. Another writer,
Mr Robert Taber, expressed these ideas clearly. In The War of the Flea
he wrote, 'but the counterinsurgency experts have yet to win a war.
At this writing, they are certainly losing one'. 8 And also, 'No
6. See p 191.
7. See p 216.
8. Robert Taber The War of the Flea (New York, 1965), p 173.
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small nation, and few great ones, can stand the deprivation
indefinitely. Yet the painful fact is that the guerrillas, for their
part, can carry on indefinitely' .	 The writer sees such statements as
propaganda in their own right, designed to weaken government and
public resolve and confidence. They are based on selected, credible
truth, and ignore the many facts that contradict. Several of the
themes of conflict were missing from the Easter Rising stu4y, which
was essentially cuicerned with mobilisation. Examination of the
independence struggle of 1919-21 would, however, uncover them all.
The 'Bad Faith' theme appeared only in studies where government
attempted reconciliation, as in Algeria. It was used by the
Provisionals immediately after the period studied, as the new
Secretary of State, Mr Whitelaw, tried to build bridges to the Catholic
community.
'Legitimacy' and 'Credibility' may be seen as the culminating
themes of conflict propaganda. Once the revolutionaries have
accumulated massive strength in these two areas they are ready to
launch the themes of victory, which we will come to later. Legitimacy
is an idea, developed from the original motive force of the leadership.
It is the imagination of the revolution taking hold of a wide audience.
Although closely linked to the theme of 'Righteousness', it implies
acceptance as well as ambition. We may feel that for every hundred
proclamations issued, only one or two ever achieved true legitimacy.
Just as legitimacy suggests a moral right to govern, 'Credibility'
claims the physical ability. In revolutions that rely upon superior
military strength as the final arbiter, credibility rests largely
on evidence of such strength. Where the revolutionary strategy is
based on leverage, proven ability to maintain a certain level of
violent activity may be sufficient.
In all revolutions th. insurgents need to keep their casualties
to a minimum, both to retain their offensive ability and to maintain
morale in their ranks. In some campaigns that depend upon the gradual
acceptance of new ideas by 'neutrals', such as the Assassins' preaching,
this need, is magnified by the necessity of continuing in action over
9. Taber, p k5.
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a long period of time. Survival propaganda therefore runs parallel




Message: 'Enemy, this method, this unit, this individual that is being
turned against us is in the first place brutal, indiscriminate and
offensive to liberal opinion everywhere, in the second place he or it
increases mass support for our movement, and thirdly he or it is
ineffective. For your own good, do not any longer use the unit, method
or individual.
Theme 17: Special Status
Message: 'Enemy, recognise our activists as soldiers fighting a Just
War. Do not dare treat them as common criminals. Give us all the
benefits but none of the disadvantages of belligerent status.'1°
Theme 18: Security
Message: 'Friends, have no fear for your own safety. If you die we
promise the immortality of martyrdom. If you fall into the hands of
the enemy our blackmail or propaganda will rescue you.
The theme of
	 is used to support or replace some of these
survival themes. The 'Counter-Productivity' argument works only
against governments already affected by 'Guilt' • It needs to be carried
to its target audience by front organisations whose motives cannot be
questioned. If successful, it strengthens the guilt transfer. However
its main purpose is tactical, to weaken the security operation and
enable activists to operate in greater safety. The Northern Ireland
study provided the best examples, but Palestine and Algeria showed
earlier application. Where guilt is ineffective, terror can take its
place. The Assassins used selective terror to dissuade political and
10. In June 1977 the Geneva Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed
Conflict adopted Protocol II, making fresh provisions on laws to
operate during non-international armed conflicts, such as armed
rebellion. Open to broad interpretation, these laws seem destined
to be used more for purposes of propaganda than mercy. See L C Green
'The New Law of Armed Conflict', article in The Canadian Yearbook of
International Law, Vol XV, 1977.
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religious leaders, officials and soldiers from taking their duties to
suppress the Nizari Ismailis too far. Even in conditions that favour
the 'Counter-Productivity' theme, terror backs it up. Catholics who
dared join the RUC, the UDR or any government force were murdered.
The 'Special Status' theme was used by the IRB, the Irgun, the ALN
and the Provisionals. By granting the claim to the prisoners of 1916
the British transferred legitimacy as weil as releasing activists who
planned and led the war that began in 1919. When Mr Whitelaw gave way
before this argument in 1972, a move that he subsequently regretted,
he weakened th. moral basis of the Northern Ireland administration and
strengthened terrorism from all sides. 11 Authoritarian regimes such
as the Seljuks and the Sultan of Oman cild not be reached by such
appeals. The 'Security' theme exploits any weakness on the government's
part over the status of prisoners, since once political crime is
recognised as distinct from other offences, the release of 'political
prisoners' can be made a bargaining condition for a truce or other
concession. This, too, can be backed up by terror, as the Irgun
showed. By kidnapping hostages the revolutionaries can attempt to
blackmail authority for the release or safety of captured activists, a
method made familiar by recent events.
If revolutionaries can mobilise mass support, remain in action,
end intensify the conflict until they have huge stocks of legitimacy
and credibility, they may be ready to use the theme or themes of
victory. These themee place the government at checkmate. Generally
speaking the first is used against an alien, colonial or
quasi-colonial government and the second against a domestic regime.
Themes of Victory
Theme 19: Cost and Futility of Resistance
Message: 'Enemy, see the cost in lives and treasure, and in international
respect and domestic strife, of vainly trying to suppress an
irresistible and just cause. For your own sakes, give up.'
Theme 20: Climate of Collapse
Message: 'Enemy, your society is rotten, your government unjust and
without legitimacy, your security forces incapable. Chaos and terror
will reign until you reject the present regime. For your own sakes,
be realistic and accept us.'
11. See Wilkinson, p 128.
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The 'Cost and Futility' theme accompanies a campaign of
leverage, creating if it i successful the Asset-to-Liability-Shift.
We saw it at work in Palestine, in Algeria, in Ulster, and, in respect
of British and Iranian aid, in Dhofar. 'Climate of Collapse' also
uses leverage, in this case internal leverage of public opinion that
demands an end to the bloodshed and anarchy at any cost. It may have
been part of Hasan-i Sabbah'a strategy eventually to deploy this
appeal. The FLN were able to use it in conjunction with 'Cost and
Futility' because of the large colon presence in Algeria. In mid-1970
the Popular Front was able to project the theme in Dbofar. Although
both themes can be valuable as auxiliary weapons in a revolutionary
campaign designed to end in final military victory, their real
significance lies in their use as decisive blows in campaigns where
propaganda is the primary weapon, with violence as a supporting arm.
These twenty themes are obviously not exclusive, nor, as we have
seen from the studies, is every one applied in every revolution. They
represent, nevertheless, the results of careful analysis of the six
cases in this thesis and may be accepted as the common pattern of
revolutionary propaganda emerging from those cases. The sample of
campaigns was small, and the process of selection that sought examples
interesting to this research may have produced rebellions with a
higher than average propaganda content. The writer believes that
further research would tend to confirm the pattern, but he also accepts
that the reader will require that research to be done before he
necessarily shares this view.
The Role and Importance of Revolutionary Propaganda
The foregoing reservations apply equally to deductions on the role
and importance of propaganda as a weapon system in revolutionary hands.
The cases have supplied ample evidence that propaganda played an active
role. They showed, too, that its effectiveness depended upon its
interaction with politics and military action - the triad. In no case
would propaganda on its own have made progress. Hasan's da'is would
have been put to death by Seljuk troops, Pearse would have been ignored,
Begin's proclamation would have been so much waste paper. Without the
threat posed by armies in Morocco and Tunisia, and the enormous problems
posed by displaced people, leverage against France might never have won
307
victory for the TIN. Provisions], propaganda depended upon facts
provided by their activists and the British response, just as Popular
Front appeals seemed credible only so long as their fighters posed a
severe military threat. Yet propaganda was important, in every case.
Its importance may be measured by consideration of the outcomes
had propaganda not worked in the ways that it did. If our
interpretation of Assassin strategy is correct, the main thrust of that
movement was to convert the masses. This strategic propaganda was
backed up by terror and tactical propaganda that dislocated effective
counter-measures, keeping the campaign alive for many decades. Without
the New Preaching, the killings would have been pointless. The Laster
Rising itself was a military disaster. It could possibly have
destroyed the physical force tradition and consigned Pearse' s re-
publican ideas to oblivion. Propaganda, including the style of the
deed itself, procured the opposite results. Official Zionist strategy
recognised the impossibility of forcing Britain to abandon the Mandate
or concede interim demands for increased immigration. Without its
international propaganda machinery the Jews would have bad no effective
means to balance the Arab pressure resisting any change to the White
Paper terms. Begin's violence might have been disowned by the Tishuv
and discredited by the British had it not been for the strident voice
of Revisionist propaganda. Eventually the 'Cost and Futility' theme
caused Britain to quit. Without the benefit of propaganda to mobilise
the Catholics, the Provisional campaign in 1971 and 1972 would probably
have fallen as flat as the 1950s cross-border operations. The
appearance of a 'freedom struggle' that influenced American and other
foreign opinion at that time was the outcome of skilful publicity.
When, in the summer of 1972, Provisional propaganda faded, the IRA
no longer posed so severe a threat. In the case of the Popular Front
this test can best be applied by observing how, once the Sultan began
to steal their clothes, the rebels in their nakedness were exposed to
defeat.
Of the six cases, this last was the only one where the
revolutionaries were defeated outright by the security forces, and it
was the campaign with the weakest rebel propaganda. It seems likely
that the original motive force that bad brought the Assassins into
existence had died out of that movement before outside forces crushed
the bases. The two cases that ended in victory for the revolutionaries,
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Palestine and Algeria, enjoyed strong propaganda. The same can be
said of the IRB and the subsequent struggle for Irish independence.
These facts seem to justify the conclusion that on the evidence of the
cases studied propaganda is not just an important component of
revolution, but an essential one, and in certain circumstances it can
be the decisive element.
Additionally we may consider the proposal that, but for propaganda,
there might never have been revolutions at all. This view is
arguable. Some might say that it is social and economic deprivation,
frustrated nationalism, religious zeal or military oppression that
cause people to rebel. Certainly such forces often lie at the heart
of revolutionary situations, to the benefit of the rebel leadership and
embarrassment of authority. They do not of themselves make or
implement the decision to resort to violence. A nation can be
committed to war by its government, and the armed forces and apparatus
of state will respond without hesitation. A disaffected population can
be committed to revolution only if it has a leader of imagination who
succeeds in propagating the motive force in the form of effective
propaganda. A vague pre-disposition to rebel is transformed by such
means into strategy, organisation and action.
In no case studied was it possible for authority to counter
revolutionary propaganda by political or military means. Answers when
they came, were in kind. Frequently security forces provided ammunition
for hostile appeals, indeed some of the outstanding propaganda successes
scored by rebels in these studies have arisen in this way; Maxwell's
executions, the Exodus episode, the reaction at Philippeville,
interrogation-in-depth. The revolutionary battleground resembles a
minefield in which any false move can be costly.
There is some evidence that revolutionary propaganda encourages
amongst rebels a race to extremes. The need of those under propaganda's
spell to justify past actions, and the propensity of the themes and
messages to exaggerate emotional responses may tend to drive
revolutionaries beyond the limits of reason and cause them to reject
restraint. Persona]. disagreements over tactics or about the true nature
of the cause are important factors too, but our studies indicate that
propaganda intended for moderate goals can be quoted by extremists to
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justify immoderate ambitions. Perhaps W B Teat a had the civil war
that followed Irish independence in mind when he wrote:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the fai.coner;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack afl. conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.	 12
Some Techniques and Technical
Characteristics of Revolutionary Propaganda
This research has not been concerned with the psychological
techniques of propaganda per se. This section attempts only to identify
some technical factors that may distinguish revolutionary propaganda
from other forms of persuasion. Some aspects have been mentioned
already. We have noted the remarkable stretch of imagination often
needed to conceive of the rebellion in the first place, the total and
unshakable faith that must be placed in the cause and its motive power,
the need to spread this faith in undiminished form amongst followers,
and the importance to this task of organization. Although we saw an
example of successful revolution begin'r t ng without pre-propaganda
and pre-existing attitudes favourable to the rebels, the difficulties
of managing without these benefits were clear and, in other cases,
the advantages that they bestowed were obvious. The hazy and shifting
dividing line between 'friends', 'neutrals' and 'enemies', the three
main target audiences, has been observed as a characteristic of a
revolutionary situation, which is linked to the revolutionary technique
of trying to convert the second two groups to their cause. Most of
the themes of rebellion require facts to give them credibility, and as
well as providing some facts by their own actions, insurgents lie in
wait for the government to make facts that can by interpretation be
turned to their advantage. The whole concept of 'survival propaganda'
may- be seen as a technique peculiar to revolutions. The way that
12. W B Yeats 'The Second Coming' in Peter Alit (Zd) The Variorum
edition of the poems of V B Teats (New York, 1957), pp kOl-k02
(lines 1-8).
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propaganda, to be effective, needs to be closely coordinated with
political and military action may be characteristic of aU conflict
propaganda. The studies have, however, shown that this concept of the
'triad' is vital in revolutions.
The rebel is always 'at home' with his target audience and this
characteristic of revolutionary propaganda puts him at an advantage
when dealing with an alien regime. The absence of this advantage in
situations involving the overthrow of a domestic government is one
of the reasons why this type of rebellion is much more difficult to
achieve than the throwing off of some colonial style 'yoke'.
Sowever, a domestic government that allows itself to become psychologically
distant from the people may expose itself in rather the same way as
a foreign administration, by losing its ability to communicate
effectively. Identification with a significant section of society and
acceptance as a leader and saviour by that mass is an important
technique of revolutionary propaganda. Kasan, Begin and Pearse
demonstrated the technique in action, although in Pearse's case the
process cost him his life. The leadership of the FLN and Provisional IRA,
and the early Popular Front commanders also mastered this technique.
Within the revolutionary leadership, discussion and even
dissention are commonly found. We saw the IRB split over objectives
and methods, Zionists divided on the issue of violence, rivalry between
the TLN 'External Committee s and the ALN, and similar confusion in
the upper echelons of the Provisionals and the Popular Front. Marxist
movements permit such discussions, albeit within strictly limited terms
of reference, as part of their appraisal of the 'objective
circumstances'. These internal dialectics may affect the form of the
movement's propaganda, but the propaganda itself must not hint at
disunity or offer alternative explanations, messages or themes. By its
totalitarian nature, effective propaganda excludes contradiction and
discussion, a fact that remains true whether the cause that it serves
has high moral virtue or evil intent. It cannot be satisfied with
partial success, it must produce near unanimity. Opposing voices must
be silent, where they have not been won over to the cause.
Propaganda tries to dominate the individuals who compose its mass
audience, influencing them by all possible routes, in the realm of
feelings as well as ideas. It furnishes men with a complete explanation
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of society and provides immediate incentives to action. Absorbed within
the revolutionary organisation, committed by their deeds, and
psychologically manipulated by every available form of media and
stimulation, the converts adopt a mystical attitude in which their
minds are open only to facts, propositions and emotions that
correspond with what has gone before, and are closed to rational
arguments.
These characteristics explain why nearly all revolutionary
propaganda uses the emotional message style. Logical arguments are
too easily countered by the logic of authority. This emphasis upon
the heart rather than the mind applies equally to messages addressed
to 'neutrals' and 'enemies', although here they may be dressed up a
little in the garments of logic, becoming what Dr Thomson has termed
the quasi-rational/half emotional message style.13
So far as the generally accepted techniques of propaganda,
listed on p20, are concerned, all appeared at one time or another
in the case studies. Commonest were Glitterin g Generalities, Card
Stacking , Symbolism, Name-Calling and Character-Assassination,
Vagueness and Guilt Association. The last differs from the theme of
'Guilt' in a narrow, technical sense only. The theme is likely to be
constant, to be picked up and used whenever possible. The technique
involves the act of transferring guilt, making use of the best
psychological approach and so on. Here is a theme which by constant
application has been brought to the status of a technique in its own
right.
Lenin distinguished between propaganda suitable for the
intelligensia and 'agitation' appropriate for the masses. The first
dealt in abstract political theories and idealistic appeals while the
second concentrated upon visible and pressing economic, social and
material grievances. We can only guess that Hasa.n's da'is adopted
similar tactics. The Fatimid directive advised each missionary 'not to
overtax the intelligence and the patience of his audience ... He
must learn to observe the people, recognise the state of their minds,
their abilities, extent of their endurance.1' Pears. and the IRB
13. See p 17.
ik. See p 66.
312
also tailored their propaganda to the consumers, using drama,
history and cultural and political appeals towards the educated
middle-class who composed moat of the leadership of the 1916 Rising.
In the subsequent mobilisation of the Irish masses, the IRA and
Sinn Fain used the simpler emotional messages generated by the
executions, arrests and suppression.
The egalitarian nature of Zionism allowed a nearly constant appeal
to penetrate all levels of the Yishuv, and the cause drew much of
its strength from the fact that deep emotional and idealistic
conviction was found everywhere, not merely among an blite. This was
not the case in Algeria, where nationalism was an idea initially
comprehensible only to the middle-class, educated Muslim. Appeals to
the rural population in the remote mountains where the rebellion began
had to deal with poverty, oppression and fear, the last being made
real by ruthless enforcement. In the cities the urban poor were made
to take sides by terror in the first place, and by the appropriate
exploitation of French counter-measures in the second. Forced to
choose between Muslim terror and French terror, they supported their
own. The Provisional IRA influenced sophisticated Catholics in the
North and sympathetic audiences overseas by pursuing aims such as civil
rights and opposition to Stormont, while mobilizing the mass mainly on
hatred of Protestant domination, job discrimation, economic
deprivation and security force counter-measures. In Dhofar the tribes
were brought to rebel by themes of injustice, poverty and neglect.
When Marxists assumed control they apparently forgot Lenin's advice
and tried to inspire their simple followers with communist dogma that
audiences neither understood nor welcomed. The need to address
appropriate themes and. messages to each level of society can therefore
be listed as another characteristic of revolutionary technique, and as
a general rule it is at the elite that idealism should be aimed, while
the rank and file are influenced by appeals that relate to their
immediate needs and circumstances.
Different types of propaganda have found separate ways of
overcoming the limitations imposed by Parkinson's Law 15 that argues
that 'propaganda begins and ends at home' • A German manufacturer who
15. See p 15.
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wishes to sell his product in Japan will employ a Japanese advertising
firm. In war a belligerent will use a friendly national from the
enemy state to broadcast messages to that audience. The second
method can sometimes be used in revolutionary warfare, as the Dhofar
example showed, but other techniques are Lao employed. For the rebel
leadership the problem has two parts: how to reach the 'enemy', that
is the section of the population surrounding and forming the government
which, for sociological or other reasons, is impervious to direct
appeals, and how to reach 	 overseas, whose support can be
essential. One technique to overcome the first problem involves the
use of 'fronts', or 'front spokesmen'. As early as the Assassins we saw
how a respected theologian was persuaded to speak with respect of the
Rizari Ismailis to hi. students, making by his reputation an effect
that direct appeals could not equal. This was achieved by terror. In
the Algerian and Ulster examples many groups and spokesmen carried
messages useful to the FLN or to the Provisionals to French and English
audiences respectively. A few acted with the sole intention of helping
those revolutions, but most were motivated by concern over some matter
removed from the main conflict, such as civil rights, moral issues,
legal argument or a desire to find common ground. Terror was not the
primary instrument: sometimes by chance and sometimes by subtle
encouragement such individuals or groups spread rebel themes with
conviction. Fronts are also needed inside the 'converted' section of
the population who can speak to the media on behalf of the
revolutionaries without being seen as belonging. General Kitson has
shown how rebel organisation divides key leaders between covert and
overt sections, enabling the propaganda apparatus to function 'above
ground' so long as the regime will tolerate it. 6 For fear of libel
action if nothing else, newsmen in modern society treat such spokesmen
as if they were neutral sources, thus raising the credibility of
their statements.
The spreading of revolutionary propaganda to overseas 'neutral'
audiences is more difficult. The Jews and the Irish had the advantage
of strongly organised ethnic groups resident in some of their target
territories, and thus overcame the problem by using these as outlets.
i6. Kitson, pp 126-130.
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Being resident, the groups were capable of presenting messages in forms
acceptable to the rest of the population. The Algerian wtionalists
bad no such advantage outside the Arab world, but managed instead to
persuade several nations to allow rebel publicity bureaus to be
established on their territory. The Popular Front expanded the 'front'
technique to the international scene, something that can always be
done by revolutionaries who receive the backing of one of the great
powers, or of the diffused groups known as the 'New Left'. Without
friends overseas a rebel movement would find it difficult to employ
leverage against its enemies. However in a divided world it may be
seen as unlikely that no country would wish to fish the troubled waters
of some other state's domestic difficulties, so the prospect of
revolutionaries having to fight unsupported seems small.
The propaganda that is aimed outwards by insurgents is not always
the same as the messages directed inwards at the faithful. (The
totalitarian style is present only if overseas ethnic groups need to
be whipped up to revolutionary pitch. They become 'friends' rather
than neutrals, and receive the full emotional appeal.) The style
directed at the 'enemy' and at 'neutrals' is often quasi-rational,
dry, more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger. To neutrals the important
objective is recognition, thus 'legitimacy' is the main theme. To the
'enemy', messages are designed to confuse, divide, embarrass, anger.
The regime must be humiliated and people must lose faith and hope.
'Red Herrings' and a constant demand for public enquiries are useful
techniques. It is beat if the population is unaware until it is too
late that it is being led down the road to 'the climate of collapse'
or 'cost and	 or both. The threat should not seem so real
that the government can rally the masses to counter it. Yet the
theme of 'inevitable triumph' can seep unnoticed into the public
consciousness, preparing it to yield when the time is ripe.
This slow, stealthy process is important to the strategy of
leverage when applied against a domestic regime. This is really the
only way that a minority revolutionary movement can hope to gain
power. By the combined use of interim aims and survival propaganda
it may reach a commanding position. Interim aims can attract far
larger support than the strategic purpose. Their attainment raises
prestige, increases mass support and leads on to the next objective.
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The Provisional campaign of 1971 and 1972 is an excellent example. If
in the process the right of the government to protect its own and
community interests is jeopardised, either by guilt association or
outside leverage, and if the government's supporters lose heart, and
begin to withhold their commitment, to 'sit on the fence', then the
rebels may be able to proclaim the 'climate of collapse'. The
'Marighella formula' poses severe dangers for any government and these
case studies have shown their reality. Yet in the liberal democratic
state there may now exist an over-reaction, a reluctance to employ
lawful, restrained and necessary measures until it is too late, out
of a fear of falling into the trap. If this is the case, Car].oa
Marighella may inadvertently have opened the way to leverage with
what has been called the 'ratchet effect', which slowly and irreversibly
moves events towards revolutionary victory.
External leverage, such as Begin's campaign, the YLN's eventual
strategy and the Provisionals' pressure,has seemed to work best when the
rebels challenge an alien government, and when international influence
can be brought to bear. As the age of uropean empires fades into
history we may expect to see this method working to prevent assistance
from reaching a threatened state, as was attempted in Dhofar, and
through international support for minority groups inside states.
All that has been said so far depends upon the revolutionaries
being able to get their messages across to their target audiences.
More perhaps than in any other modern communication setting, rebel
propagandists can still make effective use of face-to-face persuasion,
hand-bills and posters printed in a cellar, and the group indoctrination
of horizontal propaganda, all of which have been with us for centuries.
The dedication achieved by the motive force provides convincing,
fearless da'is, backed up as necessary by the terror of the fida'ie.
Naturally this internal propaganda can be and, when possible, should be
strengthened by modern media, but dedication not sophistication is the
key factor. When, however, it comes to influencing 'neutrals' and
'enemies', these simple aids are insufficient. The target audiences
are out of reach, scattered, free of organisation or rebel discipline,
and sceptical of direct appeals. In modern times, these audiences can
best be reached through the mass media, newspapers, television,
radio and so on. In the chapter dealing with Ulster it was suggested
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that because of their role of interpreting news - facts - to the
public, the media bad become the battlefield of the propaganda war.
This assessment explains why the penetration, influencing, or if
these fail, confusing of the media are vital revolutionary objectives.
If rebels can make or engineer appropriate facts, and then ensure
that they are interpreted to the public in accordance with the
movement's propaganda assumptions and objectives, they are well
placed to win this part of their campaign.
The news media is not too easily penetrated, influenced or confuBed.
We in the West see the media as having a duty to present news, and we
accept that this includes the right to interpret. We also attach
importance to the freedom of the press and broadcasting corporations
to criticise aspects of the national scene, including government
policy and action, from the declared standpoint of editorial policy.
The media in authoritarian and totalitarian countries do not share
these rights, but we would applaud any criticism that they dared utter
against oppression or in support of any move towards freedom. Liberal
democracies are not so well conducted that abuse of authority is unknown.
The media, therefore, has a constant duty to uncover and expose abuse;
we should be hypocritical if we praised this abroad and condemned it at
home. In a revolutionary situation the abuse of power by authority is
more than ever likely, criticism more than ever necessary. Few
journalists will wish to assist violent and possibly anti-democratic
forces. Yet in their role of critic of the state and its reactions
they may be placed in a delicate position and be made vulnerable to
influence or confusion, while a committed revolutionary concealed in
their ranks could use his position to good effect. Be this as it may,
the central position of the news media in any modern campaign of
revolutionary propaganda emerges from these studies as a significant
technical characteristic.
A final characteristic is also linked to criticism. It arises out
of the tendency of the arts, 'youth', the political left, the
liberal-minded and others whose inclination or role is to criticise
society to be open to new ideas and, therefore, be receptive of
revolutionary propaganda. Interest and sympathy may dissolve if the
revolutionary groups turn out to be intolerant or violent. Nevertheless
this proclivity, which may derive from no less noble a motive than the
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intent to be a pilgrim, provides the revolutionary with a ready
market for his pre-propaganda and sometimes creates a situation
in which it is the government rather than the rebel movement which
has to prove its moral worth and superior intentions.
PART II: POSSIBLE COUNT2-MZAZTJRES
The evil that is in the world always comes of
ignorance, and good intentions may do as much
harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding.
Counter-Measures in the Cases Studied
Regimes that are faced with revolutionary challenges usually begin
with all the material advantages; structure of government, police,
military, money and authority. Either the people have voted them to
power and they rule by consent, or else their authority rests on an
ability to discourage or suppress opposition. The challenge to the
regime will draw its strength from political acumen and the accumulation
of military power, and. from its success in attracting followers and
undermining lawful authority. The six case studies have suggested that
each component of this revolutionary triad has to be countered at its
own level. Unless the propaganda component is countered effectively the
revolutionary forces may grow in size and dedication, government
prestige and confidence may fade, and neutrals may apply unwelcome
pressures that influence the outcome. This is what happened in two
cases, Palestine and Algeria, and it happened eventually when the forces
set in motion by Pearse had completed his design. In two of these
examples, Dublin 1916 and Palestine i5-+8, the British failed to mount
any effective counter-propaganda. In the third, the French Army in
Algeria dealt energetically and ably with the problem at the tactical
level, but partly because their counter lacked political support
and control, aspects of the campaign created a situation where strategic
revolutionary propaganda undermined French domestic support and made
world opinion critical of France's position.
The response of the Seijuk administration to the Assassins
was the reverse of the French in Algeria. Here the tactical reply seems
17. Camus, op cit, p 126.
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to have been feeble, but the strategic threat was auccessfu].ly held in
check by a revival of faith amongst the people. The Provisional IRA
succeeded in applying leverage against Britain, but because their
political acumen was weak this pressure could not achieve their
strategic aim. Interim aims were, however, accomplished by a mixture
of violence and propaganda, against the second of which the British
counter-measures were at best only partially successful, at least during
the period studied. The Sulta&s counter-propaganda was effective
tactically as well as strategically, and his campaign of counter
revolution suggests that the triad neede to be recognised and used by
authority as well as rebels. One clear deduction may be drawn: unless
governments are willing and able to counter propaganda, they expose
themselves to dangers which political skills and military prowess
cannot always overcome.
The reasons why individuals or governments fail to act wisely can
seldom be uncovered. Often those concerned do not know the answer, and
if they do they would rather not say. Short-term expedience and
self-interest probably accounted for the weak Seijuk reaction to
Aasaaein terror and tactical propaganda. If the true purpose and the
extent of the threat had been recognised, and if the authorities had
appreciated how, by bowing before it, they were enabling the Nizari
Ismailis to remain in operation for so long, they might perhaps have
stood firmer. The Maxwell administration in Dublin simply did not
understand the power of public opinion, failed until it was too late
to give this factor its proper measure of attention, and lacked the
structure and skills necessary to mount an effective counter. The
British administration in Palestine and the government at home seemed not
to realise that Zionist appeals to world audiences and the leverage
these generated might be the decisive weapons of that campaign.
Nevertheless they were aware of the damage being done to Britain's
reputation by this propaganda and their failure to counter it deserves
study. The recent disbandment of the wartime apparatus may have been a
factor, but since it was always within the power of government to use
the departmental information etaffs, augmented as necessary, this alone
is an insufficient answer. Possibly it was the quasi-moral reluctance
to use propaganda in peacetime at all that lay at therootof the trouble.
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Finally it has to be considered whether in the circanatances the
government doubted that its propaganda could ever be effective.
The last possibility opens a door to the interesting hypothesis
that some counter-insurgency campaigns are fought in the face of such
strong currents of history, and against moral forces of such power,
that governments appreciate the impossibility of responding with
credible or effective counter-propaganda, and abstain from the attempt.
It may be seen as likely that, at least in some subconscious ways,
this sense of facing impossible odds inhibited the British in Ireland
in the years following Pearse' s deed, in Palestine after World War II,
and perhaps in Ulster in the aftermath of the civil rights campaign, and
the Trench at government level over Algeria. We will return to this
question shortly.
Trench governments prior to de Gaulle may have been victims of
their own illusion that, since Algeria was a part of Trance, it was a
purely domestic issue best dealt with by the army on the spot, and no
proper concern of world opinion. The niceties of diplomacy inhibited
their embassy officials and when eventually the need to respond
effectively to international ZLN propaganda became apparent, facts
from Algeria created by security forces which bad lacked proper
political control destroyed the moral basis of France's argument. In
Northern Ireland during the period studied government counter-measures
were made difficult by the divided political control and the three-sided
nature of the conflict. The importance of propaganda in that struggle
came to be realised by governments and by security forces as time went
by, but understanding of the problem did not, and perhaps could not,
always lead to action to overcome it. Behind the several failures
observed in this research, where governments have suffered on account of
not countering revolutionary propaganda effectively, ignorance of the
subject has lurked as a powerful factor, and it sometimes seems that
ignorance has been cultivated.
Cases studied showed that of the three target audiences affected
by rebel propaganda, 'friends', 'neutrals' and 'enemies', none is more
important to both sides than the first, the loyal supporters of revolt
or government around which the opposed leaders build their strength.
Just as the revolution cannot get off the ground unless mobilisation
is successful, so governments cannot hope to survive unless they
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consolidate their domestic base. Appeals to the other two audiences
are important, but they come later in order of importance, and often
in time. The initiative in the early stages of rebellion ia always
with the rebels, as much in propaganda as action. Authority is
therefore for the time—being on the defensive. The essential target
to be defended is the loyalty of its supporters.
In those cases where government suffered from its failure to
counter hostile propaganda it was apparent that an understanding of
the power, role and workings of revolutionary appeals was needed by
political leaders, officials and security forces. This was so not only
because a response needs to be presented at government, police and
military levels, but also because by their reactions each group is
liable to provide revolutionaries with the facts so essential to their
campaign. This aspect underlines the inter-relationship between
politics, military action and propaganda, noted in the analysis of the
revolutionary technique, which with equal force governs the
effectiveness of any reply. It explains, too, why an understanding of
propaganda needs to be part of the equipment of the top leaders, not
just of their aides. Unless the makers of policy have a feel for the
subject, advice from below is never likely to compensate for so serious
a deficiency. A Maxwell with this understanding might have handled his
difficult assignment well; the Maxwell of history seems hardly likely
to have heeded the best possible psychological advice, even if it
had been available. Nevertheless, leaders who understand may not always
be experts in the art, and appropriate advisers are therefore necessary,
in government, police and military, always assuming that it is the
intention to resist this form of attack in kind.
The important position of the news media has already been noted.
Authority has often tended to accuse this media of disloyalty when
criticism was severe, sometimes in disregard of weaknesses in its own
performance or in the presentation of that performance. This reaction
usually makes matters worse. A better answer is to give the public
opinion factor its due priority and handle each issue with care.
Propaganda' a Reputation
If bias against propaganda is a powerful factor in any argument
about counter-measures to revolutionary attacks, and it certainly seems
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that it is, this bias deserves examination. Its origins were
disclosed in the first chapter. We saw how the Allies in the 191k-1918
War made falsehood a regular feature of their propaganda, particularly
to the home fronts. The totalitarian nature of full-scale propaganda
ha been observed. The incursions upon civil rights that censorship and
any official interference with press freedom to interpret can involve
are obvious. Furthermore where propaganda is active there are fears
that the public is being psychologically manipulated, 'conned', by
'black' or 'grey' operations, by disinformation or what the Americans
call 'dirty tricks', and by other irresistible forces under government
control. The use of such methods by authoritarian regimes, particularly
during the last fifty years, has tended to confirm in many liberal
minds the notion that propaganda is an evil force and an unmentionable
subject. The writer sympathises with the first contention but not the
second.
It can be argued that propaganda is neither good nor evil, but
a neutral weapon system that is as upright or as culpable as those who
use it. There is truth in such a view, but in the case of total
propaganda, even if the totality is confined to quite small groups, its
totalitarian action may be seen as damaging regardless of whether the
cause is worthy or not. For this reason propaganda in its full sense
can be seen as an evil force, a weapon to be used by government only
with great reluctance, if at all., in the direst national emergencies.
This assessment will not, however, deter others from using propaganda,
and the motive force of revolution that provides justification for
any act, will certainly ensure that propaganda continues to be used by
rebels. Therefore the subject cannot safely be regarded as
unmentionable, It cannot be swept under the carpet without exposing
society to grave risks. A population that pretends that propaganda does
not exist or cannot influence its views is open to psychological attack.
Where this attitude is shared by authority, the attack may go unopposed.
Defending the Liberal State
If a liberal democracy threatened by revolution can only defend
itself by a combination of politics, security force measures and
propaganda, the need for some form of government propaganda apparatus
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seems inescapable. The problem is to find an appropriate response at
this level which does not damage democratic values.
In place of the counter-terror that for centuries was the normal
government answer to terrorism or revolt, liberal states have evolved
doctrines of counter-insurgency in which security forces operate
lawfully to restore order. A similar approach may be necessary in the
case of propaganda, in the form of government 'counter-propaganda'.
Within the limits of human nature, counter-propaganda would use only
unimpeachable methods, and would reject 'grey' and 'black' operations,
disinformation ! untruth and, so far as possible, any interference
with the media's access to information and right to interpret. In
adopting counter-propaganda, government would reject propaganda
per se with its overtones of manipulation, falsehood and guile.
This nomenclature would enlist to authority's 8ide those pre-existing
attitudes in a liberal society that see propaganda as 'a bad thing'.
Restriction on information would be necessary for security, and some
prohibitions, legal or voluntary, might be needed to prevent rebel
leaders from using the media as an outlet for violent appeals.
Incitement to violence by any person might also have to be prohibited,18
but so far as possible such. restrictions should be kept to a minimum.
It may seem a contradiction in terms to discuss revolution within
a truly liberal state, since the nature of the constitution should
enable dissent to take peaceful forms. There are, however, such
problems as minorities, whose aspirations may conflict with those of
the majority and there are anti-democratic forces which seek to
overthrow liberal governments for ideological reasons, and whose
motivation cannot necessarily be disarmed by the opportunities for
constitutional change. It is also a fact that liberal intentions
do not always lead to wholly just and socially acceptable policies,
so the seeds of unreSt nay be sown. In a divided world great powers
are tempted to exploit for their own advantages internal problems in
other countries, so small groups may receive the necessary finance,
training and weapons to pose a threat to the state. It is unlikely
i8. See Patricia M Leopold 'Incitement to Hatred - The History of a
Controversial Criminal Offence' in Public Law (Oxford, Winter, 1977),
pp 389-k05. Miss Leopold explains the pitfalls of legislation
in this area.
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that such threats would reach dangerous proportions unless a mixture
of maladministration and revolutionary pre-propaganda thriving upon
it bad alienated a sizeable section of the population. In considering
methods of counter-propaganda, it is realistic to expect that this
will often begin from a position of real or apparent moral weakness.
The very fact that there is a rebellion brings the government' a legitimacy
into question. Where, as in Palestine and Northern Ireland, the
government finds itae].f in one corner of a triangle, special problems
affecting its counter-propaganda effectiveness are likely to arise.
Earlier in this chapter the possibility was raised that some
counter-insurgency campaigns are fought in the face of such overwhelming
historical and moral forces that government response in the
propaganda field is thought to be impossible. How should such a
situation be dealt with. in future? Since it seems unwise to commit
administrators and security forces to a counter-insurgency campaign
without protection from the effects of revolutionary propaganda, the
choice which ought surely to be faced is between disengagement and
resistance of all three components of the attack. The British
reaction in Palestine failed, in part at least, for want of
counter-propaganda. If such a measure was indeed impossible in the
circumstances then so, too, was the whole campaign, which ought perhaps
to have been terminated earlier. Once France discovered that her
Algerian policy could no longer be defended internationally, or even
at home, an early withdrawal ought possibly to have been considered.
These judgements are easily made with the benefit of hindsight and free
of the political pressures active at the time. They are offered only
as pointers towards a conclusion that prospects of success in
countering revolutionary propaganda should be measured alongside
expectations of controlling violence when governments decide whether
and for how long they intend to resist a revolution. The rational
options are to resist on all fronts or not at all.
Counter-Propaganda
Professor Jacques EUu]. concluded his study of modern propaganda
with this advice:
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The only truly serious attitude - serious because the danger
of man's destruction by propaganda is serious, seriOus
because no other attitude is truly responsible and serious -
is to show people the extreme effectiveness of the weapon
used against them, to rouse them to defend themselves by
making them aware of their frailty and their vulnerability,
instead of soothing them with the worst i].lus ion, that of
a security that neither man's nature nor the techniques of
propaganda permit him to possess. 19
Ellu.1. was referring to dangers that he sees as arising from the
technological society. Nevertheless his words have relevance to this
study. Not only are we vulnerable on account of our ignorance, but
official attitudes and public bias in many liberal democracies ten&
towards a will-to-ignorance. An educative effort has therefore first
to overcome this barrier. Although success in the Ellu]. formula
of mass understanding is to be hoped for, within the needs of
countering revolutionary propaganda, education of key individuals may
be a sufficient start. These include political leaders in and out of
government, senior officials concerned with defence, domestic
administration, communications and central policy, police and military
at a].]. levels, but particularly at and near the top, and, so far as
possible, members of the news media.
Education needs the backing of thorough research, which in itself
can stimulate interest through seminars, publications and discussion.
Police and armed forces academies and staff colleges should study
the subject, and after-action reports should include analysis of the
propaganda component. Politicians, civil servants and members of the
media could be invited to attend staff college or ministerially-sponsored
study periods or 'war games'. It should be policy that all these
activities be exposed to the public. The subject has to come out from
under the carpet. Propaganda may continue to be a 'dirty word', but
we must cease being frightened of it.
Counter-propaganda staffs may be needed in government, police and
military. Like all aspects of counter-insurgency, the twin controlling
influences would be the law and government policy. The three staffs
might share services such as monitoring, analysis, information storage,
19. E].lul, Ci), p 257.
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research and so on, but each would concentrate its attention on the
problens specific to politics, police work or the military, and be
ready to give advice to planners and commanders within its own
sphere of interest. Chiefs of counter-propaganda would exercise
control over all public information activities, including the
inlormation or public relations staffs. Countering propaganda calls
ideally for the type of mind described in this quotation:
He must understand symbols and speak in words. He must
contemplate the particular in terms ofthe general, and
touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of
thought. He must study the present in the light of the
past for the purposes of the future. No part of man's nature
or his institutions must be entirely outside his regard.
Methods
Counter-propaganda is concerned with public attitudes. It seeks
to turn 'enemies' away from their mistaken revolutionary loyalty and
back to their proper allegiance; it works to retain the support,
understanding and commitment of 'friends'; it tries to enlist domestic
'neutrals' into the government camp and to convince overseas
'neutrals' that it is authority and not the rebels that deserves their
sympathy and assistance.
The traditional public relations function has been summarised
as the effective presentation of a good story to achieve public
recognition. This research has shown that unless the public opinion
factor is considered at all levels, and at the outset of planning,
there may not be a good story to tell. It also shows that when effective
hostile propaganda is active, authority's normal presentational methods
may be, as it were, shouted down by the revolutionary opposition. The
information or public relations staffs are always likely to play the
biggest part in countering propaganda, but to be effective under
difficult conditions they need to operate as part of a co-ordinated
counter-propaganda effort. The counter-propaganda staff must participate
20. J M Keynes 'Alfred Marshall, 18k2-192k' in Memorials of
Alfred Marshall (Edited A C Pigon) (New York, 1936), p 12.
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in policy-making, the provision of advice in operational planning,
surveillance and analysis of revolutionary propaganda, long-term
forecasting, the educational function and liaison.
The head of counter-propaganda advise8 his minister, chief
constable or general-officer-commanding on the threat from hostile
propaganda, its apparent aims and methods, and on possible ways of
countering it. Often the greatest service that this staff officer
can perform is to persuade his superior of the dangers inherent in
those proposed courses of action which seem likely to play directly
into the hands of the revolutionary propagandist - over-reaction,
measures of dubious legal or moral standing, short-term operations
that may leave long-lasting embarrassment, or concessions to revolutionary
demands that may transfer legitimacy without compensating advantage to
authority. The political, police or military commander will have to
weigh this advice against the often conflicting requirements of
politics and security, and sometimes he will have to risk a setback on
the psychological front in order to retain a sufficient measure of
control in other areas. Properly advised, he will at least make the
decision in the light of all the factors. Furthermore, by foreseeing
difficulties on the public opinion front, he can order forward planning
to minimise them.
This function is also undertaken by the head of counter-propaganda,
this time in conjunction with the staff officers responsible for
intelligence, operations and planning. The proper briefing of all those
taking part in some potentially controversial operation, and the making
of appropriate arrangements through the information staffs for press
briefings, facilities and so on, can ensure that the reasons for the
measure are fully explained and that no acts of stupidity or
malevolence provide gratuitous ammunition to the other side. The
dynamics of counter-insurgency almost certainly throw up material that
any competent revolutionary can turn into propaganda: foresight and
planning can, however, reduce this to a minimum and soften its impact
on public opinion.
Analysis of hostile propaganda requires close co-operation from
the intelligence staffs, who can provide the fragments of evidence that
combine to form the pattern of revolutionary themes as well as the
details essential to an effective reply. Counter-propaganda staffs
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should also guide intelligence operators away from types of secret
operations that easily rebound to disadvantage. Where there are
complaints and enquiries, these should be handled in as speedy, fair
and public a manner as possible. Staffs do a service if they press
for such arrangements to be agreed in advance of any controversial
incident.
In considering counters to the themes of revolutionary
propaganda, authority must be guided by social and other
circumstances, pre-existing trends, and the attitudes of the people
who compose the various target audiences. The government's first
and most important task in this endeavour is to analyse the first
revolutionary theme, that of righteousness, which expresses in
propaganda terms the root cause of the rebellion. A response may
reject outright the rebel argument and seek to counter it by exposing
its shallowness or it may be based mainly on social, economic or other
reforms, combined with publicity to show that the call to revolt is
unjustified because the government and not the rebel leadership provides
for the people' a needs. Any response must be carefully thought
through and must not be fashioned for short-term convenience.
Concessions can easily transfer legitimacy 1 and if made in the face
of threats they may strengthen rebel credibility too. Nevertheless
proper reforms should not be postponed simply because a minority are
disturbing the peace. Government policy in the face of a revolutionary
threat should be clearly stated. Authoritative statements made at the
highest level provide points of reference essential for effective
counter-propaganda.
Ministerial statements are valuable means of countering other
rebel themes. They carry weight and are certain to be fully reported
by the news media. Speeches in parliament or before other audiences
allow the counter-insurgency strategy to be explained, and help the
public to understand that the succession of 'news 	 are part
of a necessarily long-term policy. Revolutionary motives in
discrediting security force methods, individuals or units, and in
demanding 'special status' for convicted activists, can best be
exposed by spokesmen removed from the sound and fury of the actual
operation. Senior officials and security leaders may give press
conferences to answer questions on matters within their jurisdiction,
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which if well done lend credibility to the government's policy.
Here, too, propaganda attacks can sometimes be dealt with, and it is
often more effective to expose hostile motives than to answer
specific allegations. Details are best handled at news desk level.
The revolutionary propaganda attack can be blunted if
understanding of methods and aims is widespread and if the public is
wary of this component of revolt. The news media has tended in the
past to shy away from this matter, aware perhaps that their own role is
inevitably closely entwined. It is still desirable that journalists
should address the subject, but other groups that may be usefully
involved include institutes of defence study and academics.
Authority's own case can also be publicised through all the
normal outlets, such as posters, television advertisement, newspaper
announcements, handbills and, where appropriate, loudspeakers, in much
the same way that governments have coznpaigned against smoking and drugs.
The need to tailor such appeals to the consumers is obvious. But
however effective those methods may be, public attitudes are likely to
be influenced more by the news media, particularly television, than by
any other source. This is where the media's interpretative role is so
important. The success or failure of rebel themes will depend to a
large extent upon each journalist's presentation of the facts. It is
in this area that the information staffs play their important part in
countering hostile themes.
The work of information staffs is the subject of further
research. 21
 In outline their role is to provide accurate information
quickly, so that journalists can make their reports and form their
opinions in the light of all the facts, not just those selected truths
or biased interpretations that may be offered by revolutionary
spokesmen. In controversial situations the evidence of an eye witness
is often conclusive, and the information staffs should when
appropriate make this available. They also provide background briefs
and briefings, which add the necessary up-to-date detail to the major
policy statements of ministers or high officials. These staffs depend
upon all concerned in the security operation for a rapid and completely
21. By Major R A flooper, Royal Marines, in the Department of Politics,
University of Exeter,1978-79.
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accurate supply of information, and this in turn hinges upon an
understanding of the importance of this service at all levels,
achieved by the educative function of the counter-propaganda staffs.
The information staffs should not be drawn into speculation when
briefing the media, nor should they attempt to 'slant' the facts in an
effort to affect the interpretative process. They must provide
information that is disagreeable to authority just as freely as that
which is welcome. Just as the public and media are entitled to a
totally different standard of behaviour by their security forces from
that expected from insurgents, so they are entitled to complete honesty
from information staffs.
The government's counter to the first rebel theme - righteousness -
has already been discussed. Appropriate replies to the other themes
will vary according to circumstances and there can be no counsel of
perfection. Some ideas are set out below as examples of possible
replies. In almost every case the method of answering consists of
a combination of appropriate actions by government and its servants, the
efficient provision of accurate facts which demonstrate those actions,
and by the necessary explanations of government strategy and rebel
motives provided by speeches, publicity and briefings.
Although the term
	 has for convenience been used
throughout this thesis, it could be misleading if it caused us to lose
sight of the fact that those who support the rebels are as much a part
of the nation as other citizens, and will still be there when the violence
has passed. Counter-propaganda must avoid divisiveness and aim instead
to rehabilitate. Whilst it may be necessary to condemn rebel leaders,
discredit should not be heaped upon the rank and file, their families
and friends, or the front spokesmen who preach on their behalf. The
government should discredit the rebel cause and its organisational base,
violence, and false arguments and justifications, thus directing its
counter-propaganda mainly against ideas and actions, rather than against
people. Amnesty offers can sometimes help, subject to legal
considerations and to their not strengthening the rebel theme of
'security'. Financial inducements seem to work in some circumstances
but not in others. Both should be considered. A rebel who has changed
his allegiance is better than one who is in prison, plotting the next
uprising, or one who is dead, a martyr for another generation to emulate.
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By focusing its attacks on ideas and actions, instead of against
people, a government may also be better able to deal with a three-sided
situation like Palestine or Northern Ireland, since such attacks cannot
be denounced as partial.
Counters to Hostile Themes
Theme 2: 'Hatred'. In so far as government forces refrain from creating
facts indicating oppression, this theme becomes herder for rebels to
project. By showing the tragic results of revolutionary violence,
counter-propaganda can slowly turn this theme inwards on its
originators, and against violence per se.
Theme 3: 'Inevitable Triumph'. Arrests or deaths of insurgents, and
other security force successes can be publicised to turn this theme
on its bead.
Theme '+: 'Allegiance'. This theme is used by the rebels inside their
organised group. Initially little can be done to counter it, but as
disillusion begins to grow the proposal may be attacked indirectly
through families, church, etc. The idea that members have been 'conned'
by selfish, cynical revolutionary leaders might be launched. Defectors
spread their doubts. Amnesty offers and finAncial temptations can
sometimes break shaky allegiances. Eventually, an alternative focus
of loyalty may be offered.
Theme 5: 'Moral Certainty'. Activists must if possible be denied the
sure belief that they are on firm moral ground. If journalists
refrain from describing rebels as 'freedom fighters', or 'guerrilla
soldiers' and their acts as 'daring attack8' or 'shootings', and if the
full facts of terrorism are exposed, some of the certainty may weaken.
Rebels have to be seen by the public as criminals guilty of morally
indefensible acts, and in time the public's judgement may undermine
the moral certainty of activists themselves.
Theme 6: 'Terror' • So long as rebel warnings and threats are credible,
that is to say while disobedience or defiance results in swift and
terrifying rebel punishment, the theme of terror is likely to be
effective. Therefore it cannot be countered by words alone. Security
forces have to gain ascendancy over rebel activists, denying them the
opportunities to intimidate and punish, before this theme loses its
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power. The hardest target audience for authority to reach is the group
that surrounds the insurgents. To free themselves from terror, they
have to renounce the activists in their midats. Such a change of heart
may result from the combined effect of counter-propaganda dealing with
all the rebel themes. This would be a culminating point of
government success.
Theme 7: 'Glorification of Heroes'. This theme can be weakened if
the appearance, demeanour and statements of authority and security
forces eschew pomp, arrogance, complacency and signs of overbearing
power in favour of quiet efficiency, concern, firm but lawful
determination and shows of such strength as is necessary and no more.
Police and soldiers ehould be hard-worked or out of eight. Displays
of affluence by state servants are to be avoided. Police and troops
should be seen as the bard-pressed protectors of the threatened
people: the rebels are unlikely to be seen as heroes if this is the
case.
Theme 8: 'In Praise of Violence'. Cults of violence have thrived in
supposedly religious and humanistic societies in spite of apparent
contradictions. They should, nevertheless, be attacked on moral
grounds by clerics and laymen, and any tendency to see such cults
in heroic and glamourous terms should be countered by exposure of
the horror arid personal tragedy involved.
Theme 9: 'Justified Reaction'. Assuming that security force actions
have been in response to terrorism or revolt, and are always lawful
and restrained (an idea], and perhaps rare situation), the flaw in
this theme should be exposed and the motives of spokesmen
challenged.
Theme 10: 'Long War'. Counter-insurgency operations can be likened to
the war against crime, which no policeman expects to 'win', but which
can be controlled indefinitely. Rebels may come to see time as their
enemy.
Theme 11: 'Guilt'. The theme is directed against the government's
supporters, and it is towards these 'friends' that a counter must
be addressed. Guilt over past neglect or maladministration can be
lessened by emphasising reforms already made, benefits given, and
the opportunity for constitutional action provided by a liberal nation.
False allegations and the resurrection of ancient bones of contention
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can be exposed as artificial incitement. A useful answer may be to
take the offensive by condemning acts of violence as representing
22the most fundamental violation of human rights imaginable.
'Friends' who are indignant are unlikely to feel guilty.
Theme 12: 'Bad Faith'. If government launches projects designed to buy
off the rebel supporters, or acts out of insincere motive, this theme
will deserve to work. Sincere acts and a lively awareness of real
community needs can lessen its effect. Appeals must by-pass the rebel
leadership and, go direct to the people. However, organisation and
discipline constitute a formidable barrier.
Theme 13: 'Security Force Incompetence'. Over-confident statements
and claims can strengthen this rebel theme, being 'sent up' by some
action. Evidence in the form of convictions and an improved security
situation are the beat defence. These, in their way, 'send up' the
theme.
Theme 1k; 'Legitimacy'. The government transfers legitimacy to the
rebels if it loses prestige, uses illegal or morally unsound methods,
backs down in the face of threats, speaks of the insurrection as
though it were a state of war, vacillates in its policy, permits the
violent organisation to set up 'political wings' to operate 'above
ground' or negotiates with revolutionary leaders while violence
continues. It strengthens its own legitimacy by dealing with the
situation as nearly as possible by routine methods and by insisting
that crimes must be detected and punished regardless of any
'political' motive. Authority needs to pay particular attention to
countering rebel claims to legitimacy to overseas 'neutral'
audiences.
Theme 15; 'Credibility'. Where the rebel claim to credibility is
false or magnified, it should be cut down to size by exposure of the
rebel organisation's weakness and limited support. If the claims
have accumulated strength through security force inability to control
a deteriorating situation, attempts by authority to deny what is
obvious may only make matters worse. The answer must lie in recovering
22. When in July 1972 the Provisional IRA murdered eleven people in a
carefully co-ordinated bomb attack in Belfast, the media dubbed
the event 'Bloody Friday'. Erstwhile IRA supporters condemned
the action and the guilt theme was transferred.
333
the initiative in the physical arena. Counter-propaganda can assist
by pointing to the dangers, and thus preparing the government's
supporters for sacrifices and tougher measures.
Theme 16: 'Counter-Productivity'. Foresight and planning can often
provide full justification and explanation of security force methods
to pre-empt this theme. When individuals, units or methods are
attacked simply because they are hindering rebel actions, the true
motives of such attacks should be exposed.
Theme 17: 'Special Status'. It is necessary to explain to'friends'
and 'neutrals' that the plea for special status has no merit, since
tIE convicted men are ordinary criminals and not'political prisoners'
or 'prisoners-of-war', and to go on to expose the motive of the
theme which is to remove the fear of long sentences from the minds
of activists, and thus prolong the violence.
Theme 18: 'Security'. If theme 17 is correctly answered, this will
deprive rebels of hope of early release if convicted. Their sense
of security can be further undermined, by government refusals to
yield to blackmail in the form of hostage-taking, eta, designed to
achieve release by coercion. Rebels who have lost hope of escaping
justice can have their morale lowered another degree by being made
to doubt that death in the cause really amounts to martyrdom. This
aspect needs gentle handling, but if the community begins to feel
that those who die are the dupes of cynical leaders who prefer not
to take risks themselves, the glory may fade.
Themes 19 and 20: 'Cost and Futility' and 'Climate of Collapse'. These
defeatist appeals need. to be challenged should they surface, and those
who promote them may be asked to consider the full consequences of
what they are proposing - surrender. Neither theme is potent unless
the revolutionaries have achieved a dominant position.
Limits and Dangers
The limit of the effectiveness of all counter-insurgency methods
is marked by the incidence of successful revolutions. Countering
propaganda is seldom likely to be easy, and efforts in this direction
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are no more certain of success than political endeavours to prevent
rebellion or security force attempts to suppress violence.
When counter-propaganda has been successful a risk may arise
of authority using the advantages so gained to defer political
decisions, or even trying to make counter-propaganda into a substitute
for politics], action. Any instrument can be misused, and if through
the use of counter-propaganda the disaffected felt that they had no
effective means of communication other than violence, the misuse
might become perilous.
It could also be dangerous to imagine that revolutionary
propaganda can be analysed and treated like an allergy and that
thereafter it will present no threat. Like other weapon systems it
retains a number of constant characteristics but its techniques and
tactics will be revised in the light of government defences. The
discrediting of official counter-measures is likely to be one new
tactic, while the increased use of fronts and a greater measure of
sophistication and subtlety may distinguish technical innovation. The
element of surprise poses dangers in all forms of conflict and may be
exploited by revolutionary propagandists through such means as
'disinformation'. Modern technology may enable insurgents to 'capture'
a communication satellite by replacing the intended signals with
their own, and to deceive a mass audience as to the true source of
messages. Study of psychology may allow rebels to find new and
effective ways of exploiting social, economic and other grievances
that seem to exist in every society, however liberal its character
or well-meaning its government. Successful defence must depend upon
vigilance, foresight and capacity to respond and, more than anything
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